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Maria Paz Cockerill 
Enabling children and young people to flourish: 
The Capabilities Approach and its Aristotelian roots 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis argues for the Capabilities Approach in education, based on Aristotelian philosophy, 
in preference to the performative approach of the present Standards Agenda in education. 
This agenda confines learning to reaching standardised numerical targets and considers 
persons predominantly as economic units. Instead, Aristotelian philosophy provides a renewed 
understanding of realising potential and well-being, thus strengthening education theory and 
practice. 
 
A particular contribution of the thesis is to make explicit the ethical dimension in education. 
Importantly, it explains the nature of this dimension and the theory that supports it. The thesis 
maintains that the basic shared human capacity for care, affiliation, and deliberation forms an 
essential part of the moral imperative that society must work to realise. It argues that the 
Capabilities Approach which has already influenced development in economics, health, and 
social policy, should also influence education. 
 
The Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach focuses on the essential role of the capabilities of 
practical reason and affiliation. It includes a flexible method of reflection which seeks a 
synthesis between emotion and reason, informed by an ethical framework about what human 
beings share. The development of these capabilities enables human activity to occur in 
complex interdependence, promoting deliberated trust and co-operation in society, which in 
turn supports meaningful discourse, understanding, and positive action between individuals 
and groups. This thesis argues that education should have a significant role in nurturing these 
capabilities, to enable children and young people to flourish during their school years and 
beyond. The ability to plan, monitor, and evaluate learning and life decisions with reference to 
their well-being requires these capabilities.  
 
Crucially, the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach is inclusive of and sensitive to the needs 
of vulnerable groups and individuals in society. It redefines our understanding of realising 
potential which includes an ethical dimension, and offers practical ideas about how education 
can help young people live a fulfilled life. 
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Introduction 
 
Education: the need for a broader perspective 
 
Social scientists highlight the paradox that ‘at the pinnacle of human material and technical 
achievement, we find ourselves anxiety-ridden, prone to depression, worried about how 
others see us, unsure of our friendships, driven to consume and with little or no community 
life’ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: 3). There is wide agreement about the remarkable sensitivity 
of health to the social environment (Wilkinson and Marmot, 2003; Marmot et al., 2010) of 
which education is an integral part. Evidence also shows that the lives of children and young 
people are affected (UNICEF, 2007; Layard and Dunn, 2009) by a worrying rise in mental health 
issues (WHO, 2010). This is further exacerbated by the utility based culture of performativity
1
, 
which has influenced education in England and given rise to a narrow standards-driven system 
where success is judged through standardised forms of assessment (Pring and Pollard, 2011).  
 
Education needs a broader perspective of what it means to be a humane and educated person 
than is implied by this narrow focus (Pring and Pollard, 2011). A case has been made that 
suggests that the existing focus on standardised academic success and economic performance 
in education requires scrutiny and refinement (Smeyers et al., 2007; Bridges et al., 2008; 
Bridges, 2009; Pring et al., 2009; Alexander, 2010; Smith 2011). Moreover, the need for re-
assessment becomes critical in the face of persistent poor education and health outcomes, 
particularly in areas of greatest deprivation affecting the most disadvantaged (nef, 2004; 
UNICEF, 2007; Pring et al., 2009; Marmot et al., 2010; WHO, 2010).  
 
In this thesis I put forward the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach, which offers a broader 
perspective than the performative culture in education at present allows, in preference to two 
major influences which lead to a narrow definition of what being educated entails and which 
prevent educational success for many. The two foci of utilitarianism in education which this 
thesis challenges are: (1) the theoretical bias which considers education as principally about 
generating productivity in respect of employment outcomes, and (2) an overemphasis in 
teaching and learning fuelled by this philosophy, which concentrates foremost on instruction 
in passing standardised tests. This philosophy supports a positivist understanding of progress 
and success in education which reduces evaluation to grades and numbers, also influenced by 
reductionist tendencies in science. Instead, this thesis challenges the theoretical 
understanding that defines education in terms of productivity and utility, and strengthens a 
theoretical understanding of education focused on intrinsic values about realising potential in 
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terms of flourishing. Significantly, this Aristotle-inspired approach focuses on what persons can 
be and promotes societal structures to ensure that opportunities are provided in which 
persons can realise their potential.  
 
For centuries, many educationists have supported the importance of progressive education 
(Darling and Nordenbo, 2003), and some have focused particularly on the expansion of 
personal thought and collaborative engagement (Dewey, 1915, 1933; Bruner, 1960). This 
holistic approach concentrates on the development of grounded human beings and 
encompasses a wider vision of an educated person than is afforded by a performative view of 
education. The recent Nuffield review mentions continued efforts in education today which 
seek to break free from the performative culture by adopting a more progressive approach 
(Pring et al., 2009). Yet there remains the persistent tendency towards education for 
productivity. The force of this thesis rests in its attempt to extend a progressive understanding 
of holistic education with its broad vision of an educated person by adopting the Aristotle-
inspired Capabilities Approach. I argue that this approach offers a helpful theoretical 
framework that includes an ethical dimension and which also provides practical ideas for 
education. 
 
I propose therefore, that Nussbaum’s version of the Capabilities Approach and the Aristotelian 
philosophy on which it depends serves to underpin a much needed ethical dimension in 
education. I suggest that the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach offers: (1) a framework of 
shared capabilities within which realising potential can be understood, (2) an alternative 
language in education free from the dominance of the performative culture of business and 
productivity (Pring, 2004; Smeyers et al., 2007), (3) a definition of happiness and well-being 
shaped by an ethical understanding of what living well and doing well entails, which can guide 
educational thinking and practice, (4) practical reason and affiliation as two capabilities crucial 
to the process of reflective practice and developed by it, which enable understanding, well-
being and educational success, (5) an approach to education which recognises diversity, resists 
reducing everything of value to a single standard or measurement, and which is free from the 
mechanistic tendencies of an approach defined by utility alone. 
 
 
The Capabilities Approach 
 
The Capabilities Approach was first developed by Amartya Sen (1992, 1993) and Martha 
Nussbaum (1993, 2000) as a radical challenge to the conventional approach to welfare 
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economics. It can be defined as an approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment and to 
theorizing about basic social justice, where the key question is considered to be: What is each 
person able to do and to be? The approach so defined takes each person as an end worthy of 
dignity and considers whether individuals have the required opportunities to develop their 
capabilities ‘to do and to be’ in order to flourish. 
 
In this thesis I concentrate particularly on Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian development of the 
Capabilities Approach including the list of ten capabilities which she advocates (Nussbaum, 
1993: 242-69, 1995: 86-131, 2000: 72-101). Nussbaum suggests the list of central human 
capabilities is one which ‘can always be contested and re-made’ (2000: 77) but which ‘can be 
endorsed for political purposes, as the moral basis for central constitutional guarantees, by 
people who otherwise have a very different view of what a complete good life for a human 
being would be’ (ibid.: 74). While researchers in the field suggest that the relative weight given 
to these capabilities may vary with age, among people and across cultures (Anand, 2005), 
there is a strong consensus from researchers across disciplines as varied as psychology, 
economics, and philosophy in respect of ‘valued beings and doings’ (Alkire, 2002: 2).  
 
Concerning the Capabilities Approach and its conceptual understanding of what constitutes a 
good life and of the social structures which enable individuals and societies to flourish, 
Nussbaum points to practical reason and affiliation as two capabilities which ‘both organize 
and suffuse all others, making their pursuit truly human’ (2000: 131). Practical reason is 
understood as ‘Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life’ (2001: 417). Affiliation is understood as ‘Being able to live with 
and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in 
various forms of social interaction, to be able to imagine the situation of another ... [and] being 
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others’ (2001: 417). 
Developing these capabilities helps people to plan, monitor, and evaluate their personal 
development in respect of realising potential as individuals and in the context of others. 
Significantly, practical reason and affiliation enable persons and societies to engage with the 
ethical dimension of life through the flexible process of honing thoughts and emotions by 
sensitive and thoughtful reflection, and testing their ideas and assessing their actions in 
dialogue with others. 
 
Consequently, with regards to education, Nussbaum defends the capabilities of practical 
reason and affiliation as significant for living well and flourishing, and urges educationists to 
nurture these capabilities in educational settings (1997, 2010, 2011). Congruent with 
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Nussbaum’s position and drawing on the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, I support an 
understanding of educational success which includes realising potential for living well, and 
which does not define success primarily in terms of levels of productivity or above average 
achievement on a single standard scale. Instead I set out the Capabilities Approach and its 
Aristotelian roots as a theoretical underpinning well-placed to guide flexible reflection towards 
sensitive understanding and just action in education. 
 
 
Emerging literature in relation to the Capabilities Approach 
 
An emerging literature considers and defends the significance of various versions of the 
Capabilities Approach in fields including economics, law, health, and education (Sen 1993, 
2009; Nussbaum, 1993, 2006, 2010, 2011; Anand, 2005; Walker, 2006; Brighouse and Robeyns, 
2007; Law and Widdows, 2007; Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007; Terzi, 2010). The Capabilities 
Approach offers an alternative to prevalent utilitarian measures for social justice and focuses 
on what entails human development and sustainable living, and is particularly helpful when we 
consider the vulnerable and those living in disadvantage. In practice, the Human Development 
Reports published by the United Nations have embraced the concept of capabilities as one of 
their theoretical cornerstones (UNDP, 1990-2007/8). Other examples of the Capabilities 
Approach can be found in various disciplines including economics (Sen, 2009) and health 
(Anand, 2005), in an attempt to improve the situation and ability to flourish of vulnerable 
groups such as the young, elderly, disabled, and dispossessed. Others specifically focus on 
changing existing injustices in society in relation to gender discrimination (Nussbaum, 2000), 
poverty through gender disadvantage (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007), including protecting the 
legal status of minority groups such as pregnant women (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005). 
 
Although the Capabilities Approach has not received the same attention in education which it 
has in health and economics, educationists have engaged with this theory to various degrees in 
the philosophy of education, especially with regards to developing human freedoms (Saito, 
2003). Regarding practice, educationists have employed the Capabilities Approach in a variety 
of areas including educational policy analysis and pedagogy in tertiary education (Flores-
Crespo, 2004, 2007; Walker, 2006), disability and special educational needs (Terzi, 2010). 
Others have applied the Capabilities Approach to issues of social justice in education, in 
particular as an attempt to achieve gender equality (Unterhalter and Aikman, 2007). The 
Capabilities Approach has also been defended as an alternative to Human Capital theories in 
respect of measures of equality in education, and is suggested as more sensitive to context 
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and individual need than that provided by economic measures such as GDP (Walker and 
Unterhalter, 2010). In general, these writers engage with the Capabilities Approach as 
developed by Sen (1992, 1993) and Nussbaum (2000) in respect of human freedom for 
capability development and its relation with education. They do not focus on Nussbaum’s 
Capabilities Approach with regards to the implications of its distinctive Aristotelian roots. 
Hence, although these writers acknowledge Nussbaum’s contribution to the Capabilities 
Approach, they do not specifically engage with the significance of the Aristotelian philosophy 
which underpins it and the ethical dimension which it supports.  
 
What I seek to do in this thesis is engage directly with Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian 
understanding of the Capabilities Approach, and suggest ways in which her position and the 
Aristotelian philosophy which informs it are significant for our understanding of an educated 
person. I argue that the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach strengthens education theory 
and practice, supporting an ethical dimension which can help educationists nurture individuals 
to realise their potential.  
 
 
The ethical dimension in education and reflective practice inspired by Aristotle  
 
Alexander (2010), in the Cambridge Primary Review, argues that pedagogy should be about the 
way teachers apply ‘values, principles and judgement, rather than the trading of tired 
dichotomies or capitulating to this or that national strategy which has been imposed from 
above in pursuit of a definition of educational “standards” that nobody is permitted to 
question’ (2010: 3). Others propose that education should focus beyond the extrinsic value of 
exam success in pursuit of increased economic outcomes. For example, Terzi defends the 
intrinsic value of education and the importance of specific practices which relate to personal 
fulfilment and focus beyond the instrumental securing of employment or position in life. She 
recommends practices in education such as appreciating literature, the natural environment 
and music. In respect of judgements about policy in education, Brighouse insists on the 
importance of a clear definition of principles in education to guide the design and role of social 
institutions, and the judgement about the worthiness of a policy (in Terzi, 2006: 148, 182). 
Furthermore, Hogan suggests there is an overemphasis in education on indexing which 
promotes a mentality of ‘technicity’ (2000: 374). 
 
These considerations point to the need for articulating an ethical dimension beyond 
performativity in education, a view that has also been voiced in recent educational reviews 
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(Pring et al., 2009; Pring and Pollard, 2011). However, although educationists such as Pring and 
Pollard (2011) accept the importance of an ethical dimension in education, they refrain from 
articulating its nature. A strong theoretical basis which includes the ethical dimension in 
education is needed in order to strengthen the ability of education to move beyond the 
mentality of technicity. Therefore, in this thesis I set out a theoretical basis with reference to 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach and its Aristotelian roots, in an attempt to defend an ethical 
dimension in education beyond utility.  
 
I hope to show that Aristotle’s thinking provides a helpful understanding of what an educated 
person entails, which is pertinent beyond the ancient Greek philosophical setting of its genesis, 
and is applicable and necessary in education today. Indeed, recent education reviews indicate 
that our values in education arise from what it means to become an educated person, and that 
this defines what is important to learn and what counts as learning successfully (Pring and 
Pollard, 2011: 15, 30). I propose that the ethical dimension arising from Aristotle’s philosophy, 
in particular his Nicomachean Ethics, provides important pointers when defining what we 
mean by an educated person. This dimension informs our understanding of what education 
should include, the essential emphases for teaching and learning, and how we define and 
evaluate educational progress.  
 
Therefore, I propose in this thesis that the Capabilities Approach with its Aristotelian roots 
enables rigorous yet sensitive discussion and provides workable solutions to questions 
pertinent in education today, such as: Are there any capabilities which we share as human 
beings that transcend cultures, provide a basis for living well, and which society has a moral 
responsibility to nurture? What is a worthwhile life and how should we organise ourselves in 
society and in education to make such a life possible? How should we best understand well-
being or happiness and what is its relation to teaching, learning and evaluation? What does 
realising potential mean and consist in? How does our view or definition of realising potential 
affect our understanding and practice of teaching and learning? How should we evaluate 
progress and attainment in education which is sensitive to each individual and their context?  
 
 
Overview of thesis 
 
I will engage with these questions in the eight chapters of this thesis. As outlined below, in this 
thesis I begin by exploring the Aristotelian philosophical roots which underpin Nussbaum’s 
development of the Capabilities Approach. Second, I consider this approach and its significance 
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for issues about human flourishing, social development, and well-being, together with the 
ethical dimension included in these considerations. With this background in place, I focus on 
the present challenges in education and the importance of the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities 
Approach for practice and evaluation. Furthermore, I set out an approach for education based 
on a rich heritage of reflective practice sympathetic with the Aristotelian contemporary 
Capabilities Approach, which I suggest nurtures human beings so that they can flourish and 
succeed as reflective thinkers and responsible social beings.  
 
1. A philosophical grounding for education: An Aristotelian approach 
In Chapter 1, I explore Aristotle’s philosophical view and its potential to strengthen education. 
I propose a broad working definition of ethics to guide education, which challenges the 
prevalent performative approach. I show that Aristotle’s philosophy recognises the complexity 
of moral dilemmas and the difficulties inherent in making judgements. Here, insight (nous) and 
practical wisdom/reason (phronēsis) are important to secure judgements about realising 
potential.  
 
This philosophy stands in contrast to a standardised approach in evaluation where everyone 
fits onto the same linear scale not sensitive to diversity. This in turn narrows practice to 
instruct for success in relation to this narrow scale. Aristotle’s position is important for 
education as it does not reduce evaluation to calculation using one scale and allows for diverse 
values. Given the complexity of the human condition this process for Aristotle requires an 
understanding of what is really valuable for human beings, and a balanced ability to apply 
general principles to the particular instance under deliberation. For this reason, Aristotle 
reminds us that ‘our account would be adequate, if we achieved a degree of precision 
appropriate to the underlying material; for precision must not be sought to the same degree in 
all accounts of things’ (NE I, 3, 1094b 10-15). I argue therefore, that a philosophical grounding 
for education such as this puts a strong case against certain utilitarian aspects of education. 
 
2. Realising potential: Human flourishing in the context of a shared nature 
In Chapter 2, I consider Aristotle’s ‘function argument’ in the Nicomachean Ethics which 
develops a view about human beings and their shared characteristics, from which surfaces a 
particular understanding of human flourishing understood as eudaimonia, which stands 
against the standardised approach in education. Although Aristotle offers a general outline for 
what we share as human beings, there is respect for human complexity within this philosophy. 
For this reason, there is no single measure of the good in Aristotle’s ethics. Nevertheless, it is 
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possible to make judgements about what is good or bad for human beings in the context of 
our shared nature, a point supported by psychology research which suggests there exists some 
basic common understanding about this across cultures described as universal characteristics 
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004).  
 
Of significance for education today, the Nicomachean Ethics calls individuals and groups to the 
public arena to reflect and evaluate sensitively and critically in order to make good choices 
about how to live well. The process involves learning to think well within an ethical framework 
based on what human beings share, in order to reach the best possible decision in any given 
situation, both individually and as a society.  
 
3. The Capabilities Approach for personal and social development 
Researchers propose that human development and considerations about success and equality 
in this area should include data from a variety of areas (Sen, 1992), and critique evaluation 
confined to economic or happiness measures alone as insufficient for understanding 
development (Sen, 1993; 2009). In Chapter 3, I engage with the development of the 
contemporary Capabilities Approach and its potential for considering issues about human 
development, which are particularly significant for education.  
 
Aristotle’s position regarding the function argument and the concept of eudaimonia, 
understood as personal fulfilment and realising potential in respect of developing the natural 
capacities to be well, do well and thus flourish (Hughes, 2001), challenges a standardised 
version of human happiness and allows for different conceptions of the human good. Realising 
potential here is understood from an ethical perspective which includes a space for virtues, for 
the pursuit of the mean in the search for balanced judgements, and an overall grasp of what 
flourishing entails. This process requires the essential capabilities of practical reason and 
affiliation to be developed. I argue that the Capabilities Approach as developed by Nussbaum 
also allows for different descriptions of the good life and in this it builds on Aristotle’s 
philosophy. 
 
4. Happiness reviewed within the context of the Capabilities Approach 
Exploring the current happiness debate and positive psychology research in this area, I suggest 
that Aristotle’s understanding of happiness in respect of eudaimonia is still pertinent today. It 
is an important contribution that helps us understand progress in well-being or happiness with 
greater sensitivity, and stands in contrast to standardised measurements of the kind to which 
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positive psychology and social science research is prone. Reviewing our understanding of 
happiness and well-being and its importance for and relation to learning is urgent, given the 
evidence of rising mental health issues (WHO, 2010) also affecting children and young people 
(UNICEF, 2007).  
 
Education and well-being in society are intertwined and are both dependent on and 
responsible for nurturing relationships based on trust. This view is supported by psychology 
and social science research, identifying education as ‘one of the strongest determinants of 
generalised trust’ (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005: 47, 64), and one of the seven determinants of 
health (Marmot et al., 2010). The Capabilities Approach with its Aristotelian roots strengthens 
education’s ethical responsibility to support the development of the capabilities of practical 
reason and affiliation, which enable persons to realise their potential as happy, trustworthy, 
thoughtful and engaged members of society.  
 
5. The significance of the Capabilities Approach in education 
Chapter 5 focuses more specifically on the barriers to realising potential fuelled by education 
within the performative culture, and argues in favour of the Capabilities Approach as an 
alternative for positive change in education.  
 
In this chapter I first explore the difficulties which children and young people face today, where 
evidence indicates that children continue to make decisions which hinder their ability to 
flourish (OECD, Unicef, 2007). Research recommends developing resilience and well-being in 
young people across the social gradient if children’s outcomes are to be improved (Marmot, 
2010). There are also concerns about the curriculum and Standards Agenda in education adding 
to children’s levels of stress. Furthermore, educationists challenge the system within which 
success in education is measured, promoted by the business language used and the persistence 
of the factory metaphor in education (Pring, 2005).  
 
The importance of helping children to think well, relate well, and make good decisions in favour 
of their own and societal flourishing continues to be urgent today, and I advocate the 
contribution of the Capabilities Approach in education to enable positive change in this area. I 
argue in favour of this approach and its ethical dimension which gives clear practical guidance 
in education, that takes account of each person’s struggle for flourishing, and that upholds 
practical reason and affiliation as crucial to realising potential nurtured within a framework of 
reflective practice.  
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6. The importance of reflection in education within the Capabilities Approach 
In Chapter 6, I argue that what is distinctive about reflection within the Capabilities Approach 
is its focus on practical reason and affiliation using a flexible method of reflection which 
includes an ethical dimension within it. This approach enables persons to plan, monitor 
progress, and review success in respect of realising potential on an ongoing basis, and looks 
beyond extrinsic values such as utility. With this in mind, I consider the similarities of 
progressive models promoted by Dewey and Bruner with reflective practice within the 
Capabilities Approach. I propose that the Capabilities Approach builds on their position with 
the ethical grounding it includes, which ensures that the focus on the individual child is not at 
the expense of learning. 
 
I hope to show that the flexible model for ethical reflection offered in this thesis encourages a 
rich understanding of cognition, which includes the synthesis of emotions and reason tested 
within a common framework about human nature. Reflection of this kind requires individual 
attention and assessment undertaken in dialogue with others. It dislodges simplistic notions of 
reflective practice sometimes evident in pedagogy and learning, evidenced by a mechanistic 
attitude resulting from a rigid and formulaic approach.  
 
7. Reflection as a way of life for growth: Learning from traditional tools of reflective practice  
Some suggest that part of the problem we face in education is the failure to learn from the 
past (Pring et al., 2009: 85). In this chapter therefore, I expand on the notion of reflection by 
looking to the past, in particular, reflective practice from the Greco-Roman heritage of 
philosophy as a practical tool for life (Hadot, 1995), and the later tradition of 16
th
 century 
Ignatian reflection which evolved from these philosophical roots. This heritage of reflective 
practice enriches the understanding of reflection for teaching and learning as a way of life 
sought in this thesis. As a result, flexible reflective enquiry within the Capabilities Approach is 
proposed which promotes essential ethical questioning, analysis and evaluation.  
 
In Chapter 7, I also explore difficulties faced by the growth metaphor including the tendency to 
subjectivism and individualism. I propose that the Capabilities Approach and its heritage of 
reflective practice could salvage an understanding of growth in education which avoids this 
tendency, owing to the general principles which underpin it. Significantly, this approach 
considers growth from the perspective of a lifetime, assessed in the context of an ethical 
framework based on shared human characteristics and capabilities. 
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8. Evaluating quality and success in education within the Capabilities Approach 
The instrumentalisation of research assessment has been strongly criticised (Oancea and 
Furlong, 2007; Elliott and Lukes, 2008; Smeyers, 2008; Bridges, 2009; Pring et al., 2009), owing 
to the connection between the narrowing of the official concept of quality to measurable 
performance, the narrowing of practice to production and delivery, and the narrowing of 
assessment to what can be quantified (Oancea, 2007: 260). Furthermore, Nussbaum suggests 
that given the universal desire to grasp the world and make it comprehensible to reason, 
oversimplification and reduction remain ever-present dangers (1986: 260).This is sometimes 
evident in education research particularly in the ‘what works’ culture of evaluation (Oancea 
and Pring, 2008) and the tendency towards an over-reliance on statistics resulting from 
‘scientism’ (Smith, 2011) exemplified by the Standards Agenda in standardised tests. 
 
By contrast in this chapter I propose the Capabilities Approach and its ethical dimension as a 
way forward for evaluation which seeks greater balance in understanding quality and success 
in education. Important in this approach is developing and implementing the capabilities of 
practical reason and affiliation, shaped through reflective practice, which help evaluators to 
think well, relate well and make sensitive judgements based on a variety of evidence. This 
thesis extends educationists’ views who support evaluation as ‘intelligent and informed 
appreciation’ dependent on discernment rather than solely on metrics (Bridges, 2009: 511), or 
who propose that evaluation must include aesthetics (or ‘connoisseurship’) rather than be 
confined to science (Eisner, 2002). Importantly, Hogan reminds us that teaching as a way of 
life, which includes evaluation on an ongoing basis, is distinctive by its ‘inherent relationship to 
learning as a human undertaking’ and the ‘inclusive undertaking for how life is to be lived’ 
(2004: 27). It is in this process of evaluating learning and teaching towards realising potential 
for flourishing that I believe the Capabilities Approach provides a great contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 This term is used by Lyotard to describe a situation in education where the value of function 
has superseded concerns of justification or rights in education, owing to the triumph of 
technocratic reason (1979, in Hogan, 2000: 378-9). 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
A philosophical grounding for education: An Aristotelian approach  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Few would argue that a principal aim of education is enabling individuals to realise their 
potential to live worthwhile lives and for society at large to flourish. Nor is it contentious to 
consider such an aim as an ethical pursuit. The debate begins when we try to unpick what 
various groups mean by realising potential, or what a worthwhile life entails, or what counts as 
a flourishing society. Further debate arises regarding how best to assess progress in respect of 
these and which measures are most appropriate for the task. The purpose of this chapter is to 
put forward a philosophical approach that helps us steer through this debate, inspired by the 
work of Aristotle, which is better able to shape education than the utilitarian alternatives 
prominent in education.  
 
This Aristotelian approach is pertinent today as it embraces the importance of insight and 
practical reason, giving a credible place to both emotions and reason towards realising 
potential, and making judgements about progress in this area. This Aristotelian approach 
challenges evaluations in education which are measured according to a single standardised 
scale, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8. I suggest that such an approach provides a 
much needed ethical framework, enabling educationists to decide what the learning 
experience should consist in and how to understand success when working towards human 
flourishing.  
 
 
Identifying the problem and what is required 
 
What is required in education today is a conceptual framework based on ethics beyond utility 
which provides sound criteria from which to develop practice and consider assessment. I argue 
that this approach is a much-needed alternative in education, which stands in contrast to the 
performative approach present in the Standards Agenda. An Aristotelian approach is 
important in that it offers not just necessary and defensible criteria which enable us to make 
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sense of education with reference to what being educated entails, but also sufficient criteria 
that reflect the complexities of the real world in this respect. Hence in this chapter, I argue 
that what is required is a philosophical approach that is sensitive to the manner in which we 
experience the world through our emotions, while at the same time accepting that we require 
thought to make sense of our perceptions and insight for living well. Such a philosophical 
position provides a strong theoretical base that enables us to make judgements about 
underlying understandings and beliefs about education.  
 
It is worth recognising the commitment of so many teachers and practitioners to initiate 
children and young people into what they believe to be worthwhile knowledge, understanding 
and activities – in short initiating them into a way of life that enriches them as human beings. 
Such practice requires deep reflection about the aims of education and its progress. Thinking 
in this way about education is not easy as it tackles disagreements in societies about what 
values are worth pursuing and what constitutes a worthwhile form of life. Here we can see 
that education is at its heart about ethics and that such ethical issues are already pervasive in 
our systems and practice. For example, an ethical framework shapes our choices in the 
resources that the practitioner chooses or is instructed to use, in the interests of the pupils and 
students who try to make sense of the world from their individual, group or cultural 
perspective (Pring, 2005; Pring et al., 2009)
1
, or indeed in the tools chosen to assess progress 
(Pring, 2004; Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Bridges, 2009).  
 
However there is often tension between the evident commitment of so many practitioners 
and the educational system within which their performance and the standards of their pupils 
are judged. There is a pull to comply to a framework of measurement based on a single scale 
that is rather simplistic, where in fact a much more nuanced account is required. One reason 
for this is that much of the language used in the field of education today is understood using a 
model of productivity. It utilises business language that reflects this position, and has as its 
conceptual base a utilitarian perspective that considers measurement as driven by numerical 
formulaic assessment and commensurability.  
 
The present language of productivity can be an obstacle rather than a facilitator for education 
towards human flourishing. This is because it presumes an over-rationalistic and scientific bias 
such as that promoted by ‘scientism’ (Smith, 2011: 1) that eschews our view of persons and 
what counts as progress, as it does not fully acknowledge them as thinking-feeling, relational 
beings. This yearning for objectivity and proof in education, misconstrued as only satisfied by a 
 21
(quasi) scientific approach (Bridges, 2009: 497) has been fuelled in recent decades by the 
culture of ‘performativity’, described as ‘efficiency measured according to an input/output 
ratio’ (Lyotard, 1984: 88). This (quasi) scientific tendency towards evaluation in education has 
been critiqued by many educationists across the field (Dunne and Hogan, 2004; Law, 2004; 
Bridges and Smith, 2006; Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Bridges, Smeyers and Smith, 2008; 
Bridges, 2009; Pring et al., 2009, 2010; Alexander, 2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011). Smith (2011) 
helpfully articulates the narrow and misconceived nature of this tendency in education, which 
he describes as ‘scientism’ (ibid.: 1).  
 
Let it be clear from the start that I am not against statistics, only over-reliance on them 
and unreflective faith in them. The position is much the same as it is with the more 
familiar case of science. The fact that science has made our lives safer and more 
comfortable in numberless ways, and that many areas of science are intrinsically 
fascinating, does not justify scientism, the colonising by science of every other form of 
thought and the assumption that whatever problem we have, the solution will inevitably 
be a scientific one. (Smith, 2011: 1). 
 
So what is the alternative? I suggest a fruitful alternative would be to embrace a different 
conceptual beacon which we can trust in education, one that enables us to make sense of 
education within the context of ethics beyond utility and which resists scientism. The challenge 
is to avoid reducing measurement to numerical formula, and instead to promote practice and 
assessment which is sensitive and interpretative, and which embraces broader horizons of 
understanding and greater awareness of the variety of expressions of human flourishing. I 
argue in this chapter that this is possible with an ethical base and approach inspired by 
Aristotelian thought. 
 
 
An Aristotelian approach 
 
In this section, first I define what is meant by the term ethics, and second I develop a 
philosophical frame that is preferable to utilitarianism, inspired by the writings of Aristotle, 
with particular attention to his Nicomachean Ethics (NE). Aristotle’s ideas are flexible enough 
to be adapted to the present day and steer a middle course between over-emphasis on 
emotions or reason. Aristotle’s approach empowers us with a theoretical base that reflects the 
complexities of human lives and allows them to pursue a variety of paths to success within 
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their particular culture. It therefore provides a better approach than that provided by the 
utilitarian model, which is constraining, confines individuals within a deficit model of human 
development, and overall does not convince. 
 
 
1.1 A working definition of ethics  
 
Ethics is about how people should live, and live together, as they shape their lives in co-
operation and reciprocity with others, and as they are themselves shaped by practical reason 
and affiliation (that is: the capability to make sound judgements through critical sensitive 
interpretation, and the capability to relate to others with compassion, care, and with respect 
for the dignity of every individual). In short it is about personal fulfilment and inter-personal 
respect and harmony. One reason for this as Aristotle points out, is that ‘… a human being is a 
political [animal], tending by nature to live together with others’ (NE, IX, 9, 1169b, 19). The 
claim that certain human abilities or capacities exert a moral claim that they should be 
developed a claim about how human beings are in essence at their best. Here, ethics is seen in 
the holistic sense as a way of being, which requires developing a set of psychological and 
cognitive capacities in order to make judgements about how to live a fulfilled life.  
 
In this wider sense the term ethics is used interchangeably with morality. Both are defined 
with reference to that which we share by virtue of being human, rather than with reference to 
conformity to any behaviourist format, or a particular cultural or religious authority, as the 
term morality is sometimes associated with and spoken about. Ethics in this sense is not 
restricted by the sometimes narrow Kantian interpretation of responsibility or duty in specific 
aspects of morality. Nor is it confined to rule compliance in the utilitarian sense. Instead, 
ethics is considered as a broad approach to how we should live a life and so is concerned with 
all of life. As understood from an Aristotelian perspective therefore, I take ethics to be 
primarily concerned with providing the general outlines of a normative theory about living 
well, itself shaped by empirical enquiry, but not as provided by scientism.  
 
Frankena (1973) offers helpful categories in respect of ethics, that we can use here as a rule of 
thumb to facilitate philosophical thinking about morality, as described below. 
 Descriptive empirical enquiry, historical or scientific, such as that done by anthropologists, 
historians, psychologists, sociologists, social scientists and educationists. The goal of such 
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enquiry is to explain the phenomena of morality or to work out a theory of human nature 
which bears on ethical questions. 
 Normative thinking that anyone does when they ask what is right, good, or obligatory.  
 Critical or meta-ethical thinking. This is the kind of thinking that we do when we are 
challenged to our limit in our normative judgements. It asks and tries to answer questions 
such as what does it make sense to say, what can we know and what do terms such as 
right or good or free or equal or responsible mean.  
 
 
1.2 Towards a philosophical approach that education can trust 
 
The following are ethical questions which are at the heart of educational practice and 
assessment, and the very raison d’être of learning: How should we be and what should we do 
in order to flourish, and how might we know that we are succeeding? How can we enable 
children and young people to realise their potential and what is meant by realising potential? 
What should learning and evaluation look like in the light of these questions? We need a 
philosophical approach that helps us answer these questions in a manner that is coherent and 
that we can in principle communicate to others beyond our immediate cultural or linguistic 
circle. As far as possible this requires seeking objectivity in terms of making sense dialogically 
through our shared language, and avoiding the extremes of either complete subjectivity or the 
objectivity provided by scientism. 
 
I suggest that the kind of theoretical base we seek and for which I will argue in the rest of this 
chapter, needs to respect complexity, be non-sceptical, pluralist, depend on a recognisably 
social reflective method, and not over-estimate clarity in evidence. It must be eager to 
recognise the complexity of moral dilemmas, be willing to recognise that human nature is very 
flexible, and consequently that human flourishing can occur within a variety of social 
structures that makes it very difficult to communicate trans-culturally. A philosophical 
approach such as this would be well suited as the conceptual frame we seek to inform and 
shape practice and evaluation as it claims objectivity only as far as the nature of the subject 
allows. Aristotle in his writings on ethics advocates just such an approach and calls us to the 
public arena to reflect, deliberate and evaluate sensitively and critically in order to make the 
best possible choices about how to live well. Thus in the four sections below I first put forward 
a case for a shared language that is non-sceptical and in principle enables comparability. 
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Second, I engage with the issues pertaining to present educational language, its utilitarian 
influence and associated pitfalls. Third, I examine the utilitarian attempt at commensurability. 
And fourth, with the help of Aristotle’s writings I suggest a position in ethics important in 
education - one that is credible and allows for pluralism without either being subjectivist, or 
reducing ethics to science. 
 
 
1.2.1 Seeking ‘plausible objectivity’: Making sense through our shared language  
 
What makes genuine communication even possible? I suggest that any viable way of talking-
form of life requires us to be able to relate to the real world. I will not enter here into the 
complex philosophical debate about truth claims in epistemology and will not attempt a full 
defence of non-scepticism
2
. What I will do for the purpose of this chapter is gather some 
evidence for an understanding of ‘objectivity’ defined by the possibility of genuine non-
sceptical communication based on a shared natural human heritage which enables human 
beings to discourse about their experiences in meaningful ways. This is the understanding of 
objectivity which I will use in this thesis, rather than its extreme version, logical positivism, 
which reduces truth claims to logic and mathematics.  
 
Given our evolutionary journey as homo sapiens we can at the very least say that our different 
cultures and languages have shared roots (Midgley, 1978). These shared roots as human 
beings mean that to the present day we have our most basic needs in common, such as the 
need for shelter and food on the one hand and the need for reciprocity, affiliation and 
practical reason
3
 on the other. This in turn means that we interact with our world in ways 
which are at the deepest level shared. Because human beings are also some of the most 
flexible of earth’s inhabitants our journeys have taken quite different paths and our languages 
and customs have developed in disparate ways, and it is difficult to translate or compare 
between these various practices.  
 
However, if we accept that we have shared roots, the possibility for a shared language is a 
reality, even if we also share the constraint that translation between persons or across cultures 
is often difficult. When Wittgenstein writes of the limits of our language being the limits of our 
world
4
, he is drawing attention to the fact that our language and our entire way of thinking 
about and assessing matters in our world cannot be separated from our way of living. Like the 
post-modernist, we can accept that there are constraints on our understanding and that there 
is no neutral standpoint for establishing how the world is, and therefore that we have no way 
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of assessing the truth of things other than in terms of how we have learned to think and talk. 
But this is a long way from saying that in fact our language does not relate to the real world at 
all. We do not have to go as far as the subjectivist who denies any common ground between 
language or cultures, and confines us to our cultural or even individual worlds, thus making our 
attempt to make references to others and the real world impossible. In fact Wittgenstein 
affirms in his Philosophical Investigations that language is essentially a public matter. To this 
extent, the intelligibility of language depends upon a set of conventions to which speakers 
have all subscribed, and the strong presumption is that in speaking or writing, they intend to 
observe these shared conventions.  
 
Gadamer, in his work Truth and Method, also develops this idea of ineffability and stresses the 
importance of seeking what we as language users actually share for meaningful 
communication. For Gadamer there is too much stress upon difference in the modern age and 
not enough attention to what binds us as a species, what we share in common. He subscribes 
to the realist dimension that there is a world beyond our culturally conditioned perception of 
it, but that we cannot get a full picture of that world as interpretations constantly change. So 
he encourages what he calls a ‘fusion of horizons’ where we use dialogue as a central feature 
for understanding. And we build a bigger picture of past and present through a shared 
solidarity based on what we share. In this sense he speaks of ‘Being that can be understood is 
language’ (Lawn, 2006: 66).  
 
These helpful insights point us towards a non-sceptical position about relating to the real 
world in what we say, and to an understanding that is not subjective about our ability to 
communicate with one another in a comparable way. Translation between people or cultures 
is a complex matter, especially when dealing with ethical concerns. In fact, we could say that 
translation is more of an art than a scientific process and cannot be reduced to any simple 
formula that would automatically guarantee success. This point will be further discussed in 
Chapter 8 in respect of evaluation with support from Bridges (2009). If we do accept that we 
have shared roots and that we can in principle relate to the real world beyond our individual 
language frameworks, there simply must be a basis for shared understanding between us, 
even though such translation will require patience and hard work. 
 
 An example of this is evident in popular sayings from various cultures, such as: ‘a bird in the 
hand is worth more than ten in the bush’ or ‘never look a gift horse in the mouth’. Some of 
these sayings are easily transliterated between languages, but most are steeped in 
 26
metaphorical language the meaning of which is shaped by their cultural heritage and which are 
consequently difficult to translate in a manner that is faithful to the original. This requires a 
dialogue between peoples to find a fit that best communicates its intention. Therefore, 
evidence of difficulties in translation does not mean that translation is impossible. Rather 
evidence that we do often understand one another successfully itself supports the fact that 
effective communication is possible and that an effective social reflective method of 
interpretation is ongoing and thriving between peoples and groups.  
 
1.2.2 What of the language of education? 
 
Making sense of education as an ethical pursuit, in respect of our experiences, relationships, 
and choosing what is worthwhile in that context, is coloured by the language we use as well as 
our interpretation of it. The metaphors that have been developed in education recently in the 
UK, to a large extent reflect conceptual business models that are constrained within a 
language framework of productivity. An exception is the growth metaphor in education which 
will be discussed further in Chapter 7. The language of targets or outcomes resulting from the 
business model which lends itself to reference against a common standard agreed, suggests 
that educationists do in fact believe we can get things wrong, and that judgements are not just 
purely a matter of personal opinion, hunch, or feeling. This practice presupposes that we have 
some mechanism of understanding one another that is to some extent objective. The aim here 
is objectivity in what can be said, in order to guide practice and monitor progress. It rightly 
takes a non-sceptical approach to truth and non-relativist approach to our ability to 
communicate these truths, but to do this it often adopts a framework of ‘scientism’ (Smith, 
2011: 1) within which practice and measurement are defined. 
 
For example, the present educational language of targets, impact and outcomes all points to 
an agreed framework based on a scientific method of standardised empirical enquiry that can 
be objectively assessed and about which we can communicate effectively. Smith warns against 
this when he challenges ‘scientism’ (2010: 1). Within this agreed framework of scientism, 
educational professionals and policy makers understand judgements about teaching, learning 
and research as objective and defined by a single standard. They are making truth claims that 
are not subjective, and in practice independent of the individual, the practitioner, the school, 
the community or a particular society. They are non-sceptical about the meaning of the 
language they use or the evaluations made by individuals or groups.  
 
 27
However, the objectivity they seek by using this model of scientism is wrong headed, 
especially when education is considered as an ethical pursuit. There are two reasons for this. 
First in seeking objectivity, an overly narrow lens is used to explain
5
 human beings as having 
commensurate values that can be scientifically measured using a single standard. Second, 
when it considers education from an ethical perspective, it does so from a utilitarian 
perspective where the language of more or less is a quantitative language that depends on 
commensurability, which economist Amartya Sen challenges (2009). As Pring (2005) rightly 
suggests, the business language and rhetoric used in educational policy today sees teaching as 
a purely technical matter of reaching targets, and learning as a technical matter of achieving 
targets. This does not allow education as an ethical pursuit to be understood using a wide 
lens, sensitive to the complexity of the human condition and seeking to understand and gain 
clarity so far as the subject allows. The point that ethics cannot seek precision-style clarity is 
made by Aristotle as he insists that although ethics should start from what most of us would 
pre-philosophically have taken to be true about the way we function as human beings, truth in 
ethics defies any attempt at exact formulation (NE, 1094b10-15). Clearly ethical assessment 
cannot be done using purely scientific tools, as it also requires that we listen to our wider 
heritage as drawn for example from the arts and humanities more broadly, as well as paying 
close attention to our human desires and feelings. And this wider approach has far reaching 
implications on teaching, learning and evaluation. 
 
Furthermore, educationists do not always consider themselves to be working within the 
conceptual and practical realm of ethics, unless pressed, as illustrated by the culture of ‘what 
works’ (Oancea and Pring, 2008). But they would agree that education is concerned with how 
to realise potential for individuals and societal flourishing. It is in this sense that education is 
undoubtedly an ethical pursuit. Truth claims made about educational practice and research are 
in fact value laden and thus what we choose to include or exclude in such practice or research 
and its evaluation needs to be understood within the ethical frame. As illustrated in recent 
education reviews, educationists stress the significance of considering educational practice 
and evaluation within a frame which is not restricted by the language of targets and outcomes, 
and to take seriously the ethical dimension in education, (Pring et al., 2009, 2010; Alexander, 
2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011). They emphasise the importance of shaping practice and the 
curriculum in a manner not restricted by the language of targets and outcomes, in order to 
engage individuals and groups to reflect, imagine, reason, deliberate, and make a positive 
contribution to the lives of others and the community around them.  
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Others, such as Palmer (1983) highlight the importance of the practitioner as authentic role 
model and supporter of learners, and the need for the recovery of community in education. 
Williamson (1997: 93-104) reminds us that morality is part of the weft of society and of social 
experience and that learning must therefore include opportunities for reflection, enquiry, 
dialogue and engagement if we are to understand and make choices that are morally sensitive 
of the other. Midgley (1997: 36), echoes this when she discusses the need in education for 
opportunities to deliberate through serious thought. Furthermore, White (1997: 25) rightly 
points out that education should widen young people’s conceptions of what their own 
fulfilment might consist in. Nussbaum (1997: 300) also stresses the importance of including 
this kind of deliberation in tertiary education everywhere, as in her opinion it would be 
catastrophic to become a nation of technically competent people who have lost the ability to 
think critically, to examine themselves, and to respect the humanity and diversity of others. 
Furthermore, she rightly states that the task of world citizenship requires the would-be world 
citizen to become a ‘sensitive and empathetic interpreter’ (ibid. : 63). Noddings (2006), 
helpfully offers a practical approach to reflective thinking for schools to adopt, and 
Stenhouse’s Humanities Curriculum Project ensures that young people can explore matters of 
deep personal concern as teachers mediate to students the different ‘voices in the 
conversation of mankind’ (Pring, 2005: 15). 
 
Notwithstanding critics such as these, the educational language of productivity prevails and 
does not acknowledge sufficiently the complexities of education from an ethical perspective, 
except as viewed from a utilitarian perspective. It is utilitarianism and its historical roots that 
underpin much of educational language, policy, practice and evaluation today, as illustrated by 
standardised tests such as GCSE and GCE, which include clear targets and measurable 
indicators. Business language which supports this position has been adopted enabling funding 
to be justified by clearly relating quantity of funding to quantifiable outcomes. It has done this 
by pursuing a single scale standardised measure to explain progress in raising achievement. 
Lacking in this approach has been a sincere attempt to recognise the importance of individuals 
and the vulnerable, and to acknowledge the importance of a sensitive interpretative approach 
which includes emotions when considering ethical issues at the heart of education.  
 
The next step is to explore the utilitarian perspective exemplified in the culture of 
‘performativity’ (Lyotard, 1984: 88) in education, and consider why it is unsuitable as the 
conceptual base for education. I will consider why the roots of utilitarianism in its denial of the 
importance of emotions for ethics have tended it to be over-reliant on reason. As a result, a 
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scientific-style model for commensurability has been its hallmark. But given the complexity of 
the human condition it seems implausible that there be commensurability in ethics. The 
counter-intuitive results that a utilitarian approach yields, means that we need to look for a 
path that is more sympathetic to the interplay between emotion and reason in the quest for 
making sense and making judgements about living well, while resisting the charge of 
subjectivism. Here is where we can draw on the Aristotelian approach in ethics for guidance. 
Yes, we still seek a kind of plausible objectivity in the way we make sense of life as relational 
beings. But the assumptions Aristotle makes about the nature, scope and method of ethics 
have a down-to-earth common sense quality and a nuanced view of the interplay between 
emotional sensitivity and rational coherence that can provide a more defensible conceptual 
base for educational practice and assessment than does the present utilitarian model today. 
 
  
1.2.3 From emotions to calculus: The Achilles’ heel of utilitarianism  
 
It is worth looking at the roots of the present utilitarian position before delving into the 
problems that ensue in pursuit of calculus or commensurability through algorithm-style 
measurements. I will briefly draw on the work of Hume, Bentham and Mill to do this. Jeremy 
Bentham’s (1748-1832) approach to utilitarianism is a critique against emotions as the guiding 
criterion in ethics, and presents an extreme position. Much of the background against which 
Bentham, and later John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873) reacted in formulating their versions of 
utilitarianism, is to be found in the subjectivist work of David Hume (1711- 1776), where moral 
is not considered as a quality of things in themselves but the response which those things 
evoke in us. Hume thought that the empathetic quality in our shared human nature enables us 
to respond to situations in the same kinds of way. Our shared human nature guarantees 
comparability, building as it does upon our universally shared moral sense.  
  
It is worth noting that a subjectivist such as Hume, the utilitarians that followed such as 
Bentham or Mill, and an Aristotelian, could all be said to make assertions about basic 
comparability, as they all subscribe to some version of a natural law theory based on a shared 
human nature. They may differ widely in their views of ethics, but they are at one in holding 
that both the content and the form of moral thinking must in the end be derived from an 
examination of the kind of being that a man or woman is, and that this kind of examination 
must be conducted by the methods of rational enquiry which we employ also in other non-
moral fields. So the essence of a natural law theory of morality lies in what it has to say about 
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the starting point and the method of moral thinking. And the variety in these three theories 
stems from the different pictures of people that they use for their starting point. Hume 
assumes that we share the disposition to sympathy with others, while Bentham's and Mill’s 
attempts to be scientific presuppose a shared view both of values (or preferences) and of the 
canons of moral reasoning. But there is arguably no such shared view. Aristotle on the other 
hand offers an approach that takes both sense and reasoning seriously, while denying the 
possibility of commensurability of any kind in ethics (Hughes, 2006).  
 
The advantage of Hume’s account over the later utilitarian position is that it correctly 
highlights the importance of emotional response for understanding morally important features 
of persons and situations. Ethical understanding is too often seen as purely a matter of 
reasoning. But unfortunately Hume makes no provision for any rational assessment of the 
emotional responses we have, and overestimates the extent to which our natural emotional 
responses can serve as a criterion for what is of moral value.  
 
Hume claims that sympathy, or fellow feeling with others is a principle in human nature   
(Selby-Bigge and Nidditch, 1975: 222-23). In this sense, Hume views these emotional responses 
as purely natural and in so doing does not sufficiently acknowledge that they are in fact rarely 
so and that our emotional responses to situations are far from being universally shared or 
morally reliable. As the field of psychoanalysis shows us our emotional responses can often be 
a product of a variety of influences, of some of which we may not be conscious. Unfortunately, 
in this psychological account, Hume makes no provision for any rational assessment of the 
emotional responses we have, whether natural or learnt. Hence he leaves himself open to the 
claim of incomparability in ethics.  
 
In our search for a conceptual base that is better than that which exists at present with the 
utilitarian position, we seek comparability. In fact this is precisely what utilitarianism attempts 
to do also. But in so doing, it relies on calculus, which is misguided. The starting points in 
Bentham’s account of utilitarianism are that we know what pleasure and pain are and how 
they motivate everything we do, and that the maximisation principle for goods is the most 
reasonable to hold. Bentham believes moral principles to be true and not simply the 
expression of sentiment or feeling, and such truths can be found in the principle of utility. That 
is, that pleasure or the avoidance of pain are the only fundamental goods, and that to have 
more of anything good is better than to have less.  
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Bentham in trying to tackle the injustice of the workplace at the time was influenced by the 
work of Adam Smith. In particular, he was interested in the attempt to explain the phenomena 
of economic life, industrialisation and the distribution of wealth, in terms of a few basic 
assumptions believed to be laws of nature as established by God. Seeking moral reform in 
favour of the workers, Bentham also uses the key notion of comparability in its strongest form, 
commensurability, thereby trying to demonstrate that the exploitation of workers by factory 
owners was morally indefensible. This utilitarian position relies on the commensurability of 
values as a measure to deal with injustice. There are echoes today where greater justice is 
sought for those who though not exploited as the factory workers were then, nevertheless lack 
opportunities to flourish in today’s unequal society. An example, is the agenda to narrow the 
gap in education between the privileged and those living in areas of economic deprivation, 
which is understood with reference to succeeding in standardised tests measured on a single 
scale.  
 
This utilitarian view of education as of ethics remains an implausible account owing to 
difficulties in the commensurability of values. For example it seems ill-conceived to try to ask 
the equivalence in value between different peoples’ activities, such as: a walk on the beach, 
the attendance of a punk rock concert, eating out, sailing the Greek islands, reading the 
biography of David Beckham, or writing sweet nothings about their life on Twitter, to name 
but a few. Perhaps for this reason, welfare economics has tried to replace value-
commensurability with a calculus of preferences. But there has been no way of computing the 
best overall outcome for several people with different preference rankings even here. For the 
utilitarian, we can now say that defending a whole set of moral conclusions on very few 
assumptions and a method of calculation based on commensurability is not convincing and is 
counter-intuitive. And further, our conceptions of what is or is not valuable is often subject to 
a diverse variety of psychological and cultural influences which can radically alter our most 
basic view of the world.  
 
Neither a purely emotional response nor calculus of values gives us a convincing basis for 
ethics and we need to look for starting points elsewhere. As Sen writes, regarding economics 
and justice, we are inescapably and successfully involved in evaluating alternatives with non-
commensurable aspects. 
 
Non-commensurability can hardly be a remarkable discovery in the world in which we 
live. And it need not, by itself, make it very hard to choose sensibly … The presence of 
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non-commensurable results only indicates that the choice-decisions will not be trivial 
(reducible to counting what is ‘more’ and what is ‘less’), but it does not at all indicate 
that it is impossible – or even that it must always be particularly difficult. (Sen, 2009: 
241) 
 
 
1.2.4 An Aristotelian approach that depends on insight and practical wisdom
6
 
 
As I have explored above, neither emotions on their own nor calculus seem an adequate base 
for ethics and do not provide the conceptual framework sought in this thesis. Emotions, 
understood by Hume as the neutral standard for ethics do not leave room for any cognitive 
element in emotions as an essential factor to the way we make judgements. Calculus on the 
other hand, demands commensurability that is questionable in ethics. Instead, what is 
required is a more integrated approach such as that espoused by Aristotle in the Nicomachean 
Ethics
7
. Here, an appropriate place is given to balanced emotions and reason, and 
comparability is possible within a shared understanding of human fulfilment. Aristotle rightly 
resists attempts to force ethics into the confines of a systematic theory while still giving us 
methods by which we can make moral judgements and work towards fulfilment.  
 
Aristotle recognises the importance of virtues and focuses primarily on how people can make 
choices about how to behave. Aristotle considers virtue as a kind of excellence of 
understanding about the things that are most honourable (NE 1141b15) and considers 
practical wisdom as a kind of intellectual virtue: to possess it is to be good at thinking in a 
certain way. Making judgements is about responding appropriately to a given situation, which 
for him involves both an understanding of the universal principle (eg. kindness) and the 
particular situation (eg. what action would constitute kindness in this instance) (NE 1141b5). 
He would consider that universals come from particulars (NE 1143a32-b5), so the notion of 
kindness develops over the years and even though the word kindness might still be used, the 
individual’s growth in experience of instances of kindness deepens their perceptive grasp of 
the virtue.  
 
Making judgements is made possible through the development of emotional balance which 
requires a honed emotional grasp or understanding of a situation (sometimes called insight) to 
which thought is then applied in order to reach a decision. An appropriate response to 
situations is understood in terms of what a person of practical wisdom would know. And this 
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depends on having suitable role models, for example in parents, the community and the law. 
Practical wisdom is thinking about what to do when one has already grasped the emotional 
context of the situation. And practical wisdom so defined is about how we become 
experienced in living well towards the fulfilled life (NE VI,13 and NE VI,7)
8
. Aristotle views 
virtues as the responses which facilitate such an understanding, and motivate actions in which 
that understanding is expressed (NE II, 4). And the standard by which we can make 
comparisons is our recognition of a fulfilled life as a whole that we share by virtue of being 
human. So for example, answering the question, ‘How ought I to feel towards a drug addict 
seeking money for their next fix in the street?’ would first of all require our grasp of what it is 
to live a fulfilled life. We then require life experience of observation of fulfilled people to 
develop well-tuned emotional antennae, so to speak. Only then is one capable of deciding 
what one says to the drug addict, or how to be kind to him – and it is this element that is a 
matter of judgement. What is being sought here through this flexible process or method is an 
emotionally appropriate response to a particular situation.  
 
Therefore one could say that for Aristotle, ethics is an epistemologically cognitive-emotive 
grasp of an individual situation where the intellectual and appetitive are synthesised in 
harmony. And this is made possible by a balanced set of emotional responses that include 
experience in moral virtue and a fine-tuned emotional disposition to which then deliberation is 
applied. This honed emotional grasp is what Aristotle calls insight (sometimes also translated 
as understanding which itself is sometimes translated as nous), which he describes as 
perception of the particular (NE 1143a25-b6, specifically 1143b6). It could be argued that the 
non-scientific, non-logical nature of an emotion related intellectual insight such as Aristotle has 
in mind, is open to the charge of subjectivism as there seems to be no possibility of a standard-
neutral criticism between individuals. However, Aristotle’s concept of insight, must be 
understood within the parameters laid down by our shared human nature which enable a 
shared language and from which a shared discourse is possible and deliberated judgements 
are made. This is best explained in the Function Argument (NE I,7) which I will look at in 
greater detail in the following chapter. Furthermore, it is Aristotle’s belief that we share basic 
human functional capabilities that provide an objective standard for basic comparability in 
terms of an epistemological justification in ethics.  
 
Unlike Hume, who considered reason as slave to the passions, Aristotle considers emotions to 
be an immediately affective-cognitive response to a situation in which the belief is not an 
explicit, separate element which then causes the feeling. For example, I feel fear because I 
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experience something as likely to cause pain, or harm, or to be in some other way threatening 
(NE II, 5). Fear involves the belief that a situation is somehow dangerous. Nussbaum (1990) 
explains this well in ascertaining that Aristotle does not make a sharp split between the 
emotive and the cognitive. For Aristotle emotions can play a cognitive role, and cognition, if it 
is to be properly informed, must draw on the work of the emotive elements (Nussbaum, 1990: 
78-9). Here we do not rely purely on sense for making judgements. Choice here is seen to lie at 
the borderline between our intellect and our passions - as Aristotle describes it, as 
‘deliberative desire’ (NE 1113a100-12) as well as ‘desiderative understanding’ (NE 1139b3-5). 
This cognitive role of emotions means that emotions provide a non-verbal grasp of a situation 
and respond in some way to its morally relevant features. And such a grasp is the starting point 
which reason can then build upon to decide what should be done. For example, a person might 
grasp that someone else needs kindness in their lives, but will still need to decide which action 
would succeed as being kind to that person in that instance. Similarly in the classroom 
situation a teacher may grasp that a child needs reassurance, but still needs to think through 
what she has to do to achieve that end. Aristotle would hold that without this ‘starting point’, 
this emotional grasp, practical wisdom or our ability to see what needs to be done cannot exist 
(NE 1144b31-35).  
 
As I have already described, possessing practical wisdom for Aristotle means being good at 
thinking about what one should do which includes an emotional dimension within it, thereby 
making sense of how to live a fulfilled and worthwhile life as a whole. Or put another way, 
being able to see what one is doing from the point of view of a fulfilled life. This of course 
depends on an integrated understanding of the function of a human being and also involves an 
affective reading of the situation in an appropriate way. A more contemporary illustration of 
what moral choice might be like, also along these lines, is put forward by Murdoch (1971) in 
The Sovereignty of Good, where she stresses the importance of being ‘attentive’ and really 
‘looking’ in order to make judgements. She develops a helpful metaphor for this which she 
calls ‘moral vision’. Using this metaphor she considers the task of attention as ongoing all the 
time and highlights the importance of looking hard even at apparently empty, everyday 
moments thus making ‘little peering efforts of imagination’ which have important cumulative 
results.
 
As she puts it, one can only choose within the world that one can see and this implies 
that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort (ibid.: 34, 42-43).  
 
This kind of vision requires ongoing effort in terms of individuals having to think about what to 
do in each particular instance. And this thinking results in the kind of action-descriptions which 
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might be used to formulate moral principles. Nevertheless for this moral vision to be possible 
at all it requires both the grasp of a fulfilled life, and practice through moral virtue and 
practical wisdom. For Aristotle, our ability to think clearly about practical decisions depends 
upon our emotional balance. The kind of vision we have been talking about is made possible 
by our emotional balance, as only the emotionally balanced person will be sensitive to the 
morally significant features of the complex situations with which we are commonly faced. Thus 
one cannot be morally good in the full sense without practical wisdom, nor have practical 
wisdom without possessing moral virtues. (NE 1144b31-32). And practical wisdom as already 
explained involves a grasp both of universal principles and of individual situations. It is this kind 
of understanding of education as intrinsically concerned with enabling individuals to grow in 
their capacity to make good judgements in their lives, which salvages the metaphor of growth 
in respect of education. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, and involves the 
development of the capacities of practical reason and affiliation which Nussbaum promotes 
(2001: 416-418). 
 
Aristotle’s position is not subjectivist as he would claim that any version of a fulfilled life has to 
fulfil basic requirements. These include developing moral virtues that help us grasp the 
particular in emotionally balanced ways, and experience through practical wisdom which 
enables the intellectual element required for making choices. Thus, to sum up, the neutral 
standard in ethics in epistemological terms is a fulfilled human being. We think about the 
capabilities humans have, and that is how we recognise what a fulfilled life is like. However, we 
need to distinguish between this epistemological justification, that is, recognising a fulfilled 
life, and what a fulfilled life consists in, which requires both guidance in moral virtue (role 
models – eg. parents, community and law) and gaining experience through practical wisdom. 
Hence, though there is a standard neutral justification which allows us to compare between 
individuals and societies, there is no blueprint for living well as such and no clear definition of 
what living well consists in. 
 
Our factual knowledge of what it is to be human may not be complete, but we have enough 
information about features of our shared human nature to be able to recognise a fulfilled 
human life in circumstances very different from our own or from our experiences. We can in 
this way look intelligently at lives different from our own and give a convincing background 
explanation of human fulfilment in different people’s life circumstances and progress. This is 
evidence we can trust, and there is a sufficient degree of objectivity and comparability here 
which allows for many different ways of life and many different accounts of justice, and rights 
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and duties
9
. This is precisely because human beings are such complex and such flexible beings. 
As Aristotle points out, as long as we do not seek more precision than the subject matter 
allows, we should be content with this (ibid.: NE I, 3, 1094b 10-15). 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have sought to provide a conceptual base that is plausible and that we can rely 
on when making sense of education. Thus, I have explored issues concerning language and 
communication; educational language and its pitfalls, also highlighting critics who propose a 
different approach; and the problems of over-emphasising either sense or calculus, as does the 
utilitarian position. Through this discussion a conceptual base has been put forward that 
includes the following characteristics: 
i) An approach that is non-sceptical about ethics and thus claims that there are truths to be 
known. 
ii) An approach that is not subjectivist and thus upholds that these truths are not there 
simply to be made up by each individual or society since there is a degree of 
comparability between peoples based on a shared human nature. 
iii) An approach that recognises the complexity of moral dilemmas even within a single 
society and yet refuses to over-simplify the many possible conflicting facets as does the 
commensurability of values. Nevertheless a refusal to oversimplify in this sense does not 
in any way lessen inculcating the importance of evidence for ethics, as for anything else. 
iv) An approach that identifies human nature as flexible, maintaining that within limits any 
given individual could flourish in quite different lives, and that there may be more than 
one equally viable human social structure in which individuals could flourish. 
 
Consequently, I have attempted to show that if we use an Aristotelian approach rather than a 
utilitarian one, we can establish a theory that is plausible and that we can trust as a base for 
ethics (and thus education), with the following significant features: 
i) That is realist about ethics and thus not sceptical and not post-modern in its cruder 
definition, but at the other extreme is also not about imposing values.  
ii) That is pluralist, because humans are very complex and human flourishing is realised in 
different ways shaped by context and circumstance. However, this does not mean that 
anything goes and it is not in that sense subjectivist. There is some degree of 
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comparability based on the principle of shared human functional capabilities, though 
these are realised in multiple ways. 
iii) That recognises the importance of evidence for ethics, based on an account of emotional 
balance and empirical knowledge in the Aristotelian sense. 
 
The conditions for a good description of a theory are firstly, that it arises out of an ordinary 
way of seeing the world and that it can be recognised as such. And secondly, that it is a good 
basis for assessing how we think and act, in this case in relation to education. I suggest that the 
Aristotelian approach proposed here as a theoretical base meets both these conditions.  
 
Applying this Aristotelian approach in ethics as the conceptual framework for education would 
ensure that we keep a tighter focus on what is important for realising potential. For example, 
there is the importance of focusing on nurturing emotionally balanced responses in childhood 
which include developing the capabilities for human interrelatedness and choice-making 
towards a fulfilled life, and which demand reflective practice made possible through practical 
reason and caring engagement. Working towards excellence in these areas enables individuals 
to realise their individual potential to flourish in a society which is supportive of others in 
striving for the common good. A significant benefit of Aristotle’s approach is that it emphasises 
the importance of the practitioner as role model both in terms of imparting learning and 
making judgements, and in their own level of practical wisdom (reason) and affiliation (caring 
engagement) which affect their daily interactions with others. Furthermore, evaluation within 
this conceptual framework resists being reduced to the rigid method of ‘scientism’ (Smith, 
2011: 1). Instead evaluation focuses on building a corpus of evidence that we can trust, based 
on many kinds of data, always mindful of careful looking and of collecting human stories that 
together create a true picture of progress in different contexts. It is a body of evidence such as 
this and not numerical tables alone or standardised measurements using a single scale that are 
required to understand progress, and from which we should establish best practice. 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 Pring, R. (2005: 11). Here he makes a good case for education as a moral practice.  
 
2
 For a comprehensive account of debates in epistemology see Dancy, J. (1985)  
 
3
 The term affiliation (our interdependence and sense of relatedness by virtue of being human) 
and practical reason (The ability to make good judgements based on emotion, thought, and 
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insight) are developed by Nussbaum (1993; 2000) from Aristotle’s philosophy, who in the 
Politics describes human beings as essentially social beings, and in the Nicomachean Ethics 
stresses the importance of practical reason or wisdom (phronesis) for deliberations about 
living well. 
 
4
 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.6 
 
5
 In the next chapter I discuss Aristotle’s different types of explanations, and his view that 
when speaking about ethics we need to look at explaining the fulfilled life, which is about 
looking at the purpose or function of human beings. 
 
6
 Here I use practical wisdom interchangeably with practical reason. 
 
7
 Irwin, T. (1999); Broadie, S. & Rowe, C. (2002); and, Hughes, G.J. (2001). 
I draw on Irwin and Broadie’s translations for Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and Irwin, 
Broadie, and Hughes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I use the 
abbreviation NE to refer to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics throughout. 
 
8
 ibid.: NE VI,13,1144b31-32. See also NE VI, 7, 1141b 10-15 where Aristotle describes the 
greatest excellence in practical wisdom is where an individual can deliberate with the 
greatest grasp of the function of a human being in mind, that is the fulfilled life. 
 
9
 This thinking forms the basis of Nussbaum’s capabilities list which will be discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Realising potential: Human flourishing in the context of a shared nature 
 
Human excellence grows like a vine tree, fed by the green dew, raised up, among wise 
men and just, to the liquid sky. (Pindar, Nemean VIII. 39-44, in Nussbaum, 1986: 1) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to use an Aristotelian lens to take a fresh look at the question of 
human flourishing and the implications that ensue from the way we make choices, live 
together, and support one another and those most vulnerable in society. This stands in 
contrast to the utilitarian approach in respect of well-being (Layard, 2005; Seligman 2011) and 
the tendency towards individualism in society today, which at last is beginning to be 
acknowledged as detrimental to well-being and flourishing societies. Consequently, in Chapter 
2, I consider some of Aristotle’s key philosophical concepts relevant to human flourishing and 
realising potential, and argue in favour of their contemporary application and adaptation in 
our search for understanding and progress in this important area of human development. 
Specifically, in today’s western society where people refer to fulfilling or realising potential in a 
very individualistic way, it is important to note that realising potential is here understood in 
the Aristotelian sense of fulfilling potential of human beings qua human beings, within the 
context of a shared human nature.  
 
Aristotle’s philosophical approach provides an essential framework that enables us to engage 
with the contemporary debate about realising potential with greater sophistication than is 
often possible at present. In particular, I draw on his views about discourse and what 
constitutes an explanation. In addition I focus on his understanding of the structure of human 
beings and what constitutes flourishing, with reference to the Function Argument in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (NE Bk. I,7). Aristotle’s far-reaching and inclusive approach enables us to 
recognise a shared language and calls us to map a shared journey that is focused beyond the 
individual, that resists viewing individuals as units of production, and that is anchored in 
mutual relation and shared human capabilities. His arguments equip us with starting points for 
living well based on general natural characteristics we share as human beings. These shared 
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characteristics enable us to give explanations towards human flourishing based on endoxa (the 
popular view), and do justice to the complexity of the human condition. In Chapter 2, I suggest 
that an Aristotelian approach when adapted to our present globalised society, enables 
individuals, communities, governments and policy makers to make considerable inroads into 
creating environments and nurturing social commitments such that our systems work towards 
every person’s ability to realise their human capabilities and thereby realise their potential.  
 
 
2.1 Aristotle’s contribution to the contemporary debate about realising potential  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are considerable benefits in taking a broad view of ethics such 
as that espoused by Aristotle, and in resisting the notion of scepticism in this area. This 
broader view of ethics allows us to investigate the areas of the moral alongside and in relation 
to other areas of human lives such as intellectual commitment, personal love, friendship, trust, 
and affiliation in general, and to ask subtle questions about their inter-relationship. Taking all 
these into consideration gives us a fuller picture and broader horizons as we question what is 
entailed in order to construct a good life, the kind of society we need to build, and the kind of 
education we must provide to make this possible. As we become aware that ethics permeates 
all aspects of our lives we begin to form a general account of how a person might live in order 
to live a good human life, and a sensitivity and awareness of the complexities involved. In this 
sense personal morality, good citizenship and the best way to organise a state all fit together 
into one narrative.  
 
At present, these interrelated areas have been compartmentalised and their bearing on a 
nuanced view of what quality of life entails has been diminished
1
, and further exacerbated by 
the obsession with measurement. For example, the utilitarian approach is characterised by 
both confining interpersonal comparisons for social assessment to achievement in pleasure 
only, and by identifying achievements with the utilities achieved (Sen, 1992: 32). Aside from 
the question of aggregation of values and the associated problems, this approach is limited to 
considerations about pleasure or pain in the area of human flourishing. In contrast, Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, provide a more far reaching account, based on the 
popular view (endoxa) of how the good person might live and how society could be structured 
in order to make well-being or flourishing possible. In keeping personal morality, good 
citizenship and state organisation interwoven, Aristotle’s philosophy has the ingredients of a 
theory of justice that is powerful and that can help today’s governments discern what 
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arrangements they need to provide in order to support each person’s human capability to lead 
a flourishing life. This Aristotelian perspective depends on evidence about the nature, 
structure and purpose of what it is to be a human being and the kind of explanations we are 
able to provide and communicate about this subject. This is where Aristotle makes a significant 
contribution to the contemporary Capabilities Approach, which will be discussed in this 
chapter. With the exception of pioneers such as the economist, Amartya Sen, and the 
philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, whose contribution will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
Capabilities Approach still often falls short of engaging with the ethical dimension so critical to 
human development. Although the Capabilities Approach has been a great step forward in the 
way we understand human development in economic and social welfare terms, the ethical 
dimension that Aristotle’s approach offers, makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of what realising human potential entails. 
 
The Capabilities Approach as developed by Nussbaum (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993:242-70; 
Nussbaum, 2000:70-111), which we will examine in Chapter 3 and 5, is based on this 
Aristotelian thinking about the nature and purpose or aim of human beings in life. The 
Capabilities Approach in the political arena, exerts a moral claim that certain human abilities 
should be developed (Nussbaum, 2000: 83). Therefore, as a society we must find ways for 
these abilities to be realised. This view recognises that each human being is born with an 
inherent dignity and requires life circumstances that are worthy of that dignity. There is an 
ethical dimension here, which to have social plausibility must extend equal consideration to all 
at some level of equality (Sen, 1992: 4). The key question then becomes: equality of what?  
 
By contrast, public life today continues to be influenced by the general social contract 
approach, originally inspired by theorists such as Locke, Rousseau and Kant, and based on the 
contentious assumption that all people are equal in social and mental powers. However, when 
thinking about justice between people who are in fact very different and unequal in abilities or 
power, such as children, minority groups, or those with disabilities, we need an approach that 
is sensitive to this diversity, rather than the social contract approach, which for this purpose is 
a blunt tool. Furthermore, even when we have identified one group, equality in terms of one 
variable may not coincide with equality in the scale of another. As Sen (1992) reminds us: 
 
… equal opportunities can lead to very unequal incomes. Equal incomes can go with 
significant differences in wealth. Equal wealth can coexist with very unequal happiness. 
Equal happiness can go with widely divergent fulfilment of needs. Equal fulfilment of 
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needs can be associated with very different freedoms of choice. And so on.                 
(Sen, 1992: 2).  
 
Aristotle’s view of the fundamental characteristics shared by human beings provides a starting 
point for the discourse about equality that is more sensitive to the complexity and variety of 
human beings than the social contract approach. The Aristotelian starting point enables us to 
address the question about ‘equality of what’ with greater accuracy and sophistication as we 
contribute an answer focused upon our fundamental shared capacities as human beings. 
Aristotle’s ethical dimension based on our natural make-up as human beings informs the 
Capabilities Approach that Nussbaum espouses, which has far reaching implications for 
education, as I will argue in Chapter 5 and 6 in particular.  
 
The focus of Chapter 3 will be the Capabilities Approach as developed from an Aristotelian 
perspective. As Chapter 8 makes clear, the Capabilities Approach engages with questions 
about diversity in education, beyond diversity in terms of multicultural issues alone. That is, 
the Capabilities Approach enables diversity in education to encompass evaluation generally, 
and to be a guide for making judgements in this area. Nussbaum’s development of the 
Capabilities Approach (2000: 78-80) contributes greater finesse to debates about respecting 
diversity, and enables us to critique the present tendency towards one common standard 
present in education, which surfaces through standardised tests, and age constrained 
curricula. 
 
 
2.2 Aristotle and the question of human flourishing  
 
As we shall see, Aristotle sets down the markers for the present-day Capabilities Approach that 
is making inroads into the socio-economic debates about quality of life (Nussbaum and 
Sen,1993) and equality (Sen,1992). His theories about what constitutes understanding and 
what counts as an explanation give shape to his view about the structure and aim of human 
beings in general and consequently their human functional capabilities. From this view of the 
structure and potential of human beings, still applicable today, arise the responsibilities of a 
society to ensure that every person is able to realise a certain quality of life. In the next part of 
this chapter I will consider some of Aristotle’s key concepts, in particular his Function 
Argument (NE I,7), that are important for us as contemporary tools for discerning what it 
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means to become fully human and the kind of society that supports this journey, including its 
responsibilities in education.  
 
In order to understand the development of Aristotle’s philosophy, it is helpful to note that 
before his return to Athens in 335BC, Aristotle spent a lengthy period in Thrace where he 
studied zoology and wrote books on biology, logic and completed Book I of the Metaphysics 
(which literally means ‘after-physics’). And this, together with his family background in the 
natural sciences, informed his thinking and practical approach, giving rise to helpful methods 
of understanding the world and consequently helping us decide how we should live. It was 
back in Athens and once his ‘school’, the Lyceum was formed, that he wrote his major works, 
probably including the remaining books of the Metaphysics, the De Anima, and finally the 
Ethics. The thinking from this body of work sustains Aristotle’s approach in the later work of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, specifically his thinking in his previous works about the nature of 
things in relation to discourse, universals and particulars, identity and change, and what we 
can explain. It is this growing conviction about what there is, what we can say, know and 
explain, that shapes Aristotle’s understanding about what is essential to the human species 
and its individuals. Aristotle explains this in terms of structure and purpose in his Function 
Argument (NE I,7). 
 
It is worth pointing out, that Aristotle’s approach is primarily anthropocentric, in contrast with 
his predecessor, Plato. In the Nicomachean Ethics, as Aristotle tackles the question of why we 
should be good in the context of human flourishing, his starting point is the observation of the 
world of nature, from which claims are made about the way things are, and why animals and 
human beings in particular behave as they behave. Aristotle believes that the answer to these 
questions is to be found not in some super-sensible world of Platonic Forms, as was the case 
with his predecessor, but in the internal organisation of the organisms themselves. Hughes 
(2001: 6) makes this point well as he explains that like Plato, Aristotle seeks to know the 
ultimate explanation of things, but unlike Plato, he believes that questions about such 
explanations must arise out of rather than ignore mundane questions about how we are to 
explain the shapes of inanimate parts of nature, and the shapes, movements and growth of 
animals. Specifically, when assessing how different species of organisms are by nature 
impelled to pursue what is good for them, we can begin to see how values are central to the 
behaviour of living things. As we learn to look at ourselves as animals and to understand how 
animals function, we can see how biology, with its inbuilt values, as is the case in thinking 
animals like humans, leads on to ethics.  
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I will discuss some characteristically human functional capabilities later in this chapter, and 
some of these, though more complex in the human species, nevertheless have their roots in 
their animal counterparts, as will be argued with reference to the philosopher Mary Midgley 
(1978: 4-82) and her elegant and entertaining work. Her position, which she claims to be 
mistakenly challenged by dualists and reductionists alike (Midgley, 1994: 15-18), defends 
human functioning as dependent on its natural characteristics. This provides an important 
insight that much of human life involves adaptation and learning to make a wide range of 
choices available towards realising potential as individuals and societies. 
 
 
2.2.1 Discourse, explanations, and the heart of the matter 
 
Before we delve into the Function Argument itself it is worth sketching out the conceptual 
tools which Aristotle uses to defend his claims about human beings. It is through the 
philosophical lens that Aristotle identifies the constituents of being human and sensitively 
hones what he considers to be the key elements for weaving the story of human flourishing. 
For the purposes of this argument this will be brief and in outline only. 
 
Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the claim that human beings by nature reach out for 
understanding, and that human beings seek to comprehend and grasp the world under some 
general principles that will reveal an order to its multiplicity (Nussbaum, 1986: 259). In 
Aristotle’s words: 
 
It is because of wonder that human beings undertake philosophy, both now and at its 
origins ... The person who is at a loss and in a state of wonder thinks he fails to grasp 
something; this is why the lover of stories is in a sense a philosopher, for stories are 
composed out of wonders. (Metaph. 982b12-19) 
 
As Nussbaum (1986: 260) explains, we wonder and we look for an explanation for the 
apparently wondrous motion. There is a natural continuation between wonder, story-telling 
and theorising. And it is this cyclical process, rich in complexity, which enables us to make clear 
judgements in any given situation. Thus our experience is an object of wonder that serves as 
our starting point for research about the way things are. In the context of learning and 
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evaluation in education, this process of reflective practice and critical deliberation will be 
examined further in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Aristotle also uses the principle of non-contradiction to show that we can only justify 
something from within our experience, as we cannot step outside it. In other words, in 
discourse, by asserting something definite we are also ruling something out, that is, at least its 
opposite (Metaphysics, IV4). According to Aristotle no principle can be provided with an 
explanation that stands outside our discourse or our conceptual scheme. The starting point of 
all discourse is perception and to step outside it would be to cease to think or to speak 
(Nussbaum, 1986: 252-253). In Aristotle’s account of discourse we are able to designate a 
thing in speech only when it impinges on our experience. Aristotle uses thunder as an example 
- when we hear it we can use the name thunder to refer to that noise and only then question 
what this instance of thunder actually is and through this process begin to understand the 
meaning of thunder more fully (Ackrill, 1997:110-131). Furthermore, for Aristotle, it is from the 
things we experience and from this discourse that we can then ask the ‘why’ questions in order 
to understand the mechanisms that make things work as they do. In so doing we begin to 
establish the kind of explanation we are seeking. In the case of human beings we can provide 
explanations based on their structure, and these universal types of explanations, which 
provide reference points, are shaped and refined by further observation of particular instances 
(since perception is our starting point for knowledge, as described earlier).  
 
Aristotle offers four types of explanations which are often misleadingly referred to as causes, a 
word best understood today with reference to the fourth type of explanation only, which deals 
with the origin of change. In his writings, Aristotle puts forward four possible types of 
explanations (aitia) to which all scientific explanation of things can be reduced. (1) Matter 
(hulê): this explanation helps us understand what things are made of. For example, a tree 
grows because it is made of certain materials. (2) Form (morphê or eidos): this explanation 
helps us understand ‘what something is’ or its essence, that is, how matter is organised or that 
which determines the nature (phusis) of the thing in question. In this sense how something is 
organised is not a part of a thing but the thing itself, considered from a particular perspective. 
For example, a tree grows because of the way it is structured. (3) Purpose (telos): this 
explanation helps us understand the aim or function (ergon) of something, especially in the 
case of organisms. For example, a tree grows for the sake of becoming a certain sort of tree, 
and not to look decorative or provide a canopy of shade, though it may do these incidentally. 
Sorabji (1980) points out, that if we turn to human beings, we are to take it as basic that all 
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living things have the capability to grow to the pattern of their species and to maintain 
themselves there, and that this capability can be transmitted to the next generation by those 
that precede them. (4) Origin of Change (More or less what we would nowadays call ‘cause’. 
What makes something happen, brings it into being). Furthermore, in the case of organisms, 
the purpose (3) and form (2) are taken as one.  
 
In line with Sorabji (1980: 49), I will use the word explanation here instead of cause as a more 
rounded translation of the word aitia for today’s audience. Aristotle in his theory of 
explanations understands a ‘thing’ in terms of its form, that is, not just in terms of its material 
stuff or its constituent parts but rather its structure in terms of the way it is organised to 
function. And so in this sense we need to identify the structure that constitutes matter or the 
individual, before we can say something intelligent about the thing itself. This, he holds, can 
only be done from our perception of every particular instance. In respect of human beings, we 
observe the particular form of every individual and we place this information within the wider 
context of the link between them and their natural heritage in evolutionary and psychological 
terms. Of course, human beings can be studied in terms of their material constituents such as 
chemical make-up. And though this is helpful for certain exercises, it will not tell us what we 
need to know about the structure of human beings in terms of what certain aspects of their 
composition are for. For example, when we ask why we have a thyroid, we do not seek just a 
chemical explanation, but rather an explanation that informs us of its purpose, of how human 
beings function better with a thyroid than without, and the reasons why this is so. What a 
thing is for cannot just be explained by its material constituents, but also by its function. The 
key point here is that we seek a level of explanation without which we cannot understand the 
point of something. Hence we must not stop at the material explanation but always look for 
the function, what it is for.  
 
In the case of human beings, Aristotle believes that we are organised in such a way that we are 
enabled to flourish, just like plants are organised in such a way they are able to flourish as they 
photosynthesise etc. So human beings have a set of functional capabilities, some of which we 
share to some extent and in some contexts with other animals (NE 1098a1-4). This formal 
explanation of a human being is what Aristotle would call its soul: a way of explaining this 
living body with all its capacities. It is in this sense that human beings can be defined in terms 
of their capabilities, since for Aristotle, the well-being of any individual consists in the 
integrated exercise of those capabilities. We can see here the inextricable link between 
structure (form) and aim (purpose) in respect of human beings (or indeed other organisms), a 
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structure which through observation, takes into account and is informed by the natural 
heritage of human beings from other animals. Though controversial, philosopher Mary 
Midgley (1978) supports this naturalist view:  
 
Homo Sapiens is an animal. (At least he is not a machine, or an angel, or a fairy, or even 
something from Vulcan) So it would really be odd, would need a lot of accounting for, if 
comparative methods that make good sense over the wide range of other terrestrial 
species suddenly simply had no application to him at all. (Midgley, 1978: 15). 
 
 
2.2.2 Being human, in a nutshell 
 
Ethics, for Aristotle, has something to say about the fulfilled life and about the kind of 
community or society in which persons might hope to function best in order to lead such a life. 
Realising potential requires both understanding of what a fulfilled life consists in and living 
within a supportive structure that enables us to be motivated to work towards such fulfilment 
(NE 1103b26-31). Since Aristotle relates the aim of human life (or telos) to ethics, and the aim 
is interlinked with its natural structure, he considers ethics to be based on the capacities, or 
capabilities of the human being as they become actively alive (NE 1097b33-1098a3). And 
human fulfilment involves all our human capabilities working at their best in harmony with one 
another (NE I.7). In this sense, Aristotle understands fulfilment or realising potential within the 
parameters of how human beings are organised, or structured, in respect of their capabilities.  
 
Aristotle believes that most people would answer the question, ‘What do you aim for in life?’ 
with the answer, ‘fulfilment’. Differences in opinion only appear when asked what fulfilment 
consists in. For Aristotle, fulfilment is the ultimate aim (telos) (NE 1094a18-21) and sufficient of 
itself (NE 1097b14-20). Hence it is not sought for anything further, and disagreements about 
what a fulfilled life amounts to take place within a general agreement that it is a fulfilled life 
that everyone is aiming for. 
 
The arguments in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are complex, sometimes lacking in 
transparency, and there is ongoing debate amongst philosophers as to the most accurate 
interpretation of the text. Bearing this in mind, I will outline some of the arguments, in 
particular in respect of what we share in terms of functioning as human beings. Here, Aristotle 
provides the general method for discovering what fulfilment consists in, as he believes that 
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this is possible only if we can understand the function of a human being. His arguments are 
based on his metaphysical view of the soul, as mentioned above, and focus on the formal 
explanation of being human in terms of explaining this living body with all its capacities. It is 
through this Function Argument
2
 that Aristotle attempts to establish an objective or 
independent foundation upon which ethics and politics can be based, with criteria for 
assessing our generally held beliefs about ethics (Hughes, 2001: 36-41). As Nussbaum (1993: 
242) suggests, Aristotle’s objectivity is justifiable by reference to reasons beyond local 
traditions and practices, as they derive from features of humanness that lie beneath all local 
traditions, and that these are there to be discovered, whether or not they are recognised by 
local traditions. Furthermore, there is evidence in favour of an argument in support of shared 
natural characteristics that explain why some of these features of humanness not only lie 
beneath all local traditions but also stem from and are shared by other animals (Midgley, 
1978). Midgley argues in favour of such an argument from nature bringing evidence from 
various disciplines including neurology and socio-biology, anthropology, and psychology (ibid.: 
4- 82). Nussbaum (1993) recognises that the fact that Aristotle held this position, does not 
necessarily make it true. Nevertheless, as she points out: ‘it does, on the whole, make that 
something a plausible candidate for the truth, one deserving our most serious scrutiny’ (ibid.: 
243). 
 
Aristotle considers that humans, as organisms, have an inbuilt function or aim, which is 
achieved when they function properly. And what is meant by living fulfilled lives is simply 
functioning properly by exercising our human capabilities (NE 1098a16-18), which are natural 
characteristics that we all share. He would consider the function of a human being to be, as he 
puts it, ‘activity of the soul’ (NE 1098a7), by which he means that the being or essential nature 
of an individual is expressed through a typifying activity (which would be congruent with the 
central doctrine of his Metaphysics) (Broadie and Rowe, 2002: 276).  
 
The typifying activity which Aristotle sometimes refers to, as we saw earlier, is exemplified in 
different people exercising their characteristic function well in varying ways. Aristotle gives 
various examples, such as the flute player, the sculptor, or the carpenter (NE 1097b25). 
Nussbaum supports this comparison with crafts as a ‘useful analogy’ (1986: 293), as it 
illustrates how understanding of good lyre playing, for example, must begin from an 
understanding of what those functions are. And good functioning for any craft practitioner 
must remain within the boundaries of what that activity in its nature is. Similarly, the search 
for the good life in any human being must begin with the essential ingredients of a human life 
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and human activity. According to Aristotle, what is characteristic in all human beings and all 
these craft practitioners is ‘being actively alive’ (NE 1097b33-1098a3). This activity relies on 
exercising our capabilities, thus making the best available choices in our conduct, and can be 
understood as living well as a ‘thinking/perceiving body’ (NE 1178a20). Making judgements 
here means living life with reference to a principle about what being human entails, 
recognising our fundamental human capabilities and activating them, and applying reflective 
practice to every instance in order to make sense of life as a whole.  
 
This argument allows for considerable individual variations, and possibly owing to the 
complexity of human beings Aristotle’s views of what is characteristically human in respect of 
human capabilities is quite inexact. It could be said that Aristotle would not include destructive 
capabilities, for example, such as lying or stealing. One reason for this is that since essential 
capabilities for Aristotle are practical reason and affiliation, fulfilment also requires exercising 
these capabilities well. That is, we need to exercise our capabilities with excellence or 
commitment and dedication, from both a personal perspective and within the context of 
others’ needs. In this sense human fulfilment must consist of intelligent action to which our 
other capabilities contribute (such as food, a healthy body, adequate shelter etc), or must be 
involved in intelligent action (for example emotions, NE I,8). In Chapter 7, I will explore the 
growth metaphor in education and attempt to salvage the concept of growth in respect of 
learning and realising potential, from the Aristotelian perspective which excludes destructive 
capabilities and requires practical reason and affiliation as pivotal to excellence and fulfilment. 
 
For Aristotle, having an excellence (aretē), is to say that the thing is good of its kind, and to say 
it is good of its kind is to say it is able to perform its characteristic function well (NE 1106a15-
24). The good of a thing of a given kind is in its function (NE 1097b25-8), and the function term 
primarily names an activity (NE 1098a5-7) (Broadie & Rowe, 2002: 277). And as we mentioned 
earlier, in Aristotle’s account (NE 1098a17-18) the human good turns out to be a very general 
kind of thing, which in today’s terms might be lived out differently by persons in different 
contexts. Furthermore, being actively alive (NE 1097b33-1098a3) or functioning well, or having 
a complete life (NE 1098a18-20), must include an abundance of opportunities for excellent 
activity and mutual support to exercise the functional capabilities. It is in this way that we 
develop rational maturity (and rational here includes the notion of balanced emotional 
awareness as an integral element), are able to make sense of our lives, and thus can realise our 
human potential or fulfilment. 
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In summary, through the Function Argument Aristotle tries to answer important questions. 
First, he argues that all human beings aim at fulfilment or a worthwhile life. Second, he holds 
that a worthwhile life must involve developing our specifically human characteristics to the 
full. Third, he concludes that, upon reflection, what is most characteristically human about 
ourselves is the way in which thought permeates and shapes our lives, not just our intellectual 
lives, but also our feelings and emotions, what we choose, and how we relate to others. 
Understanding our common human features with reference where applicable to our link with 
other animals, for example, ‘in the area of motivation such as territorial instinct, or parental 
craft, or communal living’ (Midgley, 1978: 4-82), is invaluable as we map how living a good life 
impacts on our individual and societal fulfilment.  
 
In Chapter 4, I will examine further what well-being, or fulfilment (eudaimonia) consists in. But 
at this stage, from Aristotle’s Function Argument, we can see his conviction that ethics 
depends on an account of human nature, which in turn depends on an account of biology and 
physics etc. As we deepen our understanding of our biological make up including associated 
areas such as the mind and consciousness we will have a fuller grasp of how a human being is 
organised, the implications for functioning, and the support necessary to enable every person 
to realise their fundamental human capabilities. What we do know from this account is that 
human fulfilment ‘is clearly something complete and self-sufficient, being the end of practical 
undertakings’ (NE 1097b20-22). And although we know that we lack the full picture when we 
speak about what it is to be human, we can nevertheless identify general definitions in respect 
of the essence of being human.  
 
In our contemporary debate about realising potential, we can draw important lessons from 
adopting an approach that seeks to understand the structure of being human as a basis for 
making judgements about living well, and that helps us map our lives towards fulfilment. It is 
this search for what we all share as human beings that enables us to name with increasing 
certainty, the basic human capabilities that demand universal support structures. Without 
this shared framework and definition, our human quest for realising potential becomes a 
private matter about which we cannot make assessment or communicate in any meaningful 
way as it lacks any shared understanding. Furthermore, these human capabilities are complex 
and we should not be tempted to oversimplify them (as in the case of reductionism), or 
aggregate them (as in the case of utilitarianism) in our obsession for classification which 
reduces understanding to scientism. The endeavour to improve the quality of life for all 
people to flourish is a noble one, but we must remain sensitive to the complexities of this 
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quest. Aristotle’s contribution to the study of human flourishing is particularly significant 
because his stance in respect of human functional capabilities and hence the Capabilities 
Approach (though he does not use this language himself) is an ethical matter. This insistence 
on the ethical focus provides a crucial dimension, often ignored in economics or social 
science, or even education. 
 
 
2.2.3 Our shared human capabilities: The precursor to the Capabilities Approach 
 
As mentioned previously, Aristotle considers the essential nature of an individual to be 
expressed through a typifying activity, and such activities are the realisation of the key human 
capabilities. The word Aristotle uses for capabilities is dunameis, which is the same word that 
in the singular, is often translated potentiality as contrasted to act. As Irwin explains, with 
reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics (IX), ‘if x has the capacity to function, x is capable of 
functioning and x will function in the right conditions’ (1991: 318). In this sense a capability is 
what is realised in an activity.  
 
According to Aristotle, capabilities are either innate as in the case of sensing, or learnt as in 
the case of a builder, building (Eg. NE 1103a20-35). But even the learnt ones presuppose an 
innate potentiality to learn, since there are innate capabilities that we simply display in 
actuality without choosing so to do or learn. Sensing, for example, is prior to our acts of 
seeing or hearing (NE 1103a26-30). But there are also capabilities that in order to realise we 
need to learn or practice, and choose to activate. Aristotle uses the illustration of the builder 
or the cithara player and tell us that they become builders by building, or cithara players by 
playing the cithara (NE 1103a35). Some of these capabilities are incidental and others 
essential to being human. We have the incidental capacities to become many things in terms 
of craft (NE 1094a10-26) only some of which we will realise, such as the example Aristotle 
gives of the builder or cithara player, or in today’s professions, a lawyer, a surgeon, an 
astronaut, a magician etc. It is possible that we have many dunameis, which we never 
actualise at all, for example, being a lawyer or a gifted musician. These would be innate 
powers, which are accidental to human nature.  
 
The capabilities just mentioned can be contrasted with, for example, the capability to learn to 
speak, think, walk, decide, reproduce, all of which are essential properties of humans. In other 
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words, they are part of our definition, our ousia (ousia is also used as equivalent to essence 
NE 1107a6 in respect of excellences). The function of a human being, as we have seen, is to 
develop our essential capabilities in a harmonious manner in order to live a fulfilled life. For 
Aristotle, there is a variety of ways in which this can be done and not all humans living fulfilled 
lives are said to be living the same kind of life in detail even if they must be doing so in 
fundamentals. Aristotle also writes of natural (essential or fundamental) capabilities from 
which the virtues or excellences develop (NE 1103a25) which enable us to realise our aim as 
human beings, as we learn and practice them to help us choose well. These capabilities which 
we can develop or not, as we choose, are known as hexeis, often translated as habits, 
dispositions, or states (Eg. NE 1103a26-b25; NE 1104a11-b3). These are learned dispositions, 
which can be chosen or not, and learned well or badly, which can then be activated in 
appropriate circumstances in respect of human fulfilment. It is in this context that human 
fulfilment consists of exercising our fundamental capabilities well, of which practical reason, 
which fine tunes our ability to choose well, and affiliation are crucial.  
 
As outlined above, Aristotle’s view of our shared discourse is also applied in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. In respect of human fulfilment our shared discourse and the choices we make in 
pursuit of well-being or flourishing, are framed within the parameters of our ‘grounding 
experiences’ as human beings (Nussbaum, 1993:250). Aristotle outlines these and describes 
and defines them in general terms in NE II.7. These grounding experiences fix the reference 
for our deliberations about how to live well. It is these grounding experiences from which 
Nussbaum (1993) develops the contemporary Capabilities Approach which informs the 
ongoing debate on equality, and that will give us important pointers for education towards 
realising potential. For example, Nussbaum defends including the humanities as integral to 
the curriculum, and fostering reflection, critical deliberation, and dialogue, in order to 
educate responsible citizens capable of collaboration across differences and borders to solve 
pressing global problems (1997; 2010). This need for sensitive critical deliberation through 
reflective practice in education will be further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, in respect of 
learning and evaluation respectively. 
 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3. It is worth 
mentioning at this point that Richard Rorty’s (1989) pragmatist view, which resembles the 
Capabilities Approach in spirit, has no substantive vision of a shared human nature. It is this 
lack of a shared human nature, in my opinion, which misguides Rorty’s otherwise persuasive 
arguments, as they do not allow for any universal reference point based on what we share as 
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human beings beyond the confines of specific cultures, or at times the private experience. 
Instead, Midgley (1978; 1994) builds a strong case in favour of a shared human nature and 
towards sensitive objectivity, which in contrast to Rorty lays the ground for effective 
communication between the private and the public sphere. It is such an approach, in my 
opinion, from which a moral framework such as that envisaged by Aristotle, should guide us 
today as a society to strive for a minimum threshold of human functional capabilities to be 
available to all, such as proposed in Nussbaum’s capabilities list (2000: 74-75). Otherwise we 
are always limited by the confines of our specific context and arbitrary environment, unable 
to break out beyond this subjective lens when making ethical judgements on our journey of 
human development. 
 
  
2.3 A shared human nature: Enabling sensitive critical understanding and diversity 
 
Midgley, reminds us wisely that: 
 
The world does not relapse into helpless confusion just because things have more than 
one aspect and can be correctly described in more than one way. On the contrary, 
overlapping pictures taken from different angles provide the right way to get a 
reasonably unified notion of an object. Grasping this benign plurality is the first step in a 
rational approach to language. (1994: 56). 
 
 
2.3.1 In favour of a common understanding of human flourishing 
 
It is clear from the previous section that Aristotle’s assumption is that the good for humankind 
can be understood with reference to human nature, where human nature is understood from 
the sum of the individual standpoints and requires continuous dialogue and scrutiny that seeks 
out the most important judgements and beliefs about the way human beings have defined 
themselves to themselves. This requires that we make use of our faculty of reason which itself 
is honed by our emotions and desires. But we must remember Aristotle’s comment that this is 
not an exact science and should not demand more exactness than the subject demands (NE 
1098a26-29). This common understanding supports an objective standpoint, but not of the 
scientific kind later developed in the enlightenment period, which many, including Rorty, 
rightly refute. Hence, Rorty argues that we need to give up the notion that ‘all contributions to 
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a given discourse … can be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational 
agreement can be reached’ (1979: 299).  
 
However, Rorty goes further and offers a kind of hermeneutics operating only within the 
assumptions of a particular culture, and thus disclaiming any kind of objectivity in respect of 
truth, arrived at using a framework of reason. This illustrates a complete loss of confidence in 
the power of reason to understand our nature, or to support the notion of a shared human 
nature. Because Rorty (1989) maintains that there is no permanence in life, the best we can 
hope for is to find grounds in solidarity (ibid.: 189-99). His notion of contingency (ibid.: 3-72) 
points not to anything permanent, but to the fact that we are who we are just because we are 
thrown by our circumstances into a particular family, at a particular time and culture. Thus in 
the face of such radical inability to know anything permanent or universal in humanity all we 
can do is find grounds for solidarity when trying to understand, for example, what hurts, 
humiliates and shames people.  
 
Although Rorty does not mention the Capabilities Approach, in respect of the human 
functional capabilities we have been discussing, this perspective is not too far away from the 
idea that we have various capacities, such as capacities for feeling shame, hurt and pain. 
However there is a relativism here that does not allow these capabilities to be agreed or 
translated between cultures or indeed peoples, or between the private and the public spheres, 
which challenges this idea of solidarity. Others, such as Gadamer, in Truth and Method (1960), 
refute the enlightenment’s obsession with scientific-style objectivity with its reduction to 
scientism in respect of hermeneutics. Gadamer for example, claims that solidarity is achieved 
in the ‘fusion of horizons’ between people (Lawn, 2006: 66). Lawn describes Gadamer as a 
‘perspectival realist’ (2006: 122) since his view of solidarity, unlike Rorty’s, is developed from 
within a realist position albeit limited by perspective. The very fact that we do communicate 
and concede a common language suggests that there is something beyond each individual, 
even if we can only interpret this from our sense perception and from somewhat myopic 
perspectives. Aristotle’s views on discourse demonstrate that he would not seek objectivity 
beyond that which is possible for human beings, limited as we are by our contextualised sense 
perception.  
 
For Rorty (1989), trying to synthesise the public and private spheres of human existence is 
futile. As he writes: 
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The closest we will come to joining these two quests is to see the aim of a just and free 
society as letting its citizens be as privatistic … as they please so long as they do it … 
causing no harm to others and using no resources needed by those less advantaged. 
There are practical measures to be taken to accompany this practical goal ... [In respect 
of speaking about the private and the public] there is no way to make both speak a 
single language. (1989: xiv-xv). 
 
Seeing things from different perspectives, or through different lenses, or using different 
language frameworks or genres, does not of itself mean that we are not referring to the same 
thing. This would be the case whether the approach is poetic, artistic, literary, or scientific. We 
may nevertheless find it very difficult to arrive at a common understanding when translating 
between these differing interpretations. These may include: the poet, describing the sense of 
wonder at the enormity of the universe; the artist, depicting the interplay of light and dark; the 
writer, describing the onset of day from ‘the morning star’ or of night from ‘the evening star’; 
and the scientist, labelling their discovered planet as ‘Venus’ and assigning a formula to 
describe it. All these interpretations, from their particular perspective, could be said to be 
depicting the same reality, and together gather deeper understanding than apart. Crucially, 
arriving at a shared understanding requires sensitive critical deliberation which must include 
real dialogue and reflection.  
 
Similarly in the case of the human condition and human nature we must continue seeking 
greater understanding of our shared reality, and we should resist this progressive loss of 
confidence in the powers of reason itself, both to understand our nature, and to direct the 
course of our lives. We need not see a complete discontinuity between the thoughts of the 
private and the public, or the past and the present, and rather enter into a constructive 
dialogue between each viewpoint, using the points of contact that we already have, from 
whatever discipline they originate. Nagel (1986: 3-4) supports this endeavour to relate the 
subjective and the objective viewpoints. This proposal urges us to take both angles seriously 
and in relation to one another. As Nagel points out, objectivity is only one technique used in 
understanding, and combined with our subjective viewpoint it can be reshaped and vice versa. 
There is a balance of the private and public, a relation of the two aspects of life, which simply 
‘defies distortions’ (Midgley, 1978: 75). However, given the ultimate separation of the public 
and the private to which Rorty is committed, his perspective does not allow for a universal 
moral dimension to be considered in matters of functional capabilities. And in accordance with 
Aristotle’s thought, it is precisely this moral dimension that we seek in respect of realising 
human capabilities towards flourishing. Therefore, instead, we should continue to seek a 
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common understanding with confidence, as Midgley, Nussbaum and Aristotle before them 
have sought to do. The philosopher John Cottingham (1998), also encourages us to persevere 
in this search. 
 
That the task facing us is such a formidable one, and so uncertain of success, may give us 
pause, but is no decisive ground for giving up in despair, nor for concluding that there is 
anything inherently suspect in the philosophical goal of striving for a life guided by a 
rationally informed vision of the good. (Cottingham, 1998:27). 
 
 
2.3.2 In support of a shared human nature 
 
As outlined above, Aristotle’s approach is informed by biology. Today, the sciences including 
psychology also provide evidence in support of both a shared human nature and the shaping 
force of nurture (Nettle, 2007). We are very similar in many ways to other mammals, both in 
terms of physiological make-up and behavioural traits. Midgley, makes an admirable case in 
favour of a naturalistic stance for human beings, bringing evidence from various disciplines 
including neurology, socio-biology, anthropology, and psychology (1978: 4-82). Even though 
contemporary scientific developments have further nuanced and fed our understanding of the 
human condition and its roots, her argument, supported by evidence from many scientific and 
social science disciplines, still holds true today. Midgley (1994: 44-51) acknowledges that we 
should not seek scientific-style objectivity of the kind exemplified by scientism, given that 
human affairs are complex and our powers of understanding limited. Regarding differing 
perspectives or viewpoints, Midgley argues that these are connected and that we can 
investigate the various viewpoints and attempt to relate them. In her view, enquiry is not 
about choosing one view as the true one, but about deciphering a composite picture from 
them all. And as the quotation below illustrates, we should not overestimate our faculties as 
capable of certainty or complete understanding. 
 
Whatever else evolution may have accomplished, it plainly has never put any pressures 
on our species that would be likely to give us faculties capable of grasping this or any 
other subject-matter completely. (Midgley, 1994: 44). 
 
Midgley (1994: 108) suggests it is reasonable that we understand the way of life that suits 
human beings, if we understand their nature more fully by knowing about their natural 
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heritage. And although human morality cannot be reduced to or equated with anything found 
among other social creatures, some key areas can be understood if considered from a shared 
natural social background. In Midgley’s words, ‘we are not just rather like animals; we are 
animals’ (Midgley, 1978: xiii). Though differences with other animals are many, comparisons 
have always been made and these help us understand ourselves. However, rationality, and to 
some extent culture and speech are some of our distinguishing features from other animals.  
Furthermore, she maintains that animals are not machines, and to try to reduce them to 
machines is wrongheaded. The metaphor of function in respect of humans remains a helpful 
one in that it gives us insights as to what something is for, or in the case of humans, what is 
good for them. Implicit in this is a value judgement: what counts as a plus or a minus. And our 
structure of instincts and motivations indicates what is good and bad for us. So, if it is true we 
are naturally enquiring animals, and that this tendency has a fairly central place in our natural 
structure of preference, then it follows that enquiry is an important pursuit for us, and the 
same would apply to other tendencies (Midgley,1978: 75). We cannot drop our tendencies or 
motivations but we do have the choice of better or worse ways of expressing them (ibid.:76-7). 
For example this is the case in respect of how we care for our young, our need for private 
space, our social groupings for safety, how we deal with fear, etc. It is also important that the 
claim of a shared human nature is not reduced to a scientific material account of our species, 
and Midgley points to the genetic explanation for humans as important but not exclusively so. 
As we are social beings, taking the long evolutionary perspective here is essential since society 
‘is not an alternative to genetic programming’ although it ‘requires it’ (Midgley, 1978: 95-6). 
We need therefore, both the material and evolutionary perspectives as they require each 
other, and we should not deny either or reduce one to another. 
 
The motivation of living creatures does not boil down to any single basic force. It is a complex 
pattern of separate elements always being readjusted. Creatures really have ‘divergent and 
conflicting desires and motivation is fundamentally plural’ (Midgley, 1978: 168). When we 
wonder whether something is good, our common sense will direct our attention to wants. And 
it is because our wants conflict that we have problems. We therefore need a priority system by 
which we can evaluate these, and in doing so ‘take our species’ wants and needs as facts’ 
(ibid.: 182). As she reminds us, ‘The question is never which wants to have. It is always what to 
do about conflicts between existing ones’ (ibid.: 183). Moral philosophy attempts to do this, as 
it ‘understands, clarifies, relates, and harmonises the claims arising from the various aspects of 
our nature’ (ibid.: 169). And it is the likeness of our emotional constitutions, which makes us 
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able to ‘sympathise to some extent with one another’s dilemmas’ (ibid.: 173-4). Midgely’s 
example below explains this point further. 
 
We can all feel respect, guilt, horror, admiration, regret, and the like. And though we do 
not feel them in unison, we are sufficiently within shouting distance in the matter to be 
able to understand one another’s reactions if we try, and to exchange reasons for 
thinking on of these responses suitable … general willingness to think and talk in this 
way shows a jointly inherited physical basis … Understanding ethics, means, in the first 
place, as with mathematics, being able to follow an ethical argument. Next, … it means 
being able to state and generalise the standards involved. Third, it means being able to 
relate those standards to other forms of thought, to say something about the place of 
ethics in life. (1978: 173-74). 
 
It is therefore key that we see ourselves as part of the biosphere in which we reside and that 
we acknowledge our shared roots with other animals as well as our shared natural 
characteristics as a human species.  
 
 
Summary 
 
Aristotle’s philosophy shapes the Capabilities Approach with its rich notion of what it means to 
be human and fulfil or realise human potential. This view is counter to the individualistic 
conception of realising potential evaluated in utilitarian terms. Instead, realising potential in 
the Aristotelian sense consists in realising the common potential of human nature that 
underpins or gives shape to developing individual talent. This view rests on Aristotle’s complex 
account of ethics, which rests on the development of our human capacities with reference to 
our shared grounding experiences that we understand across the human populace. What is 
critical here is an ethical dimension that is borne from the starting point that we all share a 
human nature full of potentialities which exercises the ethical demand. This is the practical 
implication of Aristotle’s philosophy for the contemporary Capabilities Approach that is the 
subject of Chapter 3. 
  
Adopting a stance in favour of a shared human nature, and making use of an ethical 
framework such as Aristotle’s in respect of some essential functional characteristics of human 
beings, enables us to forge a path between our individual and societal conflicts, towards 
 59
human flourishing. Aristotle helps us understand that the Capabilities Approach is complex, 
because human beings are complex, and that as will be discussed in Chapter 4, human 
flourishing or fulfilment is about more than happiness simply understood. What we seek in the 
Capabilities Approach is ‘a truth that is anthropocentric but not relativistic’ (Nussbaum, 
1986:11) and that of necessity takes the moral dimension into account. In this way, seeing our 
human capabilities from the perspective of our shared human characteristics, and being 
observant of our natural evolutionary roots, helps us develop a shared language and ethical 
framework for evaluating human flourishing. It thus provides an important platform, from 
which we can work towards nurturing society in respect of equality, trust and co-operation 
between human beings, locally and globally.  
         
Aristotle’s arguments equip us with starting points for living well based on general natural 
characteristics we share as human beings. This in turn enables us to give explanations towards 
human flourishing that respect the diverse human condition and that include an important 
ethical dimension. Aristotle’s far-reaching and inclusive approach enables us to recognise a 
shared language and calls us to map a shared journey that is focused beyond the individual, 
that resists viewing individuals as units of production, and that is anchored in mutual relation 
and shared human capabilities. This Aristotelian view, though thousands of years old, 
continues to challenge societies’ commonly held beliefs about progress in respect of quality of 
life and, as will be discussed in later chapters, provides an important conceptual framework for 
education to challenge the utility based culture of ‘performativity’ (Lyotard, 1984: 88).  
 
 
 
                                            
1
 Social science research now recognises the importance of individual and collective social 
action as an indicator of quality of life for well-being leading to flourishing communities. 
Reference: Nick Marc’s research, nef: http://www.neweconomics.org/programmes/well-
being 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Capabilities Approach for personal and social development  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3, focuses on the contemporary Capabilities Approach and the importance of 
developing this approach using Aristotle’s philosophy, as outlined in the previous chapters. 
This thesis suggests that this approach includes the ethical dimension necessary for 
considering questions about human development, quality of life and equality, also so 
important for deliberations about education theory and practice.  
 
As we engage with issues about personal and social human development, quality of life and 
equality, the Aristotelian view discussed in the Chapters 1 and 2, is relevant here. In particular, 
it challenges societies’ beliefs about the assessment of quality of life. This is the case, whether 
quality of life is considered from the economic perspective of an increase in Gross Domestic 
Product and Gross National Product (GNP), or from the psychological perspective of individual 
self-report of feeling happy. However, numerical comparisons in respect of GNP or happiness 
are often taken as objective indicators for measuring quality of life. While this approach is 
seductive, it runs the risk of over-simplifying the complexities of the human condition by 
reducing a plethora of non-commensurable factors to a single numerical scale. The insistence 
on a scientific approach based primarily on numbers to measure human development reduces 
what is important for development or quality of life to an overly narrow view, limited to one 
area or ‘space’ (Sen, 1992: 1)
1
.  At its worst, it is susceptible to scientism as critiqued by Smith 
(2011). 
 
An important reason to critique a narrow approach limited to one ‘space’ is its tendency 
towards a reduced understanding of equality in society (for example, in terms of units of 
production or happiness respectively as is the case in either GDP or psychological 
measurements as the key measures for quality of life). This narrow understanding of equality 
provides only a partial understanding of quality of life, as it does not recognise that equality in 
one ‘space’ often means inequality in other ‘spaces’. As Sen (1992: 1, 30)
 2
 suggests, the 
subject is more complex and sensitive than this narrow approach allows. Instead, what is 
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necessary is an approach that takes into consideration both objective and subjective accounts 
of human progress, and which is capable of discussing nuances between ‘spaces’. 
Furthermore, discussions about equality in respect of working towards enabling persons to 
realise their potential take on greater seriousness when considered within the ethical 
dimension which the Aristotelian view embraces. 
 
Aristotle’s philosophical approach helps us challenge the utilitarian stance towards assessing 
quality of life by numbers, and the purely income-based economic view. Based on an 
understanding of shared human characteristics, Aristotle’s philosophy enables us to engage 
with complexities about quality of life in a nuanced way as we map the journey in respect of 
flourishing. Aristotle’s position gives depth and support to the basic claim of every individual to 
dignity and concern. This position incorporates an essential ethical dimension. Specifically, it 
calls us to pay credence to the ethical dimension of our personal and social responsibility to 
ensure equality as we engage in supporting the development of human capabilities, such that 
no one is prevented from developing those capabilities which we consider essential for 
flourishing across humanity. Therefore this view maintains that it is by developing such human 
capabilities that persons are best able to flourish and realise their potential, as they plan and 
make decisions in their lives and with reference to others.  
 
The benefits of making sustained efforts to embrace the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities 
Approach in education, will be the subject of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. Suffice to point out at this 
juncture that the Capabilities Approach offers the opportunity to make considerable inroads 
into enabling individuals and communities to realise their potential, by discerning the elements 
necessary for inclusion in education, and by ensuring provision of opportunities accordingly 
which adopt a sensitive interpretative approach to evaluation. Importantly, Aristotle’s 
contribution, including his philosophical tools and concepts about shared human 
characteristics and capabilities, together with the contemporary Capabilities Approach, 
strengthen education theory and practice in respect of realising potential.  
 
 
3.1 The Capabilities Approach: A contemporary perspective inspired by Aristotle 
 
The contemporary Capabilities Approach was developed in the 1980s by economist Amartya 
Sen. It was initiated by his search for a better perspective on individual advantage than that 
found in the moral and political philosopher John Rawls’ focus on primary goods (Sen, 1992: 7-
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8), as critiqued by McMurrin (1980 in Sen 2009: 234). Sen suggests that ‘primary goods are at 
best, means to the valued ends of human life’. They are ends to other things, in particular 
freedom. The capability approach is particularly concerned with correcting this focus on means 
and instead focusing on the opportunity to fulfil ends and the ‘substantive freedom to achieve 
those reasoned ends’ (2009: 234).Consequently, the Capabilities Approach was aimed at 
bringing new ideas previously excluded from welfare economics.  
 
The wider relevance of the Capabilities Approach soon became clear to Sen (1992), and the 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum. She has strongly influenced the way the approach has 
developed, has since worked together with Sen on the project of human capabilities 
(Nussbaum and Sen, 1993), and was the one to point out its connection with Aristotelian ideas. 
In collaboration with Nussbaum, development economist Sudhir Anand, and economic theorist 
James Foster, both referenced by Sen (1992: 154, 168-9), the Capabilities Approach has been 
accepted as a paradigm for policy debate in human development, inspiring the creation of the 
HDI (United Nations Human Development Index) as a measurement of progress first 
implemented in the Human Development Report in 1990
3
.  
 
It is worth noting that the Capabilities Approach has been used to evaluate human 
development issues by many and in various areas ever since. It is a complex topic which has 
attracted attention across disciplinary boundaries contributing to debates in economics, 
political philosophy, health, social policy and world development work in some or all these 
areas. For example, as mentioned above the Capabilities Approach to human development 
continues to be used by the United Nations in their work on Human Development
4
. Also, the 
Brundtland Report (1987) produced by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, when defining sustainable development, makes the essential link between the 
value of the environment and the lives of living creatures. This view has since been refined by 
economist Robert Solow (Sen 2009: 250)
5
, applying a wider view of humanity than was first 
used in the original report. In addition, theoretical and applied discussions in support of the 
Capabilities Approach are provided by economists and others including Sen (1992), Nussbaum 
and Sen (1993), and Basu and Kanbur (2009).  
 
What this section offers is a focus on the contemporary Capabilities Approach put forward by 
Nussbaum, and reasons in favour of its importance today. It seems to me that Nussbaum’s 
(2000: 11-15) Capabilities Approach, which does not fundamentally contradict with Sen’s 
understanding, lays the groundwork for engaging with the equality debate in a meaningful way 
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that includes an essential ethical dimension. As supported by Walker and Unterhalter (2010) 
the Capabilities Approach in education is better equipped to enable equality in this area than 
either the utilitarian or resource based approaches. However, they do not engage with the 
theoretical underpinning which results in the ethical dimension so critical to the Capabilities 
Approach as proposed by Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian version. In Chapters 5 to 8, I will 
explore the particular contribution of this approach to education theory and practice.  
 
The Capabilities Approach is a general approach, focused on information about individual 
potential and thus advantages, and judged in terms of opportunities rather than a specific 
design for how a society should be organised. This perspective points to the central relevance 
of the inequality of capabilities as we evaluate social disparities, but it does not propose any 
specific formula for policy decisions (Sen, 2009: 232). In addition, the Capabilities Approach is 
sensitive to plurality and difference and focuses on human life rather than on ‘detached 
objects of convenience, such as incomes or commodities that a person may possess, which are 
often taken, especially in economic analysis, to be the main criteria of human success’ (ibid.: 
233)
6
. Furthermore, the Capabilities Approach in contrast with the utility or resource-based 
approaches, demands that we attend to various things: (1) the importance of considering 
capability rather than focusing on achievement exclusively, which includes the responsibility 
and obligations of societies and individuals to help the vulnerable; (2) the plural composition of 
capabilities and the essential role of practical reasoning for deliberation (since we cannot 
reduce all the things we have reason to value into one homogeneous magnitude, reflected 
evaluation demands reasoning, and not just counting); and (3) the place of individuals and 
communities and their interrelations (Sen, 2009: 235-252). 
 
The Capabilities Approach makes an essential contribution to the way we should view justice 
and injustice, in terms of assessing advantage and disadvantage. Put another way, it offers an 
important focus based on shared human capabilities against which to evaluate what is better 
or worse for human beings in respect of flourishing. In contrast, the utilitarian approach 
concentrates on individual utility (for example, happiness or pleasure) as the essential criteria 
for evaluating advantage or disadvantage generally. This of course is dependent on 
aggregation and commensurability of values, which goes contrary to the ethical dimension 
proposed in this study. Another approach popular in economics is to focus on income, wealth 
or resources. Unlike the Capabilities Approach, neither the utility-based approach or the 
resources-based approach allows for assessments to take into consideration what a person is 
capable of doing or being, and what that person has reason to value. An essential concept of 
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capability therefore, is its link with the opportunity aspect of freedom, rather than just 
focusing on what happens at ‘culmination’ (Sen, 2009: 232), and of considering each person as 
an end rather than as aggregated data or an average (Nussbaum, 2000: 41-47). Furthermore, 
as Sen and Nussbaum both agree, an approach that is respectful of each person’s struggle for 
flourishing, requires both understanding of the generality and the particular. Thus it requires 
both, some overarching benchmarks (such as those given by the Capabilities Approach), and 
detailed knowledge (collected as stories from the particular context). The Capabilities 
Approach aims at a fairly radical change in the standard evaluative foci widely used in 
economics and social studies, which in turn influences education. Nussbaum’s contribution to 
this approach offers a theoretical framework of universal human capabilities as a guide for 
each individual in their development of normative ethics. Nussbaum’s work on universal values 
provides a basis for global human development, and in particular it emphasises that we ensure 
the value and dignity of every person (ibid.: 69). 
 
The Greek poet Pindar wrote a poem about what the good life for human beings requires. He 
believes that ‘human excellence grows like a vine tree, fed by the green dew, raised up, among 
wise men and just, to the liquid sky’ (Pindar, Nemean VIII.40-2. The citations are from lines 39 
and 42-4. Cited in Nussbaum, 1986: 1). This poem illustrates our shared human need for a 
particular kind of climate in order to function well as human beings (Nussbaum, 1986: 1). Using 
Nussbaum’s contemporary human Capabilities Approach (2000: 34-110; 2001: 414-425), I 
would suggest that essential for human fulfilment, is that certain shared human functional 
capabilities, in reality have the potential to be realised (from the individual context and in 
plural ways). In Chapter 2, we examined Aristotle’s view of the ‘good person’, which is similar 
to the person which Pindar suggests has developed excellence. Aristotle’s view is that such a 
person is able to identify starting points to basic things that help us flourish, based on our 
knowledge of human nature, such as our need for health, shelter, meaning and purpose, right 
relation, love, and friendship etc. Furthermore, from these general benchmarks, we can point 
to particulars when this is missing in a person’s life, either our own, someone else’s, or a whole 
community. For example, by observation we can see if someone is consistently eating the 
wrong food; is living rough; has no access to housing; is discriminated against for their gender, 
or skin colour, or religion; is abusing their body or others through substance abuse, or 
inappropriate behaviour; alienates themselves from the community through anti-social 
behaviour; does not trust others, or co-operate with others; and so on. We aim at human 
flourishing by making judgements based on motivation, observation and deliberation. And we 
strive for justice by using the general starting points about what we share as humans as our 
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reference base and link these starting points with the observations we make in each particular 
instance. This is the process by which change happens. 
 
As discussed, Aristotle argues that we share general characteristics by virtue of being human, 
an important one of these being the capacity for deliberating through conflicts. Like all human 
beings, this essential capacity, together with other human capacities, requires care (support, 
trust and co-operation) and excellence to be realised. And also as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Midgley shows that this claim of shared human characteristics is part of our evolutionary 
heritage, and is one in which we can be confident, given the large body of evidence that exists 
from the sciences and social sciences. This basic shared human capacity for care, affiliation, 
and deliberation forms an essential part of the moral imperative that we, as a society, must 
work towards realising (Nussbaum, 2000: 72). This claim is supported by Aristotle in his view 
that we are inherently social beings, or as he puts it, man is ‘by nature a civic being’ (NE 
1097b11). It is this ethical dimension, inspired by Aristotle, which is integral to the 
contemporary Capabilities Approach offered by Nussbaum.  
 
Nussbaum (2000: 34-110) has developed this line of thought through her significant 
contribution to the Capabilities Approach, which includes a much-needed moral imperative for 
individuals, governments, and global development and sustainability (ibid.: 83). Any theory of 
ethics, and more specifically any theory of justice, must decide on the most appropriate 
features on which to focus, so as to evaluate a society and assess justice or injustice therein. It 
seems to me, that the Capabilities Approach generally, and Nussbaum’s contribution in 
particular, offer suitable starting points for evaluating development and working towards 
justice between peoples and nations. Based on shared human characteristics that cross 
cultures, the Capabilities Approach offers a unifying structure which is sensitive to the diverse 
and plural nature of societies, and from which we can work together globally. Nussbaum refers 
to this when she says that her project, ‘commits itself from the start to making cross-cultural 
comparisons and to developing a defensible set of cross-cultural categories’ (ibid.: 35). The 
core idea is that of a human being as a ‘dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in 
co-operation and reciprocity with others’ (ibid.: 72). And this idea of human dignity according 
to Nussbaum has broad cross-cultural resonance and intuitive power. As is particularly evident 
in today’s fast changing global environment which we all share, cultures are dynamic and 
change is a very basic element in all of them (ibid.: 35, 48).  
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Nussbaum shares Aristotle’s view that once people take the opportunity to reflect and 
deliberate about their situation: ‘In general, people seek not the way of their ancestors, but 
the good’ (Politics, 1269a3-4). And as the quotation below illustrates, it is because of our 
shared characteristics as human beings in our journey toward human flourishing, that 
Nussbaum defends universal values inspired by Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics.  
 
I believe … that the human personality has a structure that is at least to some extent 
independent of culture, powerfully though culture shapes it at every stage. Desires for 
food, mobility, security, for health, and for the use of reason - these seem to be 
relatively permanent features of our makeup as humans, which culture can blunt, but 
cannot altogether remove. (Nussbaum, 2000: 156-157). 
 
Nussbaum’s exposition of the central human capabilities, ten in total (ibid.: 78-80), is 
developed in defence of universal values, to provide a robust framework for politics, and in 
particular issues of global human development including minority and vulnerable groups. In 
brief the list of capabilities comprises of the following: (1) life; (2) having bodily health; (3) 
having bodily integrity; (4) being able to use the senses, imagine and think; (5) emotional 
development and attachment; (6) developing practical reason; (7) affiliation - being able to live 
with and toward others, and to be treated with dignity; (8) being able to live with concern for 
other species; (9) being able to play; and, (10) being able to participate and be a full member 
of one’s environment. Nussbaum identifies these universal functional capabilities of human 
beings focused on what they can actually do and be, as overarching benchmarks for aspiration 
and comparison. This position considers that certain functions are particularly central to 
human life and its fulfilment. Taylor (1993: 227-9) agrees with the importance of having 
insights such as these about human capabilities in order to be able to judge our progress in 
terms of human flourishing with greatest finesse. These essential insights are respectful of 
every person’s struggle for flourishing and consider each person as an end and as a source of 
agency and worth in their own right. Thus these central capabilities are not just instrumental 
to further pursuits but are held to have value in themselves, in making the life that includes 
them truly human.  
 
In Nussbaum’s writing, and as influenced by Aristotle, practical reason and affiliation stand out 
as of special importance to human development. For Nussbaum, practical reason and 
affiliation ‘suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human’ (Nussbaum, 2000: 82). As 
Nussbaum explains:  
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To use one’s senses in a way not infused by the characteristically human use of thought 
and planning is to use them in an incompletely human manner. To plan for one’s own 
life without being able to do so in complex forms of discourse, concern, and reciprocity 
with other human beings is, again to behave in an incompletely human way. (ibid.: 82)  
 
It is practical reason as an approach to ethical reflection that enables us to deliberate on our 
emotions, needs and motivation within the particular situation in which we find ourselves. This 
approach spurs us on to seek detailed knowledge of the variety of circumstances and contexts 
and cultures in which we strive to do well.  
 
Importantly, through the Capabilities Approach, Nussbaum highlights the importance of the 
synthesis of emotional balance and thoughtful experience for making judgements in support of 
human flourishing and realising potential. Realising the functional capabilities of affiliation and 
practical reason in particular, though all of them are necessary in different contexts to greater 
or lesser extents, is essential for us to develop a sense of self-worth and trust of others in our 
interrelatedness. The Capabilities Approach joins people together by recognising universal 
shared capabilities with an ethical dimension, that encourage deliberation, the imagination, 
empathy and care (Nussbaum, 2001: 401-454) and Nussbaum explores the links between the 
universal human capabilities and the importance of developing the imagination and 
understanding emotions for empathy. To use Taylor’s words (1993: 227), these capabilities 
‘commandeer moral allegiance’ as they are based on an insight about the structure of human 
beings and what they require in order to flourish. And it is this ‘moral allegiance’ which 
contributes to cohesion in society through the development of genuine concern for others and 
a commitment to co-operation. Moreover, it shapes the politics of a global people as it 
promotes a corporate response that ensures fundamental human rights in respect of our 
shared capabilities, and works towards the meaningful sustainability of the environment for 
further generations. In short, the Capabilities Approach with its ethical imperative, as 
developed by Nussbaum, and inspired by the Aristotelian ideas we have already explored, is a 
significant contribution which can help us map our journey through the equality debate, so 
popular today, and which has a great contribution to make in education for the future. 
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3.2 Equality and the Capabilities Approach with its ethical dimension 
 
The question of equality is at the forefront of social policy globally, as people and governments 
seek to reach consensus about what a social minimum threshold of provision or opportunities 
must include. This then provides a benchmark for quality of life, and for structuring 
communities in such a way that care for vulnerable groups who require added support is 
available. There is wide agreement that every person should be able to realise their potential
7
. 
But the debate about equality begins as confusions arise when people speak of equality rather 
loosely without articulating clearly what they mean by the term. In addition, confusions and 
conflicts arise even when people or groups do define their use of the term, but disagree about 
the indicators that are most appropriate to evaluate progress about equality in respect of 
people’s lives, and what constitutes progress in different areas.  
 
There are three issues pertaining to the equality debate which provide much needed clarity in 
respect of the general discussion, and which when applied to education, strengthen theory 
and practice. First, the issue of lack of consistent nomenclature in the equality debate about 
which aspect of equality the chosen measurement is designed to assess. This is particularly 
important as identifying which aspect of equality is being discussed and given focus, has 
implications on other related areas and the impact of equality therein. Second, there is the 
issue about which conceptual bases give rise to the many indicators in this field. These 
grounding concepts often require challenging, as being open to the charge of relativism or 
absolutism, they limit the evidence base to the introspective subjective on the one hand, or to 
scientific-style objectivity on the other. Third, there is the issue of whether and to what extent 
we should include an ethical dimension which is non-utilitarian in our debates about equality 
and in our search for progress in this area of human development. 
 
There are crude definitions of equality which we should reject on their own as benchmarks of 
progress, such as income alone. Instead the view of equality that is here being promoted is one 
that rests on the premise that as human beings we have shared human capabilities, that every 
person, irrespective of their circumstance should be able to realise should they decide to do 
so. This view of equality exerts a moral pull on every individual and society to work towards it. 
It is this ethical dimension that the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach provides, that is so 
crucial to the equality debate. 
 
 69
3.2.1 The importance of defining terms: Equality of what? 
 
Equality is a concept that Europe and America has been developing since the enlightenment 
period. For example the advancement of machines in Europe was fuelled by the wish for 
equality, or at least the impetus to improve the material situation of many. This advancement 
provided many with basic goods, better working conditions, and even combated boredom, 
which Diderot identified as the greatest ailment for the human condition (Sennett, 2008: 92). 
There is also consensus about the importance of equality in the post-Enlightenment period 
(Sen, 2009: 291-93). In earlier works Sen (1992: 11-2) points out that every normative theory 
of social arrangement that has stood the test of time seems to demand equality of something 
that is important in that theory. For example, Sen mentions: John Rawls’s view of equal liberty 
and equality in the distribution of primary goods; Ronald Dworkin’s view of equality of 
resources as key (1992, 2009).  
 
However, as Sen (1992: 12) points out, there is an issue of lack of consistent clarity in the 
equality debate in respect of identifying the ‘space’ of equality being measured, and the 
possible ramifications that isolating this space from others has on the resulting findings. Here 
what is essential when entering the debate about equality is to be clear about the proposed 
enquiry field. Hence it is paramount to provide an answer to the question: ‘Equality of what?’ 
from the outset, an issue which Sen examines at length and where he argues in favour or the 
Capabilities Approach (1992). We are warned that while it is fine to make a claim in favour of 
egalitarianism this needs to be understood as a claim about equality in a specific space. And 
we should always recognise that claiming equality in one space, can always lead to anti-
egalitarianism in some other space (ibid.: 16).  
 
It is important to acknowledge that the subject is complex and that there are potential 
difficulties in concentrating only on one area without searching for the wider perspective in 
this discourse. In particular, it is key to know that measurement in one space can lead to the 
neglect of understanding progress in other areas or even to the regression of equality in 
another space. In addition, being clear about the aspect of equality identified for evaluation 
encourages us to begin to look for the interplay and interdependence between the various 
spaces. It also reminds us of the importance of maintaining wide horizons in our search to 
understand progress in equality, and to ensure that we do not limit our search to one space, 
using one method for evaluating equality.  
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Instead we should embrace all the methods we can find which further a clear vision about 
what equality entails for human flourishing. The issue here concerns the many dimensions in 
which equality matters, none of which are reducible to equality in one space only. For this 
reason, Sen is rightly sceptical about a unifocal view of equality (2009: 297-98). Even in respect 
of the Capabilities Approach, which Sen supports, he correctly argues that ‘it cannot speak in 
one voice’, as it relies on different lenses (ibid.: 298). Nevertheless, the Capabilities Approach 
as developed by Nussbaum (2000: 72)goes some way towards providing practical help in our 
search for equality of human capability. In particular, as we discussed in the earlier section of 
this chapter, the list of human functional capabilities which Nussbaum offers (ibid.: 78-80), 
inspired by the philosophy of Aristotle, is one that we can endorse as a moral basis of central 
constitutional guarantees.  
 
 
3.2.2 A conceptual base for equality which includes the objective and subjective view  
 
There exist a wide variety of indicators for evaluating progress in equality, such as income, 
utility, resources, or capabilities. Each is chosen depending on their conceptual base. In 
general, the utilitarian conceptual perspective, whose pitfalls regarding commensurability 
were highlighted in the Chapter 2, provides the grounding for many of the indicators 
mentioned here. Its focus on calculus and scientific-style objectivity, which over-simplifies 
measurement in respect of equality, makes this approach very enticing. However, this need for 
simplicity of measurement eschews the complexity of the issues involved in the area of 
equality, as its view is restricted to one narrow lens.  
 
Some have recognised this narrow approach and have developed theories that seek 
consensus. The approach taken by John Rawls in his work on justice is one such example, with 
its aim towards fair social allocation through distribution of resources or ‘primary goods’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000, Sen, 2009)
8
. Nussbaum points out that Rawls rightly pays credence to the 
importance of developing a reflective equilibrium through consensus and debate in order to 
agree about the basic resources we all need, and about some criteria for their fair distribution. 
However, both Sen and Nussbaum agree that Rawls falls into the social contract difficulty of 
aggregation, as he compares his mode of reasoning to the utilitarian tradition that focuses on 
the most good, summed over all its members (Nussbaum, 2000: 69; Sen, 2009: 69-70). Even 
the Rawlsian approach, in Nussbaum’s words, ‘does not sufficiently respect the struggle of 
each and every individual for flourishing’ (Nussbaum, 2000: 69).  
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The issue here is that individuals and groups vary greatly in their need for resources and in 
their ability to convert resources into valuable functionings. A marked example of this would 
be the wish to bring everyone to an equal basic level of educational attainment. With this 
comes the need to consider the individual’s situation from their perspective in order to devote 
greater resources to those who encounter specific obstacles given their particular social, 
cultural, or economic context. Rawls’s view that treats two people as equally well-off on the 
basis that they command the same amount of resources, does not give due attention to the 
great variety of specific contexts that may require different attention for equality of 
opportunity for flourishing. Equality of resources as the only indicator of human flourishing is 
not enough. Although Rawls has made a great contribution to move us beyond equality seen in 
terms of economic utility alone, his view still falls short in respect of listening to the voice of 
different individuals. For this reason it cannot achieve the necessary depth of understanding 
required to diagnose obstacles when resources seem to be adequately shared, but in fact are 
not. This view does not allow room for the subjective narrative of the individual or group to be 
taken into serious consideration.  
 
Aiming towards reflective equilibrium in assessing equality of opportunities for flourishing 
does require the subjective narrative to be taken into consideration. Although this subjective 
lens immediately dilutes a claim to scientific-style objectivity, it does not mean that our 
understanding lacks all objectivity. In fact what we seek is a kind of objectivity that stems from 
the observation of the particular and from which it builds a corpus of evidence that we can 
trust. The Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach, seeks such objective or common 
understanding by taking seriously the account of the particular. It does so as it recognises our 
shared language based on the claim that human beings share basic characteristics and needs 
from which human functional capabilities arise. It acknowledges that our understanding of 
these shared needs arises out of the particular observation and experience, from which the 
general view is reached. The Aristotle- inspired contemporary Capabilities Approach seeks to 
arrive at reflective equilibrium through a balance between the subjective and objective view. It 
challenges the veracity of the utilitarian over-emphasis on objectivity. It does so as it respects 
plurality on the one hand and supports universal shared characteristics in human beings on the 
other.  
 
It is worth considering the subjective perspective included in the Capabilities Approach, with 
its rich variety. In agreement with Sen, Allart (1993) is in favour of taking account of both 
objective and subjective indicators in research using the Capabilities Approach. He puts 
 72
forward an interesting comparative model which focuses on the level of need satisfaction 
rather than resources, for measuring progress in welfare issues. Allart explains that ‘Having, 
Loving and Being’ (1993: 88-89), are catchwords for central necessary conditions of human 
development and existence. He believes that there are basic human needs, some material and 
some non-material, and that both types must be considered to gauge the actual level of 
welfare in a society. Wisely, Allart warns us against the temptation to rely solely on a 
subjective account based on people’s opinions and attitudes, owing to the great variation in 
people’s ability to articulate both satisfaction and discomfort (ibid.: 92). For example, some 
people at times may find it difficult to recognise their situation in these terms, whether they 
are able to articulate them as such or not. The Capabilities Approach does seek reflective 
equilibrium by balancing the subjective and objective. Because of its claim of universal human 
characteristics that give rise to the Capabilities Approach, the subjective view is always 
considered from the viewpoint of these shared abilities. Yet, such objective understanding of 
what we share as human beings is arrived at through observation of the particular and re-
shaped by it. There is a symbiosis between the two that is essential. Neither the subjective nor 
the objective in isolation are viable options when choosing indicators that assess equality in 
some space, especially when assessing equality of opportunity for flourishing. 
 
As discussed, the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach has a conceptual base that 
recognises the wider spectrum facing us in respect of equality, which is more complex than the 
utilitarian conceptual base allows. This Aristotelian perspective, discussed in Chapter 2, calls 
for attention to the interconnectedness of all available indicators in the equality debate, even 
if this makes the exercise of measurement at times seem insurmountably complex. Also, this 
conceptual base urges researchers to seek understanding using every mode of vision available, 
and to search for synthesis between evidence gathered, using both the objective and 
subjective lens. Most importantly it places the individual voice at the heart of the matter and 
each person as the bearer of value.  
 
 
3.2.3 A vision of equality inclusive of the Capabilities Approach  
 
The contemporary Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach provides an ethical dimension to 
equality: a moral imperative that every person demands respect and care, based on the 
universal recognition that human beings share fundamental characteristics. It is this essential 
dimension that enables us to focus with confidence on developing opportunities for human 
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capabilities to be realised and for ensuring that people have the freedom to choose the best 
path to realise this for themselves, in reciprocity, co-operation and trust with others. It is this 
same ethical commitment that grounds the need for developing co-operation as a basis for 
equality of respect and care between people, and thus for creating environments that enable 
human fulfilment for everyone.  
 
This same commitment gave rise to the United Nations declaration of human rights, for which 
there is at least in theory agreement between nations. This declaration was created as a 
response to the horrors of the First and Second World Wars, and in particular the fact that at 
least seventy million people perished in wars, concentration camps, and gulags in the first half 
of the 20
th
 century (Sennett, 2008: 2). This declaration expresses a perceived need for a 
universal morality and expresses strong ethical pronouncements as to what should be done. 
These pronouncements, or rights, are assessed through the scrutiny of public reasoning 
involving open impartiality. There are many questions to be resolved in respect of human 
rights. To name a few: How do we classify these rights? Are these rights automatically 
protected by someone’s duty to fulfil them? (But whose duty?) To what extent do these rights 
apply to everyone in the same way and to the same degree? For example, I have the right to 
an education, but perhaps only commensurate with my abilities. Sen (2009: 355-87) takes a 
considered look at these questions, which I will not attempt to answer here.  
 
A further question that requires attention in relation to human rights is: What is the basis of 
these rights? There is great scepticism as to whether there can be a unifying basis at all, which 
mainly stems from the subjectivists or relativists. However, using Aristotle’s philosophical 
concepts a case in favour of objectivity can be defended, albeit in non-scientific-style. His 
philosophy allows for plurality and is sensitive to the subjective viewpoint. Furthermore, it  
supports natural shared characteristics in human beings, which are evidenced from valid 
deduction through observation and analysis. In this sense the claim to a common human 
nature is based on evidence from both the humanities and from scientific understanding of 
human beings. This evidence is one which we can confidently claim to be plausible. Human 
rights can also be held to be very basic, morally fundamental, and universal. In this sense, 
human rights play a similar role to that of basic human capabilities as described in this chapter. 
They both act as moral imperatives, such that these rights or capabilities must be defended or 
realised. What is key is that the language of rights or capabilities functions as a call to action in 
terms of people’s duties to one another and to ensure certain freedoms for individuals and 
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groups. As Nussbaum (2000: 99-101) points out, the language of rights still plays an important 
role in public discourse as a unifying language. 
 
Whether human capabilities or human rights, we have seen that there is a need in each to 
acknowledge the ethical dimension. This dimension is necessary for our search in equality as it 
provides a benchmark for whatever space is being considered. In particular, the ethical 
dimension included in the Capabilities Approach, as developed by Nussbaum, is particularly 
helpful for understanding progress in equality of opportunities for realising potential regarding 
human flourishing. The Capabilities Approach leads us towards a more nuanced approach in 
respect of understanding equality and its progress in society than other spaces offer, because 
of its ethical dimension. It provides a sophisticated engagement with the questions about 
‘equality of what’ at every stage. What is crucial, as Putman (1993: 143-158) and Taylor (1993: 
207-231) argue, is to recognise the interconnectedness between the scientific and the ethical. 
This requires several things. In Nussbaum’s words, first there is the need ‘to reject disengaged 
pseudoscientific understandings of the human being, in favour of conceptions that give a 
larger role to people’s own commitments and self-understandings’ (1993: 235). Second, we 
need to continue to include rational argument and dialogue between people, which requires 
ongoing conversation that goes beyond the purely numerical data-crunching exercises in 
respect of equality.  
 
Such rational arguments will include a dialogue on the numerical data available in various 
‘spaces’ as well as a body of individual accounts, each rooted in the particular historical 
situation of the contributor. Listening to this body of evidence will describe progress in ways 
that are not easy to demarcate and that are not simple. As Taylor argues, these accounts are 
inherently comparative in their understandings of development about equality, rather than 
absolute (1993: 208-232). As he points out: ‘the connections between scientific explanation 
and practical reason are in fact close: to lose sight of the one is to fall into confusion about the 
other’ (ibid.: 230). However when we think of rational argument in respect of understanding 
equality, we must take account of motivation (of our desires and emotions) as integral 
elements of evaluation (ibid.: 238-240). We can draw here on the Aristotelian view, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, which insists that emotions are highly discriminating 
evaluative responses, closely connected to beliefs about what is valuable and what is not. We 
should acknowledge more fully the interplay between motivation and reason in rational 
argument, and recognise the importance of each in issues about equality of opportunities for 
human flourishing. 
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3.2.4 Material equality is only one element when considering equality for flourishing 
 
Above, we have discussed the complexities of the equality debate; the need to be clear about 
‘Equality of what?’; the search for tools to understand equality from the subjective and 
objective view; and, the importance of recognising the ethical dimension when working 
towards equality. The contribution of the Capabilities Approach and how it can be applied 
when working towards equality has been evident throughout this discussion. Next, and with 
this backdrop, I turn our attention to the recent contribution in the equality debate, from 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), to understand their claims and to offer some alternatives.  
 
In their book, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, Wilkinson 
and Pickett believe that income inequality is the reason for many of the problems we have in 
society today. They claim that income inequality measures the hierarchical nature of societies 
since ‘where income differences are bigger, social distances are bigger and social stratification 
more important’ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: 27). Their evidence for this stems from research 
data about health and social problems, which they claim to be more prevalent further down 
the social hierarchy and more prominent in societies with more unequal incomes (ibid.: 27-8). 
Here what matters is not so much the inequality within a particular neighbourhood, but the 
extent of inequality right across society. They claim that the evidence shows that ‘reducing 
inequality is the best way of improving the quality of the social environment, and so the real 
quality of life, for all of us’ (ibid.: 29). They explain that it is because we are individually 
sensitive to the wider society that inequality has such profoundly negative effects, from health, 
to education, to well-being. And they believe that we could improve social well-being and the 
quality of social relations in society, in particular trust and co-operation, if only we reduced 
income inequality.  
 
Firstly, Wilkinson and Pickett suggest that there are close links between our vulnerability to 
income inequality and individual psychological problems such as anxiety and depression, which 
have been on the rise between the 1970s and 1990s. What they  claim is not that the rise in 
psychological problems such as anxiety and depression are triggered by increased inequality, 
but rather that they have been aggravated by increased inequality (ibid.: 31-48). They believe 
that rises in anxiety have been accompanied by rising narcissism and claim that this increases 
the threat to the social self, which is largely based on others’ perception of one’s worth and 
hence affected by social status. Secondly, they suggest that inequality increases evaluation 
anxiety, partly owing to the break-up of old-style communities and the resultant lack of 
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familiar faces between individuals, which has given rise to a constant flux of strangers. They 
claim that at the core of our interactions with strangers is our concern about the social 
judgements and evaluations they might make. Hence instead of accepting each other as equals 
on the basis of our common humanity as we might in more equal settings, getting the measure 
of each other becomes more important as status differences widen (ibid.: 42-3). This, in turn 
weakens community life and reduces trust (ibid.: 45). They also claim that the quality of social 
relations deteriorates in societies with greater income inequality (ibid.: 51-4), and that 
inequality corrodes trust and divides people.  
 
Wilkinson and Pickett correctly point out that if we live in societies with more social capital, for 
which they use Robert Putman’s (2000) definition as the sum total of people’s involvement in 
community life, then we know more people as friends and neighbours which might increase 
our trust in people (ibid.: 54-8). Furthermore, we might agree that trust leads to co-operation 
and affects the well-being of individuals, as well as the well-being of civic society (ibid.: 56-7). 
However, saying that where there is social or even income differences it is more difficult to 
trust others may not be the whole story to explain the existing social issues in respect of trust, 
or the apparent lack of community cohesion, or community involvement in more affluent 
countries. If income inequality is not the only factor, what other factors should we address 
that have a bearing on psychological vulnerabilities of identity and anxiety, or trust and 
community relations? 
 
First, in respect of anxiety, in answer to Wilkinson and Pickett’s solution of reducing inequality 
to increase the well-being and quality of life for all of us (ibid.: 33), we should turn to other 
issues that have a strong bearing on anxiety and identity, over and above income inequality. 
The sociologist, Richard Sennett (1998), perceptively links the rise of anxiety and loss of 
identity to the speed of change in the globalisation of society. As he points out, new 
developments and skills mean that the skills we have learned or information absorbed become 
obsolete within short spaces of time. Also the psychological problems mentioned above are 
here linked with markets valuing the cheapest employee over the more expensive one, who 
may not have the up-to-date skill. Rather than retrain them, the more experienced, more 
expensive workers are replaced by the younger version. Sennett rightly points out that instead 
of trustworthiness, commitment, obligation and purpose, what has developed is individualism 
(Sennett, 1998: 26). And as Alexis de Toqueville, the 19
th
 century writer argues, it is clear that 
people will be ungratified by the lonely inexpressive end of individualism, as an emotional 
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relationship can only be meaningful if it is perceived as part of a web of social relations 
(Sennett, 1974: 31).  
 
It is the weakness of loyalty and commitment that now mark the modern workplace. And 
Sennett rightly questions the capacity for durable social relations to be sustained in this 
environment and the difficulties for a human being to develop a narrative of identity and life 
history in a society such as this. It is worth considering that the reason for this individualism, 
lack of loyalty and commitment, may not be income inequality per se, but the fact that the 
conditions of the new economy feed instead on experience that drifts in time, from place to 
place and from job to job (Sennett, 1996: 28). There is a sense here of utter flux which causes 
the un-rootedness which gives rise to some of the psychological issues discussed here. In the 
face of such constant change and lack of value of the individual it is difficult to maintain a 
sense of sustainable self. This leads to a lack of self-value and value of others, and people are 
not valued because of the dignity endowed to every person by virtue of being human. This can 
easily lead to anxiety and depression. In the face of this lack of self-value it is essential to build 
a sustainable narrative. As Sennett writes: ‘Narratives are more than simple chronicles of 
events; they give shape to the forward movement of time, suggesting reasons why things 
happen, showing their consequences’ (ibid.: 30). What leads to anxiety in this view is this sense 
of the clock ticking and time passing, making our experience and our other abilities redundant, 
as they are not valued because of the fast changing required technological skill set of the 
moment. As Sennett points out: ‘the time frame of risk offers little personal comfort’ (ibid.: 
97). 
 
This personal vulnerability and loss, owing to the fast changing environment in which we find 
ourselves today, also impacts on the community and on our personal and societal sense of lack 
of trust and meaningful co-operation. We can agree that social relations deteriorate in less 
equal societies, but this may not be due to the income differential per se. Sennett supports the 
view that it is lack of communication, individualism, and lack of loyalty and flux in the 
employment market that corrodes trust. As he says: ‘It’s no longer news that this middle class 
world has cracked. The corporate system that once organised careers is now a maze of 
fragmented jobs’ (Sennett, 2008: 34). When discussing the new technological economy, 
Sennett argues that though many firms still subscribe to the importance of teamwork and     
co-operation, these principles are often a charade. He does however point to some notable 
exceptions in the ethos of Nokia and Motorola. 
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The growth of the new economy has driven many workers, both in the US and the UK, inside 
themselves. The problem is that those firms demonstrate little loyalty and do not seem to 
value their employees, eliciting little commitment in return (ibid.: 36). In The Craftsman, 
Sennett (2009) argues in favour of recapturing the importance and value of craft and its ethos. 
He comments that in modern society the craftsman’s ethos of doing good work for its own 
sake is unrewarded or invisible (Sennett, 2008: 37). Furthermore, from a social point of view 
demoralisation can occur when a collective goal for good work becomes hollow and empty. 
  
Job apprehension, as Sennett argues, quoting the New York Times, has intruded everywhere, 
‘diluting self-worth, splintering families, fragmenting communities, and diluting the chemistry 
of the workplace’ (Sennett, 1998: 97). This is important, as an apprehension is an anxiety 
about what might happen, and is created in a climate that emphasises constant risk. 
Apprehension also increases when past experience seems no guide to the present. In this state 
of rapid flux, people often resort to superficiality as they try to read the world around them 
and understand themselves. Images of a classless society, as Wilkinson and Picket espouse, can 
lead to a common way of speaking, dressing, and seeing, and thus apparently diminish 
difference. However, it can also serve to hide more profound differences. There is a surface on 
which everyone appears on an equal plane, but getting beneath this surface, which is essential 
to develop a sense of self and interrelatedness, may require a code people lack. The key 
problem here is that if what people know about themselves is easy and immediate, it may be 
too little (ibid.: 75).  
 
In connection with community participation and co-operation, the modern work ethic, does 
focus on teamwork, as it promotes sensitivity to others, being a good listener and being co-
operative. However, because it is not underpinned by an ethic based on shared human needs, 
it tends to breed an ethos that remains at the surface of experience. Sennett encapsulates the 
problem which affects contemporary teamwork in the following words: ‘Teamwork is the 
group practice of demeaning superficiality’ (ibid.: 99).  
 
The complications that arise when the ethical dimension based on shared human needs is 
undermined or ignored is made clear in Sennett’s work with bakers in the US (ibid.: 67). In his 
study he explains that when he first visited this small niche bakery run by Greeks, the character 
of the workers was expressed at work in acting honourably, working co-operatively and fairly 
with other bakers because they belonged to the same community. However, when he 
returned some years later the bakery was owned by a large conglomerate. Now the sense of 
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belonging had changed and the sense of community had all but vanished. The bakers were 
treated as units of production, measured against producing the right number of loaves per 
day. This new ethos reduced their individual sense of value and eroded the ties of communal 
honour. What was important now was standardised outputs, egalitarian in nature, but the loss 
of the value of each person and of human relatedness and affiliation that the earlier 
meaningful community exemplified, was superseded with the value of the flexible, fluid and 
superficial kind of teamwork.  
 
This example echoes the situation which has arisen since the development of the National 
Curriculum with standardised targets and measures for educational success. This situation has 
been criticised by many educationists today (Pring et al., 2009; Alexander et al., 2010; Pring 
and Pollard, 2011), and I will explore their views in greater depth in Chapter 5 and 6. 
 
Instead of the situation illustrated in this example of the bakers, or indeed in education, where 
standardised outputs are the norm and people are valued against utility of units of production, 
what is needed in society today as illustrated by the worrying issues identified by Wilkinson 
and Pickett, are significant relationships between individuals. These require a kind of 
trustfulness and an accumulation of shared history that is only possible through genuine 
shared speech and deliberation, collaboration and care. It is this sense of trustfulness that 
provides some of the glue that binds individuals, which in turn creates the climate for success 
to be a reality rather than a mirage. This is the case both at the level of an individual realising 
her potential or at the communal and societal level of ensuring support for vulnerable people. 
The challenge to be addressed is not necessarily one of income inequality per se. Rather we 
are faced with both a personal and social challenge to ensure structures which enable people 
to develop their human capabilities, and in particular their capability for practical reason and 
affiliation. This in turn nurtures dialogue and collaboration that is meaningful and not 
superficial, and enables the development of trust and a resulting commitment for co-
operation. In addition to these capabilities it is essential to foster environments where 
imagination and creativity are promoted (considered so crucial in the bakers’ example above). 
It is precisely this ability to imagine different possibilities and futures that is a catalyst for 
innovation, when combined with the other capabilities aforementioned. It is the development 
of these capabilities that enables human beings to really live together. In Aristotle’s words: 
‘That’s what it means for human beings to live together, not just to pasture in the same place 
like cattle’ (NE 1170b11-14).  
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Limiting their study to income inequality, Wilkinson and Pickett do not do justice to the 
complexity of the issue of human flourishing and realising potential. Instead, we should widen 
our understanding beyond the effects of this one economic space of income differential, and 
incorporate the human Capabilities Approach into our understanding of human flourishing.  
The Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach, is one that focuses attention on the ethical 
dimension, when making comparisons and evaluations and when making decisions for 
provision in respect of equality. As mentioned above, Nussbaum and Sen argue that we should 
be considering equality from every possible angle, using all measures available, and not 
reducing the current problems to one space such as income.  
 
As we saw in this chapter Sennett highlights the erosion of trust in society. But unlike 
Wilkinson and Pickett’s attribution of this situation to income inequality, Sennett assigns this 
increasing lack of trust to an ever growing loss of identity and meaningful collaboration, 
exacerbated when the value of individuals is reduced to units of production. Wilkinson and 
Pickett are nevertheless right to be concerned about people’s growing inability towards 
emotional balance (problems of self-worth and anxiety) and their inability to trust others in 
the western societies they explored.  
 
We need to move beyond the space of income if we are to address successfully the issues 
which Wilkinson, Pickett, and Sennett identify. Through the Capabilities Approach, persons can 
develop emotional balance and trust (also described as affiliation). This approach is the more 
appropriate space in which to evaluate progress than income alone. Emotions and affiliation 
are two capabilities from Nussbaum’s list outlined in this chapter that we should ensure can be 
realised by every person. Of course we would equally wish to avoid a situation where an 
individual’s sense of self-worth was over-inflated, or their sense of trust for others was without 
scrutiny. For this reason there are other essential capabilities that need to be nurtured into 
this mix towards making judgements, such as practical reason (again on the list of capabilities 
on offer in this approach).  
 
Furthermore, and in line with the quest for balance, Sennett (2009: 33) reminds us of the need 
for recapturing the craftsman’s ethos that fosters the unity between the hand and the mind. 
This literal picture of the craftsman at work serves as a metaphor for the importance of 
developing our ability for making sound judgements, which require practical reason, that is, 
the application of the unity of the senses and reason towards sound action. 
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It is precisely by embracing the Capabilities Approach in our search for equality, and not only 
income, that we create a benchmark capable of shaping societal opportunities that genuinely 
engender trust, interrelatedness, and co-operation. Within this broad outlook we can begin to 
move towards real progress which is sustainable as it is underpinned by the ethical dimension 
that human beings share characteristics and needs that must be recognised. This ethical 
dimension provides a benchmark which outlines the essential opportunities which enable 
people to realise their potential and flourish. Without this ethical dimension, we cannot hope 
to engender deliberated trust, co-operation and community between individuals, and 
overcome barriers of fear of difference and otherness. 
 
 
Summary         
  
At present, there is still a tendency towards a narrow understanding of equality from either a 
utility or resource based space, which does not fully acknowledge that equality in one space 
often means inequality in other spaces. Unfortunately, this narrow perspective which informs 
our understanding of quality of life, personal and social development, and thus flourishing, is 
not fully representative of the complexity of the human condition. As will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, this tendency has also permeated education, particularly since the onset of 
the National Curriculum in 1988 (Pring, 1989: 69-97). This thesis argues that we must resist 
oversimplification and come to terms with the demands of human diversity in our 
understanding of human development, quality of life, and therefore flourishing. As will be 
discussed in the next chapters, this is particularly pertinent in educational understandings of 
quality, provision of opportunities and progress. As discussed in this chapter, the Capabilities 
Approach, which has been developed with success in human development work globally, 
enables us to resist such oversimplification. What the Capabilities Approach as articulated by 
Nussbaum and inspired by Aristotle offers, is an important focus based on shared human 
capabilities, against which to evaluate what is better or worse for human beings in respect of 
flourishing and realising potential. Importantly, this approach includes an ethical dimension 
based on shared human capabilities, which calls for the dignity of every person and their need 
for concern. This approach gives us an innovative way for shaping societal structures and 
opportunities that enables individuals and groups to work towards realising potential for living 
well.  
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Looking through the Aristotelian lens which has inspired contemporary work in respect of 
human development using the Capabilities Approach, we can best begin to discern elements 
necessary for inclusion in education which help children and young people realise their 
capabilities, whatever their situation. This approach provides an important framework and 
demands that we keep personal morality, good citizenship and state organisation interwoven. 
Consequently, it has the ingredients of a theory of justice that is powerful and that can help 
today’s governments discern what arrangements they need to make in order to support each 
person’s human capability to lead a fulfilled life.  
 
In Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, the importance of the Capabilities Approach in education theory and 
practice will be explored more fully. Before this, it is worth exploring well-being and its 
interconnectedness with development in general, which includes learning. Hence, Chapter 4 
leads us to focus on well-being as a question about happiness, which has been of concern for 
individuals and societies through the centuries. In the next chapter therefore, I suggest ways in 
which the Aristotelian capabilities framework affords a significant contribution to our 
understanding of happiness as flourishing. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 In accordance with Sen, I am using the word ‘space’ in its technical form to denote the 
chosen focal variable for comparison.  
 
2
 Sen correctly points out that equality is a complex area which has to come to terms with the 
demands of human diversity. ‘Sometimes, human diversities are left out of account not on 
the misconceived ‘high’ ground of ‘equality of human beings’, but on the pragmatic ‘low’ 
ground of the need for simplification. But the net result of this can also be to ignore centrally 
important features of demands of equality.’ (Sen, 1992: 1).  
 
3
 For further information on the Human Development Report & Index see 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/ 
 
4
 The United Nations have published Human Development Reports from 1990 onwards.  
Human Development Report 2010. 20 Years on: Pushing the frontiers of human development.  
‘Human development is about putting people at the centre of development. It is about 
people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to lead 
lives they value. Since 1990, annual Human Development Reports have explored challenges 
including poverty, gender, democracy, human rights, cultural liberty, globalization, water 
scarcity and climate change.’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/  
 
5
 Sen commends the work of Solow for his contribution to the sustainability debate, in respect 
of incorporating the needs of wider humanity here. But, Sen suggests that Solow should not 
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have restricted his evidence to living standards and urges him to go beyond this, and to 
consider people’s freedom and capability in other areas, and thus to seek to safeguard what 
people value and have reason to attach importance to with reference to sustainability. 
 
6
 Aristotle also disputes wealth as key to human flourishing in the Nichomachean Ethics 
(1095a23).  
 
7
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/  
For example the work of the United Nations in respect of human development and the 
annual Human Development Reports since 1990 acknowledge that: ‘Human development is 
about putting people at the centre of development. It is about people realizing their 
potential, increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to lead lives they value’. 
 
8
 For a deeper exploration of the Rawlsian approach and some of its problems, see Sen (2009: 
52-74) or Nussbaum (2000: 63-70). 
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Chapter 4  
 
 
Happiness reviewed within the context of the Capabilities Approach 
 
 
I think the things that stop children and young people from having a good life are: wars, 
unkind people, parents that argue and split up, not having parents, not having enough 
food and water and not being able to live feeling safe. (9-year-old-girl). (Layard and 
Dunn, 2009: 151). 
 
Improving people’s quality of life requires wise policy choices and dedicated action on 
the part of many individuals. (Nussbaum, 2011: xi). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The theme of happiness understood in terms of having a good life or a good quality of life is 
complex and far reaching, abounding in history and burgeoning contemporary research. In 
view of the breadth of this field, this chapter recognises its limits and therefore attempts 
neither a wide-ranging historical account in respect of the theme of happiness nor a 
comprehensive critique of the present measures used or of the ongoing research in this field. 
Instead, the focus of this chapter is to identify areas where happiness is understood too 
narrowly or misperceived, and in its place to offer a broader understanding of happiness in 
terms of flourishing. This view, which includes an ethical framework based on what human 
beings share across cultures, draws from the contemporary Aristotelian framework of human 
capabilities known as the Capabilities Approach.  
 
The need for happiness conceived as flourishing is supported by research in philosophy, 
psychology, and social science. In particular, it follows from Aristotelian thinking as described 
in previous chapters, regarding what human beings share, our sense of relatedness, and the 
way we make sense of the world. This ethical framework also present in the Capabilities 
Approach is capable of shaping government public policy, and helps individuals and groups to 
plan, make decisions, and act within the context of others, thereby enabling them to flourish 
and living well. It gives due credence to the interconnectedness of human beings, is sensitive 
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to their individual context, and demands ongoing reasoning and public scrutiny from 
individuals and society. Importantly, with regards to children, this ethical framework which 
defines happiness as flourishing in terms of living a fulfilled life, takes seriously the voice of 
children such as that expressed in the quotation above, and demands a particular sensitivity 
from educators to nurture each child’s capacity for flourishing. 
 
There is no doubt that happiness has received attention across history with a clear thread 
visible particularly in philosophical debate from antiquity in ancient Greece to the 
Enlightenment, and now evident in modern and contemporary debate. Since the 20
th
 century, 
the field of psychology has been prominent in elucidating the key qualities which enable 
happiness and in seeking measures to understand progress in this area. Philosophy and 
psychology have been joined by the social sciences, and the culture of monitoring and ensuring 
well-being is now evident in many areas of society including health
1
 and education
2
 in the UK. 
It would be fair to say that society today, like Greek society over 2000 years ago, continues to 
seek ways to understand how happy its citizens are, what makes them happy, and to ensure 
societal structures and policies which enable happiness (Nussbaum, 1990: 203).  
 
However, contemporary happiness discourse has a tendency to place a disproportionate 
emphasis on the individual’s positive assessment of their life in terms of subjective well-being. 
This chapter claims that an analysis of happiness confined to the individual without reference 
to their relationships is misconceived. This position is supported by the ancient Aristotelian 
approach which focuses our attention beyond the hedonic understanding of happiness and 
avows that happiness be understood as the realisation of an individual’s capabilities for living 
well and doing well within the context of others.  
 
Social scientists remind us of the ever greater need to foster pro-social attitudes which 
increase social capital in our contemporary societies (Putman, 2000; Halpern, 2005, Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2009). In particular they refer to trust and co-operation as central, especially in 
the face of considerable economic inequality (Uslaner, 2002; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
Importantly, the Aristotelian understanding of happiness and its constituent parts proposed in 
this chapter, and the contemporary Capabilities Approach, upholds that ‘human activity always 
goes on in complex interdependence’ (Nussbaum, 1990: 243). Significantly, this philosophy 
with its practical application provides a framework within which to promote an outward 
reaching understanding of human flourishing in individuals and societies. The focus here is the 
interconnectedness of persons (affiliation) and their ability to develop practical reason. This 
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philosophy and practical implication addresses concerns voiced by psychologists. Specifically, it 
challenges the obsession with self-esteem when confined to the individual’s subjective well-
being in terms of feeling good as a basis for self-worth and happiness (Baumeister, 2003; 
Emler, 2005), and the tendency to connect happiness too closely with monetary wealth.  
 
Chapter 4 therefore first focuses on views of happiness which the Capabilities Approach would 
oppose, such as happiness and its relation to money or income, or the hedonic understanding 
of happiness. Second, I consider the quest for commensurable measures in respect of 
happiness and well-being adopted by psychologists, social scientists and welfare economists, 
and find it wanting. In this respect, I argue against the predominant utilitarian measures used 
for making sense of happiness. Instead I consider understanding happiness to be in essence an 
evaluative enquiry which requires a framework sensitive to science as well as ethics, and which 
looks beyond the commensurability of units of happiness or well-being. Third, I identify 
existing barriers in society which prevent or at least do not foster happiness as flourishing and 
living well, such as: (1) a decrease in mental health, and a rise in anxiety, stress, and peer 
relations, including in children; and (2) a decrease in social capital, rising individualism and a 
decrease in trust and solidarity. Fourth, I propose the Capabilities Approach as one which aids 
individual and societal flourishing. I propose this approach and its discourse in preference to 
the prevalent happiness discourse, and suggest it provides an ethical framework essential for 
persons and communities today. 
 
 
4.1 Popular understandings of happiness in contemporary society 
 
The importance of thinking about happiness, which today is sometimes interchangeably 
defined with well-being, is gaining recognition across the world, with happiness and well-being 
indices being created by governments and public bodies including the OECD index, Your Better 
Life (2011) 
3
. This index was itself informed by evidence from the European Social Survey, in 
particular its well-being module (Huppert et al., 2009), which was administered in 23 countries 
with a total sample of around 43,000 adults (aged 16 +). In addition to this, the new OECD 
index has taken note of the Sarkozy Commission report (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009) which 
supports the concept of capabilities for our understanding of quality of life. This report 
recommends a wider approach than subjective measures of well-being afford.  
 
 87
Much attention has been given to understanding what makes people happy, and today 
psychology and the social sciences have amassed a wide body of research in this area, some of 
which will be explored in this chapter. A significant reason for such continued interest in 
happiness is the fact that it is so highly valued and pursued by individuals and societies alike. 
Today, research studies show that ‘in almost every nation - from the United States, Greece and 
Slovenia to South Korea, Argentina and Bahrain – when asked what they want most in life, 
people put happiness at the top of their lists’ (Lyubomirsky, 2007:14). However, what they 
mean when they consider happiness as essential to living well is less clear.  
 
It seems that happiness has been important for people down the ages. For example, looking to 
the past, in ancient Greece, Aristotle indicates that ‘pretty well most people are agreed’ that 
happiness, understood as ‘living well and doing well’, is the greatest good (NE 10095a15-20). In 
1776, recognising the importance of happiness for its citizens, the American Declaration of 
Independence listed the unalienable rights of all men as ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness’. Also during the 18
th
 century in the UK, Jeremy Bentham, working towards greater 
social justice and in an effort to improve the injustice and pain suffered by factory workers of 
the time, developed the utilitarian position that pleasure is of greatest value. This position 
further evolved in the 19
th 
century, as John Stuart Mill worked to promote the utilitarian 
principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, quantified in aggregate units of 
happiness, which remains popular in contemporary society. Today this understanding enjoys 
much support from proponents interested in the discipline of welfare economics, including 
Richard Layard who in recent years has developed the concept of happiness economics (2005).  
 
There is an important question to be examined about the relationship of money or wealth with 
happiness and how it can be measured. For example: Does economic growth enhance 
happiness? Also there is the question of which other factors influence happiness, such as 
personal dispositions, social supports, life experiences, genetics, and others. As these factors 
are identified, the question of how we make sense of the happiness and well-being of 
individuals and groups remains pertinent. For example: Can it be measured and what can be 
learnt from the results of these measurements, and how are these evaluations linked to our 
understanding of growth in society? This is a major area which I will explore only in brief in this 
chapter, and with reference to the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach for support. 
 
Through the literature there are wide variances in the definition of happiness and what the 
term should include. For example, there are questions about whether happiness should be 
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understood from the perspective of subjective reports alone, or as an objective measure of 
doing good, or considered from peer reports, or from a combination of these and other 
factors. Again this is an area which demands close scrutiny and a separate study. For the 
purposes of this chapter therefore, this wide variation and as yet no clear conclusion about 
what should be measured in respect of happiness is sufficient to indicate that the debate 
remains open to refinement. As a consequence, within this open debate, it does seem 
plausible that happiness could well best be considered from the perspective of the Capabilities 
Approach. In support of this approach is its rich historical and philosophical provenance (as 
described in Chapter 1), and its ability to safeguard the dignity of every human person and to 
identify and stand against distributional inequalities which aggregate measures such as GDP or 
hedonic measures such as subjective well-being.  
 
 
4.1.1 Happiness and its relationship to income and wealth 
 
It is true that generally, democratic governments naturally endeavour to promote a better life 
for their citizens. Until recently the promotion of a better life has primarily focused on 
promoting economic growth as an important augmenter of happiness (although health and 
education continue to be essential foci for life enhancement). Yet, research indicates that ‘in 
most developed nations, increases in income, education and health have arguably not 
produced comparable increases in happiness or life satisfaction’ (Huppert et al., 2009: 301).  
 
A large body of literature on economic growth and happiness indicates that psychologists 
continue to seek understanding about the relationship of wealth to happiness, and undertake 
research in order to make sense of this question. As Seligman explains, ‘there is universal 
agreement on two points’ in respect of wealth and happiness or well-being (2011: 222-4). 
When comparing whole nations with each other, it seems that the richer nations with higher 
GDP in general also have higher levels of life satisfaction. However, above a particular safety 
net of GDP per capita ‘it takes more and more money to produce an increment in happiness’ 
(ibid.: 222-4). 
 
It seems that the association between happiness and economic growth or income is not 
straight forward. According to Easterlin (2001): 
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At a given time those with higher incomes are happier, on average, than those with 
lower. Also, at a point-in-time respondents typically feel that they were less happy in the 
past and will be more happy in the future. Finally, experienced happiness is, on average, 
constant over the life cycle. (Easterlin, 2001: 472). 
 
The reason for this claim is that ‘on average, income and economic circumstances more 
generally, improve substantially up to the retirement ages; yet, there is no corresponding 
advance in subjective well-being’ (Easterlin, 2001: 469). And yet, although at any one point in 
time ‘those with more income are, on average, happier than those with less’, it seems that 
‘over the life cycle, however, the average happiness of a cohort remains constant despite 
substantial income growth’ (Easterlin, 2001: 465). This is what is referred to in the literature as 
the Easterlin Paradox (1974). One reason for this paradox seems to be ‘hedonic adaptation’, 
which is a phenomenon where human beings become rapidly accustomed to sensory or 
physiological changes (Lyubomirsky, 2007: 47-49). As a result it is thought that any changes in 
positive feelings or life satisfaction derived directly or indirectly from increased income or 
wealth as a result of achieved monetary aspirations are short lived and transitory.  
 
Some psychologists such as Seligman (2011) distinguish between happiness defined in terms of 
positive feelings and well-being, which in his view shapes life satisfaction overall rather than 
purely positive feelings. He suggests that ‘when life satisfaction is plotted against income, 
some very instructive anomalies appear that give us hints about what the good life is beyond 
income’ (ibid.: 227). Seligman argues that the good life is not about improving happiness, but 
rather about nurturing well-being, shaped by quality of life which includes positive emotions 
and engagement, better relationships, meaning and accomplishment (ibid.: 238-41). There is 
an ongoing debate about whether measures implemented by governments should be confined 
to happiness defined as subjective judgement of positive terms of emotion or satisfaction, or 
whether measures should be focused instead on well-being defined in broader terms which 
incorporate subjective as well as objective measures
4
.  
 
 
4.1.2 Happiness and its relationship to life satisfaction and well-being  
 
Happiness, as this chapter illustrates already seems to be a term with many subtle yet 
different understandings, which makes discourse about happiness more complex than it would 
seem. Ruut Veenhoven, the social psychologist interested in the subjective quality of life, seeks 
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to understand happiness using one of four categories and to measure it with an index 
analogous to that of GDP (2008: 4-5). Although the four categories identified by Veenhoven 
could be argued to be interwoven, separately they nevertheless provide a helpful starting 
point. The reason being, that one of these categories identifies happiness as subjective well-
being understood in terms of self reported happiness alone. The idea of happiness as 
subjective well-being was first introduced by Ed Diener in 1984 (ibid.: 10), building on Jeremy 
Bentham’s definition of happiness in the 18
th 
century as subjective feeling (ibid.: 2). This view 
has many supporters today, either on its own or combined with other measures (Diener and 
Seligman 2004: 1-31; Helliwell and Putman, 2004: 1435; Huppert and So, 2009: 1).  
 
As Veenhoven argues, happiness in its widest sense can be used as an umbrella term for all 
that is good, and in this sense is used interchangeably with well-being or quality of life. 
However, he divides these qualities of life into four categories: two outer qualities, being 
livability of environment and utility of life, and two inner qualities, being life-ability of the 
person and satisfaction with life. Veenhoven only considers satisfaction with life as an 
indicator of the concept of happiness (2008: 4). For Veenhoven, livability is considered a 
precondition for happiness, while life-ability is claimed to contribute to happiness. However,  
neither can be claimed to be identical with happiness. Instead, he considers the core meaning 
of happiness to be subjective enjoyment of life. Veenhoven also divides satisfaction into four 
qualities, and only accepts life satisfaction as the core meaning of happiness (ibid.: 7-8). 
Therefore in this sense, ‘overall happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the 
overall quality of his/her own life-as-a-whole favourably’ (ibid.: 8).  
 
However, a view of happiness as subjective well-being may be too narrow an understanding of 
what many prize as the ultimate goal in life, as it fails to recognise other valued elements such 
as liberty, equality, or fraternity, which for example, the American Declaration of 
Independence also embraces as valued goals alongside happiness. A broader understanding of 
happiness which takes into account relationships and the idea of interconnectedness may 
enable policy makers to nurture co-operation, which as researchers have already identified is 
an existing barrier to well-being, partly as a result of the decline in levels of community trust 
(Layard, 2005: 82). Trust is an area which I will considered in greater detail later in this chapter, 
which may be nurtured by the broader understanding of happiness provided by the Aristotle-
inspired Capabilities Approach. 
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There are researchers in the field, such as Huppert (2009) and Seligman (2011) who have 
sought a broader conception of happiness, beyond the category of subjective well-being and 
life satisfaction, to incorporate other criteria beyond the subjective. Seligman, for example, 
makes the following point: 
 
The old standard of positive psychology is disproportionately tied to mood ... Life 
satisfaction essentially measures cheerful mood, so it is not entitled to a central place in 
any theory that aims to be more than a happiology ... And it turns out that life 
satisfaction does not take into account how much meaning we have or how engaged we 
are in our work or how engaged we are with the people we love. (2011: 13-14). 
 
For Seligman life satisfaction is defined as ‘a unitary construct’, which he maintains is not 
adequate to assess well-being or flourishing, which are instead ‘multi faceted constructs’ 
(2011: 279). He draws support for his argument from research from the European Social 
Survey undertaken by Huppert and So (2009), who also seek to measure flourishing rather 
than purely subjective well-being or life satisfaction. Interestingly, they define flourishing as 
having high positive emotion, plus being high on any three of the following: self-esteem, 
optimism, resilience, vitality, self-determination, and positive relationships (Huppert and So, 
2009: 2). These, Seligman calls ‘stringent criteria for flourishing’ (2011: 238).  
 
Yet, using the criteria used by Huppert and So (2009: 2), it could be argued that a person may 
be described as flourishing without reference to high ranking results in respect of positive 
relationships. The reason being that this feature is not considered a core feature and is rather 
an additional feature (one of six, where any three of the six must be chosen to be described as 
flourishing). Hence, positive relationships are not considered by Huppert and So as a necessary 
or sufficient criteria for flourishing. In this sense, reaching out to others in terms of 
relationships or affiliation is not considered necessary for flourishing, only a possible indicator 
of flourishing. This view is one which is at odds with the Aristotelian view. In conclusion, the 
broader view of happiness and well-being as flourishing suggested by Huppert and So, though 
correct in its endeavour to broaden its horizons beyond the subjective well-being view alone, is 
nevertheless still open to challenges in the weighting given to different aspects which affect 
happiness. This position does not give sufficient credence to the importance of relationships 
and our interconnectedness. The issue of weighting and the question of commensurability in 
our understanding of happiness and its implications for welfare economics (the well-being of 
society) needs further consideration. 
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4.2 Measuring happiness: The quest for meaningful assessment 
 
Happiness is rising on the political agenda and this calls for measures of how well 
nations perform in creating great happiness for a great number, analogous to measures 
of success in creating wealth, such as GDP. (Veenhoven, 2008: 232)
5
  
 
The quest for meaningful measures which can sit alongside measures such as GDP, for 
governments to implement in their plans for progress in society have been popular for 
centuries. It is understandable that GDP alone should not be the most prominent indicator to 
guide plans or actions about progress in society which contribute to better lives for individuals. 
The quest for measures which we can trust continues, in respect of happiness and well-being. 
Although there has been support for such a measure since John Stuart Mill, more recently a 
divergence of view has emerged as to what the measure should include in order to explain 
most fully the situation being measured. Prominent figures in psychology and economics, such 
as Seligman (2011) and Layard (2005) diverge in their views. Seligman suggests that we move 
beyond the term happiness, which he argues is a unitary construct, and instead substitute this 
with well-being which is a composite concept. However, for Layard this unitary construct is 
important, since he believes that ‘unless we can justify our goals by how people feel, there is a 
real danger of paternalism’ (2005: 113). 
 
However, even if people’s feelings need to taken seriously, Seligman is correct to maintain that 
happiness, understood only in terms of positive feeling, is not fine-grained enough to take 
account of persons who would consider that their quality of life is very good but yet do not 
necessarily feel positive emotion. One problem with using only the subjective measure such as 
that which Layard proposes in order to avoid paternalism, is that as Seligman indicates, ‘just 
the happiness metric for policy ... undercounts the vote of half of the world – introverts and 
low positive-affective people’ (2011: 239).  
 
In addition, Seligman rightly claims that although additional measures to GDP are important, a 
metric of happiness defined in terms of only a subjective account of personal feeling ‘is a 
wholly subjective target, and it lacks objective measures’ (ibid.: 239). Instead, Seligman 
proposes including a measure which incorporates subjective as well as objective measures. He 
suggests that in addition to the happiness measure, engagement, positive relationships, 
meaning, and accomplishment should be included into the metric. This view that subjective 
measures are not enough is supported by Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009), who assert the 
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importance of using both subjective and objective measures for assessing well-being. They also 
recommend producing an approach better capable of informing policy than purely hedonic or 
economic measures. However, they go further than Seligman, and embrace the importance of 
the Capabilities Approach when making sense of quality of life. 
 
Some researchers suggest that the ‘measures of happiness used differ somewhat with the 
level of intervention’. For this reason, ‘at the individual level we need sensitive measures of 
happiness of persons, but at the collective level we rather need global aggregates’(Veenhoven, 
2008: 3). The question remains however, about whether aspects of the quantitative metrics 
proposed above may in reality be too crude on their own, to make sense of the happiness of 
either individuals or of groups. In defence of the quantitative metric, Easterlin (2001) argues 
the following in respect of the individual:  
 
... although each individual is free to define happiness in his or her own terms, in 
practice the kinds of things chiefly cited as shaping happiness are for the most people 
much the same – probably because most people everywhere spend most of their lives 
doing the same types of things. (2001: 467).  
 
He admits that this is not to say that: 
 
... the happiness of any one individual can be directly compared with that of another. 
But if one is concerned with comparing the subjective well-being of sizable groups of 
people, such as social classes, this similarity in feelings about the sources of happiness 
gives credence to such comparison. (2001: 467).  
 
One problem with this view is that it is not sensitive enough to identify the difference between 
peoples’ subjective feelings of happiness which are based on genuine experiences of well-
being, and those which are affected or distorted by cultural adaptation and by ‘unreasoning 
acceptance of persistent deprivation’ (Sen, 2009:275). This is the reason why Sen maintains 
that when understanding happiness and shaping policy which nurtures well-being, ‘the need 
for reasoning about our un-scrutinized feelings can be cogently defended’ (ibid.: 275). In 
support of Sen’s view I argue in this chapter that the Capabilities Approach allows us to 
identify distributional inequalities and safeguard the dignity of the individual and of groups, 
enabling people to develop practical reasoning in their reflective deliberations and choices 
which promotes individual and societal flourishing. 
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As explored in Chapter 1, commensurability about evaluative feelings in respect of what makes 
people happy is unsupported, since as Sen reminds us ‘we cannot reduce all the things we 
have reason to value into one homogenous magnitude’ and ‘functionings are diverse’ (2009: 
239). Two distinct objects are commensurable if they are measurable in common units. 
However, non-commensurability is present when several dimensions of value are irreducible 
to one another, such as when evaluating alternatives with non-commensurable objects, like 
the units of happiness that a concert gives a person with the units of happiness that running a 
marathon gives another. This is why Sen stresses that ‘reflected evaluation demands reasoning 
regarding relative importance, not just counting’ (ibid.: 241). And to this he adds the 
importance of public reasoning as a way of ‘extending the reach and reliability of valuations 
and of making them more robust’ (ibid.: 241).  
 
At this point we can conclude that the endeavour of making sense of happiness or well-being 
in society by adopting a quantitative metric of unit, in terms of subjective or objective well-
being, or both, is understandable in our collective wish to create environments and 
possibilities in which people and communities can thrive and flourish. However, although the 
sentiment which drives these metrics is commendable, we must be weary of either reducing 
happiness to un-commensurable units of subjective feeling, or, of confining our understanding 
of happiness to the results of quantitative measures, whether subjective or objective. 
Therefore, it is essential to broaden our understanding of happiness or well-being further, 
embracing the Aristotelian capabilities framework rather than the utilitarian framework of 
welfare economics. One reason for this is that the capabilities framework takes private and 
public reasoning seriously, and considers them essential for an account of happiness which is 
sensitive to the complexity of human beings and their interconnectedness.  
 
It is worth noting that the recent report exploring the measurement of social progress, to 
which Sen was an advisor, recommends such a far reaching approach, as quoted below. 
However, time will indicate whether these ambitious proposals will be implemented through 
careful listening to the voice of individuals and public reasoning, as Sen suggests (2009: 273-
276), and not be limited in its interpretation by using quantitative subjective and objective 
measures alone. 
 
Quality of life depends on people’s objective conditions and capabilities. Steps should be 
taken to improve measures of people’s health, education, personal activities and 
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environmental conditions. In particular, substantial effort should be devoted to 
developing and implementing robust, reliable measures of social connections, political 
voice, and insecurity that can be shown to predict life satisfaction. (Stiglitz, Sen, and 
Fitoussi, 2009:15). 
 
Before exploring happiness understood within the context of the Capabilities Approach to 
flourishing and living well, I will identify persistent barriers to flourishing which continue to be 
a reality for individuals in society today, which prove a challenge to realising the important 
aspiration articulated by the Sarkozy Commission Report (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009), as 
quoted above.  
 
 
4.3 Unsettling evidence of unhappiness in society 
 
Prominent social scientists such as Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), highlight worrying trends in 
society today which do not nurture happiness despite world-wide economic progress and 
rising living standards over recent years, as the quotation below illustrates.  
 
It is a remarkable paradox that, at the pinnacle of human material and technical 
achievement, we find ourselves anxiety-ridden, prone to depression, worried about how 
others see us, unsure of our friendships, driven to consume and with little or no 
community life. (2009: 3). 
 
There is plenty of evidence for these difficult social issues. For example, there is evidence that 
across the world mental health conditions affect millions of people. According to The World 
Health Organization (WHO) around 151 million people suffer from depression, and around 844 
thousand people die by suicide every year. Also, in low-income countries, depression 
represents almost as large a problem as does malaria (3.2% versus 4.0% of the total disease 
burden) (WHO, 2010: 2). Moreover, it is thought that depressive disorders will be the second 
leading cause of disability worldwide by 2020 (Ibrahim et al. 2010). This statistic is supported 
by studies commissioned by the WHO which predict that by the year 2020, depression will be 
the second leading cause of mortality in the world, affecting 30% of adults (Murray and Lopez, 
1996).  
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Quoting Barry Schwartz’s
6
 research of 2000 for support, Lyubomirsky (2007: 37-8) indicates 
that depression has become an epidemic. She postulates two important forces as contributing 
factors: one being ever rising expectations for our lives, and the other being an intensifying 
individualistic culture. Lyubomirsky expands on this individualistic tendency in society:  
 
Our increasingly individualistic culture leaves us all alone to manage our everyday 
stresses and problems, compelling us to blame only ourselves for our shortcomings and 
failures. Increasing job insecurity also contributes to the many stressors of modern life. 
And, perhaps most important, may be the unravelling of the social fabric. Compared to 
previous generations we feel far less belonging and commitment to our families and 
communities and are thus less buffered by social support and strong meaningful 
connections to others. (2007: 37-8). 
 
 
4.3.1 A focus on children and young people 
 
When we focus on the lives of children and young people, these barriers to flourishing are 
further borne out by evidence from the Unicef report in 2007, which assembled 40 indicators 
of child well-being from OECD countries. This study concluded that children in the UK and the 
US fare less well than in the other 21 countries included in its analysis (Innocenti Report, Card 
2007). And as educationist David Carr reminds us, ‘to be angry, fearful,... —or even 
depressed—is to be impelled towards or inhibited from some course of action or other’ (2000: 
28). In society today, children and young people seem to function with varying degrees of 
success in ever more complex situations. For example, many young people experience the 
following: a prevalence in changing family structures, complex and competitive social lives 
from a young age, rising internet risks, a susceptibility to fast changing identities to keep up 
with their peers, and role models from the media promoting consumerism, or beauty, or 
material wealth as the key to happiness.  
 
There also seems to be a rise in anxiety and stress in children and young people’s lives, as 
borne out by government statistics which indicate that 10% of all 5 to 16 year olds have 
clinically significant mental health difficulties (Layard and Dunn, 2009: 114). In addition, 
between 1974 and 2004, the rate of adolescents’ emotional problems, such as anxiety and 
depression is said to have increased by 70% (Collishaw et al. 2004). There is also evidence of an 
increase in self-harm and other mental health issues from studies commissioned by the Mental 
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Health Foundation (2006)
7
. Moreover, as young people’s insecurity and stress increases, the 
standards-driven system of education through standardised forms of assessment is detected 
by educationists as being a contributing factor (Pring and Pollard, 2011: 39).  
 
In support of Lyubomirsky’s hypothesis about the trends in individualism and its negative 
effects in the previous section above, there is evidence of a decrease in good peer relations as 
reported by children and young people. In 2007, the UNICEF commissioned Innocenti Report 
found the UK ranked bottom in respect of peer relations between adolescents, where only 
40% of British children over the age of 11 describe their peers as kind and helpful.  
 
Society and its governments recognise that our children will be the leaders of progress towards 
a flourishing society in the future and hence protecting their well-being and preparing them for 
the future is the raison d’être of world-wide organisations such as UNICEF. Consequently, we 
should both celebrate the majority of children and young people who are flourishing in society 
today and encourage them further. We should also be pro-active in our concern and action to 
safeguard the increasing minority of children and young people who are unhappy and failing to 
flourish in society today. Education, as will be discussed in the following chapters, plays a 
formative role in this endeavour, especially in nurturing children and young people to reach a 
reflective equilibrium towards themselves, others, and as stewards of a sustainable 
environment.  
 
 
4.4 Disconnectedness: Increased individualism, decline in trust and solidarity 
 
Regarding children and young people’s well-being and ability to flourish, Layard and Dunn 
remind us of the importance of social connections as they maintain that ‘inadequate respect 
between people’... ’is what we believe is at the root of our problem’ (2009: 135). Social 
connections between people matter as determinants of well-being. This is a view supported by 
Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, as indicated by their recommendation to include a measure of social 
connections when looking at issues of life satisfaction (2009: 15). Wilkinson and Pickett also 
remind us of the growing research on social cohesion and social capital, which show its close 
relationship with health and well-being (2009: 78-9). Like research in the area of happiness and 
well-being, the field of research into social capital is also wide and intricate. This chapter will 
therefore only focus on the concept in brief, in order to establish its significance in society, to 
highlight the areas where there is agreement about its connectedness to well-being, and to 
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identify support in favour of the importance of relationships and trust at the heart of the 
concept of social capital. For a more comprehensive account of social capital and its intricacies 
see Putman (2000), Uslaner (2002), and Halpern (2005). 
 
The connections between social capital and well-being are supported by studies such as that 
conducted by Helliwell and Putman in 2004, where their evidence ‘confirms that social capital 
is strongly linked to subjective well-being through many independent channels, and in several 
different forms’ (2004: 1435, 1444). Here social capital is measured using a variety of vehicles, 
and understood in terms of ‘networks and norms of reciprocity and trust’ (ibid.: 1437). Halpern 
also explains, that ‘any social structure – short of a fully formal institution – that facilitates co-
operation and trust between people can be viewed as a form of social capital’ (2005: 292). The 
core idea here is that social networks have value, both to those within the networks and to 
bystanders outside the networks. As Helliwell and Putman point out ‘social capital can be 
embodied in bonds among family, friends and neighbours, in the workplace, at church, in civic 
associations, perhaps even in Internet based 'virtual communities'’ (2004: 1436). 
 
Correspondingly, research indicates that those with close friends, or friendly neighbours and 
supportive fellow workers ‘are less likely to experience sadness, loneliness, low self-esteem 
and problems with eating and sleeping’ (Helliwell and Putman,2004: 1437). In addition, ‘the 
happiness effects of social capital in these various forms seems to be quite large, compared 
with the effects of material affluence’ (ibid.: 1437). Hence subjective well-being is best 
predicted by the depth of a person’s social connections. As Helliwell and Putman report, ‘most 
of our measures of social capital appear to have this 'turbocharged' effect on happiness and 
life satisfaction’ (ibid.: 1443). And significantly, ‘those who believe themselves to live among 
others who can be trusted will tend to report higher subjective well-being’ (ibid.: 1442). 
However, it must be noted that not all the effects of social capital are positive, and some can 
have devastating effects, such as some networks which ‘have been used to finance and 
conduct terrorism’ (ibid.: 1437), or ‘gangs’ (Halpern, 2005: 118-9). Nevertheless, social 
networks can be a powerful asset for positive action and flourishing, both for individuals and 
for communities.  
 
The existence and importance of social networks supports the view that well-being and 
happiness requires a sense of connectedness, and that therefore an analysis of happiness 
confined to the individual without reference to their relationships is misconceived. Many 
psychologists today agree that ‘the classical theories of happiness were fully right in their 
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assumption that individual happiness is contingent upon (while certainly not fully determined 
by) the social order. Some psychologists even start from the thesis ‘that happiness must be 
seen as the outcome of an interaction process between individual aspirations and expectations 
on the one side, and more or less favourable micro and macrosocial conditions on the other 
side’. (Haller and Hadler, 2006: 171). Others also remind us that on its own, ‘the goal of self-
realisation is not enough. No society can work unless its members feel responsibilities as well 
as rights’ (Layard,2005: 92). Therefore, the ‘happiness of a society is likely to increase the more 
people care about other people’ (ibid.: 141).  
 
 
4.4.1 Distinctions in social capital 
 
The notion of social capital is complex and theoretical work in respect of the concept has 
identified different sub-types of social capital, in particular the distinction between ‘bonding’ 
and ‘bridging’ social capital (Putman, 2000: 22-3; Halpern, 2005: 19-20). This is an important 
distinction, since 'bonding' social capital depicts links among people who are similar, and 
hence connected, for example, by ‘ethnicity, age, social class, etc’. On the other hand, 
'bridging' social capital depicts links ‘that cut across various lines’ of society (Helliwell and 
Putman, 2004: 1437) and is therefore best understood as outward looking networks which 
‘encompass people across diverse social cleavages’ (Putman, 2000: 22-3; Halpern, 2009: 19-
22). Bridging capital is also discussed by Rothstein and Uslaner in terms of ‘generalized’ trust, 
which they believe ‘links us to people who are different from ourselves’, which nurtures ‘a 
concern for others, especially people who have faced discrimination’ (2005: 45-46).  
 
If society is to progress in a manner which is sensitive to the dignity of every person and which 
cares for those who are vulnerable, it is especially important to nurture bridging social capital 
or generalised trust between different types of peoples. In particular, social capital would be 
most essential between: (1) those who find it more difficult to trust one another and work 
together owing to their apparent differences, and (2) those who are unable to translate 
between different contexts and cultures towards greater understanding.  
 
As experts involved in the report for the Children’s Society, A Good Childhood, remind us, ‘we 
must acknowledge that prejudice and discrimination are significant barriers to creating the 
kind of caring, respectful society in which all children can flourish’ (Layard and Dunn, 2010: 
148). Fostering bridging social capital, or generalised trust as understood above, seems crucial 
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if our children and young people are to flourish. In respect of increasing bridging social capital 
or generalised trust, the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach is valuable. As the Capabilities 
Approach is based on shared starting points between human beings and encourages the 
development of practical reason and affiliation, it is significant in nurturing meaningful 
discourse and understanding for deliberated trust and connectedness, all essential for bridging 
social capital or generalised trust.  
 
Research in respect of social capital suggests a decline in this area, although there is ongoing 
debate as to the cause of this decline. Halpern suggests that ‘the simple hypothesis that social 
capital is falling in a uniform manner across nations is not borne out by the data’ (2005: 222). 
There does however seem to be consensus about certain areas of decrease and increase 
respectively. For example, social networks or connectedness related to politics or religion have 
decreased, and social networks which support leisure time and friendships have increased.  
 
 
4.4.2 The rise in individualism and the need for solidarity 
 
This fits in with Putman’s thesis, and also with the popular interpretation ‘that across the 
world people are becoming more individualistic and even hedonistic’ (Halpern, 2005: 223). As 
discussed earlier, the claim of an increase in individualism is supported by researchers. 
Lyubormirsky, links individualism with unhappiness in adults (2007: 37), and Layard & Dunn 
link individualism with unhappiness and lack of flourishing in children and young people (2009: 
4, 6-8). Moreover, Layard warns against the ‘growth of individualism’ which has been evident 
in the last fifty years which he claims has corroborated towards the decline in community trust 
(2005: 82). And this decline in community trust, he believes, helps to explain why happiness 
has not risen in the last fifty years despite continued economic growth (ibid.: 82).  
 
Although Layard and Lyubomirsky do not define individualism, it seems from their description 
of it that they understand it as the tendency of individuals to turn in on themselves and look 
inwards, rather than individualism understood in the more extreme form as methodological 
individualism. As Sen explains, ‘methodological individualism’ is the belief ‘that all social 
phenomena must be accounted for in terms of what individuals think, choose and do, 
detached from the society in which they exist’ (2009: 244). It would be fair to say that the view 
of psychologists and social scientists mentioned here, and the Capabilities Approach, would 
not concede the possibility of such detachment of the individual experience from their social 
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environment and therefore would not espouse the more extreme understanding of 
individualism. Here, individuals’ abilities to live the kind of lives they have reason to value 
brings in social influences both in terms of what they value and what influences operate on 
those values. It is hard to envision how persons in society can think, choose or act without 
being influenced in one way or another by the nature and working of the world around them. 
Hence, for the purposes of this discussion, the concern is the tendency of individualism to 
erode affiliation and thus diminish trust between individuals and groups, thereby eroding 
social capital and creating barriers to flourishing.  
 
Some researchers describe a difference in the characteristics of individualism in different parts 
of the world. For example, Japan is said to exemplify a kind of ‘co-operative individualism’, 
parts of Europe such as Sweden are described as exemplifying ‘solidaristic individualism’, and 
the USA and to some extent the UK demonstrate an ‘egoistic individualism’ characterised by 
increasing materialism (Sen, 2009: 223-4). A common thread between these is the ‘emergence 
of individualized and privatized consumption patterns’ (ibid.: 234).  
 
An important point to note here in respect of individualism (regardless of the nuances in its 
definition) is its negative impact on the broad definition of flourishing which this thesis 
considers important. That is, individualism seems primarily to nurture an inward focus in 
persons and groups confined to the needs of the individual or the group. At the very least, 
individualism results in a blindness or unwillingness to recognise others as important. It 
therefore does not afford the essential outward looking focus necessary for connectedness 
and social capital. Such a narrow focus on the individual does not recognise shared human 
needs and capabilities, and makes it more difficult to build a meaningful public discourse in 
respect of living well based on shared starting points about humanity. What is most worrying, 
as Putman and Halpern point out is that: 
 
Notably in the Anglo-Saxon nations ... trends towards individualism and social 
disengagement have become generalized over recent decades. ... People have been 
using their loosened social, economic and moral constraints to rid themselves of the 
potential ‘inconveniences of others’ in all walks of life ... Sometimes this has been 
obvious, such as with the growth of gated communities, but in general it has been a 
more subtle social and psychological withdrawal ... Public values, ... government action 
and the structuring of a nation’s social capital stand together in a dynamic equilibrium, a 
web of causality. (Halpern, 2005: 242-243). 
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Consequently, a view accepted by many is that individuals and groups in society need to 
nurture greater solidarity, or as Halpern puts it, ‘more solidaristic values’ (ibid.: 243). The idea 
of solidarity has also been identified as key to flourishing by theologians, who define solidarity 
as co-operative working towards greater social action, based on the dignity of every individual 
and on respect between persons across the globe (Hanvey, 2011). As Hanvey explains, the 
dangers of individualism are considerable and the need for solidarity and thus respect and 
connectedness between people is crucial for flourishing.  
 
Not only does the principle of solidarity ... resist the collapse of society into short term 
individualism, it keeps us conscious of the historical nature of society and human 
culture. Without recognition that we have responsibilities to the past, present and 
future, the moral quality of society is impaired. ... It effectively instrumentalises [persons 
and groups] to serve the immediate needs of the present and prevents any 
consideration of the future consequences. ... There is no greater tyranny than the 
imperialism of the present. In an age that sees history only as a burden and regards 
cultural amnesia as liberation, the principle of solidarity is an important guarantor of an 
open society that values its members. (Hanvey, 2011: 6). 
 
In summary, research seems to support the view that well-being requires social 
interconnectedness, and that this to some extent is correlated with a sense of trust between 
individuals and groups. This sense of trust is considered essential to the Capabilities Approach 
with its concept of affiliation. It is agreed that trust is declining, negatively affecting social 
capital and well-being. Importantly, researchers identify the value of trust and co-operation in 
our ability to live flourishing lives: 
 
Although we do not, strictly speaking, include social trust within the core definition of 
social capital, norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are a nearly universal 
concomitant of dense social networks. For that reason, social trust - that is, the belief 
that others around you can be trusted - is itself a strong empirical index of social capital 
at the aggregate level. High levels of social trust in settings of dense social networks 
often provide the crucial mechanism through which social capital affects aggregate 
outcomes. (Helliwell and Putman, 2004: 1436). 
 
The Aristotelian capabilities framework which is discussed below provides a flexible structure 
within which to understand happiness as flourishing within a fulfilled life, where individuals 
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develop their capability for practical reason and affiliation. This thesis contends that the 
contemporary Capabilities Approach, grounded on Aristotle’s philosophy, fosters deliberated 
trust and respect between individuals, and a sense of connectedness and solidarity towards 
greater social capital, which is so essential to a flourishing society. Although the pursuit of 
happiness is admitted as being a lifetime’s task, the Capabilities Approach with its ancient 
provenance and philosophy, may prove to be what 21
st
 century society so badly requires for its 
well-being. 
 
 
4.5 The Capabilities Approach: An important understanding of happiness  
 
Understanding well-being in terms of flourishing within the framework of capabilities is gaining 
prominence, as the paradigm of the Capabilities Approach has received recognition in the 
Sarkozy Commission report chaired by Joseph Stiglitz, with advice from Amartya Sen (2009). Of 
importance is that this far-reaching report has been influential in its effort to rethink the 
quality-of-life measurement from the perspective of capabilities. The quotation below, in 
which Nussbaum comprehensively defines the Capabilities Approach, is significant to the 
discussion about happiness as flourishing within a fulfilled life. 
 
The Capabilities Approach can be provisionally defined as an approach to comparative 
quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social justice. It holds that the 
key question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing them for their basic 
decency or justice, is, “What is each person able to do and to be?” In other words, the 
approach takes each person as an end, asking not just about the total or average well-
being but about the opportunities available to each person. It is focused on choice or 
freedom, holding that the crucial good societies should be promoting for their people a 
set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not 
exercise in action: the choice is theirs. It thus commits itself to respect for people’s 
powers of self-definition. The approach is resolutely pluralist about value: It holds that 
the capability achievements that are central for people are different in quality, not just 
in quantity; that they cannot without distortion be reduced to a single numerical scale; 
and that a fundamental part of understanding and producing them is understanding the 
specific nature of each. Finally, the approach is concerned with entrenched social 
injustice and inequality, especially capability failures that are the result of discrimination 
or marginalization. It ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy – namely, 
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to improve the quality of life for all people, as defined by their capabilities. (Nussbaum, 
2011: 18-9). 
 
This chapter offers a perspective on happiness or well-being which resists commensurability 
and which is not best understood in aggregate terms of utility, such as the utilitarian quest for 
happiness seeks to do. Instead, understood within the capabilities framework of the 
Capabilities Approach, happiness as flourishing takes account of the importance of individual 
freedoms, choice and voice, and calls for ongoing debate towards an ever fuller understanding. 
In this sense, the Capabilities Approach is faithful to the concept of plurality and irreducibility 
in respect of quality of life.  
 
The Aristotle-inspired approach combines ‘rigour with concreteness, theoretical power with 
sensitivity to the actual circumstances of human life and choice in all their multiplicity, variety, 
and mutability’ (Nussbaum, 1993: 242-270). This is possible through the ongoing interplay 
between individual understandings and contexts, and universal beliefs about grounding 
experiences shared across humanity. This perspective enables individuals and groups in society 
to reflect and debate questions about happiness, living well and its constituent parts, in the 
context of mutual human capabilities and in a way which is sensitive to the individual. It thus 
provides shared starting points for developing important capabilities, namely practical reason 
and affiliation. These are considered necessary for happiness, as they enable persons to make 
positive decisions in favour of their flourishing and to work together with others in an 
authentic spirit of deliberated trust and co-operation towards a flourishing society. This 
understanding of happiness as flourishing and living well, has important implications for what 
we value and nurture as a society, and how we work together to nurture happiness or well-
being.  
 
For many years now, Sen and Nussbaum have been advocating the Capabilities Approach to be 
adopted into social policy in respect of human development. Sen, in his work Inequality 
Rexamined (1992) and Development as Freedom (1999),  proposes ‘to commend the capability 
framework as the best space within which to make comparisons about quality of life, and to 
show why it is superior to utilitarian and quasi-Rawlsian approaches’ (Nussbaum, 2011: 17-8). 
Importantly, Nussbaum adopts the term capabilities in her approach in order to emphasise 
that ‘the most important elements of people’s quality of life are plural and qualitatively 
distinct’ (ibid.: 18). For this reason, aspects of individual lives including health and education 
‘cannot be reduced to a single metric without distortion’ (ibid.: 18).  
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Similarly, others such as Wolff and de-Shalit (2007) support this view, as outlined below. They 
suggest that well-being is best understood: 
 
... in such a way that everything that affects people for good or ill can figure in an 
understanding of their level of advantage and disadvantage, accepting that there are 
many determinants of well-being ... and that they are not all reducible to a common 
currency. (2007: 8). 
 
Accordingly, they support the view that ‘advantage’ or well-being, must be ‘understood in a 
pluralist form’ (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 8). Sen and Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities in 
particular is adopted by Wolff and de-Shalit, which together with the pluralist approach in 
general they consider as the starting point for their position (ibid.: 8). Within this view, in order 
to understand how happy someone is, or their level of well-being, it is necessary to understand 
how well or badly someone’s life is going. This requires attention to what they can do and be 
and needs to take account of their capability to function. Being attentive to a variety of things 
such as bodily health and integrity, affiliation, practical reason, control over the environment 
and other human capabilities is therefore essential for Wolff and de-Shalit.  
 
Enabling social policy with a basis which will carry wide conviction, the Capabilities Approach 
can help governments, groups and individuals to ‘identify the worst off and take appropriate 
steps so that their position can be improved’ (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 3). Wolff and de-Shalit 
seek to promote social equality ‘such as relations of community and solidarity between 
people’ (ibid.: 6) rather than focus on material equality. This means identifying areas of life, 
‘which once realised by equal relations, contribute to individual well-being’ since ‘social 
equality and inequality, is something which makes individual lives go better or worse, by 
affecting their sense of belonging to a society, or connection with others; what we ... call 
affiliation’ (ibid.: 6). In this profound sense people’s lives in respect of happiness and well-
being are affected by government policy, by the nature of the society they live in, and by how 
they regard and treat each other. 
 
As noted in the previous section, there are persistent barriers to flourishing. The social capital 
literature describes lack of connectedness as a key barrier to flourishing, affected by a lack of 
trust which results in apathy and an inability to discourse meaningfully and act co-operatively. 
The idea of interconnectedness in the sense of affiliation is also an important part of our 
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understanding of happiness as supported by psychology research (Haller and Hadler, 2006: 
169). Further evidence from psychology studies also support the link between trust and well-
being: ‘Greater happiness can be created by improving the livability of society at large, such as 
by providing a decent standard of living and a climate of trust’ (Veenhoven, 2008: 2). 
 
In the light of this evidence, the significance of Nussbaum’s claim that the capabilities of 
practical reason and affiliation are essential for flourishing should be noted. As she maintains: 
they ‘suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human’ (Nussbaum 2000: 82). This is 
pertinent as there is consensus in the social capital literature of the link between trust and a 
sense of connectedness, which in turn supports meaningful discourse, understanding, and 
action between people (Helliwell and Putman, 2004: 1436). Practical reason and affiliation are 
in this sense crucial for engendering deliberated trust, capable of fostering complex forms of 
discourse, reflection, and co-operative action, and which supports concern and reciprocity 
between human beings, thereby enabling well-being. This is what we should seek to nurture as 
fundamental for the happiness of individuals and as the bonding element towards social 
progress. Such an understanding of happiness which cannot be measured by a single numerical 
scale, takes us beyond an overemphasis on subjective positive feelings. This view of happiness 
calls us to recognise ‘the need of objectivity for communication and for the language of public 
reasoning’ and ‘ethical evaluation’ (Sen, 2009: 122).  
 
Nussbaum is correct to suggest the Capabilities Approach as an ethical framework. In addition, 
she defends practical reason and affiliation as two particular capabilities which suffuse all the 
others towards living well and flourishing, and urges educationists to embrace this view and 
nurture these capabilities in educational settings (1998, 2010, 2011). As Rothstein and Uslaner 
claim, ‘Education is one of the strongest determinants of generalised trust’ (2005: 47, 64). 
Significantly, trust may prove to be the bonding agent between peoples which enables 
happiness as flourishing, as the capabilities of affiliation and practical reason are realised. 
Therefore, education must engage in helping children and young people to develop 
deliberated trust and co-operation, by nurturing the capabilities of practical reason and 
affiliation in order to flourish. In particular, education must engage in supporting those living in 
areas of greatest deprivation who will need particular assistance. This is a particular focus of 
the following chapters, which explore the importance of the Capabilities Approach in 
education. 
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The evidence in this chapter supports the view that helping individuals to flourish and be 
happy in this sense, is important. Moreover, flourishing has been identified as requiring a 
sense of connectedness or affiliation, based on a shared understanding of humanity, as well as 
requiring the capacity to transform concern into positive action and co-operation by making 
balanced judgements through practical reason. The final part of this chapter will focus on (1) 
identifying the shared starting points which enable people to reach out to others beyond their 
own group, which provide the basis for the Capabilities Approach, and (2) exploring the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation which nurture deliberated trust and co-
operation. As Rothstein and Uslaner point out: ‘When people do not see themselves as part of 
the same moral community with a shared fate, they will not have the solidarity that is essential 
for building up social trust’ (2005: 61). The Capabilities Approach provides this shared moral 
sense, and the possibility for solidarity and deliberated trust through the development of the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation. 
 
 
4.6 Trust and co-operation enabled by practical reason and affiliation 
 
Not everyone is wholly trustworthy and trust must be placed with care ... Well-placed 
trust grows out of active inquiry rather than blind acceptance. (O’Neill, 2002: 17,76). 
 
What is needed in society today as illustrated by the worrying issues identified by Wilkinson 
and Pickett (2009), Halpern (2005), and others, are significant relationships between 
individuals based on deliberated trust capable of leading to co-operative action. These require 
a kind of trustfulness that is only possible through genuine shared understanding about 
humanity as the catalyst to shared speech and deliberation, and collaboration and care. It is 
this sense of trustfulness that provides some of the glue that binds individuals and which in 
turn creates the climate for happiness as flourishing to be a reality rather than a mirage. 
 
The binding element between people as outlined here is fragile and dependent on a shared 
understanding of what humans share. This binding element is susceptible to being thwarted by 
societal structures which value outputs to the neglect or value of the people who produce 
them. In the face of this lack of self-value and value of others it is difficult to maintain a sense 
of sustainable self, essential to building a sustainable narrative based on shared starting points 
and a sense of connectedness. As Sennett writes: ‘Narratives are more than simple chronicles 
of events; they give shape to the forward movement of time, suggesting reasons why things 
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happen, showing their consequences’ (1998: 30). We need a narrative that is mutually 
recognised as shared, which gives rise to mutual connections, makes possible meaningful 
relationships, trust, collaboration, and which enables flourishing. I argue in this chapter that 
the Capabilities Approach provides the framework for this narrative to develop.  
 
Psychology supports the view that we are by nature inclined to relatedness, that the 
environment can thwart our development, and that in some respect we need a sense of 
shared history and experience for well-being (Deci and Ryan, 2002). They suggest that:  
 
... we assume people have a primary propensity to forge interconnections among 
aspects of their own psyches as well as with other individuals and groups in their social 
worlds ... [which] must be viewed as a dynamic potential that requires proximal and 
distal conditions of nurturance. (2002: 4-5).  
 
The shared narrative we seek is here developed in the context of the need for competence, 
relatedness, and autonomy, which are considered universal as based on our human nature, 
and shaped by the social context. In this context, Deci and Ryan argue that ‘needs, when 
satisfied, promote well-being’ (ibid.: 22), whereas a social context that thwarts need fulfilment 
‘diminishes the ‘individual’s motivation, growth, integrity, and well-being’ (ibid.: 9). For Deci 
and Ryan, competence refers to ‘feeling effective in one’s ongoing interactions with the social 
environment and experiencing opportunities to exercise and express one’s capacities’ (ibid.: 7); 
relatedness refers to ‘feeling connected to others, to caring for and being cared for by those, 
to having a sense of belongingness both with other individuals and with one’s community’. In 
this sense, the tendency to connect with and be accepted by others ‘concerns the 
psychological sense of being with others in secure communion or unity’(ibid.: 7); and 
autonomy ‘concerns acting from interest and integrated values’ (ibid.: 8), not to be confused 
with independence. 
 
The Capabilities Approach has much to offer if we are to develop deliberated trust and co-
operation amongst individuals and groups, and nurture an environment where our innate 
need for competence, relatedness and autonomy are realised towards our well-being and 
flourishing. Three elements of this approach are discussed here. First the common ethical 
evaluative framework of the Capabilities Approach is based on shared grounding experiences 
from which virtues and virtuous action is understood. This framework then acts as a 
benchmark for decisions about choosing well and acting well, which take account of the dignity 
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and potential of every individual. Within this context, the capabilities of practical reason and 
affiliation are essential for realising well-being and flourishing, in that they enable individuals 
and groups to make balanced decisions in the context of what human beings share.  
 
In Chapter 3, I explored the notion of a shared nature based on human functional capabilities 
which all humans share. In this section, the focus is to examine how Aristotle and the 
contemporary Capabilities Approach fosters connectedness which enables human flourishing, 
as it enables human beings to understand difference and live together, by developing virtuous 
action with reference to what human beings share. Here, Nussbaum’s article, Non Relative 
Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach will be the primary source for support of Aristotle’s views, 
which she uses to justify the contemporary capabilities list and approach (1993). 
 
What Aristotle seems to do in the Nicomachean Ethics (II, 7) is to ‘isolate a sphere of human 
experience that figures in more or less any human life, and in which more of less any human 
being will have to make some choices rather than others, and act in some way rather some 
other’ (Nussbaum, 1993: 245). Once each sphere is introduced, in which it is accepted that 
everyone at some point has dealings, then Aristotle considers what it is to choose and respond 
well within that sphere - that is - to be virtuous or to make use of these spheres in order to 
make judgements for choosing and acting well. For example, a sphere of experience is paired 
with a corresponding virtue term: fear of death with courage; bodily appetites with 
moderation; distribution of limited resources with justice; association and living together with 
truthfulness; attitude to the good and ill fortune of others with proper judgement; planning 
one’s life and conduct with practical wisdom, and so on. Of course, there is always the 
possibility to choose defectively - that is - to over or under react, and the spheres of grounding 
experiences become the reference point for reaching balanced judgements with reflected 
equilibrium. 
 
The key point here is that everyone makes some choices and acts somehow or other in these 
spheres, if not properly, then improperly. As Nussbaum puts it:  
 
Everyone has some attitude, and corresponding behaviour, toward her own death; her 
bodily appetites and their management; her property and its use; the distribution of 
social goods; telling the truth; being kind to others; cultivating a sense of play and 
delights. ... No matter where one lives one cannot escape these questions, so long as 
one is living a human life. ... This means that our behaviour falls, ... within the sphere of 
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the Aristotelian virtue, in each case. If it is not appropriate, it is inappropriate; it cannot 
be off the map altogether. (Nussbaum, 1993: 247). 
 
In this sense, we can understand progress in ethics, to be progress in ‘finding the correct fuller 
specification of virtue, isolated by its nominal definition’ (Nussbaum, 1993: 248). Put another 
way, we can identify a very basic universal definition for a particular virtue based on the 
shared human spheres of experience, and from there make sense of what it means in this 
instance to act well or rather to flesh out what the virtue term means in the contextual 
situation. The Capabilities Approach, and the list which Nussbaum articulates, described in 
Chapter 3 , gives individuals and societies a basic ethical framework based on shared 
grounding experiences, where virtuous action can be evaluated with reference to this 
framework to help us make sense of what choosing and acting well in the particular instance 
entails. 
 
Because this framework points to our common features as human beings it acts as a uniting 
element, which underlines the need for respect between human beings, and the sense that we 
are all connected by this common framework of shared experience. It is within this framework 
that affiliation and deliberated trust through practical reason can be nurtured. These 
recognised common capabilities then have implications on fostering environments where we 
can develop virtues for realising our potential for flourishing, rather than promoting 
environments and policies which thwart our ability to flourish. As Nussbaum argues, Aristotle’s 
analysis of the virtues ‘gives him an appropriate framework for these comparisons, which 
seem perfectly appropriate inquiries into the ways in which different societies have solved 
common human problems’ (1993: 249). Within any deliberation, the first stage of the enquiry 
includes the ‘demarcation of the sphere of choice of the ‘grounding experiences’ that fix the 
reference of the virtue term’ (ibid.: 250). The second stage becomes the ‘ensuing more 
concrete enquiry into what the appropriate choice, in that sphere, is’ (ibid.: 250). 
 
Here is where the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation become especially important in 
order to help us choose in favour rather than against flourishing. Nussbaum defines practical 
reason as: ‘being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life’(Nussbaum, 2001: 417). Affiliation, Nussbaum defines as: 
‘being able to live with and toward others, to recognise and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of 
another’ and ‘having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be 
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treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 417). 
This is based on Aristotle’s claim that human beings feel a sense of fellowship with other 
human beings, and that we are by nature social animals. For example, ‘however varied our 
specific conceptions of friendship and love are, there is a great point in seeing them as 
overlapping expressions of the same family of shared human needs and desires’ (Nussbaum, 
1993: 264). It is this conception of shared universal innate needs which Deci and Ryan describe 
and research using psychological language (2002: 5-23). 
 
In respect of the Capabilities Approach, it is a helpful ethical framework within which to 
develop deliberated trust and co-operation between people, by promoting environmental 
structures which nurture them. This approach encourages individuals to act with reflective 
equilibrium, taking account of our shared context and needs as human beings. As Nussbaum 
reminds us regarding the capabilities list, ‘this is just a list of suggestions, closely related to 
Aristotle’s list of common experiences’ (1993: 265). This leaves open the possibility for refining 
this list in the light of experience and debate. It is however important to note Nussbaum’s 
claim as essential if we are to develop the kind of flourishing society we seek: 
 
It seems plausible to claim that in all these areas we have a basis for further work on the 
human good. We do not have a bedrock of completely un-interpreted ‘given’ data, but 
we do have nuclei of experience around which the constructions of different societies 
proceed. There is no Archimedean point here, no pure access to unsullied ‘nature’... 
There is just human life as it is lived. But in life as it is lived, we do find a family of 
experiences, clustering around certain focuses, which can provide reasonable starting 
points for cross-cultural reflection. (1993: 265). 
 
The Capabilities Approach seems more necessary than ever in society today, as we decipher 
happiness in the context of others, and strive to flourish. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have explored some underlying factors considered as barriers for well-being 
and flourishing, as identified by philosophers, psychologists, and social scientists. For example, 
there are growing areas of concern in society, as evidenced in the psychology literature by the 
rise of anxiety, depression and other mental health issues, in adults and children alike. There is 
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also evidence of a growing lack of trust and co-operation between individuals and groups, also 
supported by the social capital literature, and an increase in individualism is considered as a 
corroborating factor. Some of the worst affected people in the population live in areas with 
high levels of deprivation. Philosophers such as Wolff and de-Shalit (2007) suggest we focus on 
the social environment to nurture flourishing, which is what psychologists also describe as 
psychosocial resources, such as those identified by the psychologists Deci and Ryan (2002) as 
fundamental needs, such as competency, relatedness and autonomy.  
 
The decrease in people working together in an authentic spirit of co-operation or trust also 
leads to a superficial narrative (Sennet, 1996), even though in practice we live in a worldwide 
global community where communication is ever easier. Nevertheless the social narrative in 
place, often tends towards superficiality and individualism which stands in contrast to the 
narrative we seek, which is based on trust and solidarity (Halpern, 2005). As Sen (2010) 
identifies, what is missing is a deep discourse and understanding of others made possible by 
public reasoning.  
 
I argue in this chapter that happiness as flourishing is best understood within the capabilities 
framework, which supports a broader view of happiness than afforded by definitions based on 
individual preference grounded on individual feelings. In this sense, a wider definition of well-
being or happiness as flourishing is preferable, which supports ‘a state of being with others, 
where human needs are met, where one can act meaningfully to pursue one’s goals, and 
where one is able to enjoy a satisfactory quality of life’ (McGregor, 2007, quoted in Walker, 
2009). Practical reason and affiliation are the two capabilities correlated with nurturing 
flourishing, through virtuous action and involving deliberated trust and trustworthiness. In 
order to trust, we need to understand what we share, rather than focus on what divides us. 
Here the Capabilities Approach with shared spheres of experiences provides the ethical 
framework we seek.  
 
The vocabulary of human flourishing and virtues within the Capabilities Approach can enrich 
therapeutic or educational endeavours with people who are grappling with issues such as 
finding meaning in life, making difficult choices or reflecting on what kind of person they would 
like to be. Given the importance of social relationships for mental health, it is not surprising 
that societies with low levels of trust and weaker community life are also those with worse 
mental health (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: 70). As will be discussed in the following chapters 
this is where education plays an important role when grounded on the capabilities framework. 
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From the evidence of the Childhood Enquiry 2009, Layard and Dunn suggest that ‘a society 
which practices less mutual respect will produce many types of bad outcome’ (2009: 135). 
They also highlight the need to ‘change the overall ethos of our society, making it less success-
oriented and more generous with respect’ (2009: 135). The Capabilities Approach in education 
can help create the ethos we seek by nurturing the capabilities of practical reason and 
affiliation in particular. In Chapter 5, I will explore the Capabilities Approach and its importance 
in education, with its evaluative ethical framework which calls educators to go beyond the 
success-oriented utilitarian paradigm which is prevalent at present. 
 
In this chapter therefore, I have argued that a view of happiness as flourishing or living well 
provides an alternative view of well-being, which is broader than monetary considerations and 
individual feelings, which can positively affect individuals within society, and which 
government policy can embrace. Although it does not claim to eradicate the stubborn issues 
identified here, it has the capacity to nurture the well-being of individuals and to promote the 
much-needed fusion of horizons between its people, as individuals and groups develop 
practical reason and affiliation which engenders deliberated trust. 
 
This understanding of happiness has implications when considering learning and teaching and 
what we have a responsibility to help children develop, in particular, the capability for practical 
reason and affiliation. We would do well to take consideration of Nussbaum’s view quoted 
below, as we explore in the next chapter the significance of the Capabilities Approach in 
education.  
 
[Education] … draws citizens toward one another by complex mutual understanding and 
individual self-scrutiny, building a democratic culture that is truly deliberative and 
reflective, rather than simply the collision of unexamined preferences. And we hope in 
this way to ... increasingly learn how to understand, respect, and communicate, if our 
common human problems are to be constructively addressed. (Nussbaum, 1997: 294). 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish a case in favour of the Capabilities Approach as a 
conceptual grounding for education theory and practice, to help children and young people to 
flourish. This is where we turn our attention to next as we consider the importance of the 
Capabilities Approach in education. 
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1
 Health and well-being boards are being created across Local Authorities in the UK as part of 
the new strategy to understand and monitor well-being, in accordance with the recent Public 
Health White Paper 2010. http://healthandcare.dh.gov.uk/early-implementers-of-health-
and-well-being-boards-announced/ (Last accessed 28/05/011). 
 
2
 The New Ofsted Framework introduced in 2009 introduced well-being as one of its 8 
indicators for evaluation. http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/Ofsted-home/Forms-and-
guidance/Browse-all-by/Other/General/Framework-for-the-inspection-of-maintained-
schools-in-England-from-September-2009 (Last accessed 28/05/11). 
 
3
 Here I refer to the Happiness index created in Bhutan, and the recent Happiness index 
created by the OECD in 2011. This index covers 11 areas: housing, incomes, employment, 
social relationships, education, the environment, the administration of institutions, health, 
general satisfaction, security and the balance between work and family. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_201185_47837411_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(Last accessed 28/05/11). 
 
4
 For example refer to the debate between Seligman (2011) and Layard , where the former 
wishes to move away from the concept of happiness altogether and focus on well-being 
instead, and Layard who defends his position since 2005 that happiness as a subjective 
measure remains a helpful standalone measure.  
 
5
 This article is also available online: 
http://www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven/Pub2000s/2008g-full.pdf 
(Last accessed 01/06/11). 
 
6
 Schwartz, B. (2000) Pitfalls on the road to a positive psychology of hope, in Schwartz, B. and 
Gillham, J. (Eds.), The science of optimism and hope: Research essays in honour of Martin E.P. 
Seligman. 399-412.  
 
7
 Truth Hurts: Report of the National Inquiry into Self-harm among Young People, Mental 
Health Foundation, 2006. This study finds that self-harm is a ‘hidden epidemic’ (2006: 8). 
http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/content/assets/PDF/publications/truth_hurts.pdf?view=Sta
ndard (Last accessed 04/05/12). 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
The significance of the Capabilities Approach in education 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent educational research argues that education needs a broader view of what it means to 
be a humane and educated person than is afforded by a narrow focus on standardised
1
 
academic success and economic performance (Pring and Pollard, 2011). Moreover, evidence 
from many sources suggest that existing narrow foci and indicators in use require immediate 
critical scrutiny and refinement, in the face of persistent poor education and health outcomes, 
particularly in areas of greatest deprivation. I argue in Chapter 5, that the Capabilities 
Approach in education, with its focus on human development, could provide a grounding for 
education theory and practice to adopt the broader view required. The Capabilities Approach 
may redresses the obsession with an oversimplified narrow standardised framework for 
educational success. It would do so by enabling educators to focus on nurturing human 
capabilities which engender flourishing. This approach calls for due attention and care to be 
given to the particular individual and their context, and thereby resists standardisation. At the 
same time, the Capabilities Approach could also enable the balanced degree of objectivity 
required to make judgements about progress and quality. In this chapter therefore, I attempt 
to defend the significance of the Capabilities Approach in education, with its emphasis on 
developing practical reason and affiliation, as more profoundly necessary for success in society 
today than the performative approach in education allows.  
       
In this chapter I explore ways in which the Capabilities Approach could be significant in 
realising the aim of educating for success when defined with reference to Aristotle’s 
philosophy about human flourishing. As examined in previous chapters, the contemporary 
Capabilities Approach developed by Nussbaum and the philosophy which underpins it gives 
structure and guidance to the shared process of making sense of life, and of realising potential 
within the context of human flourishing. This approach, outlines general necessary 
constituents which enable human flourishing when instantiated and contextualised. It thereby 
includes a framework within which to understand human development, and to pursue equality 
which enables capabilities to be realised. When applied to education therefore, the 
 116
Capabilities Approach could have much to offer as it provides a ‘benchmark’ against which to 
understand and define success, that is more helpful to the view of an educated person we seek 
here, than the present utilitarian approach prevalent in education.  
 
In respect of flourishing, the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach has the potential to equip 
learners, teachers, and policy makers, with an ethical dimension much needed in education, 
based on what we share as human beings. This means that the Capabilities Approach includes 
an ethical imperative in education for important qualities to be developed and opportunities 
to be offered which enable flourishing. The approach could provide an much-needed 
grounding for shaping the learning process, whether thinking about educational reform in 
general, or pedagogy, curriculum, and assessment in particular contexts. For example, in 
respect of developing practical reasoning (the ability to act deliberately and effectively within 
the context of a concept of what human flourishing entails), or affiliation (the ability to relate 
to others with concern and care for the dignity of every human being), the Capabilities 
Approach demands that any kind of formal curriculum and assessment process is shaped 
beyond the confines of a utilitarian stance to teaching and learning to a standardised test 
solely in service of economic success for the majority.  
 
In respect of making sense of the world and situations in which people find themselves, the 
Capabilities Approach offers a framework for cognitive awareness and action which embraces 
a balance between reason and emotion, between the subjective and the objective, and 
between the individual and the collective. With regards to nurturing human development 
through education, the Capabilities Approach could help define the purpose and practice of 
education. Significantly, given this approach is based on a concept of being human informed by 
shared human capabilities, it is holistic, it takes account of the importance and dignity of every 
person, it is flexible enough to embrace the needs of the individual, and hence it could be 
significant to engender flourishing in our 21
st
 century society. This approach, which nurtures 
the child as an active maker of sense in his or her world, stands in contrast to the popular 
vision of learning, such as that promoted by the National Curriculum since 1988, with its 
standardised agenda, which prescribes and pre-formulates what counts as success (Pring 1989: 
69-96). 
 
In Chapter 5, therefore, I will first identify significant issues of concern in respect of children 
and young people today which call for the Capabilities Approach to be embraced in education. 
Second, I will consider the Capabilities Approach as a conceptual base for education theory 
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and practice. Third, I will examine how the school system today serves young people in their 
attempt to succeed in the broader sense used here, and offer some alternatives for change. As 
a result, this chapter will prepare the ground for Chapter 6, which focuses on reflective 
practice within the Capabilities Approach. 
 
 
5.1 Present areas of concern in young people’s lives and the need for change  
 
Before examining the Capabilities Approach in education, I will focus on why we might need 
such an approach in the first place. Key areas of concern continue to be prevalent , to affect 
children and young people’s path to success in education, and remain a barrier to flourishing 
for individuals and communities in society.  
 
It is widely accepted that health, psychological well-being and education outcomes are 
correlated (WHO, 2010b: 3). However, separating the causes for poor outcomes in each area is 
a complex matter, for which the debate is ongoing and for which conclusive answers remain 
elusive. What is agreed is that to a large extent these areas of concern are interwoven and 
dependant on economic, social and material factors. The Marmot Review, Fair Society Healthy 
Lives (2010), suggests that improving health outcomes and reducing health inequalities is a 
matter of social justice (2010: 9). This requires a focus on giving every child the best start in life 
by reducing inequalities in early child development, by ensuring high quality early years 
education, and by building the resilience and well-being of young children across the social 
gradient (2010: 16). Yet another focus recommended by this report is to enable all children, 
young people and adults to maximise their capabilities and have control over their lives (2010: 
18). Marmot and his fellow researchers remind us in this review that:  
 
People in higher socio-economic positions in society have a greater array of life chances 
and more opportunities to lead a flourishing life. They also have better health. The two 
are linked: the more favoured people are, socially and economically, the better their 
health. ... We could go a long way to achieving that remarkable improvement by giving 
more people the life chances currently enjoyed by the few. ... People would see 
improved well-being, better mental health and less disability, their children would 
flourish, and they would live in sustainable, cohesive communities. (Marmot et al., 2010: 
3). 
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From the statistics below it is clear that for a variety of reasons, children and young people 
continue to make decisions which hinder their ability to flourish as much in terms of health, 
psychological well-being, and education. Generally, those worst affected in terms of positive 
outcomes in respect of health, well-being, and education seem to be those living in areas of 
highest deprivation as identified by the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)
2
. 
 
 Significantly however, according to the report produced by the Organisation for Economic   
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2009, Doing Better for Children, high public spending 
on child welfare and education in the UK is failing to produce results in many key areas.  The 
proportion of youth not in school, training or in jobs in the UK remains high, at more than 10% 
of 15 to 19 year-olds. This is reported to be the fourth highest rate in the OECD, ahead of Italy, 
Turkey and Mexico. Education results are also considered low relative to spending levels. 
Moreover, the UK is placed in the middle of OECD comparisons of how well 15 year olds do at 
school and in terms of the gaps between well and poorly performing pupils
3
. In addition, a 
study and report produced for the National Equality Panel in 2009 found that both cognitive 
development and educational achievement were lower for children and young people of all 
ages living in areas of greatest neighbourhood deprivation
4
.  
 
In respect of health, alcohol misuse is associated with a range of social, physical and mental 
health problems, including depressive and anxiety disorders, obesity, and accidental injury 
(Currie et al, 2008)
5
. Yet, between 13 and 15 years of age, the prevalence of risky behaviours 
such as smoking and drunkenness doubled in many OECD countries. Drunkenness in the UK is 
the highest in the OECD, with one in three 13 and 15 year olds having been drunk at least 
twice (OECD, 2009).  
 
Another area related to health and education is teenage pregnancy, where the UK reports the 
fourth highest teen pregnancy rate after Mexico, Turkey, and the United States (OECD, 2009). 
Victoria Sheard, when deputy head of policy at Terrence Higgins Trust, was reported to say 
that, ‘So long as the number of teenage pregnancies remains high, there is a need for young 
people to be given more information to protect themselves. That's why we strongly welcome 
plans to make sex and relationships education a statutory part of the national curriculum’
6
. 
Although this suggestion is to be applauded, the issues seem more complex than the quick fix 
approach intended here, in terms of simply providing more information about the facts and 
easier access to contraception. Evidently, the general picture which appears from the statistics 
on teenage pregnancy cannot be changed with such simplistic tools. Moreover, research in the 
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area of early child bearing suggests far greater complexity exists in the narrative of 
contributing factors than this solution recognises (Nettle and Cockerill, 2010: 1-2, 6-7), which 
require a more holistic approach than that suggested above. In addition to factual information, 
individuals would benefit from developing the capability of practical reason and affiliation in 
order to make sense of their situation, and the information and its implications in respect of 
their personal and social life journeys and imagined possibilities. 
 
The social narrative outlined in this section thus far, which is a reality for many children and 
young people today involves delicate decision-making on an ongoing basis. This remains a 
persistent issue of concern. Children and young people to greater or lesser extents are 
challenged with making sense of a world which is growing in complexity, and continue to seek 
their place within it. They are faced with a plethora of decisions. To name a few examples, 
these include, whether to attend school, to have a balanced diet, to smoke, to drink in excess, 
to postpone sexual relations until older, or to be proactive about protecting against unwanted 
pregnancy.  
 
Making positive decisions is made ever more difficult by complex factors including material 
poverty. Other factors include the increasing reduction in social capital in urban areas, defined 
as a decrease in social structures facilitating co-operation and trust between people (Halpern, 
2005: 292). Regarding young people, this picture of declining trust and co-operation has been 
identified as being particularly acute in adolescents living in areas of greater deprivation 
(Nettle and Cockerill, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, other factors contribute to young people’s high levels of stress and anxiety 
7
. 
These include, a lack of psychological resources to deal with difficult issues in life, and teaching 
and learning which does not intersect with the needs of many young people, nor with the 
difficult issues they face, and which instead overemphasises tests and attainment levels. This 
in turn augments children’s difficulties in making positive decisions. Added to these pressures, 
globalisation requires ever more sophisticated decision-making abilities from children and 
young people to be effective contributors and economic performers in society, which is at 
odds with the prescribed and utilitarian educational experience of many.  
 
Today, with widening access to technological media and communication, there exist stronger 
media influences towards consumerism and individualism as the solution to well-being, than 
have been present in the past. In addition, the new face of friendship is hallmarked by virtual 
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methods of relating through digital technology which require great sophistication and 
deliberated action and trust in order to enable human flourishing. This is supported by the 
Nuffield Review which states that ‘something radical has emerged in the last few years 
affecting how young people communicate with and relate to their friends and acquaintances’, 
where ‘they have developed their own on-line community networks through My-Space or 
Facebook’ (2009: 74). Also, beyond the media and digital communication, the increasing 
cultural mix which children encounter in society today, requires them to be able to translate 
between various cultures and beliefs, in order to avoid conflict, to communicate effectively, 
and to live collaboratively.  
 
This seems like an insurmountable challenge for the best prepared adults, yet children and 
young people are faced with decisions such as these on a daily basis. For example, they must 
answer questions such as: Should I believe what I see in this advert? Do I buy into this concept 
of what is beautiful or fashionable or healthy? Should I accept this person as a friend on Face 
book? Will it be helpful if I join this gossip-like commentary on Twitter? Should I support this 
pressure group and join their blog? Will I go on the environmental march this weekend and 
should I contribute to the community clean-up event, even though my friends laugh at the 
idea? As the statistics explored above have shown in respect of health, well-being, and 
education, the situation regarding children and young people making decisions in favour of 
their own and others’ flourishing is of particular concern. This concern is particularly acute in 
respect of vulnerable children in areas of high deprivation, given that the pressures they face 
are greatest and the material and psychosocial resources weakest in this group. 
 
Yet, as a civilised society and as human beings connected to others by virtue of our shared 
humanity, we have a moral obligation to nurture our children and young people to flourish. As 
educators we must play our part, even when recognise that enabling young people to flourish, 
as they make good decisions, relate to others well, and become agents of change, is something 
in which everyone in society should participate. We accept that this requires joint working by 
parents, friends, community and voluntary organisations, local and national government policy 
and provision, including education. Although the education system alone cannot meet this 
challenge or fully equip children and young people for this reality, the moral imperative 
remains that as educators we do our best to enable children and young people to develop 
their capabilities to function and flourish in the conditions they find themselves. The challenge 
is indeed great, and requires that we find ways in tertiary education as well as school and early 
years settings for making a difference in this area. This means ensuring that children and young 
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people have space and time to ask, discuss, and seek answers to important questions about 
what living well includes, how they wish to live, and what they will do to help others in this 
journey. This requires engaging children and young people in a process of reflection, enquiry 
and participation as an integral part of their learning (Nussbaum, 1997). Such opportunities are 
important if we are to enable children and young people to be more curious, resilient, 
motivated and interdependent learners, with higher aspirations for their own and their peers’ 
success. 
 
School improvement continues to be a goal for governments around the world and the World 
Health Organisation urges a collective agreement to improve educational outcomes in order to 
increase health and decrease poverty
8
. In particular, given the evidence outlined above, what 
remains an important focus for education today is honing young people’s ability for decision-
making and for making sense of the situations in which they find themselves, guided by 
principles about a shared human nature which transcends cultures or material situations. 
Nurturing practical reason and affiliation, which together enable deliberated trust and co-
operation, are crucial in this process, and particularly relevant as we engage within the digital 
age. The question remains: How can this be achieved beyond the utilitarian-driven Standards 
Agenda prevalent in education today?  
 
In the next part of this chapter I propose the Capabilities Approach as a way to begin to 
address this challenge. The Capabilities Approach includes a framework, or universal narrative 
for what we share as human beings and thus demands that we all engage with an ethical 
dimension in education. Importantly, the Capabilities Approach, calls us to focus on developing 
a particular kind of reflective practice, which I will discuss further in Chapter 6. The Capabilities 
Approach, I believe, can help students reflect more deeply about their past and present, and 
imagine their future in a balanced, resilient way. The framework included in this approach is 
crucial when making decisions towards right relations with others, and towards flourishing and 
hence success.  
 
The predominant performative culture in education which focuses on narrow academic 
outcomes assessed using standardised tests does not give sufficient space to develop the 
capabilities considered important for flourishing. In preference, the Capabilities Approach 
which is based on the Aristotelian philosophy discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, is proposed in this 
thesis. Significantly, the Capabilities Approach enables educators and learners to embrace the 
‘principles for the future’
9
 outlined by Richard Pring and Andrew Pollard (2011: 6-7) in their 
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recent report, Education for All: Evidence from the past, principles for the future. This report 
provides a review of research in primary, secondary, and adult education, in addition to well-
being reports regarding of mental health. The evidence highlights concerns about the present 
situation in education and recommends critical scrutiny in this area.  
 
In line with the Capabilities Approach, Pring and Pollard (2011: 6-7) offer principles for the 
future which embrace the ethical dimension in education, essential for positive change. Pring 
has been an advocate of including the moral dimension in education for over 20 years (1989: 
97-101). Pring and Pollard (2011) articulate the need for the ethical dimension to be reclaimed 
in educational policy and practice and for young people to be nurtured to develop moral 
seriousness. They also object to the utilitarian style business language which has immersed 
many aspects of education. What they do not do in this report (2011) is offer an alternative 
philosophical base which better suits the principles for the future which they recommend, 
than the utilitarian stance. This thesis begins to articulate the nature of the ethical dimension 
sought, with reference to the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach. 
 
 
5.2 The Capabilities Approach  
 
The Capabilities Approach based on Aristotle’s philosophical concepts is an invaluable 
theoretical grounding and practical guide for education. Nussbaum (2000: 69), makes this clear 
below, and although her arguments here focus on women’s development specifically, the 
Capabilities Approach suffuses her thinking in respect of education (Nussbaum, 1997,2010): 
 
We want an approach that is respectful of each person’s struggle for flourishing. ... 
This, in turn, requires both generality and particularity: both some overarching 
benchmarks and detailed knowledge of the variety of circumstances and cultures in 
which people are striving to do well. The shortcomings of both the utilitarian and the 
resource-based approaches suggest that we will take a stand in the most appropriate 
way if we focus not on satisfaction or the mere presence of resources, but on what 
individuals are actually able to do and to be. General benchmarks based on utility or 
on resources turn out to be insensitive to contextual variation, to the way 
circumstances shape preferences and the ability of individuals to convert resources 
into meaningful human activity. Only a broad concern for functioning and capability 
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can do justice to the complex interrelationships between human striving and its 
material and social context
10
. (Nussbaum 2000: 69). 
 
The Capabilities Approach rests on the premise that there exist starting points which all human 
beings share. It offers people shared general principles for making sense of life, by developing 
reflective practice as a guide for flourishing. It provides individuals with helpful methods for 
understanding the context-sensitive and particular situation which enable them to make sense 
of the here-and-now. The potential strength of the Capabilities Approach in education is that it 
remains sensitive to the needs and capabilities of the child. For example, at one extreme, in 
the case of a child with profound learning difficulties, when space in the curriculum is given for 
this child to reflect by being offered a simple light stimulus towards which she can voluntarily 
turn, which helps her experience curiosity, joy and calm, it is significant for her development 
and ability to flourish. The opportunities which we give these children and others with varying 
learning abilities to reflect on their identity, space and community is important for their 
development.  
 
Considerations such as these, which go beyond the outcomes driven curriculum and focus on 
the needs of the individual child in context should concern policy formulation, teaching and 
learning, or evaluation. The Capabilities Approach could help here to ensure that individuals 
are given the opportunity to realise their individual capability, while being aware of the needs 
and capabilities of others. Parallel to this, as the teacher or learner engages in making sense of 
situations and making decisions in each particular instance, the Capabilities Approach could 
provide guidance for the teacher based on universal features about human flourishing shared 
by other human beings which can act as a reference point for their specific deliberation about 
the particular instance in question. 
 
If we are to address the issues which continue to face children and young people outlined in 
the previous section, this thesis supports embracing the Capabilities Approach in education 
which is serious about each person’s struggle for flourishing. This attention and care could be 
particularly important for those who live in areas of greatest deprivation, given that as has 
been illustrated here, we already know a considerable amount about what kinds of economic 
circumstances make any flourishing difficult. Given this knowledge, the present emphasis in 
education on one solution fits all requires change. The Capabilities Approach could provide the 
general benchmarks for progress and change in this area, remaining sensitive to the particular 
circumstance of each person. Most importantly, the Capabilities Approach recognises the 
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complex interrelationships between human striving and its material and social context and 
includes flexible methods to help individuals and groups develop their most important 
capabilities and flourish.  
  
I propose that a framework based on human capabilities such as this could enable a more 
inclusive, broader, and richer way of viewing progress and success in education. It recognises 
the interdependence between education and other aspects of human development such as 
health and well-being. This is significant as health and education outcomes are recognised to 
be closely correlated, and areas of greater economic deprivation indicate difficulties in 
progress and success in both these areas. Both health and education outcomes can only 
improve as individuals make positive choices in favour of both healthy choices and sustained 
positive choices for flourishing. 
 
 
5.2.1 The capabilities theory and list offered by Nussbaum 
 
Both Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, have developed 
and continue to support the Capabilities Approach. Nussbaum is particularly concerned with 
providing a philosophical underpinning for this approach based on Aristotle’s ideas of human 
functioning. Sen does not explicitly do this, though he agrees with Nussbaum’s understanding 
of Aristotle’s thinking (Sen, 1992: 39, 2009: 231). Sen also reminds us that education should 
play a role in broadening human capability, not just human capital. As he points out, this is 
possible when a person benefits from education ‘in reading, communicating, arguing, in being 
able to choose in a more informed way, in being taken more seriously by others and so on’ 
(1995: 294). While Sen focuses on the role of capabilities in differentiating the space within 
which quality-of-life assessments are made, Nussbaum goes further and subscribes to a 
universal list of capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000: 78-80). These, she claims to be cross cultural 
(ibid.: 34, 67, 72-73) and to pertain to every human being as a basic benchmark against which 
judgements about progress in quality of life can be made (ibid.: 74-5, 89). She maintains that 
these capabilities are founded on the belief that by virtue of being human certain functions are 
considered particularly central in human life. Consequently, the human capability for this 
function to be realised, must be ensured by every community or government with reference to 
the general benchmark provided by the capabilities list (Nussbaum, 1993: 242-69, 1995: 86-
131, 2000: 72-101)
11
.  
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As outlined in Chapter 3, the list of capabilities put forward by Nussbaum, which is not 
intended to be hierarchical, comprises the following: (1) life; (2) having bodily health; (3) 
having bodily integrity; (4) being able to use the senses, imagine and think; (5) emotional 
development and attachment; (6) developing practical reason – being able to form a 
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life; (7) 
affiliation - being able to live with and toward others, and to be treated with dignity; (8) being 
able to live with concern for other species; (9) being able to play; and, (10) being able to 
participate and be a full member of one’s environment (2000: 78-80).  
 
Nussbaum identifies these universal functional capabilities of human beings as overarching 
benchmarks for aspiration. This view considers that certain functions are particularly central to 
human life and its fulfilment. This framework is respectful of every person’s struggle for 
flourishing and considers each person as an end and as a source of agency and worth in their 
own right. Therefore, these central capabilities are not just instrumental to further pursuits but 
have value in themselves, in making the life that includes them truly human. As a result, when 
the Capabilities Approach is embraced and imbues education it enables educators, learners, 
policy makers, and the general public to recognise the intrinsic value of education beyond any 
instrumental or utilitarian ends. 
 
Nussbaum ( 1993: 242-7) draws on Aristotle’s view of what human beings share, which he has 
deduced from the spheres of human experience which figure in more or less any human life 
and in which all human beings have to make some choice or other. Using this framework, 
Aristotle seeks to make sense of what choosing well or not entails within each sphere of 
experience (NE II, 7). From this list of spheres and abilities or virtues for positive action, 
Nussbaum develops the general but definite list of ‘central human capabilities’ (1993: 242-69). 
These she considers to be the general list outlining areas in which human beings need to have 
a choice to realise this capability or other, if they are to be able to function well and flourish 
within the spheres articulated by Aristotle. Hence, according to Nussbaum this list ‘isolates 
those human capabilities that can be convincingly argued to be of central importance in any 
human life, whatever else the person pursues or chooses’ (2000: 74). Thus it provides basic 
political principles that should be embodied in development policy (2000: 74-75).  
 
Critics claim difficulties in Nussbaum’s view that this list is subject to ongoing revision and that 
it should emerge through intercultural ethical enquiry (Clark, Working paper: 7). They point to 
the fact that this list has not changed in any substantial way over the years despite ongoing 
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enquiry, and they indicate that the concept of a method of enquiry or reflection such as 
Nussbaum proposes is unhelpful as it is open to potential abuse. In defence of Nussbaum, 
though she does not claim her list to be conclusive or changeless, the fact that it has not 
changed much may support the truth of her claim, rather than count as evidence against it. 
Moreover, given that the general benchmarks which make up the capabilities list are 
composed of the particular experiences of individuals, the fact that they have not changed 
much over time, suggest that these starting points about what we share and need to flourish 
as human beings may in the round be correctly identified. The evidence both from recent 
enquiries and from the popular or widely accepted views dating back to ancient Greece would 
suggest that this may be the case. 
 
In order to test the idea that the list Nussbaum proposes bears general agreement with 
people, I undertook a further sample enquiry with adults involved in education. I consulted 
twenty individuals working in the field of education, from the foundation, primary, and 
secondary stage, and across phases, including school inspectors, managers, school advisers 
and teachers. They were given a copy of Nussbaum’s capabilities list (2000) and were asked to 
reflect upon this list and identify anything they considered should be removed or added to it. 
In addition they were asked to identify the extent to which they found this list comprehensive 
in respect of what human beings share and require to flourish, and the extent to which it was a 
helpful framework for education.  
 
The feedback from this enquiry was overwhelmingly positive in favour of the human 
capabilities list as it stands. For example, someone mentioned that we must aspire to this list 
for ourselves and others. Feedback from early years educators included the point that all 10 
statements in the list are key to babies and children. In addition, one individual working across 
the primary and secondary phase remarked that this list must be our focus and vocation – to 
help ourselves and in turn others to achieve. Some individuals suggested that affection would 
benefit from being given a more prominent position, rather than being subsumed into other 
definitions. Others indicated that a list such as this would be very helpful in schools as the 
underlying principle through which teachers and learners are able to make sense of their core 
purpose and progress. One person suggested that a more user-friendly version of this list 
would be helpful in all large scale institutions, including schools, to guide practice and 
provision. 
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Of course this is not conclusive evidence in favour of the capabilities list, but it does suggest 
that we are exploring in the right area. As Aristotle himself recognised at the end of his 
discussion on human nature in the Nicomachean Ethics: 
 
Let the good, then, be sketched in this way; for perhaps we need to give an outline first, 
and fill in the detail later. To develop and articulate those elements in the sketch that 
are as they should be would seem to be something anyone can do, and time seems to 
be good at discovering such things, or helping us to discover them. ... it is for anyone to 
add what is lacking. (NE 1098a20-6). 
 
 
5.2.2 The significance of practical reason and affiliation  
 
In the capabilities list which Nussbaum develops, practical reason and affiliation stand out as of 
special importance to human development. As Nussbaum suggests the reason for this is that 
practical reason and affiliation ‘suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human’ (2000: 
82). Nussbaum explains that:  
 
To use one’s senses in a way not infused by the characteristically human use of thought 
and planning is to use them in an incompletely human manner. To plan for one’s own 
life without being able to do so in complex forms of discourse, concern, and reciprocity 
with other human beings is, again to behave in an incompletely human way. (2000: 82).  
 
It is practical reason nurtured through ethical reflective practice that enables us to deliberate 
on our emotions, needs and motivation within the particular situation in which we find 
ourselves. This approach spurs us on to seek detailed knowledge of the variety of 
circumstances and contexts and cultures in which we strive to do well. In this way, the 
Capabilities Approach is context sensitive, a key requirement for the plural lives of children 
today. Nevertheless, while considering the particular, this approach enables us to keep the 
wider narrative always in focus as it claims that human beings share fundamental capabilities. 
Hence, it offers universal benchmarks about what human beings share which give rise to 
general principles as a guide for actions. But this approach is not rule-based in any simple 
sense, as it recognises the nobility of the particular instance as the context in which making 
sense occurs and decisions about actions are made. The instance, through time and 
interpretation in turn reshapes the general principles.  
 128
An example is helpful here. In respect of education and the contribution of student voice and 
participation, the very idea that young people have a voice and are able to contribute to 
shaping their own learning environment and teaching and learning more generally, has 
developed force since the rise of progressivism. This has arisen as a result of the shared 
recognition that voice, even young voice, is integral to realising human freedoms and to 
contributing to the democratic process, without which justice in any area and specifically in 
education, cannot be ensured. The specific instances when student voice
12
 has been included 
and recognised as important, have enabled the general principle about the importance of 
everyone’s voice, to include the young voice as the norm. Nevertheless, even today, minority 
groups, such as children, or the elderly, or the disabled, or the poor have to fight continuously 
to have their voice heard, accepted, and included.  
 
To this day, although student voice is accepted as important, it is often simply heard in the 
shape of passive contribution through surveys, rather than active participation in shaping the 
learning landscape. Nevertheless, the general principle that young voice is essential in schools 
and helps reshape learning and redefine relationships is being accepted and embedded into 
practice in individual settings. This has resulted from an increase in specific examples of 
student voice, where they reflect about important issues in their school setting and thereby 
endeavour to effect change
13
. Fielding (2004), argues persuasively for the transformative 
potential of students as researchers in developing a radical collegiality where dialogue 
between adults and young people in schools enables a joint approach to making sense of 
issues and to effect change. 
 
Given persistent material and other inequalities in society, the Capabilities Approach is more 
important than ever in developing the essential capabilities of practical reason and affiliation 
which enable people to flourish in these circumstances. The aim is that these capabilities 
enable children and young people to make positive choices in respect of their health and well-
being, which help them to learn well, as they understand or make sense of the situations in 
which they live. Realising these capabilities requires reflective practice in order to reason and 
to engage with others in positive and constructive ways. This process enables individuals and 
groups to grasp the emotional, cognitive, and social context within which decisions in service 
of flourishing are made. Chapter 6 and 7 focus on reflective practice in order to nurture the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation. These are considered integral in facilitating 
individuals and societies to succeed and standards in many aspects of life to rise, as better 
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choices are made across the board. This entails persons developing a balanced and sensitive 
understanding of themselves, others, and the environment at large. 
 
The Capabilities Approach recognises and reminds us of the necessity for structured thought 
informed by emotions and practised individually and with others, enabling people to hone 
their skills and habits and thereby make sense of situations and take action towards flourishing 
and success. Here success is considered within the context of both living well and doing well. 
This may well include necessary skills such as nationally recognised qualifications which are at 
times a requirement for success in the work place. But more significantly this requires, of 
necessity, an authentic endeavour in helping children and young people to make sense of 
themselves and others, as they develop the craft of flexible reflection. In addition, the 
Capabilities Approach calls policy makers, researchers and educators to be sensitive to 
diversity, not just in terms of multi-cultural issues, but also by resisting one standard for 
everyone found in standardised tests and fixed milestones.  
  
The Capabilities Approach in education could help us to examine real lives in their material and 
social settings and to nurture them from this individual starting point. At the same time, the 
Capabilities Approach also offers general benchmarks for understand the wider narrative of 
which these individual instances are a part. It attempts to consider the individual’s progress 
and potential together with the bigger picture of which it is a part. The Capabilities framework 
could help us steer between the individualist tendency towards the completely subjective on 
the one hand and the fundamentalist obsession with objectivity on the other. This is 
particularly significant in education if we are to address some of the stubborn challenges and 
barriers which children and young people continue to face and need to overcome if they are to 
succeed. The suggestion here is that adopting the Capabilities Approach in education could 
help children and young people develop capabilities such as practical reason and affiliation, 
which enable them to make good decisions in favour of their individual flourishing and to 
understand the connection and interdependence between their individual flourishing and 
others’ in society. 
 
 
5.2.3 The Capabilities Approach in education theory and practice 
 
As discussed in previous chapters and supported by Sen (2009), there are three major 
contributions which the Capabilities Approach offers which require consideration, that stand in 
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contrast to the utilitarian approach so prevalent in economic measurement as well as in 
education. These are: (1) The importance of considering capability rather than focusing on 
achievement exclusively, which includes the responsibility and obligations of societies and 
individuals to help the vulnerable; (2) The importance of considering the plural composition of 
capabilities and the essential role of practical reasoning for deliberation (since we cannot 
reduce all the things we have reason to value into one homogeneous magnitude, reflected 
evaluation demands reasoning, and not just counting)(Emotions are an integral part of this 
kind of reasoning); and (3) The importance of considering the place of individuals and 
communities, and their interrelations (Sen, 2009: 235-252). Some preliminary comments are 
helpful here in respect of the three points above and how these might strengthen education 
theory and practice.  
 
In respect of the points above, when thinking about educational theories, there are 
implications for whether the Capabilities Approach supports progressive views as espoused for 
example by Dewey (1915, 1933) in its earlier formulation; by Bruner’s (1960) more recent 
social-constructivist approach; by Lave and Wenger (1991) in their view of situated learning; 
and by Silcock (1996, 1999) in his attempt to give progressivism a new voice based on 
emerging research in developmental psychology. There are some key issues which need 
exploration. For example, there are questions about whether the Capabilities Approach as a 
progressive theory in education is susceptible to criticisms about an overly individualistic 
tendency, or whether it can hold the balance between the capability of the individual and the 
collective (if we accept that there are capabilities which are in some sense general to all). This 
thesis attempts to defend the Capabilities Approach against the charge of subjectivism.  
 
Furthermore, in respect of educational practice, there is a balance to be held between an 
individual and collective focus within learning, and also, between formal structures or models 
in learning activities and no model. Again, I suggest that although there will always be a 
tension between having a structure and having no structure, the structure offered by the 
Capabilities Approach could enable the individual to develop freely and to make sense of their 
world within parameters outlined by what we all share by virtue of being human. I mention 
this with particular reference to ethical questioning in respect of reflection, which I will 
consider in detail and for which I will offer structures informed by the Capabilities Approach.  
 
I suggest the Capabilities Approach as one which underlines the practical responsibility 
practitioners have in supporting the vulnerable and in providing opportunities and activities 
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which enable them to make sense of life, to understand others and difference, and to act in 
favour of a fulfilled life. This approach could offer a framework for personalised understanding, 
focused beyond the test, to help educators nurture the individuals’ essential human resources, 
with sensitivity to the needs and capabilities of each person within their context and within a 
shared framework.  
 
In favour of pluralism and the importance of practical reason, if we are to foster sound 
decision-making as integral to the learning process of living well, the Capabilities Approach 
could offer a universal framework against which to test any reflective process, and the 
outcomes which arise as a result of these activities. The model offered for reflection within the 
Capabilities Approach, which includes enquiry, adopts an ethical reflective framework which 
ensures learning engages with the interplay between desires, emotions and reason, and 
considers cognition as encompassing these three elements. Through these models, education 
practice is able to foster reflection, both individually and collaboratively, as part of the public 
forum and hence in service of realising fundamental capabilities for flourishing.  
 
When considering the place of individuals, their communities and their inter-relations, the 
Capabilities Approach takes seriously the contextual nature of identity for individuals and 
communities. It promotes the coexistence of the particular in its context, with the general 
benchmark of human capability. Using a flexible process of reflection to synthesise these two 
aspects, individuals and communities may cultivate a sense of self-awareness, empathy and 
moral commitment towards one another.  For example, space in the curriculum could be 
secured for children to engage in reflection about the personal characteristics which they value 
about themselves and their friends, to research and evaluate their local heritage and enquire 
about what could be celebrated or improved in their community, and to become agents of 
change by organising and participating in projects which engender positive change in their 
local society. 
 
Adopting a sensitive framework based on what we share as human beings suggests that the 
Capabilities Approach could suffuse teaching and learning with an ethical dimension in respect 
of human flourishing. Regarding teachers, this approach could provide a framework within 
which to consider the needs and context of the individual and to ensure attention is given to 
the specific situation which surrounds the life of the child who is learning. For example, this 
may require ongoing reflection concerning whether the child or young person has eaten 
enough or at all, or is free to concentrate on what is being learnt and not over-burdened by 
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personal or social factors such as family difficulties or friendship issues arising from mental or 
physical health concerns (eg. from stress and anxiety of incontinence). This ethical reflective 
approach takes the teacher beyond questions of meeting targets through one standardised 
strategy or another, and could help them embrace the wider context which may enhance or 
stifle learning. 
 
The broader view of education which could be grounded by the Capabilities Approach, 
requires not just teaching and learning to the test but also giving time to reflective practice, 
both individually and collaboratively. The kind of reflection suggested here is not one that is 
developed using an instrumental approach. Instead, it is connected to practical judgement and 
developing practice, wisdom and expertise by making sense of situations with care and 
attention on an ongoing basis. It is such engagement in reflective practice, as individuals and 
with others, which nurtures people in developing the capabilities of practical reason and 
affiliation, to become successful decision-makers and more committed to positive action in 
society. Developing these capabilities often is and always should be part of the weft of school 
life and be made explicit within the teaching and learning experience of the classroom.  
 
 
5.3 The school system: How it serves young people and enables them to flourish 
 
Children today have opportunities which would have been considered nigh impossible 100 
years ago. We can all agree that education reform has sought to improve the quality of 
teaching and learning and the educational achievement for all children. Undoubtedly, today 
this has led to improvements such as better school buildings (on the whole), more up to date 
equipment, no corporal punishment , and many young people going into tertiary education 
than did before. All these elements to varying degrees help young people to flourish. However 
there are stubborn barriers which continue to block children’s success in respect of flourishing.  
 
Researchers such as Menter et al (1997) offer a critique of the ongoing change which remains 
for teachers and learners since the onset of the National Curriculum. This change has occurred 
owing to the close alignment between education and economy (1997: p3). The degree of 
prescribed change in terms of policy revisions, set curriculum programmes, and one-size-fits-all 
standardised assessments, has in the view of Menter et al (1997) reduced the ability of anyone 
in education to develop effective reflective practice. As I argue in this thesis, reflection is 
crucial for optimal functioning and thus flourishing. It is this kind of deep and ongoing 
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reflective practice that enables students to understand the difficult issues which they face and 
continue to face in their lives and to make positive decisions through careful judgement. The 
ongoing change and overprescription driven by the market economy of post-Fordism (Sennett, 
1998: 39-44) and its technologically-driven division of labour leads to the end of reflective 
practice for the worker, be they teacher or learner.  
 
This evidence of ongoing change combined with tight prescription, reveals a worrying picture 
of the way schools, since the onset of the National Curriculum and influenced by market forces 
and ideology, have served their students in respect of enabling them to flourish in their 
education and life beyond. The quest to continue to improve education for all children by 
ensuring some level of parity in quality of provision and assessment, and to some extent 
content, has been a worthy pursuit of the National Curriculum. However, the concept of 
raising attainment levels in specific areas, examined in a standardised manner, and taught 
according to high levels of prescription, is not an adequate model for education for the 21
st
 
century. The evidence today shows that this utility-based approach is not adequate for 
ensuring parity of quality of education for all (Pring and Pollard, 2011).  
 
Many students today leave school with no model of learning other than that prescribed by this 
technological approach, and as a consequence leave school with a diminished conception of 
what being an educated person entails. The Capabilities Approach could help to address the 
ethical dimension in education, lacking in simplistic views of improvement measured against 
attainment levels fuelled by the business language rhetoric which drives it. This approach 
could support students to reflect more deeply and sensitively on their learning, to better 
understand their context and become decision makers sensitive to the dignity of each person, 
including themselves. As the worrying data discussed earlier in this chapter suggests, children 
today need to make better decisions than they currently make, in service of their own 
flourishing and towards a flourishing society. Policy makers, researchers, and educators now 
have an opportunity to address this. 
 
 
5.3.1 Concerns fuelled by the factory metaphor  
 
The metaphor of school as factory which dates from the industrial revolution, is one which 
critics maintain continues to hold its grip (Silcock, 1996: 201)
14
. The factory model developed 
by Ford (Sennett, 1998: 39) has enabled this metaphor to continue in use. Although the roots 
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of the factory model became embedded in order to effect improvement, it continues to 
remain a barrier to success when thinking of education (Menter et al, 1996). Some 
educationists have tried to review and change the metaphor of the workplace, where the job 
of the teacher is to assign tasks and manage the process for students to complete the work 
correctly and smoothly (Marshall, 1990: 94-101). Instead, understanding the classroom as a 
learning setting rather than a teaching factory has been sought.  
 
This metaphor has been hard to change and continues to be given credence as education 
embraces the language of business and the hierarchy which goes with it. For example speaking 
of targets and outcomes, standards and quality control is common place. In addition, the idea 
of managers (teachers) and workers (students) still holds true in much of the language of 
education. Where it has been replaced to suit the needs of the child, this language has evolved 
into teachers as service providers and students as customers. This metaphor in education can 
influence the entire culture of a school and obscure the clarity necessary to maintain the 
centrality of the ethical dimension about the dignity of every child and our responsibility to 
enable flourishing through learning. This vision is further obscured through the business 
language and rhetoric used in education policy today which views teaching as a purely 
technical matter of reaching targets and learning as a technical matter of achieving targets 
(Pring, 2004).  
 
Viewing the child as customer of technical skills and certificates in standardised tests misses 
nurturing essential elements of child development which prepares them for flourishing. 
Elements such as sparking curiosity about the world and people around them; thinking 
passionately, creatively and critically about difficult issues with no obvious answer; learning to 
manage risk, being resilient and valuing interdependence; appreciating the wonder of nature 
and paying attention to the past, present, and future through careful listening; reflecting on 
the matter at hand, on progress, on possibilities, and on one another’s gifts; participating in 
caring for one another and the world beyond their own setting; and, developing moral 
seriousness, commitment ,and a vision of what is good. Put differently, this could be 
understood as learning to read themselves and the world around them accurately and in a 
balanced manner, through ongoing reflection. These elements should be essential parts of 
education for all, as Pring and Pollard (2011) support in their recent research.  
 
It is no surprise then that the metaphor of the factory or the business mode, which continues 
to fuel this view is at odds with Nussbaum’s claim articulated in the capabilities list outlined 
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earlier in this chapter (2000: 69). This metaphor in education is not respectful of each person’s 
struggle for flourishing and does not enable young people to engage with overarching 
benchmarks and detailed knowledge of the variety of circumstances and cultures in which 
people are striving to do well. The focus of the factory model is one of utility. Instead what we 
seek through the Capabilities Approach, is to embrace an ethical dimension which takes into 
account the dignity of each individual in the context of the capabilities which they share by 
virtue of being human. Such an approach may in time enable a revised metaphor of growth in 
education, which I will consider in Chapter 7. 
 
 
5.3.2 Further concerns about the curriculum and the Standards Agenda 
 
With the exception of technology, the curriculum does not seem to have changed much since 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century. As Richard Aldrich, the historian of education suggests:  
 
It is a shame upon us all that, at the end of the 20
th
 century, children in schools in 
England are following much the same curriculum as at the end of the nineteenth. ...The 
current list of subjects is no starting point for the creation of a national curriculum for 
the twenty-first century. (1982: 37).  
 
This point was reiterated at a recent lecture given by Ken Robinson in response to the recent 
White Paper 2010, The Importance of Teaching
15
. Robinson notes that it is depressing that we 
have a new administration which is trying to lead our schools into the 21st century by means 
of a detour to the 19th century
16
. Instead, he suggests nurturing abilities for adapting to 
change and promoting and creating a culture of creativity enabling young people to engage 
with the complexities of life and the world of business we experience today. In contrast to this 
subject specific 19
th 
century model, the opportunity for reflection across the curriculum 
enables learners and teachers to cope with change, to be creative, to imagine new 
possibilities, and to develop the wisdom and judgment for wise action. A cycle of reflection 
which encourages them to plan, monitor, and evaluate wisely at every point, and with 
reference to an appropriate ethical framework, is key here. 
 
Despite the economic driven narrow view of education critiqued by Aldrich and Robinson 
above, which continues to be promoted by the Standards Agenda, school indicators often 
persist to fall short of the required set targets. Data taken from the Secondary Schools 
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Performance Table pertaining to 2009/10 states that only 53% of students achieved 5 or more 
GCSEs at grade A*-C or equivalent including English and Mathematics GCSEs
17
. Pressure to 
improve attainment in schools can affect the breadth of students’ experience, particularly if 
curriculum time is hi-jacked by the subjects examined within the standard, or by teaching to 
the test in respect of these subjects. Educationists remind us that we should ‘educate young 
people in a way that enables the vast majority to feel they have gained something valuable’ 
and avoid this narrow approach which can lead to ‘a basic fault in the system’ (Claxton, 2008: 
17). 
 
One example of a barrier in the system is a prescribed approach to literacy, which continues 
despite the abandonment of the Literacy Strategy. Directly linked to learning, the National 
Foundation for Educational Research evaluated the effect on children’s reading over ten years 
of the Literacy Strategy, aimed at improving standards of primary school children. Although 
they found that reading ability had risen (even though there is still much to be done), they 
found this to have been at the cost of a decrease in reading enjoyment
18
 (Clarkson and 
Sainsbury, 2007). Parallel to this worrying finding, there is also evidence from studies of 
progress of international reading literacy that reading for pleasure outweighs other social 
advantages in the future success of the child (PIRLS, 2006)
19
. This evidence indicates that if 
education is preparing children for the future, then teaching to the standard test does not 
seem to have the desired effect, and moreover has become a barrier to children’s ability to 
flourish. 
 
More generally, Layard and Dunn, argue that testing and league tables ‘are becoming central 
to the motivation system of children and teachers’ which negatively affects a child’s curiosity 
and excitement about what she learns (2009: 103-4). Layard and Dunn rightly ask:  
 
What happens to the child’s incentive to explore beyond what will be tested? What 
happens to the teacher’s incentive to inspire? (ibid.: 103).  
 
Drawing evidence from studies conducted by Harlen and Deakin Crick in 2002, Layard and 
Dunn point out that ‘there is a clear danger that education becomes less stimulating when the 
main incentive is to learn things because they will be tested, and when the fear of failure is a 
major consideration’ (ibid.: 104).  
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Furthermore, a study conducted by the new economics foundation (nef)
20
 in respect of young 
people found that within a matter of a few weeks of entering secondary schools there was a 
significant drop in ‘their ability to be curious and engage in challenging and absorbing 
activities’ (2004: 5). This study also found that: secondary school children seem to become 
bored, stop learning and no longer enjoy the activities available at school. All of these 
problems are certain to undermine children’s curiosity and satisfaction. The percentage of 
children who agree with the statement, “I learn a lot at school” falls from 71 per cent to 18 per 
cent between primary and secondary. Responses to “I enjoy school activities” drops from 65 
per cent to 18 per cent’. In addition, they found that, ‘well-being falls substantially as children 
get older. When comparing 9–11-year-olds with 12-15-year-olds, average scores for life 
satisfaction and curiosity fall by five per cent and ten per cent respectively (ibid.: 5). 
 
5.3.3 Young people’s well-being and ability to flourish in the present system 
 
I will now explore children and young people’s sense of well-being more generally and how 
their experience of school in different ways continues to be a barrier to their flourishing. 
Although we examined well-being in the last chapter, it is worth highlighting a few issues again 
here. The present school system with its emphasis on standards and success in exams seems to 
be contributing to a rise in anxiety and stress in children and young people’s lives. For 
example, a study in 2006
21
 reported that self-harm is on the increase. Between 1974 and 2004, 
the rate of adolescent’s emotional problems such as anxiety and depression increased by 70% 
(Colishaw et al, 2004: 1350-62). Moreover, the Innocenti Report (UNICEF 2007) found the UK 
ranked bottom in respect of peer relations for adolescents, where only 40% of British children 
over the age of 11 described their peers as kind and helpful. Young people’s insecurity and 
stress seems to be on the rise and the standards-driven agenda is to some extent a 
contributing factor.  
 
We know that stress is a resulting response to over arduous demands which exceed the 
resources we have to meet them. Children and young people seem to function with varying 
degrees of success in ever more complex situations. As discussed earlier in this chapter, their 
ability to make positive decisions is not as refined as it could be. The education system, if not 
corroborating the difficult circumstances of young people, is certainly not helping to 
ameliorate their position by enabling them to make sense of their life in the context of 
flourishing, and to make decisions in favour of this. To this extent, we must seek broader ways 
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of engaging in education which encourage reflection, for planning, monitoring and reviewing, 
informed by the Capabilities Approach. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In Chapter 5, I have suggested that children and young people continue to face complex issues 
in their life which require them to make decisions in favour of their own and their 
communities’ flourishing. Moreover, as borne out by continued poor outcomes in education, 
health and well-being, the statistics indicate that many children and young people continue to 
be unprepared to meet these challenges. Despite this troubling situation, which is particularly 
acute in areas of multiple deprivation, children and young people need to prepare for a future 
where globalisation is the new reality and digital technology a significant vehicle for 
connectedness and innovation. They will have to understand what unites human beings in this 
diverse global society and seek to understand others beyond their own culture or setting. 
Preparing to flourish in this environment demands that they are able to hone their desires and 
deliberations in the context of shared human qualities, in order to make judgements in favour 
of flourishing. In this way they will develop moral seriousness in their decision-making and 
agency. Combined with this ability they require important psychosocial resources to be 
curious, motivated and resilient, to remain empathetic, to accomplish deliberated trust, and to 
develop an attitude in favour of co-operation. As has been suggested in this chapter, 
developing their capability for practical reasoning and affiliation is significant for this 
development.  
 
Also described in this chapter are some of the existing barriers present in education which 
prevent children and young people from success. What is clear from significant educational 
reviews such as the Nuffield Review (2009) and Cambridge Primary Review (2010), is that this 
reality is exacerbated by the education policy and structure which prescribes their provision 
and which holds them accountable. From the evidence gathered here, it seems that the 
Standards Agenda and the structures developed since the onset of the National Curriculum in 
1988, have not brought about the flourishing which children and young people require. 
Standards remain a barrier to success for too many youngsters. In addition, the evidence 
indicates that young people are less curious, more stressed and anxious, and have lower well-
being than their statistical neighbours in the OECD countries. Moreover, the business language 
that has permeated education adds to the performative culture and does not foster the human 
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capabilities which young people need to develop in order to flourish. This language of 
performativity does not promote the moral seriousness necessary for a 21
st
 century globalised 
society, as called for by Nussbaum (1997), Pring and Pollard (2011). 
 
In preference to the performative approach, the Capabilities Approach could give space in 
education for nurturing practical reasoning and affiliation to help children and young people 
become wise global citizens. In Chapter 6, I propose a flexible method of reflective practice in 
education which includes an ethical dimension informed by the Capabilities Approach.  
 
 
                                            
1
 In addition to Pring and Pollard (2011), Peter Tymms questions the concept of standards as it 
is used today. Tymms illustrates that the current debate on standards is in fact misleading, 
and that the statutory test data cannot be safely used to monitor standards over time. He 
urges the government to review what it means by standards and how tests reflect those 
standards (2004: 477-94).  
 
2
 Inequalities in educational outcomes among children aged 3 to 16 (Goodman et al.,2009). 
According to this final report in 2009 for the National Equality Panel, there exist significant 
links between children and young people living in areas of high IMD and lower educational 
achievement. As this study indicates, given that higher cognitive development and 
educational achievement are correlated with better health and psychological well-being 
outcomes, this is a worrying inequality which must be addressed (Goodman et al.,2009: 5, 
32). 
http://sta.geo.useconnect.co.uk/pdf/Inequalities%20in%20education%20outcomes%20amo
ng%20children.pdf (Last Accessed 04/05/12). 
 
3
 These statistics are taken from OECD (2009) Doing Better for Children, Country highlights. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/6/43590251.pdf (Last accessed 15/02/11). 
 
4
 Inequalities in educational outcomes among children aged 3 to 16 (Goodman et al.,2009: 25).  
http://sta.geo.useconnect.co.uk/pdf/Inequalities%20in%20education%20outcomes%20amo
ng%20children.pdf (Last Accessed 04/05/12). 
 
5
 These references where taken from the Health at a Glance2009: OECD indicators. In respect 
of non medical determinants of health, in particular smoking and alcohol consumption at age 
15. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-
2009_health_glance-2009-en (Last accessed 15/02/11). 
 
6
 Taken from the guardian.co.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/feb/24/teenage-
pregnancy-rates-2008 ( Last accessed 15/02/11). 
 
7
 The Innocenti Report for UNICEF (2007) on the well-being of children and adolescents, ranked 
the UK worst overall out of twenty-one OECD nations on a range of indicators 
 
8
 The ongoing World Health Organisation research into the Social Determinants of Health seek 
ongoing improvements in educational outcomes as a positive determinant of health. 
http://www.who.int/social_determinants/en/ 
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9
 Pring and Pollard present twelve challenges and twelve principles to enable future policy 
formulation to meet those challenges, as outlined below (2011: 6-7).  
http://www.tlrp.org/educationforall/EducationForAll.pdf  (Last accessed 04/05/12) 
1. Ministers, political advisers, civil servants and educational professional should acquaint 
themselves with recent history of education in order to build cumulatively on worthwhile 
successes and to avoid repeating mistakes. 
2. Policy and frameworks of entitlement should reflect the broad aims of education persons, 
such as: understanding of the physical, social and economic worlds, practical capabilities, 
economic utility, moral seriousness, sense of community, collaboration and justice, sense 
of fulfilment, and motivation to continue learning even to ‘the fourth age’. 
3. In pursuing educational aims, the system of education should recognise the significance of 
particular economic, social and personal circumstances, and thus enable flexible 
adaptation of curriculum, pedagogy and assessment to meet specific needs. 
4. ‘Biology is not destiny’. Still more and better investment in the early years is crucial but 
the brain remains adaptable from experiences and learning opportunities throughout life. 
5. A wider vision of education should respect and reward the practical as well as the 
academic, informal and experiential as well as formal learning, and should draw upon the 
wide range of expertise within the community. 
6. A curriculum entitlement framework should be designed to introduce young people to 
subjects and the broad domains of knowledge, to practical capabilities and skills, to a 
sense of achievement, to the ‘big issues’ which confront society and to the knowledge and 
dispositions for active citizenship, yet be flexible enough for teachers to adapt 
appropriately. 
7. Teachers’ expertise in the enhancement of learning should be supported and challenged 
by provision for continuing professional development in all phases of education and by a 
single system of qualified teacher status. 
8. The different purposes of assessment )i.e. supporting different kinds of learning, holding 
the system accountable and certifying achievements) require different and appropriate 
modes of assessment, and maintenance of appropriate balance between them. 
9. Local collaborative and democratic learning partnerships (embracing schools, further 
education colleges, universities, employers, independent training providers, and voluntary 
bodies) should be established to promote continuity in provision for lifelong learning. 
10. Funding should be directed to locally developed partnerships, with regional oversight by 
local authorities which will be in a position to understand the educational and training 
needs of the different phases and communities. 
11. Qualifications should reflect the aims of learning, including the practical, informal and 
experiential, and should provide a framework which is enabling , clear and stable. 
12. The Government should ensure necessary resources, teacher supply, legal frameworks, 
curriculum entitlement and overall accountability, but place responsibility for detailed 
provision with institutions, partnerships and authorities in particular localities. 
 
10
 For a more in-depth analysis refer to Nussbaum’s article (2003: 33-59): Capabilities as 
Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, in Feminist Economics 9:2/3. Here, 
Nussbaum articulates objections to a utilitarian approach to assessment in the area of quality 
of life and human flourishing. She examines Sen’s contribution to the debate about human 
capabilities and his arguments against utility of resources as a sound basis for assessment 
specifically applied to the area of gender equality. Note that the same argument applies 
when human capabilities are utilised for assessment of realising potential in education and 
notions of equality therein. 
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11
 Nussbaum explores this idea in several articles, and provides ways in which capabilities and 
functions are individuated sensitive to experience and choice  (1993, 1995). 
 
12
 For further detail on research and practice regarding student voice, including the benefits 
and continuing challenges, see Burton, Smith and Woods (2010) and Fielding (2004, 2007). 
 
13
 There are various examples where students are developing as enquirers, reflecting and 
engaging in shaping their learning environment. I am leading work in the UK where in North 
Tyneside schools in the primary and the secondary stage, children and young people are 
engaged and trained as student researchers of learning in their setting, and students are 
involved in a daily cycle of reflective practice. 
 
14
 Here, Silcock (1996) speaks with reference to Galton’s factory models of learning, which 
claim that successful education will follow from a firm control by teachers over what pupils 
do, and an associated firm control by governments over what teachers do. 
 
15
 http://www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationdetail/page1/CM%207980 
(Last accessed 04/05/12). 
 
16
 Reference from an article by P. Henshaw, http://anthonywilson.posterous.com/the-new-
curriculum-a-baffling-detour-to-the-1 (Last accessed 15/04/11). 
 
17
 These figures were last accessed on 23/02/11, from the Department of Education Website: 
http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000985/index.shtml 
 
18
 In particular, the study found that in respect of boys, though 70% enjoyed reading stories in 
1998 this had decreased to 55% in 2003. 
 
19
 http://timss.bc.edu/pirls2006/index.html (Last accessed 23/02/11). 
 
20
http://www.neweconomics.org/sites/neweconomics.org/files/The_Power_and_Potential_of
_Well-Being_Indicators_1.pdf (Last accessed 23/02/11). 
 
21
 Truth Hurts: Report of the National Inquiry into Self-harm among Young People, Mental 
Health Foundation, 2006. This study finds that self-harm is a ‘hidden epidemic’ (2006: 8). 
http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/content/assets/PDF/publications/truth_hurts.pdf?view=Sta
ndard (Last accessed 04/05/12). 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
The importance of reflection in education within the Capabilities Approach 
 
Authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, but 
people in their relations with the world. (Freire, [1970]1996: 62). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Solutions and tools have been made available to teachers for some years in an effort to 
improve learning and achieve educational success (still measured in numerical standardised 
form). Some of these efforts for improvement focus on interventions such as: enhancing 
thinking or meta-cognition, using Habits of Mind (Art Costa); ensuring high levels of challenge 
in lessons, using Magenta Principles (Mike Hughes); or, encouraging engagement for learning, 
using Kagan Structures (Spencer Kagan). These strategies have become popular in schools and 
are often applied mechanistically by following a toolkit recipe in service of an approach to 
learning that is driven by technical outputs, defined by utility and endorsed by the language of 
business. Here, the opportunity in education is often lost to nurture much needed reflection 
which includes an ethical dimension to consider what living well and doing well entail within 
and beyond the confines of school or university.  
 
The Capabilities Approach which stands against education for utility alone, could ground and 
guide education theory and practice. This approach, providing a framework for flexible 
reflection could enable deep sensitive understanding that helps children and young people 
improve their learning for life, individually and collaboratively. Recent research commissioned 
by the Sutton Trust (Higgins et al., 2011) emphasises the importance of learners being able ‘to 
plan, monitor and evaluate their own learning’ (2011: 19). Linked to this, how teaching and 
learning occurs, is critical to overcoming the learning barriers which children and young people 
experience, particularly those who live in economic disadvantage. I propose that reflective 
practice in education within the Capabilities Approach could begin to make inroads in this 
area. 
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In this thesis I have argued in favour of an understanding of human flourishing based on 
Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia and its constituent parts. Having identified the Capabilities 
Approach as a contemporary development which builds on Aristotle’s philosophy, I have 
suggested that when embraced by education it could offer a much needed alternative to the 
existing philosophy defined by performativity. As I argued in Chapter 5, the Capabilities 
Approach could be as valuable in education as Sen, Nussbaum and others recognise it to be in 
economics in measures of human development. Significantly, the Capabilities Approach 
continues to influence political discussions, analysis, and work, as exemplified in the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
1
.  
 
In this chapter, the principal aim is to defend reflection within the Capabilities Approach as 
helpful in education, with its Aristotelian roots and its focus on phronēsis (understood as 
practical reason or practical wisdom) which requires a balance between thought and emotion. 
In terms of progressive theories, the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach contributes an 
explicit ethical dimension. I suggest that reflection within this approach can enrich progressive 
accounts of education. In respect of practice and evaluation, this approach encourages a 
synthesis between cognition, desires and emotions and affords an ethical framework within 
which to make judgements. Reflection within the Capabilities Approach could help children 
and young people to develop understanding and insight, individually and with others. 
Importantly, through the insight and understanding they gain from reflection of this kind, 
children, young people and adults could expand their ability for wise action in favour of their 
own and societal flourishing. In particular, this kind of reflection is situated in the particular 
context and thought through with sensitivity to what human beings by nature share. 
 
In agreement with Mahbub ul Haq, the founder of the Human Development Report, this thesis 
maintains that ‘the objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people 
to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives’
2
. Furthermore, this aim could be understood within 
the context of flourishing as defined by Aristotle and adopted by the contemporary 
Capabilities Approach.  As described in Chapter 5, stubborn barriers to flourishing for our 
children and young people persist in the UK. Moreover, many educationists agree that the 
education system as it stands in England is a contributing factor which exacerbates this 
situation (Pring et al. 2009).  
 
The UNDP maintains that ‘human development is about creating an environment in which 
people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their 
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needs and interests’
3
. As UNDP states, ‘this way of looking at development, often forgotten in 
the immediate concern with accumulating commodities and financial wealth, is not new. 
Philosophers, economists and political leaders have long emphasised human well-being as the 
purpose, the end, of development’
4
. Yet education, as constrained by government policy, 
continues to eclipse this principle with the immediate concern for improving standards using 
rigid prescribed measures which seek only to prepare children and young people for economic 
success. However, as the evidence makes clear from those not in education, employment or 
training (NEET), even this narrow focus has not achieved its target of improving a significant 
minority of young people’s prospects for economic success (Pring et al., 2009: 45-46). 
 
The need for change is strongly voiced by prominent academics in education who have led 
recent reviews and who have found the present utilitarian approach wanting (Pring et al., 
2009; Alexander et al., 2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011). Alongside others, this thesis critiques 
the Standards Agenda in education which confines learning to reaching standardised numerical 
targets which are coarsely designed. In preference, it seeks to offer realistic alternatives to 
nurture learning in respect of flourishing, within the Capabilities Approach. Therefore, in this 
chapter I put forward a flexible method of reflective practice to help children and young 
people learn and make choices in favour of their flourishing.  
 
In this chapter, reflective practice will refer particularly to students’ learning with respect to 
developing a flexible approach that includes the ethical dimension which could help young 
people flourish. Although inter-connected with reflective practice in teaching, for example, as 
espoused by Donald Schön in his book, The Reflective Practitioner (1983), this chapter does not 
attempt to engage with practitioner reflection-in-action, except where it intercepts directly 
with issues concerning students’ reflective practice. 
 
In Chapter 6 therefore, I will focus first on the evidence from education reviews across the 
learning stages (Pring, 2009; Alexander, 2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011), and the changes 
advocated by these researchers which give reason for hope, and which assign credence to this 
thesis. Second, I will attempt to defend the importance of reflection within the Capabilities 
Approach and explore its provenance in education. In particular I will: (1) consider its 
similarities with progressive theories of education, such as Dewey’s and Bruner’s and seek 
guidance from these; (2) explain why a progressive approach based on human capabilities, is 
flexible and child-centred, and yet does not make the mistake of focusing on the child at the 
expense of learning towards success; and, (3) critique the tendency of a mechanistic method 
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of reflective practice and the imperialism of the collaborative approach in learning. Third, I will 
suggest that this flexible kind of reflection includes an ethical dimension at the heart of 
learning which dislodges simplistic notions of reflective practice. 
 
 
 
6.1 A reason for hope and a call for change 
 
 
6.1.1 A long history of criticism of the narrow utilitarian view in education 
 
Early in the twentieth century academics such as Dewey involved in education were already 
challenging the narrow objective in schooling of imparting disconnected knowledge of 
particular subjects to children and young people. As part of this challenge, in the 1970s,Pring 
writes of the need for developing knowledge of mind, where he defines mind ‘as a shorthand 
form of referring to the many, wide ranging abilities, capacities, tendencies that explain how 
people act and react and that at the same time seem to escape explanation in purely physical 
terms’ (1976: 7). As Pring maintained, education should be about more than imparting 
disconnected pieces of knowledge or instruction and should be about educating in a different 
sense, which does not include drilling students. Consequently, in the sense that Pring 
advocated, educating should be concerned with the development of the following qualities 
which constitute the life of a person: ‘thoughtful, imaginative, intelligent, sensitive, 
persevering, strong-willed, affectionate, and so on’ (ibid.: 7).  
 
Over ten years later and with the onset of a prescribed National Curriculum, Pring (1989) 
articulated the need for a broader approach in education than that provided by National 
Curriculum. This broader approach involves nurturing ‘human qualities’ or capabilities which 
enable young people to ‘understand themselves, other people and the world around them, 
and therefore assume some measure of control over their own life and destiny’ (ibid.: 98). It is 
about young people ‘acquiring understanding and insight’ and ‘being able to translate those 
insights into meaningful courses of action’ (ibid.: 98). Education, in this sense, ‘is concerned 
with helping people to think and to understand. It is about empowering them – giving them 
the mental tools to reflect, to reason, to argue and to solve problems’ (ibid.: 98).  
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Pring’s thesis considers the curriculum ‘as the learning experiences that are planned within the 
school’ (ibid.: 2). Like others since (Nuffield Review, 2009; Education for All, 2011), Pring is wise 
to seek a balance in the curriculum between ‘subjects, personal relevance and social utility’ 
(1989: 100). He recognises that in order to arrive at such a balance, the starting point must be 
a clear understanding of the values or aims which underpin the purpose of education, from 
which the definition of an educated person is formed. For example, three important traditions 
in education have varied views based on differing values and aims as their starting point. The 
first view values subjects above all, and is characterised by a tradition which considers 
primordial ‘the educated person to be one who has been initiated into the forms of knowledge 
that are represented by long-established subjects’ (ibid.: 99). The second view, focuses on 
personal relevance as most valuable and therefore ‘starts not with subjects, but with what it 
means to be, to grow, and to be effective as a person’ (ibid.: 100). And thirdly, there is the view 
that ‘social utility’ as the prime concern for learning, should seek to establish the skills and 
knowledge required by society to meet the ‘job vacancies’ and ‘future manpower planning 
targets’ (ibid.: 100). Arriving at a balance between these three is a complex matter. 
 
The concerns voiced by Pring regarding the National Curriculum were quite valid, both in 
respect of the over-prescription in terms of curriculum and assessment and its overemphasis 
on utility (1989: 69-96), and with regard to the lack of debate about which tradition and whose 
values should underpin education in the first place (ibid.: 97-11). The need which the National 
Curriculum aimed to meet was that of improving education, through an agreed curriculum 
framework, with a greater degree of prescription, and with more focused government 
direction. The evidence which gave rise to it suggested that ‘education ... was not coming up to 
standard: it was not meeting the needs of society, especially industry, and it was not enabling 
young people to get the best out of life (ibid.: 28). This high degree of prescription and 
narrowness of curriculum has since been addressed in England with the proposals in Every 
Child Matters (DfES, 2003). Through these proposals the government gave ‘statutory 
entitlement to a broader curriculum, encouraged wider participation, promoted 
‘personalisation’ of learning, and created an integration of social, health and educational 
services’ (Nuffield Review, 2009: 2). 
 
However, as the Nuffield Review suggests, ‘despite what has been achieved’, ‘problems 
stubbornly remain’ which continue to affect young people’s progress and ability to succeed 
(2009: 3). ‘There is continuing low achievement for many, lack of social mobility, [and] 
constant complaints from employers and others about the standards of those leaving 
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education’ (ibid.: 3). In addition the evidence of poor outcomes both in education and in health 
and well-being highlighted in Chapter 5, support this view. Furthermore, the concerns which 
Pring voiced in 1989 with respect to a lack of debate and transparency about the aims or 
ethical dimension in education, continue to be a cause of concern voiced in major educational 
reviews such as the Nuffield Review (Pring et al., 2009), the Cambridge Primary Review 
(Alexander et al., 2010), and most recently the review of reviews, Education for All (Pring and 
Pollard, 2011). 
 
 
6.1.2 The Nuffield Review of education for 14-19 year olds (2009) 
 
The Nuffield Review published in 2009, was a result of five years of research from a varied 
team of academics with extensive experience, whose recommendations were drawn from a 
large number of publications (2009: 209-216). Consistent with the long history of concern 
outlined above, this review also voices concern about the lack of an explicit ethical dimension 
in education policy and practice. In addition there are concerns about the narrowness of the 
curriculum (ibid.: 98-103) and assessment procedures which constrain both teachers and 
learners (ibid.: 60-64), and which are fuelled by business language (ibid.: 16, 203) unsuitable 
for nurturing ‘educated 19 year olds in this day and age’ (ibid.: 12, 200). 
 
This review advocates a broader vision of learning and consequently a broader vision of 
assessment (2009: 204-205), which respects teachers (ibid.: 86-88, 205), which listens and 
includes the voice of young people (ibid.: 72-74), and which provides a curriculum framework 
for the 21
st
 century (ibid.: 205). As a result it calls for a more ‘reflective and participative 
approach to policy’ (ibid.: 207), with a clear vision of education and the ethical dimension 
which guides it. This ethical dimension must take account of and be able to enable teachers 
and learners to nurture profound respect for the whole person (not just the narrowly 
conceived ‘skills for economic prosperity’), irrespective of ability or ethnic and social 
background, and in which the learning contributes to a more just and cohesive society.’(ibid.: 
208). It must have ‘system performance indicators ‘fit for purpose’ in which measures of 
success reflect the range of educational aims’, and consequently a ‘redistribution of power and 
decision-making’ which includes the learner and the teacher’s voice (ibid.: 208). 
 
Although this review articulates the need for regaining the ethical dimension in education and 
making it explicit, it does not engage with the nature of this dimension and a flexible 
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framework which enables this dimension to be developed in education. This is what this thesis 
seeks to do by suggesting the Capabilities Approach, based on Aristotle’s philosophy as a 
sound ethical framework for education. 
 
 
6.1.3 The Cambridge Primary Review (2010) 
 
The theme of the need for an ethical dimension which goes beyond utility is again voiced in 
this review of primary education published in 2010, Children, their World, their Education. 
Robin Alexander
5
, speaking in 2010, with regard to recommendations made for primary 
education as a result of evidence from the Cambridge Review, urges us to incorporate a fuller 
definition of standards which embraces a broader view of what education is for and which 
recognises the moral dimension. He quotes Warwick Mansell for support in this claim. 
 
The word ‘standards’ ... has been routinely abused in the last few years, by politicians 
and others. ‘Raising standards’ … is implied to stand for improving the overall quality of 
education in our schools. That, in the public mind ... is what the phrase means. The 
reality ... however, is that ‘raising standards’ means raising test scores, as measured by a 
set of relatively narrow indicators laid down more or less unilaterally by ministers, and 
often subject to disproportionate influence by the performance of a small group of 
schools. These scores represent only a sub-set of schools’ work. Therefore it is not clear 
that they stand, reliably, for schools’ overall quality. The two meanings are not 
interchangeable, and should not be treated as such. (Mansell, 2007: 26).  
 
In an attempt to redress this imbalance and as a result of the complete findings from the 
Cambridge Primary Review, eleven policy priorities for primary education were published and 
commended to political leaders and schools
6
.  
 
Some of these recommendations are closely aligned with the spirit of the Capabilities 
Approach. For example, to name a few: the importance of ensuring children are not in poverty 
and have well-being as well as attain in education; ensuring the UN convention of the Rights of 
the Child is taken seriously as we develop authentic student voice; ensuring a wider curriculum 
and life-long learning, thereby taking into account value in areas other than those narrowly 
viewed as indicative of quality now; recognising that education is at the heart a moral matter; 
and replacing the pedagogy of official recipe by pedagogies of repertoire and principle. And 
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this is particularly important, since as Alexander (2010: 14) reminds us, ‘Children will not learn 
to think for themselves if their teachers are expected merely to do as they are told’. These 
policies if adopted resonate with the Capabilities Approach in education, which this thesis 
proposes. Reflective practice, the focus of this chapter, is one vehicle for these proposals 
becoming a reality in education. 
 
 
6.1.4 Education for All: Evidence from the past, principles for the future (2011) 
 
This ‘review of reviews’ was led by Richard Pring and Andrew Pollard, two leading academics in 
this field. The goal of this review was ‘to highlight enduring issues and challenges which face 
policy-makers in contemplating education in England and to suggest principles which might 
inform future decision-making’ (Pring and Pollard, 2011: 5). The report offers twelve 
suggestions and principles for consideration in future policy formulation. The Review draws 
upon evidence from the Cambridge Primary Review (2010) and the Nuffield Review (2009), 
mentioned above. In addition to these, it draws on evidence from other reviews, namely: 
Learning Through life (2009), an enquiry into the future of lifelong learning; Learning through 
Life: Future Challenges (2008), a review of mental capital and well-being; Now We are 50 
(2008), key findings from the National Child Development Study; and, 12 Teaching and 
Learning Research Programme commentaries published between 2006 – 2010 (ibid.: 8-9). 
 
Like previous reviews it asks the question ‘what is education for?’ and suggests that central to 
all the reviews from which it draws evidence ‘were deliberations about the values which 
implicitly or explicitly direct educational policy and practice’ (2011: 15). Again, it highlights the 
issue that the ‘aims of education are too often seen only in terms of economic and academic 
success’. It also stresses that ‘there is a need to consider the development of the ‘whole 
person’. It voices concern that those aims ‘too often focus on individual achievement rather 
than on the public good’, and emphasises the broader purpose and wider benefits of learning, 
such as ‘a concern for the well-being of each person’. Therefore this review considers ‘mental 
good health’ as in part an educational matter, ‘too often ignored in the provision of formal 
learning’(ibid.: 15-16). 
 
Education for All (2011), draws attention to the moral dimension in education which has 
tended to be neglected in many government documents in recent years. As the review argues: 
‘values, even when unexamined, still shape in detail the structure and content of education 
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and training ‘from cradle to grave’’ (ibid.: 16). The critical problem is that the widely accepted 
yet unexamined ethical dimension to which the review refers here, has been one of utility or 
resources. This unexamined aim has resulted in every day practices which follow from an over-
emphasis on performance alone. For example this is seen in the narrow regime of SATs tests 
and consequent impoverishment of learning at the primary stage (2011: 39-40; Cambridge 
Primary Review, 2010: 16), a narrow view of assessment which categorises as failures the 50% 
of pupils who do not achieve the targets (Nuffield Review, 2009: 80, 82), and a neglect of less 
measurable aims such as personal and social well-being as mentioned in the review of Mental 
Capital and Well-being examined in this review of reviews. 
 
Instead of this unexamined view informed by a utilitarian philosophy, what we need to 
develop, which would be in line with the wishes of the reviews outlined here, and which would 
begin to address the stubborn issues that persist in society, is an explicit ethical dimension 
framed by human capabilities and informed by a shared humanity. Such a view is that 
expressed by Nussbaum in her development of the Capabilities Approach, which has been 
widely applied by the United Nations Development Programme, and which education would 
do well to embrace. It is this philosophical grounding in the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities 
Approach which this thesis espouses and which this and Chapter 7 explores and applies 
through reflective practice in education. As this review of reviews (Pring and Pollard, 2011) 
identifies, what we seek is ‘the vision of society in which learning plays its full role in personal 
growth and emancipation, prosperity, solidarity and global responsibility’ (ibid.: 16).  
 
Developing reflective practice informed by the Capabilities Approach focuses education in this 
direction, and provides a model which is both flexible enough to meet individual need, and 
based upon general principles which transcend the individual, context and culture. 
 
 
6.2 Reflective practice within the Capabilities Approach 
  
6.2.1 The dangers of a one-dimensional view of cognition  
 
A myth is still popular today which maintains that the scientific paradigm should be the only 
one used to explain progress, capable of producing the answers to questions of ultimate 
meaning for nature, humanity and the laws that give shape to our existence as we find it. 
However, many have now questioned this scientific paradigm as the sole window for 
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understanding and explanation, and have even found it to have a diminished role in explaining 
progress or making sense of life (Nisbet, 2005: 37). Answering questions of ultimate meaning, 
or ethics, or more simply answering questions which occur in cross cultural discourse, or even 
between two people of the same culture are not easily answered using the language of science 
alone.  
People are ever more dissatisfied with their incapacity to reflect in a satisfying way into these 
questions of crucial importance. They seek a framework for meaningful discourse about 
complex issues and wish to be able to make positive decisions in favour of their happiness, yet 
they often lack a sensitive process for so doing. As the theologian Langdon Gilkey reminds us:  
 
For now our questions about the meaning of our work and our lives, of the significance 
and insignificance of what we are and do ... have no framework in which to find an 
answer. Above all, our confidence in our own history and so ourselves as a community 
have been badly shaken: that confidence was based on the assurance that our science 
and technology were establishing the grounds for a fuller humanity everywhere. Of this 
hope in the future we are now much less sure. Science and technology seem to be 
capable of making the world ... inhuman, soulless. (Gilkey, 1981: 24). 
 
By restricting themselves to the paradigm of science and excluding other methods of 
explanation as valid or helpful, people and societies often believe they will arrive at simple 
concrete answers about complex issues. Implementing a fixed rule such as this, many believe 
will enable them to answer complex questions about life, their reality, and how to live.  
 
In terms of education research, methods in respect of reflective practice in this area, are too 
often based on a scientific process, often applied mechanically, with clear cut criteria for 
success. For this reason, regarding action research and evaluating experimental teaching, Stake 
and Schwandt remind us of the need to keep a balance between viewing quality as measured 
and quality as experienced. Quality as measured can be too distanced from experience, and by 
contrast the discernment of quality in quality as experienced, is a form of practically embodied 
knowledge – ‘at once both cognitive and emotional’ (2006: 404–418). Whether thinking about 
education research specifically, or reflective practice in teaching and learning per se, 
structured processes by which we can make sense of things should be ones which are pliable 
enough to mould themselves to the questions and concerns of the enquiry in order to yield as 
close an answer as is possible to ascertain in the particular situation.  
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6.2.2 A flexible method of reflection enabling a richer view of cognition 
 
When thinking, working things out, endeavouring to make sense of issues, and when engaging 
in reflective practice to this end, we should consider Aristotle’s example of the stone mason’s 
‘rule’ in Lesbos (NE 1137b 29-31). This rule was designed to adjust itself to the intricacies 
required for each stone carving to be realised, as applied and interpreted by the stone masons. 
Today, I believe a tool such as this continues to provide invaluable guidance for carpenters and 
stone masons alike.  
 
It is this picture of a Lesbian rule (Lucas, 1955) which lends itself to be applied to the reflective 
practice model which I propose. This rule is also of relevance when we come to discuss 
evaluation in Chapter 8. We would be wise to listen to Aristotle’s advice when embarking on a 
method of reflective practice in education. Aristotle maintains that ‘our account would be 
adequate, if we achieved a degree of precision appropriate to the underlying material; for 
precision must not be sought to the same degree in all accounts of things, any more than it is 
by the craftsmen in the things they are producing’ (NE 1094b 10-15).  
 
Lucas argues that when considering judgements and engaging in dialogue about how we should 
live or what we should do in a particular instance, the situation is very complex (1995). He 
recommends we acknowledge that when considering a particular situation with reference to a 
general rule ‘finitude cannot measure what cannot be confined, and limitations of consistency 
are to be construed not as a rigid regulus but as a Lesbian rule’ (1955: 213). For example, we 
might consider an example in education where secondary students are asked to make 
judgements in biology lessons about whether experiments on embryos of less than 6 weeks are 
always a positive undertaking for society, or even whether the findings from these experiments 
will enable human beings to flourish. Making judgments in respect of this example might not 
lend itself to a formulaic style method of reflection where there is a rigid rule from which the 
answer is made available.  
 
The fact that this question or enquiry involves so many complex issues at once which need to 
be contextualised makes it very difficult to see how an absolute correct answer, or even a clear 
answer is possible to achieve. Instead even though we need to acknowledge the importance of 
such a debate and enquiry and seek as precise an answer as is possible in the situation, it is also 
essential to recognise that complete precision is not an appropriate paradigm in this case. In 
the same way, a general rule about what constitutes human thriving can only be interpreted in 
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the particular situation being discussed, which in turn may shape the rule itself. This does not 
mean that we are not able to reach deep understanding about what human flourishing entails, 
but simply that such understanding as we acquire will not always be complete, or transparent, 
or precise in the formulaic sense. 
 
Nevertheless, the process of engaging with such important questions of human development, 
scientific progress, and societal beliefs, all require detailed exploration through meaningful 
dialogue. The capabilities list about what we share as human beings in terms of capabilities to 
be developed, could enable students to reflect deeply about such issues and to test their ideas 
with one another against a flexible rule based on shared principles which this framework 
provides. When reflecting in this flexible way becomes routine for students, they begin to 
acquire greater sophistication in their ability to make judgements within this framework of a 
shared humanity. They then begin to plan, monitor, and evaluate their learning and 
judgements more effectively, and within the ethical dimension of human flourishing for 
themselves and society at large. This could be significant since these students will be the 
scientists of the future, working to enhance or diminish human flourishing with their scientific 
advancements and their ramifications for action.  
 
It seems to me that the reviews outlined earlier all voice concerns about the utilitarian 
approach which guides education. Furthermore, there are concerns about the degree of 
precision which is demanded from education, fuelled by this philosophy and the business 
language which it has adopted. The reviews all identify the need for a broader view of an 
educated person than the present rigid paradigm of precise standards, targets and outcomes 
demands. Moreover they highlight the fact that this narrow view leads to a diminished 
understanding of what we can know and learn, reduced to easily measured standardised tests 
and assessed against equally crude, if precise indicators.  
 
What is evident from Artistotle’s Lesbian rule (Lucas, 1955) is that people are able to explore 
complex issues by reflecting about these, and can develop a degree of cognition in respect of 
these using such a flexible rule for reflection. This is the way that effective democratic debate 
has been conducted down the ages. Notwithstanding, the present educational system 
continues to demand a one dimensional paradigm in respect of cognition which requires 
precision confined to technical reason that is inappropriate here.  
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Instead, the Aristotelian view and the Capabilities Approach which builds on it, recognises that 
given the complexity of the human condition, cognition requires more than the development 
of technical reason alone. Instead, cognition must include emotions or desires within it. 
Nussbaum describes this synthesis of emotions and reason as ‘deliberated desire’ (1990: 78-9). 
In this fuller sense, cognition is multidimensional, and since it incorporates the less easily 
measurable aspect of emotions or desires, cognition in this sense cannot be understood as 
purely one dimensional in respect of reason. This is the view of cognition which Aristotle puts 
forward which was explored in Chapter 2 regarding human capability, function, and our shared 
nature. This is where reflective practice becomes essential in order to notice, consider and 
take account of all the dimensions within cognition which yield a richer account of reality, even 
if less precise. Such a flexible process of reflection enables us to plan, monitor, and evaluate 
situations and issues with finesse. 
 
 
6.2.3 Drawing upon tradition in education for models of reflective practice  
 
A model of learning which is broader and which the present reviews outlined seek, takes the 
liberal arts seriously for the preparation of informed, independent and sympathetic 
democratic citizens. This view draws on this richer view of cognition which stems from an 
ancient western philosophical tradition of which the Greeks where very influential. I will 
discuss this ancient heritage further in Chapter 7. More recently in history, education 
theoreticians and practitioners , such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778), Pestalozzi 
(1746 – 1827), Froebel (1782 – 1852), and John Dewey (1869-1952), have all argued in their 
distinctive ways in favour of this broader view, considering education beyond the pure 
assimilation of facts and traditions towards a specific utilitarian end. They argue in favour of 
learning that challenges the mind through active participation in reflection in order to enable 
children and young people to become active, competent, critical and caring persons in a 
complex world.  
 
The nuances between these thinkers and others of their time, and their influence on 
contemporary education, is not the focus of this thesis. However for the purposes of this 
thesis, the philosopher John Dewey and the psychologist Jerome Bruner will be the principal 
sources of inspiration in the proposals for reflective practice offered here, both in terms of 
individuals and groups.  
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In addition to the reflective practice steps developed by Dewey, and the enquiry cycle 
developed by Bruner, the principal adaptation proposed in this thesis is that of embracing the 
Capabilities Approach with its ethical dimension. This kind of reflection, whether undertaken 
by the student or teacher, is structured by its philosophical framework which includes an 
ethical dimension. I suggest that the flexible model of reflection discussed in Chapter 7, could 
be flexible enough to meet the needs of the individual child and allow assessments to be made 
within the framework offered by the Capabilities Approach. 
 
With regards to offering a practical and flexible model for reflective enquiry of various forms, I 
shall draw on Dewey and Bruner and gather inspiration from their ideas. The reflection model 
proposed in Chapter 7, seeks to embrace a balance between desires, emotions and cognition. 
As I argue, in Bruner’s position there is a tendency towards an overemphasis on the cognitive, 
manifested today in the promotion of ‘thinking skills’
7
, although there is a place for intuition. 
Dewey also provides helpful steps for reflective practice, although practical guidance for its 
implementation could be stronger, as could be the synthesis between reason and emotion for 
cognition. This thesis further develops Dewey’s ideas about the importance of qualities for 
reflective practice. By embracing the Capabilities Approach in reflective practice, this thesis 
seeks to make explicit the ethical dimension within the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach 
so important for reflection. The ethical dimension in education, guided by the Aristotelian 
philosophy, could allow for a rich and variegated account of human nature, society and 
flourishing which structures reflection. It also encourages us include emotions as integral to 
good thinking. 
 
In Chapter 7 therefore, I set out to extend Dewey’s position using the Capabilities Approach 
with reference to the Greco-Roman view of philosophy as a way of life, and to the spiritual 
thinking of the Jesuit tradition in the 16
th
 century. Importantly this Jesuit tradition which has its 
roots in the Greco-Roman view, was implemented with success at the time in Europe, China 
and beyond, and continues to thrive today. I attempt to argue that this model for reflection 
has much to offer contemporary education.  
 
 
6.2.4 Reflective practice: Dewey and Bruner 
 
Nussbaum, reminds us in her writing that Dewey was one of the most influential and 
theoretically distinguished American practitioners of Socratic education (2010: 64). For Dewey, 
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children need to learn to take charge of their own thinking and to engage with the world in a 
curious and critical spirit, and an important issue with some conventional technical methods of 
education is the passivity it encourages in students. Instead, as Dewey points out, ‘vigour of 
thought and inquiry’ is crucial for the development of flourishing societies. Today, even 
economists such as Amartya Sen agree with this claim, as he maintains in respect of progress 
in society that deliberation (meaningful dialogue) is fundamental to its development (2009: 
235-252).  
 
Although Dewey (1915: 112-15) was concerned with the issues of his time, some of these 
issues persist today to varying degrees and continue to be challenges for education. He argues 
that ‘Schools have been treated as places for ... absorbing, and [this] has been preferred to 
analyzing, sifting, and active problem-solving. Asking students to be passive listeners not only 
fails to develop their active critical faculties, it positively weakens them’ (1915: 11). Instead, 
what Dewey sought from students was ‘the change from more or less passive and inert 
recipiency and restraint to one of buoyant outgoing activity’ (ibid.: 15). But for Dewey, the 
critical spirit we seek to develop is not just an intellectual skill but is also an aspect of practical 
engagement, a stance towards problems in real life and a way of engaging with others to solve 
these. Dewey emphasised that such a focus on real-life activity is pedagogically useful as well, 
as children may be more curious and focused than if they are passive recipients. As Dewey 
describes: ‘The great thing ... is that each shall have the education which enables him to see 
within his daily work all there is in it of large and human significance’ (ibid.:24). Of necessity 
this approach insists on human relationships rich in meaning, and curiosity.  
 
Reflective practice is important not only as a tool for teaching, but also as an aim of education. 
This was certainly the case for Dewey since as he put it: 'it enables us to know what we are 
about when we act’ (1964: 211) . As such ‘it converts action that is merely appetitive, blind, 
and impulsive into intelligent action' (1964: 211). Similarly, the influential German philosopher 
Gadamer reminds us of the importance of having ‘a particular sensitivity and sensitiveness to 
situations, and how to behave in them’ (1975: 17). The kind of reflective practice which Dewey 
has in mind requires a model or steps which in turn lead to analysis, evaluation, and to further 
reflective action.  
 
In respect of developing a flexible model of reflection, akin to that of the Lesbian rule (Lucas, 
1955) identified earlier in this chapter, we can begin by drawing elements from Dewey and 
what he has to offer for developing reflective practice. Quoting from Dewey (1973: 494-505), 
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van Manen (1995: 34) points out the steps which Dewey considers necessary in the process of 
reflection: 
 
(1) 'perplexity, confusion, doubt' due to the nature of the situation in which one finds 
oneself; (2) 'conjectural anticipation and tentative interpretation' of given elements or 
meanings of the situation and their possible consequences; (3) 'examination, inspection 
exploration, analysis of all attainable considerations' which may define and clarify a 
problem with which one is confronted; (4) 'elaboration of the tentative hypothesis 
suggestions'; (5) deciding on 'a plan of action' or 'doing something' about a desired 
result.’ (van Manen, 1995: 34). 
 
As van Manen points out here, it is by following these reflective steps that reflective 
experience towards reflective action is possible. The proposed flexible model of reflection 
discussed in Chapter 7 incorporate some of these steps. This thesis goes further than the 
quotation above intends however, in that it strengthens Dewey’s concept of cognition 
conveyed above, by including emotions and desires as significant elements in the process of 
making sense with reference to an ethical framework, to be incorporated in any process of 
reflection. 
 
Turning our attention to Bruner, Dewey’s approach to reflective practice is further developed in 
the neo-Vygotskian thrust of Bruner. As explained by Silcock, Bruner’s approach is ‘founded, 
normatively, on Vygotsky's contention that mind is structured by society (1978), rather than 
society being a product of mind’ (1996: 204). I will be using an adapted model of Bruner’s cycle 
of enquiry which he proposed in The Process of Education (1960). The adapted reflective 
enquiry model in this thesis is also supported by Dewey’s steps outlined above, as it seeks to 
balance the collaborative with the individual approach. As the reflective enquiry model 
proposed in this thesis is guided by the Capabilities Approach, it enables us to keep the balance 
between the personal ability to make meaning independent of the collaborative, and the 
collaborative pursuit, as a valid way of further shaping meaning. In fact, one of the important 
characteristics of enquiry learning through this kind of reflection is the scope it allows for ‘self-
direction’ or ‘independent thinking’ on the part of the learner (Elliott, 2007: 239-40). The 
Capabilities Approach nurtures the subjective view together with the social discourse enabled 
by what we share as human beings, which helps us straddle the debate between insisting on an 
exclusively constructivist or social-constructivist view respectively (Silcock, 1996). 
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In respect of Bruner, his contribution stems from an important starting point: that ‘Learning 
should not only take us somewhere, it should allow us later to go further more easily’ (1960: 
17, 20). Hence, he argues that, ‘Mastery of the fundamental ideas of a field involves not only 
the grasping of general principles, but also the development of an attitude toward learning 
and inquiry, toward guessing and hunches, toward the possibility of solving problems on one’s 
own’. Bruner maintains that children need to be interested in what they are learning rather 
than being motivated by external rewards or standardised targets. Hence he believes that, 
‘Ideally, interest in the material to be learned is the best stimulus to learning, rather than such 
external goals as grades or later competitive advantage’ (1960: 14). Contemporary psychology 
studies also support the importance of interest for learning, in respect of developing 
motivation and internal locus of control, as important factors for successful functioning (Ryan 
and Deci, 2000: 68-78). Nel Noddings (2006) also stresses the importance of being interested, 
to remember what is learnt:  
 
Usually these people have made connections to things that interest them, and this is, of 
course, the best way to learn. ... When we are genuinely interested, we listen and read 
attentively, and we relate everything coming in to existing knowledge that acts as a 
scheme for categorizing and filing. There is no powerful substitute for real interest. 
(2006: 24). 
 
For this reason Bruner advocates learning through discovery or enquiry as a form of reflective 
practice. He considers students’ intuitive understanding as a precursor to formal 
understanding. For him, it is intuition that ‘yields hypothesis quickly, that hits on combinations 
of ideas before their worth is known’ (ibid.: 60). Bruner defines intuition as ‘the act of grasping 
the meaning , significance or structure of a problem or a situation without explicit reliance on 
the analytic apparatus of one’s craft’ (ibid.: 60). Once this intuitive step is completed, Bruner 
believes that ‘they should if possible be checked by analytic methods, while at the same time 
being respected as worthy hypotheses for such checking’ (ibid.: 58).  
 
This thesis builds on Bruner in its approach to reflective practice as it makes explicit the ethical 
dimension in this process which is based both on intuition (or desires and emotions) and 
cognition. 
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6.2.5 Reflective practice that is not mechanistic 
 
The endeavour for reflection, whether with an ethical dimension or not, is not always easy to 
develop in the school setting. In respect of teachers, Zeichner and Liston warn against the 
tendency in teacher reflection sometimes promoted by the ‘reflective practice bandwagon’ 
(1996: 73) which is mechanistic and individualistic. Instead they advocate reflective practice 
which provides space for ‘challenge and support gained through social interaction’ which is 
important in ‘helping teachers clarify what they believe and in gaining the courage to pursue 
their beliefs’ (1996: 76). Wiliam, in his research promotes teacher learning communities which 
he argues help teachers to learn together through reflection and ‘begin to develop a new 
conceptualisation of their practice’(2010: 194). This is not easy and goes beyond technical 
rationality. Crucially, in an often overly-prescribed schedule, these communities require 
teachers to make space to reflect on their individual practice and to test their reflections with 
others to refine practice further.  
 
With regards to learning, educationists such as Taber, also warn us that often in schools today 
the curriculum is so constraining that only ‘lip service’ is often paid to developing progressive 
approaches, and when it is, it is done in a superficial way (2010: 245-50). This is sometimes the 
case in assessment for learning exercises, such as feedback to which students are asked to 
respond after minimal reflection. For example, when a piece of maths or writing is returned to 
students after marking, they often include feedback in the form of a comment in green for 
praise, and one in red or pink outlining an area for improvement. Students are asked to reflect 
on this feedback and to respond on how they might improve. However, owing to time 
constraints this opportunity can often be reduced to mechanics, a tick-the-box approach to 
assessment for learning. Taber (2010) warns us against any superficial approach, and in 
respect of the science curriculum in particular, he indicates the following: 
 
If such changes in curriculum are to have the desired effect, then it is important that 
classroom practice undergoes quite radical changes to adopt new pedagogies (Levinson, 
2007), and reflects constructivist principles at its core, not at its edges. (Taber, 2010: 
245-50). 
 
It is particularly important that the flexible reflective practice model proposed in this thesis is 
based on the Capabilities Approach, and provides ways in which this practice can become part 
of the curriculum and be given space there, even as the curriculum stands today. This would 
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ensure that any reflection process is given the space required and not merely paid lip service 
or even worse, be reduced to a mechanistic process. This is supported by the findings of the 
Nuffield Review (2009: 131), which calls for important aspects of learning such as these to be 
nurtured beyond examination outcomes. For example, a secondary school in the North East of 
the UK makes time every day for group reflection on a given current theme either chosen by 
students or teachers, upon which there is time to think, discuss, and react individually and 
where a group record of the conversation is kept in a class journal. This ongoing conversation 
includes everyone in the school community and engages with meaningful issues as a 
communal ‘Thought for the Day’. 
 
 
6.2.6 The danger of overemphasising the collaborative element of reflective practice 
 
Balancing the importance of the individual and the collective processes of making sense of the 
world within the Capabilities Approach is essential. However, when the concept of teamwork 
and collaboration is overemphasised and overshadows the individual process of 
understanding, we should be concerned. In education and the workplace, teamwork and 
collaboration are often hailed as the new tools for success (partly fuelled by the myth of the 
success of the factory model in education). I would agree with Elliott (2007: 238) as he draws 
on Richard Rorty’s insistence that those of us engaged in reflective enquiry ‘have a duty to talk 
to each other, to converse about our views of the world, to use persuasion rather than force, 
to be tolerant of diversity’ (1991: 67). However, it is also true that teamwork and collaboration 
which are hailed to act as catalysts for change and learning, in reality are beset with difficulties 
and have a tendency to become superficial and hollow.  
 
For example, with reference to the workplace, Sennett (2008) reminds us of this when he 
describes how collaboration can be shallow as the workforce is reduced to implementing 
strategies and plans set out by others in respect of which they cannot exercise their judgement 
or put their stamp. This could be said to apply to the school as a workplace for teachers and 
learners alike. Within this spirit of collaboration, the constant requirement to take risks and be 
open to change can lead to an underlying trend in competition and flux in the workplace and 
the classroom which can lead to lack of identity, self-worth, and anxiety (Sennett, 2008: 34, 
37).  
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While collaboration is an important element for flourishing, if we are to avoid the concerns 
articulated by Sennett, the ethical dimension which the Capabilities Approach provides is 
essential for developing connectedness and co-operation in the belief that every human being 
is worthy of dignity. This can only be achieved if each individual spends time seeking 
understanding and making judgements by themselves and with others, rather than solely 
collaboratively. Individual construction of meaning is a necessary component of making sense 
and making decisions. If the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation are to be developed, 
what is sought is a balance between the individual and the collaborative approach.  
 
Where collaborative activities are embraced for reflective practice, another area of concern 
arises when they are implemented without the scrutiny they deserve. For example, 
collaborative activities in the classroom using teaching and learning structures such as those 
put forward by Spencer Kagan (2001)
8
 are claimed to ‘report positive outcomes for students 
including increased achievement, improved social skills and relations, and improved classroom 
climate’. Kagan also claims on the official website
9
 that this collaborative approach aligns itself 
with the many ‘mini theories of learning’ that there are. For example, the list includes: 
‘cooperative learning theory’, ‘multiple intelligence theory’, ‘brain compatible learning’, 
‘essential elements of effective instruction’, ‘expectation theory’, ‘learned optimism theory’, 
‘flow theory’, ‘Vygotsky’s theory’, ‘behaviour theory’, and ‘transference theory’. This seems 
like quite a claim, especially given that some of these theories are not easily reconciled with 
one another. Putting some of these on the same long list (eg. ‘essential elements of effective 
instruction’ and ‘cooperative learning theory’) would at the very least require some 
justification. ‘Kagan structures’ in learning, implemented at certain points where collaboration 
will enable a deepening understanding of others and which foster trust and respect between 
the team, can be very effective to enable critical interpretative learning.  
 
Furthermore, it is not in dispute that collaborative activities can promote a sense of co-
operation when used at the appropriate time. However, it is worth highlighting that an 
overemphasis on these activities in education cannot solve all the issues that face children 
today, from raising their self-esteem to making them more positive, to improving their sense 
of flow, attainment, and democratic involvement (as Kagan seems to claim as outlined above).  
 
Collaborative activities used to the neglect of individual reflection and critique, confines 
meaning-making to the social sphere, which may reduce us as human beings as it blinds us to 
the possibility of making meaning from within which is fundamental (albeit using the 
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conceptual and language structure which we absorb from the community in which we find 
ourselves) (Silcock, 1996: 205). Restricting understanding to the social sphere rejects totally 
the important insights made by thinkers such as Rousseau, Dewey, and psychologist Piaget, 
which have had such influence on constructivist theories of education. Though we may wish to 
disagree with aspects of how constructivism is developed and defined, it would be unwise to 
reject their important contributions altogether and to confine learning to socially constructed 
learning activities. 
 
While acknowledging the importance of both the individual and the collaborative endeavour 
for reflection and enquiry which deepen understanding, a balance between the two seems to 
be fraught with danger. The tendency seems to be to steer towards one or the other to the 
detriment of the necessary balance. Educationists such as Sfard (1998: 4-13) recognise that for 
learning to take place, understanding must embrace cross contextual boundaries for its 
success, and that this requires both participation and understanding by the individual alone. A 
balance between making sense of life as an individual practice and in collaboration with 
others, is key for understanding and to transfer our learning from one situation to another.  
 
Our ability to prepare ourselves today to deal with new situations we are going to 
encounter tomorrow is the very essence of learning. Competence means being able to 
repeat what can be repeated while changing what needs to be changed. How is all of 
this accounted for if we are not allowed to talk about carrying anything with us from one 
situation to another? (Sfard, 1998: 9). 
 
A focus solely on the individual, and lack of reference to the importance of the social 
communities within which learning and understanding occurs, is problematic. As Sfard (1998) 
reminds us, making sense is embedded in the engagement of the individual in contexts and in 
constant flux. But this must include that we recognise and respect the importance of the 
individual endeavour in the process of understanding and making positive judgements. Of 
course, proponents of socio-cultural approaches would associate with the ideas of situated 
learning theorists (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and emphasise the importance of context, the nature 
of the environment and of the place that individuals occupy in communities of practice 
(Wenger, 1998), and their ability to make sense and thus learn through participation in social 
settings (Le Cornu & Collins, 2004, 27-32). However, this model of the formation of a person as 
person-in-action, when taken to extreme, presents a challenge to notions that understanding 
can be owned by the individual.  
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As philosopher Mary Midgley (1978) reminds us in respect of becoming a member of society, a 
balance is important between the individual and the collaborative approach to understanding: 
 
... an infant must be programmed to respond to ... [society]. Others give him his cues. 
But he has to be able to pick them up and complete the dialogue. ... A baby that fails, as 
time goes on, to smile and talk, laugh and weep, to meet the eyes of those around it, to 
seek and follow its parent, to treat those around it with affection, to want their 
company and approval, to play and to explore the world, cannot join its society. 
(Midgley, 1978: 95-96). 
 
 
6.3 Flexible reflection within the Capabilities Approach and its ethical dimension 
 
Having established the need for reflective practice which resists the mechanistic tendency, and 
argued in favour of a balance between individual and collaborative approaches to 
understanding, this section focuses on the importance of flexibility within a model of 
reflection, and of an ethical dimension which enables each individual and group to use the 
model to understand and make sound judgements.  
 
In addition to developing a flexible model for reflection, Dewey also believed important 
attitudes must coexist with knowledge of the reflective steps or method for the endeavour to 
be successful. For example, Dewey spoke of the need for developing certain qualities, such as 
open-mindedness or sincerity, wholeheartedness, responsibility , in addition to the habit of 
thinking in a reflective way (1964: 224-28). Dewey also writes of reflection as involved in 
making practical judgements, in particular, concerned with situations about ‘things to do or be 
done, judgements of a situation demanding action’ (1916: 335).  
 
This has echoes of Aristotle’s account of phronēsis (practical wisdom or reason) explored in 
previous chapters, where attitudes or virtues are required for the process of making good 
decisions on an ongoing basis. Of course, Aristotle’s account of phronēsis is characterised 
significantly by flexibility. Therefore, what begins to emerge here is a picture of reflective 
practice as something integral to our lives, which is flexible, does not seek absolutes, and is not 
applied with rigid structures. This kind of flexible reflective practice is something which we can 
exercise in different ways, when still or when on the go, and which we undertake alone or with 
others. Today, the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach allows for an account of human 
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beings which gives depth to our understanding of these virtues and what they entail, as they 
are not necessarily restricted by the social context. Within this approach, a flexible model of 
reflection is a tool of the kind which Aristotle (NE 1137b 29-31) had in mind as an essential aid 
to develop practical reason and affiliation. Furthermore, this flexible method requires us to 
interpret it and apply it to make it fit the particular situation. In respect of education, this 
process of reflection or enquiry cannot be reduced to a paper exercise nor be mechanised, and 
within the Capabilities Approach there is an ethical framework within which the process and 
fruits of reflective practice are scrutinised for sound judgements to be made in the context of 
human flourishing.  
 
 
6.3.1 A way forward 
 
We should be bold to try new things and to begin to evaluate the extent to which they are 
happening in our schools and colleges. Where they are not happening, we must ask why not, 
and establish whether we are teaching each child to be a critical agent in his or her life, 
whether they are able to form their own conception of the good, and whether they are 
becoming engaged in the democratic process which gives dignity to every person. 
 
The approach to reflective practice sought here is one which recognises the need for a shared 
process of understanding. It supports a public forum which shapes language and meaning , as 
the framework within which we seek understanding and which supports our individual 
constructions of the world and the actions that we decide upon as a result. A balance between 
the public and the private is essential therefore for the rich understanding we seek of the past 
and present experience, and to envision the future. It is this balance which prevents us from 
collapsing into the solipsism of the subjective, and which enables us with confidence to reach 
out towards a fuller, and more complete understanding which reaches beyond the self and 
embraces the other as integral to this process. 
 
The Capabilities Approach informs the proposed structure for enquiry and reflection detailed 
in Chapter 7. It acts as the litmus test which grounds the ethical considerations of this process, 
thereby helping teachers and learners in the process of making sense of life in favour of living 
well and flourishing. There is a need to provide support for teachers to reflect with a flexible 
model within an ethical framework and to enable learners to do the same. The model required 
must not be overly rigorous or rigid which can lend itself to the mechanical interpretation such 
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as can be the tendency in education today. What we seek to avoid is a stringent method which 
lends itself to being implemented as a tick-the-box exercise, or a routine and un-reflected 
practice that follows a generic formula and does not focus on the particular context and needs 
of the learners in the specific situation. As teachers and learners develop a deep understanding 
of what they are doing through a flexible model of reflection, this reductionist tendency is 
avoided. In short, as the ethical dimension or importance of the process is embraced, reflective 
practice with a rich understanding of cognition becomes a catalyst for deep learning. This kind 
of reflection could enable students to engage with their subject in both a personal way and in 
a way which develops their commitment towards others. As they do this individually and 
collectively, this kind of reflection helps learners engage with issues of human flourishing and 
become proficient at making sense of life and making decisions in favour of flourishing.  
 
 
6.3.2 A progressive approach which dislodges simplistic notions 
 
This chapter proposes the Capabilities Approach, which some may wish to label progressive, 
which defines and guides reflective practice for individuals and groups, and which informs the 
ethical dimension in respect of what is considered to be of value in education. These are 
critical issues in education as we meet our duty to enable children and young people to make 
sense of the world and to make positive decisions in their lives. What is proposed here as 
shaped by the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach, dislodges elements of both 
constructivist and social constructivist perspectives of progressive education. It dislodges an 
overemphasis on individualism which can sometimes affect constructivist approaches. And it 
challenges tendencies of social constructivism to make meaning hostage to a social framework 
where individual reflection is mostly assimilated as a result of social discourse and restricted as 
overwhelmingly culture bound.  
 
The Capabilities Approach enables us to seek a balance between a subjective and an objective 
attitude to making sense of the world, and similarly, a balance between the individual and the 
collective as essential to any decision-making process. Furthermore, this thesis by embracing 
the Capabilities Approach, questions tight developmental progression as over-simplistic for the 
complexity of human beings processes of understanding and making decisions. Significantly, 
the ethical position understood within the context of what we share as human beings, as 
explored in Chapter 2, underpins the Capabilities Approach in such a way that it provides the 
degree of objectivity we need to understand what is valuable. Nevertheless, this approach also 
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concedes that making sense of life and particular circumstances and issues, is only possible 
from the particular instance and from within the social setting.  
 
 
6.3.3 A flexible model for reflective practice within the Capabilities Approach 
 
Pring, draws on Dewey for support in promoting reflective practice and enquiry, and thereby 
seeks to find a more open and child-centred view of education than provided by a narrow 
focus on subject knowledge acquisition (1976: 47-66). Nevertheless, Pring recognises the need 
for a degree of objectivity in education, both in terms of ethics and epistemology (Pring, 1976). 
Both a child-centred view and a degree of objectivity in education are made possible by 
embracing the Capabilities Approach and implementing it through a flexible model of reflective 
practice. 
 
Tensions arise when offering any model or method, with the risk that it be reduced to a rigid 
format, or that it be implemented as superficial means-end style practice where merely 
completing a prescriptive activity fulfils the criterion for mastery or success . What is sought 
here by offering a model for reflective practice is a rich and multifaceted process which 
enables teachers to nurture children and young people to explore how their learning fits into a 
wider narrative and to embrace their responsibility as participants of a global society. Its 
success cannot be reduced to the delivery or implementation of the model or method. Instead, 
its success depends on developing the cumulative ability of students to question, make sense, 
and develop virtues which enable them to act positively as individual members of one global 
people. This progressive approach in teaching and learning focuses on the child’s needs as 
central while embracing a flexible model as an aid or structure to the process of 
understanding. Any model is created to support teachers and learners. And in this case, a 
flexible model aims to provide support for teachers which is adaptable and which enables as 
well as requires deep understanding. Importantly therefore, a flexible model seeks to avoid 
turning the model itself into either a mechanical system or an un-reflected routine practice, 
which tends towards fixed general formulae to the detriment of the particular needs and 
opportunities of the child or children in question. 
 
The Capabilities Approach, though progressive, is itself shaped by the concept of a shared 
human nature and the need for balance in language between complete scepticism and 
objectivity. Therefore, the progressive flexible model proposed here steers a middle road 
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mindful to avoid two key tendencies or risk areas. First, it avoids the reduction of success 
criteria to the adoption of the model itself or to the implementation of certain activities in 
teaching and learning. Second, it avoids a progressive approach that leads to extreme 
scepticism or relativism in this process of making sense. For this reason, the proposed model 
relies on general benchmarks about what human beings share, such as those offered by 
Nussbaum, as key to the process of making sense for learners and teachers alike. Hence, the 
approach offered here is challenging to practitioners, as it aims to dislodge them from 
simplistic notions of progressivism which could leave them open to the risks identified above. 
Instead this approach calls practitioners to adopt a richer view and practice to help children 
stay on track and realise their capabilities, and to be equipped with the necessary psychosocial 
resources and virtues for pro-social action which they need to succeed. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this thesis I contrast two approaches in education. One which is rigid, formulaic and 
utilitarian based, and the other which is more flexible, adaptable to the individual need and 
context, and which is based upon Aristotle’s philosophy and adopted in the contemporary 
Capabilities Approach. 
 
Therefore, first, this thesis has attempted to reject a mechanistic and formulaic approach to 
teaching and learning with the objective of reaching externally determined targets with rigid 
set criteria and indicators for success. As was made clear earlier in this chapter, the need for 
change from this rigid approach is also supported by significant research in the field of 
education (Alexander et al. 2010; Pring et al., 2009; Pring and Pollard, 2011). This body of 
understanding advocates amendment in important areas fuelled by the performative culture 
in education. Alteration is called for in the curriculum and approaches to teaching and 
learning, in assessment of various areas, in the language used in education at all levels, and 
fundamentally in a return to embracing the ethical dimension in education which enables aims 
and values to be made explicit, and which provides guidance and gives meaning to action and 
evaluation in the field. 
 
Second, and in contrast to the first, this thesis advocates an approach to teaching and learning 
which has as its central objective enabling children and young people to learn to make sense of 
the world and realise their potential. This requires a balance in various areas: (1) a balance 
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between individual and collaborative approaches to understanding; (2) a balance between the 
needs of the particular child or the context of a specific group, and any externally determined 
objectives which do not take account of context or specific need or capability; and (3) a 
balance between some general framework such as that offered by the Capabilities Approach 
which provides a level of objectivity sought, and a flexible method of reflection which enables 
teachers and learners to nurture the individual child and young person to develop their 
capabilities and realise their potential with reference to the capabilities list.  
 
As supported by significant research advocating change, in this thesis I suggest embracing the 
Capabilities Approach in education, whose philosophy offers a flexible rule or model for 
reflection as a significant tool which could enable teachers and learners to thrive. I argue in 
favour of a less precise definition of cognition than the one sought by the present Standards 
Agenda in education. Nevertheless, I defend the significance of a flexible method of reflection 
based on Aristotle’s philosophy and developed within the Capabilities Approach. A richer 
understanding of cognition which includes emotions and desires is part of this approach, in 
contrast to one that restricts cognition to technical reason. In Chapter 8, which focuses on 
evaluation, I attempt to defend the merits of this flexible model of reflection within the 
Capabilities Approach. 
 
Importantly, the Capabilities Approach, based on what we share as human beings, could 
enable us to hold a view of understanding that is to some extent ‘objective’ as it is formed in 
the context of what we share as human beings, and the principle that each human being is 
worthy of dignity and respect. Nevertheless, the Capabilities Approach also requires persons to 
make sense of the world from their own specific situation which is to some extent bound or at 
least constrained by its context and culture. Making sense of life here recognises the 
importance of participation and engagement with others, both as enabling us to appreciate 
the context and culture which binds it, and then to begin to seek beyond it.  
 
Through opportunities in schools and other educational settings, a flexible model of reflection 
which is undertaken by the individual and the group, could enable teachers to help learners 
‘grow’ as they understand their world more fully and seek out solutions in favour of their own 
and societal flourishing. This reflective approach to teaching and learning stands in contrast 
with teaching and learning which is confined to reaching externally determined targets and 
measures, and provides a far richer view of learning which continues throughout life. Thus in 
Chapter 7, I explore ideas in which this flexible method of reflection could be used by teachers 
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and learners towards greater understanding, to nurture interest and curiosity, and to instil the 
craft of making wise judgements for the common good. 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 Further information about the Human Development Report s and the Human Development 
Index (HDI) is available at the following web address: http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/ 
(Last accessed 17/04/11). 
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I will not comment on these programmes here except to mention that cognition, described as 
‘thinking skills’ is considered as the skill of the future. The reasons given for the greater 
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the economy which are being fuelled by new information and communication technologies, 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Reflection as a way of life for growth:  
Learning from traditional tools of reflective practice 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Education is ... a matter of empowering children to think, ... to reason, to argue, to question, 
to respond intelligently to difficulties’ (Pring, 1989: 110). These are wise words which academic 
education reviews as well as employers continue to request of education today (Pring et al., 
2009: 11; Leitch Review (2006), in Pring et al., 2009: 66). In addition, Pring maintains that the 
focus of any educational debate, whether about learning or evaluation ‘must be, but 
frequently isn’t, an understanding (controversial though it is) of what it means to be and to 
grow as a person’ (2004: 5). However, as ascertained in Chapter 5, statistics in respect of 
education, health and well-being highlight issues of concern regarding poor outcomes for 
children and young people. Added to these issues, Chapter 6 suggested that educational 
research highlights ongoing features in the system of schooling which contribute to the burden 
of disaffection in learning for young people. In particular, the reviews examined mentioned the 
standardised system of targets and testing, and the assessment system of accountability as 
issues of concern, which are both prominent owing to the performative culture in education.  
 
The present standardised approach, with clear linear targets and objective measurable 
outcomes akin to algorithms was discussed in Chapter 6. It was found to often overshadow 
teaching and learning which nurtures children to think, to reflect, to argue, to question, and to 
respond intelligently to difficulties. Making explicit the ethical dimension in education was 
argued as crucial to help children make sense of their lives as they plan, monitor, and evaluate 
their learning, and learn to live well in relation with others. As discussed in previous chapters, 
this thesis maintains that the Capabilities Approach provides the ethical basis we require, and 
Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom (phronēsis) and its flexible method of reflection 
cultivates children and young people’s ability to think and act well in order to flourish and 
succeed beyond the narrow definition of success provided by standardised measures.  
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In this chapter I will focus on examples of reflective practice through enquiry, individually and 
collaboratively, which help persons make sense of life, make positive decisions and flourish. 
The examples proposed here in respect of teaching and learning dislodge simplistic notions of 
reflection. The reason for this, as explored in Chapter 6, is that the flexible method of 
reflection should incorporate the flexibility necessary for deepening understanding, which 
yields precision sufficient for the subject of realising potential in respect of eudaimonia. This 
method of reflection, as it draws on the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom (phronēsis) 
and seeks to nurture this capability in teachers and learners, embodies a rich account of 
cognition which includes emotions and desires. In this way it is sensitive to the individual and 
their subjective view. In addition, because this model is considered in the context of the 
Capabilities Approach and our shared humanity it also incorporates the degree of objectivity 
required for a shared understanding in society, which transcends cultures.  
 
Education within the Capabilities Approach contains an ethical dimension which recognises the 
dignity of every human being and the existence of shared human capabilities. It is this ethical 
dimension which shapes our responsibility as teachers to ensure that we take notice, take 
care, act well, and learn from our mistakes, and that we provide opportunities which nurture 
learners to do the same. One important aspect in which this is made possible is through 
reflection. As I argue in this chapter, a method of reflective practice which engages directly 
with this ethical dimension equips us more fully to deliberate on our emotions, needs, and 
motivation within the particular situation in which we find ourselves. In addition, reflection of 
this kind requires participants to understand the wider narrative within which their specific 
circumstances and enquiry fit. Consequently, this approach spurs us on to seek detailed 
knowledge and understanding of the variety of circumstances and contexts and cultures in 
which we strive to do well, and to gain insights from this which guide our actions. This 
particular kind of reflective practice therefore, is crucial for becoming an educated person able 
to flourish. 
 
Ensuring space in schooling for reflective practice of this kind could make a significant 
contribution towards realising what Pring describes as: 
  
The educated person - what we hope ‘to produce’ as a result of our school curriculum – 
[children and young people] endowed with the capacity to reason and to reflect, ...[and] 
the capability of translating this knowledge into practice. The educated person, thus 
172 
 
armed, takes responsibility for his or her own life, not in an arbitrary fashion, not in a 
state of ignorance, but mentally and morally prepared for such a task. (Pring, 1989: 98). 
 
The recent Nuffield Review reminds us that ‘part of the problem we are facing is the failure to 
learn from the past. The problems are not new. And there are solutions to be found in 
previous ... practices which have now been forgotten or rejected, ... taking place, often 
unnoticed, under our very noses’ (Pring et al., 2009: 85). This chapter looks to the past, to the 
Greco-Roman tradition of philosophy as a tool for life and as a way of life, and later to spiritual 
traditions in theology which developed from this earlier thought, namely the 16
th
 century 
Jesuit spiritual tradition of daily reflection. This heritage, as discerned in this chapter, has much 
to offer the flexible method or tool of reflection proposed here, which is invaluable in 
education for the present day and the future. Embracing this legacy from the past, capable of 
enriching the life of both children, learners, and educators today is an opportunity to be 
grasped. Drawing from this heritage of practice and considering reflection within the 
Capabilities Approach, in this chapter, I propose a particular kind of reflective practice as a way 
of life. The kind of reflective practice which I advocate, further extends the ideas provided by 
educational thinkers such as Dewey and Bruner outlined in Chapter 6. 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In Part One, I look to the past for exemplars which could 
be embraced today, first from the Greco-Roman tradition, and second, from the Christian 
spiritual tradition of the 16
th
 century. Third, I offer a process of reflective enquiry which adopts 
the Capabilities Approach. I suggest that reflective practice of this kind nurtures practical 
wisdom in the Aristotelian sense, whose purpose is to enable flourishing. Moreover, the kind 
of reflective practice proposed comprises aspects from the past traditions aforementioned 
which continue to be valid in contemporary life. In Part Two, I will explore the growth 
metaphor in education and propose a way to defend the concept of growth in education, 
understood as a nurturing of practical judgement where growth is realised through the process 
of making mistakes which requires ongoing reflection within the Capabilities Approach. As a 
result, I will attempt to salvage the growth metaphor within the context of the Aristotle- 
inspired Capabilities Approach, which provides an understanding of ‘what it means to be and 
to grow as a person’ (Pring, 2004: 5) which is invaluable when included in the discourse of 
learning and evaluation in education. 
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Part One 
 
 
Reflective enquiry which draws on the Greco-Roman and Jesuit tradition 
 
Educationists today remind us that there is ‘a persistence of technical rationality under the 
banner of reflective teaching’, where some reflective practice models ‘limit the reflective 
process to a consideration of teaching skills and strategies (the means of instruction) and 
exclude from the teacher’s purview ethical and moral realms of teaching’ (Zeichner and Liston, 
1993: 75). In this sense teaching ‘becomes merely a technical activity’ and yet as they argue, 
although the technical aspects of teaching are important ‘they cannot be separated from the 
values that underlie them’ and the ‘inherent ethical quality of all teaching practice’ (ibid.: 75). 
Dunne and Hogan (2004) also recognise the integrity of teaching and learning beyond the 
confines of technical rationality, and Hogan supports practical philosophy in education in an 
effort to reframe ‘teaching as a way of life’ (2004: 18-34). I argue that the Capabilities 
Approach with its roots in the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle underlines the importance 
of practical reason as an essential capability for reflective action. Furthermore, this approach 
provides the ethical framework required for developing reflection as a way of life for teaching 
and learning.  
 
With regards to the learner, viewing the child as customer of technical skills and certificates of 
standardised tests, misses nurturing essential elements of child development which prepares 
them for flourishing. These elements include: sparking curiosity about the world and people 
around them; thinking passionately, creatively and critically about difficult issues with no 
obvious answer; learning to manage risk, being resilient and valuing interdependence; 
appreciating the wonder of nature and paying attention to the past, present and future 
through careful listening; reflecting on the matter at hand, on progress, on possibilities, and on 
one another’s gifts; participating in caring for one another and the world beyond their own 
setting; and developing moral seriousness and commitment and a vision of what is good. As 
Pring and Pollard (2011) identify in their recent research, such aspects should be essential 
elements of education for all. These elements enable people to make sense of life at every age. 
As Hadot explains from the Hellenistic and Roman traditions
1
, these elements are incorporated 
in the practical process of philosophy: ‘learning to live’, ‘learning to dialogue’, and ‘learning 
how to read’ (1995: 81-109). As the vast body of understanding from the past indicates, this is 
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a lifetime’s task of growing to realise potential enabled through reflective practice, individually 
and by engaging with others.  
 
 
7.1 The Greco-Roman tradition of philosophical reflective enquiry as a way of life 
 
The extensive research which Pierre Hadot (1995), a historian of philosophy, offers in his book 
Philosophy as a Way of Life, will be the principal source of evidence in this chapter to identify 
the heritage of Greco-Roman thought and practice, elements of which rightly continue to 
permeate the present day. As described by Hadot and his colleagues, this tradition later 
influenced Christian approaches to reflection which continue to thrive in contemporary 
society. Moreover, Hadot maintains that the Spiritual Exercises developed in the 16
th
 century 
by the founder of the Jesuit order, Ignatius of Loyola, are a ‘Christian version of a Greco-
Roman tradition’ (ibid.: 82). Later in this chapter, I will explore the Jesuit Examen together with 
its ongoing development of reflective practice today. Both the Greco-Roman and the Christian 
traditions aforementioned will inform the kind of flexible reflection proposed in this thesis, 
given the strong thread that runs through them which is still relevant for individuals and 
society. As Hadot’s words indicate, this inherited body of thought and practice with its 
important connected strands, which continues to influence Western thought today, has 
evolved from one generation of tradition to the next while remaining faithful to its ancient 
roots: 
 
The problems, the themes, the symbols from which Western thought has developed 
were ... received ... for the most part in the form that was given to them either by 
Hellenistic thought, or by the adaptation of this thought to the Roman world, or by the 
encounter between Hellenism and Christianity. (Hadot, 1995: 2). 
 
The thread that runs through these traditions holds three functions for development as 
essential for the self and its relations: to desire flourishing, to judge in favour of flourishing, 
and to be motivated in action for flourishing. These three functions for development (desire, 
judgment, motivation to action) evident in Greek thought were also exemplified in later 
Roman and Christian traditions. For example, these elements are present in the processes 
practiced by Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations in the 1
st 
and 2
nd
 century, and later in the 
Benedictine tradition from the 7
th
 century and Ignatian tradition from the 16
th
 century, which 
continue to be practiced today (ibid.: 11). 
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According to Hadot, it is the shared experiences and ideals identified by the philosophical 
schools, such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism, Aristotelianism, which are the legacy of 
ancient philosophy to Western civilisation. Though different, these philosophical schools share 
the belief that it is essential to give meaning to one’s life based on certain shared values such 
as the belief that we are not alone and must live with reference to others, that each person is 
worthy of dignity and respect, and that we should live life by paying close attention to 
situations and taking notice of things as though we are seeing everything both for the first time 
and for the last (ibid.: 34-35).  
 
Philosophy as a way of life, rather than being concerned with the acquisition of purely abstract 
knowledge, developed tools or exercises aimed at ‘realising a transformation of one’s vision of 
the world and a metamorphosis of one’s personality’ (ibid.: 21). Therefore, the philosopher 
needed to be trained not just how to speak and debate, ‘but also to know how to live’ (ibid.: 
21). As a consequence, philosophy was intended ‘not simply to develop the intelligence of the 
discipline, but to transform all aspects of [the person’s] being – intellect, imagination, 
sensibility, and will’ (ibid.: 22). 
 
As mentioned above, reflective practice in the Greco-Roman period as developed by practical 
philosophy is examined by Hadot under helpful headings, including: (1) ‘learning to live’, (2) 
‘learning to dialogue’, and (3) ‘learning how to read’ (ibid.: 82-110). The philosopher Paul 
Grosch (1999), reminds us that this approach to reflective practice developed in the Greco-
Roman period is: 
 
... not about the short-term skill acquisition which allows us to make a conventional 
success of this life, a success measured in terms of product, performance and outcome; 
instead it is about the rich and variegated long-term cultivation of the virtues: the 
careful development of the ... human excellences or qualities of both mind and 
character. (Grosch, 1999: 190).  
 
These ways of learning inform the kind of reflective practice method proposed, including 
practice for learning through enquiry. Therefore, a brief exploration of what these aspects of 
learning in the Greco-Roman period involved is helpful at this point. 
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7.1.1 Learning to live 
 
This aspect of learning is focused on listening and observing attentively. Although all the 
philosophical traditions aforementioned include these to greater or lesser extents, learning to 
live is mapped out by Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (30BCE – 50 CE), with two lists which include 
elements essential for learning to live. The first list includes: research, thorough investigation, 
reading, attention, self-mastery, and indifference to indifferent things. The second also 
includes: remembrance of good things, and accomplishment of duties. In addition to Philo’s 
contribution, Hadot draws from Seneca and Plutarch, explaining their reflective enquiring 
approach: 
 
First thing in the morning, we should go over in advance what we have to do during the 
course of the day, and decide on the principles which will guide and inspire our actions. 
In the evening, we should examine ourselves again, so as to be aware of the faults we 
have committed or the progress we have made. (Hadot, 1995: 85). 
 
The importance of seeing the broader picture, that is, the wider perspective in any reflection 
or enquiry, is developed when particular attention is given to the process of living guided by 
principles about what we share as human beings. This ongoing search for the meta-narrative 
engenders a sense of connectedness. Hence the ability to see how the individual instance fits 
into a wider context can ameliorate the prevalent tendency towards individualism and 
solipsism. This is the case as this aspect of reflection calls the individual to think by themselves 
and with others about their specific situation and to consider the particular with reference to a 
conception of what constitutes flourishing. And it is in this wider context that particular 
understanding is gained about the good individual or society, as guided by a general 
framework such as that offered by the Capabilities Approach.  
 
Learning to live also enables individuals and groups to develop an ability for gratitude, 
nurtured by looking at situations with such care as if it were the last time. As Horace writes: 
‘Believe that each day that has dawned will be your last; then you will receive each unexpected 
hour with gratitude’ (quoted in Hadot, 1995: 96). In today’s language we understand this 
ability for gratitude as one that extends to showing gratitude to others and which contributes 
to our ability to flourish as individuals and as a society. This linkage between gratitude and 
well-being is one which psychology research supports, which is also related to our ability for 
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developing social connections and engaging and doing things for others (Lyubomirsky, 2007: 
123-151). 
 
Paying attention to the particular and the particular instance by really taking notice, also has 
the capacity to foster understanding about our connectedness to other human beings and to 
the world at large. Recognising how we are connected to others and to the world around us is 
a profound ability which enables individuals to question contemporary society’s fascination 
with autonomy to the exclusion of trust, co-operation and care (what Nussbaum describes as 
the capability of affiliation, 2000: 78-80, 2001: 417). Practising gratitude and developing a 
sense of connectedness with others contributes to the sense of well-being which Aristotle 
describes as eudaimonia, which we call happiness or fulfilment. Fulfilment in this sense, as 
reflected within the context of others and the wider narrative, prevents focusing only on the 
individual feeling good, and encourages us to reach out and connect with others as essential 
for flourishing. Some psychologists reiterate this today when they suggest that happiness is 
likely to be a bi-product of purpose, community, solidarity and justice (Nettle, 2005: 176-8; 
Lyubormirsky, 2007: 38-52). 
 
Taking notice of nature is another theme in this aspect of learning, which promotes the sense 
of awe and wonder which enables individuals to view themselves within the global context. 
Philo writes poetically about this sense of awe and wonder and of connectedness: 
 
... those who practice wisdom ... are excellent contemplators of nature and everything 
she contains. They examine the earth, the sea, the sky, the heavens, and all their 
inhabitants; they are joined in thought to the sun, the moon, and all the other stars ... 
and so ... it goes without saying that such [persons], make of their whole lives a festival. 
(quoted in Hadot, 1995: 98). 
 
Strong echoes of this approach of learning to live are evident in the 16
th
 century reflective 
practice model of the Jesuit Examen, upon which I will draw for the method of reflective 
practice through enquiry proposed in this chapter. Moreover, the capabilities list explored in 
Chapter 5 and 6, will provide the framework of ‘principles’ to which Seneca and Plutarch allude 
for this process, which are considered necessary to ‘guide and inspire our actions’ (quoted in 
Hadot, 1995: 85).  
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7.1.2 Learning to dialogue 
 
This aspect of learning concerns the famous philosophical method of Socratic dialogue which is 
a dual model involving discourse with oneself and discourse with others. This mode of 
reflective practice is described as a spiritual exercise practiced in common (ibid.: 90). What is 
significant about learning to dialogue is that it develops an ability for ‘authentic presence of 
the self to itself and of the self to others. As Hadot explains: 
 
... the Socratic and Platonic dialogues exhibit this authentic presence in the way that 
they show that what is most important is not the solution to the particular problem, but 
the path traversed together in arriving at this solution (1995: 20).  
 
It is this essential dimension which forces the dialogue to be a concrete and practical exercise. 
Plato’s writing therefore develops a model for learning to dialogue where: 
 
... with a great deal of effort, one rubs names, definitions, vision and sensations against 
one another; ... one spends a long time in the company of these questions; ... [one] lives 
with them. (quoted in Hadot, 1995: 92). 
 
And in the Republic (450b), Plato explains that this is a lifetime’s task: ‘for reasonable people, 
the measure of listening to such discussion is the whole of life’ (quoted in Hadot, 1995: 92). 
 
It is worth noting that echoes of this kind of dialogic talk to deepen understanding continues to 
influence educationists today, who promote the value of authentic dialogue in teaching and 
learning (Lipman, 1970; Mercer, 1998, 2008). 
 
 
7.1.3 Learning how to read 
 
This aspect of learning is about developing the art of reading, rather than ‘merely barking at 
print’ (Grosch, 1999: 193). As discussed in Chapter 5, this is a particular concern of the result of 
the literacy strategy in recent years, which although it has raised levels in reading ability, it has 
done so to the neglect of the love of reading, which is so important for learning how to read. In 
addition this aspect is about critical questioning of the apparent wisdom of the written and 
uttered word. For example, in contemporary society this is of particular importance to a 
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considered understanding of what is available on the internet or what is transmitted on 
television, radio, or voiced on twitter or blogs generally. 
 
In addition, this kind of learning is crucial in education, and supports the value of literature, in 
contrast to the present view of English as a school subject which maintains its importance 
primarily with regard to developing communication skills and effective use of language. 
Instead, learning how to read literature is vital as Smith makes clear, in that it ‘foregrounds 
attentiveness, engagement with text, scepticism toward received wisdom, and a tolerant yet 
still critical openness toward others’ readings’ (2003: 392). Significantly, learning how to read 
literature: 
 
 ... moves us away from “thin” moral ideas, such as those of praise and blame, to 
“thicker” moral notions. It teaches us to think in these richer and more particular ways, 
and so to see gradations and subtleties in the moral behaviour and characters of those 
around us. (Smith, 2003: 392). 
 
To sum up, the important balance maintained in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition 
described here is one between insight and understanding acquired as a result of reflective 
practice towards self-knowledge by the self, and by his or her interaction with others and the 
world beyond. It is worth noting that here we have a balance between what educationists 
espouse as a constructivist and social constructivist model of understanding, discussed earlier 
in Chapter 5 and 6. Today there can be a tendency or bias for collaborative learning which does 
not allow sufficient time or space for the individual making meaning or understanding. As this 
Greco-Roman tradition makes clear, this would be a great loss for our understanding of human 
development and its effect on teaching and learning in education, and the contemporary kind 
of reflective practice offered in this chapter ensures the balance required which the Greco-
Roman tradition exemplifies. 
 
Of great significance, as the voices of the past with their cumulative wisdom advice, reflective 
practice enables individuals to gain a deeper, more authentic and therefore more precise 
vision of the world, and of their place for agency within it. It insists on paying close attention to 
the particular, on looking deeply, on being aware of the wider narrative, and on the need for 
personal thought combined with dialogue with others. Such reflection therefore, is capable of 
ameliorating human fears and worries, as individuals and communities know themselves 
better and begin to understand their particular context and position within the wider world. 
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This long precedent of reflective practice which has helped many, continues to be pertinent for 
us today. When embraced in teaching and learning, even within specific subjects, it is an 
invaluable contribution to education as it enables persons to embed a deep kind of reflective 
practice in their personal and societal journey towards realising potential. A word of warning: 
this reflective process cannot be understood within the present linear approach to teaching, 
learning, and assessment. It is more subtle, and non-linear than this and is therefore better 
understood within the Aristotelian philosophy proposed in this thesis, which stands in contrast 
to the performative culture in education today. This point is discussed further in Chapter 8, in 
respect of evaluation in education.  
 
As Hadot (1995) identifies, what is persuasive about these four aspects of learning in 
philosophical practices of antiquity is their transformative nature. That is, they enable the 
development of affiliation and practical reason (also referred to as practical wisdom or 
phronēsis), which both Aristotle from this Greek tradition and today the contemporary 
Capabilities Approach recognise as essential elements for flourishing and realising potential. 
Hadot reminds us that: 
 
... there are some truths whose meaning will never be exhausted by generations of man. 
It is not that they are difficult; on the contrary, they are often extremely simple. Often, 
they even appear to be banal. Yet for their meaning to be understood, these truths must 
be lived, and constantly re-experienced. Each generation must take up, from scratch, the 
task of learning to read and to re-read these “old truths”. (Hadot, 1995:108). 
 
 
7.2 Reflective practice in the Christian spiritual and theological tradition 
 
As Hadot’s evidence suggests, philosophy appears ‘in its original aspect: not as a theoretical 
construct, but as a method for training people to live and to look at the world in a new way’ 
(1995: 107). His thesis claims that ‘Christian spirituality has been the heir of ancient philosophy 
and its spiritual practices’ (ibid.: 127). There are strong echoes of the Greco-Roman approach 
evident in the spirituality of the desert fathers in the Egyptian desert in the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 century, 
in particular St. Anthony (ibid.: 131-136), and later in the 5
th
 century, St. Cassian who wrote 
about the lives of the desert fathers (Funk, 1998). Later still, in the 4
th
 and 7
th
 century, the 
spiritual and theological thinkers who proceeded them such as St Augustine of Hippo and the 
Benedictine tradition universalised by Pope St. Gregory the Great, respectively, also continue 
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this heritage of thought and practice. More recently, in the 16
th
 century and beyond, this 
thread remains present in the reflective practice model of the Jesuit tradition of the Spiritual 
Exercises, in particular the Examen. However, it is worth remembering that monasticism in 
Egypt and Syria was born and developed in a Christian milieu, rather than as a direct result of 
intervention of any philosophical model. Nevertheless, under Alexandrian influence certain 
philosophical spiritual techniques were introduced into Christian spirituality which permeated 
through Christian thought and practice. According to Hadot ,this had important consequences 
which are evident to this day: 
 
The results of this was that the Christian ideal was described, and, in part, practiced, by 
borrowing models and vocabulary from the Greek philosophical tradition. Thanks to its 
literary and philosophical qualities, this tendency became dominant, and it was through 
its agency that the heritage of ancient spiritual exercises was transmitted to Christian 
spirituality: first to that of the Middle Ages, and subsequently to that of modern times. 
(1995: 140). 
 
 
7.2.1 The Examen and its applications for reflective practice in education today 
 
Jesuit scholars acknowledge that the Examen, or examination of consciousness, is an ancient 
practice in the Church, and that versions of this practice were used by philosophers of ancient 
Greece (Hamm, 1994: 106). The Examen was promoted by St. Ignatius in the 16
th
 century as 
one of the exercises in his manual, The Spiritual Exercises. Jesuit writers have grappled with the 
importance of this practice and today continue to explain it in ways that foster and encourage 
its practice by many (Aschenbrenner, 1972; St Louis, 1991; Hamm, 1994; Gallagher,2006), 
whether religious or secular (Martin, 2010). This approach to reflection is considered essential 
as ‘a daily exercise of discernment in a person’s life’ (Aschenbrenner, 1972: 14).  
 
The Examen, is composed of five flexible steps. Recommended as the first step in this process 
is identified by some writers as ‘reflective thanksgiving’ (Aschenbrenner, 1972: 17). This is 
understood as a sense of gratitude, as ‘the stepping-stone to love’ which seeks ‘to express 
itself in deeds’ (Louis, 1991: 161). The second step in the process is then about seeking self-
understanding, or enlightenment about desires, feelings and motivations, as well as omissions 
of the same (Martin, 2010:90). The third step in the process is the ‘review of the day’. The 
purpose here is to recall everything, taking notice of what made one happy, stressed, 
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confused, kind, loving, and so on. This process involves ‘everything: sights, sounds, feelings, 
tastes, textures, conversations, thoughts, words and deeds, as Ignatius says’ (2010: 91). The 
fourth step is about focusing on one of the elements noticed, which surfaces most readily for 
which one is regretful, or which with hindsight could have been handled differently, or which 
requires improvement or change. The fifth and final step is looking outwards to the future with 
hope. Hence, the concluding step of the Examen, ‘is focused towards the future and its 
choices, decisions, postures and attitudes’ and how one looks ‘to the future’, ‘in light of this 
process of reflection’ (Louis, 1991: 162).  
 
Some have described this method of reflection as designed to enable us ‘to find more readily 
what we desire’ (Gallaher, 2006: 113). This is also the reason why others acknowledge this 
method as an examination of ‘consciousness’ (Hamm, 1994: 106). This process ‘puts a special 
emphasis on feelings’ (ibid.: 106) on ‘paying attention to felt experience’ (ibid.: 110), ‘since 
feelings are the liveliest index to what is happening in our lives’ (ibid.: 107), and reminds us 
that ‘an unattended emotion can dominate and manipulate us’ (ibid.: 109). Therefore, such 
reflective practice is said to enable individuals to develop ‘the contemplative capacity’ 
(Gallagher, 2006: 118), to take notice or pay particular attention to the detail of our lives, our 
relationships, and actions. It is also clear that for Ignatius, ‘the practice of reflecting on one’s 
experience of service’ is also critical (St Louis, 1991: 154), since this is ‘a vitally illuminating and 
dynamic experience of reflection that both celebrates and enhances one’s awareness of and 
response to’ others (ibid.: 154). This exercise ‘includes a reflective awareness of the events, 
circumstances, relationships and experiences that have shaped one’s history and [which lead] 
to this present moment of self-awareness’ (ibid.: 156).  
 
This kind of reflection, although about nurturing self awareness, is not ‘an empty self-
reflection or an unhealthy self-centred introspection’ (Aschenbrenner, 1972: 15) of the kind 
prevalent in the tendency towards individualism in society today. Instead, it is a ‘gradually 
growing appreciative insight into the mystery which I am’ (ibid.: 17). This is made possible as 
an ongoing reflection of the self within the context of others and the world around them. It is 
about developing authenticity which requires a deep awareness of self-in-context, rather than 
being ‘superficial and insensitive to the subtle and profound ways of ... our hearts’ (ibid.: 15). 
Therefore the specific exercise of Examen is ‘ultimately aimed at developing a heart with a 
discerning vision to be active continually’ (ibid.: 16). 
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In this kind of reflective practice, knowledge is never considered as ‘end in itself, but is always 
a means to moving to deepening freedom’ (St Louis, 1991: 157). One seeks ‘to know and 
understand precisely in order to choose more freely’ (ibid.: 157). The purpose of reflection 
here is the ‘search for that understanding which leads to purification of choice’ (ibid.: 158). 
This search for understanding puts feelings and desires at the centre of the reflective process. 
Interestingly, there are echoes in this view of the fuller understanding of cognition which this 
thesis seeks, which as explored in Chapter 6, incorporates desires and emotions as integral to 
cognition. In this fuller sense, knowledge is made possible and evolves as deliberated desire, 
which enables us to make judgements for action towards flourishing. This method of reflection 
is one that is in sympathy with the Aristotelian understanding of practical reason which this 
thesis seeks to enable young people to develop through reflective practice. This Christian 
method with its Greco-Roman heritage could be adapted and used in education. Given the 
Examen’s sympathetic exposition and its clear guidance in respect of its well defined steps or 
method, I will draw inspiration from this reflective model for education today. 
 
It is worth noting that the Ignatian Examen is a religious practice which is undertaken in the 
context of the individuals’ relationship with Jesus. Hence the key question: ‘How has one’s life 
progressed in that characteristically Ignatian movement from knowledge to love to service (Ex 
104)?’ (St Louis, 1991: 159), is all understood as part of a process of deepening relation with 
God. Notwithstanding, this model for reflection lends itself to be adapted for non Christians, 
and is a helpful process which considers the individual within the context of others and wider 
world. Given Ignatius’s implicit definition of the authentic human person as ‘one who is free 
precisely in order to respond in mutuality of love’ (ibid.: 160), it is possible to deduce that this 
striving for authenticity to self and others applies to Christians and non-Christians alike. It is 
this sense of mutuality which is crucial for human relations, in particular our sense of affiliation 
identified by Nussbaum earlier in this thesis. 
 
To summarise, these five steps compose the following process: (1) express gratitude, (2) seek 
understanding, (3) review the day or situation, (4) focus on an omission, a regret, or need for 
change, and (5) plan for the future informed by this reflection. This process is intended to be 
very flexible and Jesuits today engage with each step in flexible order, according to the 
requirements of each reflection. For example, it is sometimes helpful to begin with step 3 - a 
review of the day or situation, and then identify gratitude about a particular aspect or praise 
what went really well - step 1. From there, one can progress to step 2 - to understand the 
situation better, and to step 4 - focusing on a particular element of regret, or which was 
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omitted or forgotten for some reason, or which can be improved or changed. Finally, step 5 - 
planning for the future, can be undertaken. This cycle can be carried out for each particular 
issue or topic under consideration. Significantly, Jesuits today have also adapted this reflective 
practice as a communal process, which highlights this kind of discernment’s collective benefit 
and applicability to communities (Shano, 2009: 250-60). 
 
This method of reflection is particularly helpful when considering life situations and making 
choices about different issues: whether a particular aspect of life, a specific difficult situation 
within the context of other human beings, a sensitive consideration of possible intended or 
unintended ramifications of an issue, etc. It is easy to see how this method might be used in 
the classroom situation for both individual reflection and group reflection, for learners and 
teachers alike. Another Jesuit writer, Joseph Tetlow, puts the Examen into the contemporary 
context describing the process of ‘discernment in a nutshell’, in a way that makes its benefits 
explicit for living well.  
 
Human beings are moved by a dense complex of motives, both in the things we do from 
day to day and in our big decisions. What drives a young woman to become a doctor or 
a young man to be an engineer? Many things contribute: success, altruism, interest. Or 
what drives a woman who has smoked for years to quit or an obese man to get thin? 
Again, many things contribute: fear of death, desire for health, concern of family. But 
they all interact in a kind of movement that eventually drives the person to act … 
Ignatius learned to think about those dense complexes of motives - images, ideas, 
attractions, revulsions . (Tetlow, 2008)
2
. 
 
Reflective practice such as this could contribute to the journey of becoming an educated 
person within society, and therefore may be significant for the vision of education for all 
described by researchers like Pring and Pollard (2011), as outlined in Chapter 5.  
 
 
7.3 A method of reflective enquiry within the Capabilities Approach  
 
Reflection through enquiry within the Capabilities Approach calls educators to make time to 
enable students to identify their desires, emotions and critical thinking abilities. Engaging in a 
flexible method of reflection, students examine their desires, emotions and thoughts (that is, 
how they feel about something, what they believe to be the case and how they think about 
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these and make sense of them in a critical manner). Significantly, they do this within a 
normative framework of shared capabilities which transcend cultures by virtue of the humanity 
which all individuals share (based on the capabilities list identified in Chapter 5). The reflective 
enquiry model proposed adopts aspects of the cognitive and participatory approaches 
important for Dewey and Bruner, while including space for desires and emotions within 
cognition, and engaging in ethical assessments integral to the process of enquiry which focuses 
on realising potential with reference to the framework provided within the Capabilities 
Approach as a general guide.  
 
Based on Aristotle’s philosophy, this flexible method seeks as part of its process, for enquirers 
to cultivate emotionally appropriate responses to a situation as applied within any enquiry. This 
is the case as implementing the enquiry process seeks to nurture practical reason or wisdom, 
which in the Aristotelian sense involves thinking about what to do when one has already 
grasped the emotional context of the situation. Hence students take notice of how they feel 
and what they believe as part of an enquiry, not just focus on the critical thinking, or purely 
rational cognitive aspect of a reflective enquiry process.  
 
When students and teachers take note of this account of enquiry, which includes reflection as 
an integral part, they may be better prepared to make informed judgements which shape their 
life towards positive action. In addition, the enquiry model proposed here also entails attention 
to others’ thoughts, feelings, imaginations, discoveries, which contribute to the body of 
inherited ideas and beliefs which help us work through and make sense of the specific situation 
or issue. In addition to this inherited body of insight and understanding, we can make sense of 
the present and plan for the future as we discuss and dialogue about issues with others. The 
heritage from the Greco-Roman tradition becomes evident here with the importance given to: 
paying attention, dialogue with ourselves and others, reading beyond the superficial, and 
seeing the particular issues within the bigger picture. Moreover, it is this process, guided by the 
framework within the Capabilities Approach, which enables us to engage adequately with the 
ethical dimension and which provides the necessary catalyst for positive action and 
commitment to others. 
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7.3.1 A method of reflective enquiry which promotes ethical questioning 
 
The reflective enquiry method offered here, entails that any enquiry process include the 
following though not necessarily in a linear or ordered form:  
• Takes notice and is attentive to both personal and others’ desires, emotions, and cognition, 
to inform the enquiry with greatest sensitivity; 
• Enables students to be explicitly aware of the influence of desires, emotions, and cognition 
on their learning and on their actions and commitment to others;  
• Encourages students to develop a sense of affiliation, nurturing deliberated trust and pro-
social attitudes; 
• To question their views, progress and conclusions, individually and as a group, within the 
ethical framework provided by the Capabilities Approach, in particular the dignity of every 
person, to understand the broader narrative for this enquiry; 
• To be critical, to seek insight beyond the superficial, or the obvious, and to understand 
complexity in relation to making sense. 
 
As Pring argues: ‘knowledge and know-how are not essentially commodities; rather they are 
individual attainments of socially developed modes of thinking and operating’. Therefore, 
‘their acquisition lies in the introduction to a form of social life and their legitimacy lies in their 
capacity to withstand social criticism’. Consequently a curriculum that is geared to the 
development of a person should foster general qualities such as ‘openness of mind, a concern 
for the truth, a collaborative spirit, and a sense of humility before the achievement of 
mankind, whether they be artistic, literary, technological, ... or religious’ (Pring, 1976: 21-22). 
As explored in the Examen earlier, seeking this deeper and more complex form of knowledge 
which involves our understanding of ourselves and others, and which is enabled through 
affiliation, is what is sought here. The enquiry process as described above, embraces this 
deeper understanding of making sense. 
 
The process of enquiry which can be implemented within and beyond the school timetable, 
though not a fixed rigid model, does require regularity within learning. What is crucial is 
ensuring learners have time within school, whether in subject lessons, or through cross 
curricular work, or both: to ask questions and be attentive to the issues involved, including 
their feelings in respect of these; to discourse with others about the relevant issues and gain a 
deep understanding of the situation under question; to see the bigger picture within which this 
question is relevant; and to begin to be guided by the ethical framework offered within the 
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Capabilities Approach as they develop a sense of commitment to social action for individual 
and societal flourishing.  
 
In respect of practical teaching structures or models which are popular, there has been an 
overemphasis on developing cognition using logical reasoning while the role of emotions have 
been downplayed or not given priority, time wise. Johnson and Siegel (2010) offer a thorough 
exploration of the issues involved in teaching thinking as a skill with its emphasis on rational 
cognition to the exclusion of emotions, in the format popular in education today, and provide a 
thorough critique. The process of enquiry provides a perfect environment in which to explore 
the ethical dimension and application of what is being learnt. It does this through personal 
reflection and group reflection involving collaborative discourse. This process where reflection 
is integral, adds the missing element necessary for cognition which this thesis seeks, which is 
often absent in cognition towards ‘thinking skills’. This thesis maintains that this process of 
enquiry is an essential aspect of education, capable of nurturing insight and action towards 
flourishing. Therefore, implementing the process of enquiry to examine and reflect on ethical 
questions begins to address the need in educational practice to nurture human flourishing and 
active commitment in society today.  
 
There are several ways in which this might be undertaken. An extended enquiry can be directly 
focused on ethical issues of human flourishing, such as one focused on what humans need to 
flourish. Another approach would be to use enquiry as a framework for specific subject 
lessons, where time is set aside at different points in any lesson to ask, discuss, and respond to 
emotions and thoughts about ethical questions, in addition to developing cognitive reasoning 
or critical thinking as a ‘thinking skill’. For example, students engage in a cycle of reflective 
practice whereby they first reflect on an enquiry question, individually or with others, and give 
time to discover the implications of this question. Secondly, they go deeper into their enquiry 
paying attention to themselves, others, the world at large, and interpreting their perceptions 
within the ethical framework provided in the Capabilities Approach. Thirdly, having established 
the implications of their findings, students are able to consider a personal or societal response 
to the issue under enquiry. This process involves a cycle of questioning and reflection which 
can follow the pattern, ‘what’, ‘then what’, ‘so what’, where reflection upon the implications 
of their findings demand some commitment from the enquirer as to what influence the 
findings have on him or her.  
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Over time and as students become more proficient in this process of learning as a way of life, it 
is possible to conclude that the heritage of the Greco-Roman process of reflective practice will 
enable students to make sense of life at a deeper level than often possible, to understand 
issues beyond the superficial level, to critique popular thought, and to develop a personal 
commitment based on the ethical perspective fostered by the Capabilities Approach. They will 
inevitably be better able to pay close attention to the particular issue; to be fearless and 
critical in looking deeply and including their understanding and insight in the process of making 
sense of issues and situations; to look into themselves and reach out to others with awareness 
of the wider narrative; and, to be guided through the Capabilities Approach to a personal 
commitment to their own flourishing and that of others. This process is similar to what Hogan 
describes as the ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of evaluation as learning from the teachers’ 
perspective (2004: 30), which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
 
 
7.3.2 Reflective practice and evaluation 
 
The benefits of the process of reflective practice which this chapter has discussed are not 
easily measured in the standardised sense. The difficulties of a single measure will be 
discussed in Chapter 8, where the importance of evaluation within the Capabilities Approach 
will be the focus. At this point it is worth noting that there is a sense in which education will 
always fall short of its quest for effectiveness in this process of reflection and enquiry towards 
insight and positive action, since learning as a way of life, as proposed in this chapter, is a 
lifetime’s task for which school years can only hope to provide the starting point. What is key is 
the persistent attempt of teachers and students when learning and evaluating or both, that 
they do justice to those with whom they engage, the texts they read, the histories and 
narratives to which they listen, the experiments they undertake, etc. As Smith suggests:  
 
This is not just any kind of alertness, but a matter of close reading rather than skimming, 
of carefully attending - listening - to those with whom we engage, whether they are 
people or texts. (2009: 437). 
 
Elsewhere, Smith (2012) writes of the need to accept that in one sense ‘education is always 
bound to fail’, and critiques the way ‘we expect education to produce the goods, and the 
wrong kind of goods at that’ (ibid.: 10). Regarding teaching and learning, as well as in matters 
of evaluating progress and quality, Smith (2012) warns against unreasonable expectations 
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which are only achievable by reducing education to a mechanistic endeavour judged in respect 
of its utility. In his words:  
 
Education is bound to fall short, because it is the nature of education that it is always-to-
come. That is why our stance towards it can only and rightly be one of faith. (2012: 10).  
 
Smith supports the importance of learning as a way of life and the belief that ‘perhaps learning 
is not always a matter of building and progressing: sometimes it involves remembering, 
forgetting, going backwards, going over the same ground again and again’ (2012: 6). This kind 
of learning, which is also applicable to the understanding of evaluation which is proposed in 
Chapter 8, ‘casts meaningful learning [or evaluation] as more like a conversion, a reorientation 
... than the steady accumulation of knowledge’ (ibid.: 6). 
 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8, the kind of flexible method for reflective practice 
offered in this chapter, which requires critical interpretative understanding, is intertwined with 
evaluation. The flexible method proposed in this chapter in respect of learning as a way of life, 
which requires learning to live, to read, and to dialogue, as part of the development of the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, is equally necessary in the process of evaluation 
in education (whether by the learner, teacher, or researcher). Here, the interplay between 
learning and evaluation is evident, as is the notion that one is not possible without the other, 
since the very process of learning requires ongoing evaluation as a critical part, and every 
instance of evaluation is to some extent a learning process which requires reflective practice.  
 
For example, an evaluator who has a heightened awareness and ability for reading the 
situation correctly and discussing this with others with sensitivity and critically will understand 
the subtleties of a text or an event , and will understand its meaning without seeking certainty. 
They will arrive at their evaluated conclusion through careful reflection and with reference to a 
shared humanity. Significantly, this activity is in itself a learning process.  
 
In Chapter 8, I discuss the importance of including this method of reflection in the evaluative 
process, together with the inseparability of the concepts of learning and evaluation. 
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Part Two 
 
 
The growth metaphor in education reviewed within the Capabilities Approach 
 
In general, the significance of metaphors is in their ability to help us understand the world, in 
particular abstractions and complex phenomena. Halstead suggests that ‘we make use of our 
imagination to explore complex ideas and develop our understanding in terms of more readily 
understood social and physical experiences, and conceptual systems are built up on these 
metaphorical foundations’ (2003: 83). Metaphor thus becomes a ‘conceptual and experiential 
process that structures our world’ (ibid.: 83). Although the imagination is crucial, since ‘human 
thought (unlike artificial intelligence) is essentially imaginative’, the imagination does not 
operate as ‘a kind of cognitive wild card’ (ibid.: 84). Rather, it operates in a ‘regular, systematic 
fashion which is open to investigation and analysis’ (ibid.: 84), given that it is ‘grounded in 
human embodied experience’ which ‘acts as a constraint on the imagination’ and challenges 
claims about the ‘arbitrariness of meaning and radical relativism of our concepts’ (ibid.: 86). In 
particular, the growth metaphor with regards to education, understood in the manner so 
described, is the focus of this part of the chapter, where growth as a metaphor in education is 
defended as significant.  
 
Concerns fuelled by the Factory metaphor in education aligned to the Standards Agenda and 
an outcome based curriculum focused on utility, was challenged in Chapter 5. A different 
metaphor popular in education especially associated with progressives, warrants exploration 
in this chapter, as it is closely associated with notions of realising potential and what this 
entails. The metaphor of growth is the focus of this part of Chapter 7, towards a reviewed 
understanding of growth within the Capabilities Approach which includes an ethical dimension 
within it that stands in contrast to education defined in terms of utility.  
 
In this part of the chapter I will engage with several issues in turn: (1) the problems with the 
notion of growth aligned to realising potential of the whole person where success entails 
completeness; (2) issues concerning the child-centred approach of progressive thinkers who 
promoted the concept of growth in education; (3) a revision of the growth metaphor which 
salvages aspects of the idea of growth as significant to our understanding of education, when 
focused on developing the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation which enable wise 
judgements to be made throughout life.  
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7.4 A critique of the concept of growth defined in terms of completeness  
 
In the article, Postmodernism and the Education of the Whole Person, Paul Standish critiques 
the idea of growth when understood as a concept confined to the school years. This definition 
resulted from connecting the concept of educating the whole person with the concept of 
reaching full height growth in humans. This view of educating the whole person implies a 
sense of completeness in our understanding of growth which is at odds with the idea of 
growth as continuous throughout a lifetime. 
 
Standish distinguishes us from our ancestors, in that ‘we find ourselves in a world where 
disparate and competing demands are placed on us’. As a result, he argues that for some 
people ‘success in specialised roles restricts a more rounded development’. He points to 
education which in his opinion ‘has encouraged precisely this’ (1995: 121). This culture of 
utility has been discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 as a barrier to educational development in 
respect of flourishing and educational success. The culture of performativity has caused an 
imbalance between those who succeed, where success is understood using narrow measures 
such as standardised tests, and those who fail , even though perhaps capable of success in 
other aspects if measured in other ways.  
 
Standish describes the ‘unhealthiness of this fragmentation’ or imbalance where some are 
‘well fed on the proteins of the grammar school curriculum but deficient in the vitamins of 
personal and social education’. He explains that ‘there is a need for a balanced diet and whole 
food’. Standish claims that it is against this background that ‘the education of the whole 
person is understandably emphasised’, especially by those ‘concerned to resist 
instrumentalism in the aims of education’ (1995: 122).  
 
Standish maintains that the idea of ‘wholeness or completeness’ can be problematic (ibid.: 
122). For example, this is the case where completeness ‘takes the form of an integrity realised 
where we are rational self-legislators, the autonomous architects of our own lives’ (ibid.: 122). 
Similarly there are concerns with notions of completeness where ‘completeness is to be 
achieved through the acquisition of a package of skills or competences’ so popular of 
‘curriculum planners’ (ibid.: 122). Another sense of completeness which is concerning ‘involves 
the unfolding of an essential self’ through ‘discovery’ or sometimes ‘through something like 
the natural growth of a plant’ (ibid.: 122). Finally Standish identifies a concern with 
completeness viewed as ‘achieved through self-exploration’, where ‘through counselling we 
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can achieve the wholeness of self-fulfilment, a realisation of our human potential’ (ibid.: 122). 
In these ways, the concern for wholeness relates to a more pervasive concern with 
completeness. 
 
This idea of growth into wholeness which includes completeness, is exemplified by the 
emphasis on learning as ‘modular’ (ibid.: 122 ), and by ‘modes of assessments which are 
exhaustive’ (ibid.: 123). The concern with educating the ‘whole person functions as an 
overarching rationale for the organisation of the education system and for curriculum 
decisions’, functioning as a ‘formal structuring principle’ (ibid.: 124). Hence a young person is 
said to be educated in this sense once they have learnt a set of clearly defined learning 
objectives within a specified curriculum, only judged through certain identified subjects, and 
have achieved a certain standard in their GCSE, or GCEs, or have completed the prescribed 
number of modules in respect of these, which in both cases have been assessed using 
numerical standardised measures. 
 
This requirement for completeness in the need to educate the whole person and which defines 
realising potential, shapes our understanding of growth in education. However, completeness 
diminishes the understanding of growth in the Aristotelian sense sought in this thesis. Within 
the concept of growth is included the orientation towards flourishing, which is a lifetime’s task. 
It acknowledges that human beings live with imperfection and continually struggle to make 
wise judgements in favour of living well and doing well, and to consider their decisions in the 
context of others and the good of society as a whole. This conception of growth requires the 
kind of learning as a way of life described in Part One of this chapter, including the need to 
learn to read, to dialogue and to live within a framework that recognises the dignity of every 
human person. This involves critical yet sensitive interpretative understanding such as the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation enable. 
 
However, growth which includes completeness does not take account sufficiently of the 
importance of the human condition to live with imperfection, to use practical reason, and to 
be interconnected with others and otherness. It does not nurture affiliation or practical reason 
which this thesis considers essential for making wise judgments in favour of flourishing and 
realising potential. In respect of affiliation for example, Standish uses Othello’s torment as ‘an 
emblem of his inability to live with the imperfection of the human condition’ (ibid.: 130). 
Furthermore, Othello’s inability to develop the capability of affiliation lies in the following 
dilemma: ‘Either I am complete as I am or I am not. If I am not complete, I do not live up to my 
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understanding of what it is to be a successful human being. If I am complete and successful, 
then I cannot leave myself open to otherness, to change, even though I know this to be 
necessary to being (human) in the world’ (ibid.: 130). For Standish, Othello’s ‘is to be an 
achieved and complete identity’ (ibid.: 130) which prevents him from connecting with others, 
giving of himself, and truly growing as a person. Regarding practical reason, I use an example in 
Chapter 8, from Jane Austen’s novels, where Austen demands of her characters that they pay 
particular attention and do justice to the subjects they are assessing, which is not a 
characteristic which can be completed in school alone or easily measured through 
standardised tests. 
 
This idea of physical growth of the body at full height is at odds with the understanding we 
need from a concept of growth in respect of the development of the person as educated. As 
Standish argues with regards to the development of a person, and in this sense with regards to 
education, ‘there is no end’ (ibid.: 133). In other words, we must ‘think of coming to this 
understanding as part of becoming educated’ (ibid.: 133). Standish accuses modernism 
because it ‘assumes the possibility of ... completeness’ (ibid.: 133) and argues as follows: 
 
In various ways educational theory and practice is inclined towards a belief in a grand 
design. Ideas of the whole person are manifestations of this; so are some smaller scale 
aspects of the curriculum. These suggest that the process of education makes sense in 
terms of the possibility of its completeness. In opposition to this, ... the assumptions of 
the grand design are at odds both with human nature and with education, and ... the 
reasons for this are to be understood conjointly. There is a disanalogy between health 
[full growth] and education which the metaphor of nutrition belies. ...The analogy with 
physical health facilitates ... skill-talk and an approach to curriculum which is 
mechanistic in style. ... In this it helps to clear the way for accounting and evaluation. ... 
It loses sight of the (qualified) ways in which being a whole might make sense and in this 
loses something of education. (Standish, 1995: 133). 
 
The concept of growth which includes the development of the whole child does not finish 
when the child becomes an adult. The idea of developing the capabilities of practical reason 
and affiliation critical in the Capabilities Approach, allows for this understanding of growth as 
ongoing rather than growth understood in purely skills-based terms where once the skill is 
acquired growth has occurred. I will explore this notion in greater detail in section 3 below. 
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Before that I will attend to the growth metaphor as associated with progressive thinkers and 
the difficulties concerning the child-centred approach connected with growth. 
 
 
7.5 The growth metaphor and issues concerning the child-centred approach 
 
The growth metaphor in respect of education has received particular criticism from those who 
promote the ‘subject based curriculum’, or the ‘useful curriculum’ (Pring, 1989: 99,100) 
exemplified by the factory metaphor. However, as Pring identifies, this ‘useful curriculum’ is 
accompanied by the culture of what works (Oancea and Pring, 2008). It is therefore 
understood within the language of performativity, where outcomes and targets confine the 
idea of growth, in respect of the ‘growth of knowledge’, to a ‘narrow concern’ (Pring, 1976: 9). 
In an attempt to regain some of the valuable aspects of the child-centred approach which 
include the concept of growth, Pring suggests the following wider concern, which stands in 
contrast to the performative culture in education: 
 
In educating we are concerned with the development, indeed enrichment, of mental 
life, and that central to such development is the growth of knowledge ... so long as a 
sufficiently generous analysis of knowledge is accepted ... that does justice to the 
manifold way in which people in general, and these pupils in particular, are consciously 
engaged in a number of activities. (Pring, 1976: 9). 
 
Pring suggests a wide understanding of growth when defending the importance of the growth 
of knowledge in education and argues that the focus of any educational debate ‘must be, but 
frequently isn’t, an understanding (controversial though it is) of what it means to be and to 
grow as a person’ (2004: 5). This requires attention to the individual and his or her 
development, and in this sense is child-centred. By contrast, in the factory model of education, 
all children are fed an identical diet of facts within a predetermined process which constitutes 
learning, such as that challenged by Dickens in Hard Times. In contrast, this attention to 
growth which Pring proposes, includes Hogan’s suggestion of drawing from Plato’s Republic 
the benefits of safeguarding ‘ the healthy growth of the imagination’ (Hogan, 1983: 44), which 
enables us to understand others and ourselves more fully, and to resist being confined to facts.  
 
In contrast to the culture of performativity, the recent Nuffield Review (Pring et al., 2009) 
supports Dewey’s thinking , where ‘Education as growth and adaptation’ is the metaphor 
195 
 
(2009: 17). The Nuffield Review identifies that Dewey, recognised ‘the danger of the ‘false 
dualism’ of the ‘academic’ (the transmission of knowledge) versus the ‘vocational’ (the 
narrowly conceived training to reach targets), and argued for the integration of practice with 
the world of ideas (‘the accumulated wisdom of the race’) (ibid.: 17). Here, the process of 
growth occurred as ‘the young person adapted to new situations, faced problems that need to 
be solved, endeavoured to make sense of experience and learned to extend and benefit from 
relations within the wider community’ (ibid.: 17).  
 
The concept of growth in respect of education has been a concern for many centuries now and 
has been associated with the narrative of progressivism which includes a significant group of 
figures such as – ‘Comenius, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Dewey’ (Darling and 
Nordembo, 2003: 289). In this chapter I will not engage with a full historiography of 
progressivism
3
, but will illustrate certain themes which have shaped the view of child-centred 
education which promotes the concept of growth. For example, Darling and Nordembo 
suggest that: for Comenius, ‘it is the children’s own experience that is important’. For 
Rousseau, ‘childhood has its own ways of seeing, thinking and feeling; nothing is more foolish 
than to try and substitute our ways’. For Pestalozzi, the development of the theme of 
educating the whole person is key: ‘head, heart and hands’. For Froebel the focus is unfolding 
of children’s awareness and understanding through the practical and creative activities which 
children naturally want to engage in, which is ‘often checked by misguided adults’. And more 
recently, Dewey’s thought was very influential in the UK during the 1960s, especially on 
‘Government reports on primary education, and on a generation of trainee teachers’ (Darling 
and Nordembo, 2003: 289-291). Following a period of extensive criticism of Dewey in the early 
1980s, there has been a revival of Dewey’s thought, in particular in support of the importance 
of ‘political education’ and ‘the renewal of democracy in schools’ (ibid.: 289-291). 
 
Connected with the progressive movement, the growth metaphor has had a ‘significant 
influence on educational thought’ (Hamm, 1989:20). As Hamm explains, the metaphor 
continues to hold sway with notions such as ‘fulfilling the potentials of each child’, 
‘individualized instruction appropriate to the uniqueness of each child’, ‘education to meet the 
needs of each child’, ‘children should be self-directed’, etc (1989: 20). These notions are 
recognisable today, for example, in the concept of personalised learning, assessment for 
learning, and autonomous or independent learning. Hamm, quoting Dearden, argues that the 
growth metaphor has become so central in educational thinking, that it functions ‘as a 
symbolic image, pregnant with meaning and rich in emotional appeals’ (1989: 20). However, as 
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he suggests, ‘a good metaphor is not always good in every context’, and closer analysis of the 
metaphor of growth ‘reveals a number of disanalogies or faulty comparisons’ (1989: 21, 22). 
 
The child-centred approach of some of the progressives, which supports the growth metaphor, 
can be distinguished by two traditions, as Pring describes:  
 
[1] ... between, those who emphasize the individual nature of growth - the gradual 
development of potential that is there waiting to be recognized, fertilized, watered, or 
just allowed to grow (the horticultural metaphor is powerful among the followers of 
Froebel and Pestalozzi) - and, [2] those who stress the social context of development ... 
where the social nature of this process of growth is emphasized. (2004: 82).  
 
In this second sense, growth is not an unfolding of what is already there, and instead is ‘a 
gradual expansion of one’s experience and understanding through the interaction between a 
person and the social and cultural environments in which he finds himself’ (2004: 82). 
 
With regards to those who emphasise the individual’s nature of growth and the unfolding of 
potential, the aptness of the growth metaphor is evident, where education like growth are 
both understood as ongoing and continuous. However, as examined in section 2 above, 
Standish (1995) identifies the problems with the idea of growth as unfolding potential which 
are too closely associated with the notion of completeness. In this sense the metaphor can 
falsely parallel physical growth with intellectual, social, or moral growth, where physical 
growth reaches maturity at a specified time and other types are ongoing throughout the life of 
the person. Similarly, this commitment to growth does not always fully explain the direction of 
growth which is sought, since it seems to allow for growth in ways which thwart the potential 
of the individual and which damage the good of society. Hence, some ‘growth theorists’ in 
simply seeking more growth in individuals do not recognise the problem that growth towards 
‘over-acquisitiveness or selfishness’ (Hamm, 1989: 22) can be an aspect of human potential 
which educators would not wish to encourage.  
 
Nevertheless there are other aspects of the growth metaphor which are helpful, that is, it 
‘hints at’ the view that education has ‘intrinsic value’ (Hamm, 1989: 21). However this is not 
without complication. For example as Dewey puts it, ‘the educational process has no end 
beyond itself; it is its own end’ (Dewey, quoted in Hamm, 1989: 21). According to Pring, for 
Dewey ‘growth is not an unfolding of what is already there’ but rather a ‘gradual expansion’ of 
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experience and understanding nurtured within the ‘social context’ (2004: 82). The growth 
metaphor in this sense involves connections between significant and meaningful experiences, 
integration and internalisation of experiences through enquiry. Here, growth is focused on 
what is relevant to the learner. In this sense there is an ethical dimension in this notion of 
growth (in ‘how to decide what is of most worth?’, where the ‘valuings of the learner’ are the 
ultimate concern and define the meaning of growth (2004: 83).  
 
Dewey’s attempt to challenge the view ‘that knowledge can be uncovered as a definite and 
permanent truth’, some suggest, led him to argue in favour of ‘a new understanding: that 
knowledge is individual, instrumental and relative’ (Darling and Nordembo, 2003: 292). With 
regards to the metaphor of growth in education, this has profound implications for what is 
considered ‘valuable’ and ‘meaningful’ in respect of teaching and learning which nurtures 
growth (Pring: 2004, 80-98). Pring maintains that Dewey’s suspicions of a theory of value 
which assumes some general criterion of value, independent of what the individual feels to be 
valuable, led him to ‘characterize value through the formal characteristics of growth of 
experience itself’, and ‘there was no external criterion to appeal to’ (Pring 2004: 84). If this 
interpretation is correct, as disputed earlier, ‘the most obvious difficulty in such a theory of 
value is that it does not exclude the growth which, on other grounds, we would wish to dismiss 
as grossly immoral’ (ibid.: 85). A pertinent example is the petty thief, whose experiences ‘open 
up the possibility of an interesting and varied life of crime’ (ibid.: 85). Pring suggests that in this 
view, ‘Dewey did not find in his formal characterisation of growth a principle by which he could 
exclude as non-valuable any particular, substantive experience’ (ibid.: 85).  
 
With regards to meaning, this pivotal focus on the individual’s experience defines meaning in 
terms of what the individual experiences as significant, or of interest. In this sense, what 
‘comes from outside has to be accommodated within the learner’s own frame of reference’ 
which is ‘tied up with his or her experience and pursuits of matters of interest’ (Pring, 2004: 
91). What appears to be challenged is the ‘public nature of the concepts we employ, the 
interpersonal standards to which enquiry must submit, the possibility of giving an objective 
account of reality, a notion of truth that is related to standards other than personal 
satisfaction and utility’ (ibid.: 91). This is what leads Darling and Nordenbo to describe Dewey’s 
account of knowledge as ‘individual, instrumental and relative’ (2003: 292). 
 
Pring’s objection to this notion of child-centredness and growth is based on his view that one 
cannot develop a ‘theory of meaningfulness’ without accepting the ‘impersonal and 
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intersubjective standards of meaningful discourse that are embedded within different 
intellectual, moral and aesthetic disciplines’ (2004: 92). An inter-subjective framework such as 
that of the Capabilities Approach, could offer the point of reference necessary within which 
individuals can test their perceptive experiences.  
 
Notwithstanding Pring (2004) and Darling and Nordembo’s (2003) critique of Dewey as 
espousing overly subjective or relativist tendencies, it should be recognised that Dewey’s views 
have often been misunderstood or ‘misread’ when grouped together with earlier progressives 
such as Rousseau (Fairfield, 2009: 14, in Fleming, 2012: 37). Instead, Dewey’s concern was to 
advance understanding by making connections and therefore he challenged dualisms which 
led to extremist tendencies (ibid.: 37). Dewey’s starting point could be understood as being 
‘the basic human organism and its relationship to the environment’ (ibid.: 38), and his child-
centred perspective and understanding of growth thus focuses on actively preparing a student 
for future life which entails participation in society to help her shape and realise her capacities 
(1897). Unlike the accusations to over-subjectivity, this understanding suggests that growth 
requires both the individual and society, that it forms part of a life time’s work where 
education expands beyond school and where a balance is sought between individual growth 
and its interdependence with others and its natural heritage. Dewey describes this well: 
 
I believe that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social 
consciousness of the race. This process begins ... at birth and is continuously shaping the 
individual’s powers, saturating his consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas. 
... He becomes an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization. (1989: 4) 
 
Nevertheless, the tension between the private and public sphere and seeking balance between 
these requires ongoing attention and reflection. Hence the psychologist David Smail, rightly 
critiques the concept of growth which overemphasises subjectivism, where the inner creative 
spirit overrides the public concern, as ‘people are brought up to believe that they can, so to 
speak, whistle up a viable world from within themselves, that all that matters is creativity – 
seen as some kind of inborn trait – and ‘personal growth’, that satisfactory living is in some 
unspecified way to do with the unfettered exercise of will’ (1996: 73). Smail challenges 
education understood in terms of this kind of growth because it involves ‘unleashing the 
potential of ‘inner worlds’, and weakening if not prescribing many of the categories of the 
outer world’ such as critical interpretation tested dialogically (ibid.: 73). Moreover, ‘carried to 
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its logical extreme, which of course it couldn’t be, this kind of cultivation of individual 
interiority would result quite literally in madness’ (ibid.: 75). As Smail is correct to defend:  
 
Meaning is public, not a private construct , and if we didn’t live in ... a world whose 
principal features we all recognised and spoke about in the same way - we would not be 
able to operate a society at all. (1996: 75). 
 
It is the factory metaphor which has been critiqued by those who in modern times challenge 
the performative culture in education and instead espouse the growth metaphor. Through the 
growth metaphor, important elements are defended, including: personal development, the 
importance of the individual’s perspective in assessments about learning, and the importance 
of experience in the process of making judgments. As discussed in this section, there are 
difficulties associated with the notion of growth as a suitable metaphor regarding education. 
Nevertheless, there is merit in the attempt to salvage the growth metaphor, which defends 
essential aspects of learning as a way of life, and which stands in contrast to the performative 
culture.  
 
 
7.6 Salvaging the growth metaphor within the context of the Capabilities Approach 
 
Educationists such as Nyberg recognise the unhelpful tendencies which have arisen from the 
view that somehow ‘growth is education’ (Nyberg, 1975: 28), and others acknowledge that the 
growth concept has ‘become central in educational thinking’, but challenge the view of growth 
as ‘the definition of education’ (Hamm, 1989: 20). This understanding which reduces education 
to growth, leads to viewing education as something natural which will happen unaided by 
teaching, or to be focused entirely on the individual’s preferences which teaching should 
nurture irrespective of other considerations. This tendency leads to an over individualistic view 
of human beings who should be left to grow naturally, or an over subjective view with an 
‘anything goes’ approach, where all learning as chosen by the student is equally valid. Rightly, 
there has been considerable critique of the growth metaphor, which Nyberg (1975: 23-31) 
explores in his article, Pruning the Growth Metaphor, where he suggests that growth and 
education are in some way interlinked and affected by one another.  
 
When considered within the Capabilities Approach and the concept of shared capabilities, the 
growth metaphor provides a richer conception of child-centred education, which does not 
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make the mistakes of focusing on the child at the expense of learning. Nyberg, in his argument 
of ‘growth as education’ (1975: 31) in terms of ‘expansion’ manages to salvage something of 
this metaphor as helpful for our understanding of teaching and learning. Nyberg contends that 
growth should be understood as ‘expansion’ in terms of ‘opening wide’ (1975: 28) as 
illustrated below: 
 
In a way, one might think of expansion as the common term which signifies the overlap 
of certain aspects of the terms "education" and "growth". Notice that this is not a 
case of identity, but a case of limited similarity in the area of overlapping aspects 
... a manner that shows the close relationship of those terms. (1975: 28, 29).  
 
When the concept of growth is understood in education within the Capabilities Approach, this 
idea of expansion gives us some indication of when to provide structure and when to allow 
freedom of exploration, of when to nudge or challenge and when to let children be, as they 
enquire and reflect.  
 
In considering the concept of expansion, the Capabilities Approach provides an understanding 
of what expansion, or growth for that matter, entails. This is not about expanding whatever 
interest the child has, or about motivating children in the sense of purely inciting an emotive 
element within them, such as emotionally rousing or stirring up children in readiness to learn. 
Pring argues against this emotional inciting of children and concludes that ‘stirring children up, 
if successful, would result in stirred-up children, not necessarily in interested children’ (2004: 
89). Growth in respect of education is also not about expanding all potential, but rather about 
expanding every persons’ capability for practical reason and affiliation, and their capacity for 
critical reflection within the context of a shared humanity. This view of growth within the 
Capabilities Approach is a fruitful way in which we can salvage the growth metaphor which 
includes the ethical dimension, and yet is not confined by the overly subjective or reduced to 
the emotive.  
 
Growth in the sense of developing the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation as 
described in detail in Chapter 5, is what is proposed here. Nussbaum explains the significance 
of growth in these areas for the ability of individuals to make good judgements within the 
context of what is good for society. She maintains that the capability for practical reason and 
affiliation enable individuals and groups in the following significant aspects given that the lack 
of such capabilities has disastrous consequences: 
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To use one’s senses in a way not infused by the characteristically human use of thought 
and planning is to use them in an incompletely human manner. To plan for one’s own 
life without being able to do so in complex forms of discourse, concern, and reciprocity 
with other human beings is, again to behave in an incompletely human way. (2000: 82)  
 
For this reason, practical reason or the ability to make wise judgements, is integrally 
intertwined with affiliation, the ability to empathise and reach out to others with care and 
solidarity. Nussbaum reminds us that ‘the human world is held together by pity and fellow-
feeling’, which enables people ‘to deal with suffering’, and thus ‘their morality is a response to 
the fact of suffering’ (1990: 375). This response entails both the development or growth of 
affiliation and practical reasoning.  
 
Dunne puts this a different way when defending the benefits of the Aristotle-inspired concept 
which is present in the Capabilities Approach. He identifies that, ‘In this conception, speech, 
expression, deliberation and action are the essential tokens of our humanity; and all of them 
are practised in essential relationships of interdependency with others’ (2006 :13). He expands 
this line of argument by drawing on Plato with regards to his important image of dialogue ‘as 
the rubbing together of two fire-sticks neither of which, on its own, can produce the 
illuminative flame’ (Republic 435a) (Dunne, 2006 :13). In this way, Dunne highlights the 
importance of affiliation or the interrelatedness of persons, which together with critical 
interpretative reasoning is then refined to make wise judgements. In the Aristotelian sense, 
our practical reasoning begins with perception which is refined into ‘deliberated desire’ 
(Nussbaum, 1986: 308), and which is tested in discourse with others and against the 
framework of a shared humanity outlined in the capabilities list. 
 
The Capabilities Approach, with the importance of practical reason and affiliation is significant 
to our understanding of growth, as it salvages an aspect of the idea of growth which informs 
and shapes education within the capabilities framework and Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia, 
explored in Chapter 2, 3, and 4. Viewing education within the wider context of enabling young 
people to flourish and thus grow in this sense, is not an individualistic or selfish pursuit 
towards realising potential. On the contrary, this journey of growth becomes possible in the 
context of and with reference to others, in our ability to relate and care for others, and in our 
ability to make deliberated judgements towards action for our personal good and the good of 
others in society. This is the ethical dimension we seek, and here the growth metaphor is 
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helpful in a view of education which has ‘intrinsic value’ (Hamm, 1989: 21), given its aim of 
enabling growth towards flourishing.  
 
As a result, the Capabilities Approach informs the kind of growth we seek. It enables us to 
understand what flourishing entails and what diminishes it. The Capabilities Approach provides 
a view of the growth metaphor which seeks to realise potential while at the same time 
acknowledging that certain potentials should not be actualised (eg. violence in certain 
situations, freedoms in others). In this sense not everything should be nurtured to grow and 
the child needs guidance and needs to have opportunities to decipher these for him or herself 
through reflective practice, thereby developing practical reason towards positive action. In the 
last resort we are preparing children for making judgements on their own, and part of this 
training includes the learner making mistakes in this process of deliberation. Precision as was 
discussed earlier is not the aim, but rather flexibility in understanding towards making wiser 
judgements. 
 
The growth metaphor understood in the context of the Capabilities Approach recognises that 
not all human potential leads to flourishing. As Hamm reminds us ‘not all of a child’s potential 
can be fulfilled ... furthermore, some potential should not be fulfilled (1989: 22). For example, 
there will be times when children and young people have tendencies to realise potentials 
which do not nurture flourishing in the Aristotelian sense discussed in this thesis. This is the 
case where children have a tendency to take other children’s property, or find it difficult to 
restrain their aggression towards others and are violent. Another example includes young 
people who engage in antisocial activities, or in risky behaviours such as riding their 
motorbikes too fast and without a helmet, thereby endangering themselves and others. Later 
in life, in adulthood, there may be examples in the workplace where fraud takes place, or 
scientific experiments which are detrimental to societal flourishing are undertaken. These 
tough, persistent and real issues in society which affect individuals and groups need to be 
recognised, and growth should instead be considered with reference to the capabilities list 
outlined in Chapter 5.  
 
Education which engages in helping children and young people to grow and realise potential 
which enables human flourishing as described in Chapter 2 and 4, may curtail behaviours and 
attitudes which diminish or are a barrier to flourishing. The ability to flourish grows as 
individuals develop their practical reasoning and affiliation and make good judgements in their 
particular situations. This process of making judgements goes beyond rule compliance, and it is 
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reflective practice which can have a significant impact in helping learners to make positive 
decisions themselves with reference to the capabilities framework, rather than simply by 
following rules. Furthermore, this view of growth as education is correct in its characteristic as 
‘ongoing and continuous’ (Hamm, 1989: 21). 
 
Of course, if left to grow naturally developing potentials which are barriers to personal and 
societal flourishing could be disastrous for success in terms of eudaimonia, and for people’s 
ability to co-operate with, care for, and relate meaningfully to others in society. This has 
implications for educators to engage in nurturing the capabilities for flourishing, such as 
practical reason and affiliation, and in intersecting when these are being thwarted. Again, 
within the framework of the capabilities list which Nussbaum provides, it is possible for both 
teachers and learners to make judgements about which action or what learning enables 
growth or leads to eudaimonia, and which tendencies are preventing them from realising 
potential in this sense. This is where the ability to plan, monitor, and evaluate situations and 
learning is key. Such understanding will require a sophisticated degree of reflective practice, 
both from teachers and learners to ascertain the extent to which they are reacting and making 
judgments in a balanced way, and to refine their judgements if they are over or under reacting 
to any given situation. Importantly, these judgements are tested dialogically and in turn 
further refined. It is reflective practice within this framework which the Capabilities Approach 
promotes which can enable persons to make inroads to personal and societal flourishing. 
Space which promotes this kind of teaching and learning is vital in education. 
 
Growth understood within the capabilities framework is an important concept which enables 
understanding of what is entailed in the educational journey of every individual, which is 
deeply dialogical, and whose ethical dimension is a shared humanity. In this sense the journey 
of growth may involve persevering in the face of difficulties and temptations, overcoming 
obstacles, following the right signposts, discarding unnecessary baggage, passing through a 
particular landscape, focusing on the destination, helping others along the way, and refusing to 
turn back. This core metaphor of growth which finds many variations on the theme as depicted 
here, are all possible through the development of practical reason and affiliation, and resist 
the solipsistic tendency into the overly subjective, through the public language of discourse 
and a shared ethical framework which transcends individual cultures. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter was divided into two parts. Part One addressed the problem which educationists 
suggest is facing education, that is ‘the failure to learn from the past’ (Pring et al., 2009: 85). In 
this chapter therefore, I expanded on the notion of reflection by looking to the past, in 
particular, reflective practice from the Greco-Roman heritage of philosophy as a practical tool 
for life (Hadot, 1995), and the later tradition of 16
th
 century Ignatian reflection which evolved 
from these philosophical roots, with its flexible reflective cycle.  
 
I argued that much can be learnt today from the heritage of practical philosophy with its 
emphasis on ‘learning to live’, ‘learning to dialogue’, and ‘learning how to read’. I proposed 
that education should embrace these elements of learning crucial for contemporary education 
beyond utility. This approach, I suggested can be further combined with flexible structures 
from the 16
th
 century spiritual reflective practice known as the Examen, in order to provide a 
helpful cycle of reflective enquiry for contemporary education. In particular I draw on the five 
step cycle of reflection of the Examen, which focuses on (1) expressing gratitude, (2) seeking 
understanding, (2) reviewing the day or situation, (4) focusing on an area for improvement, 
and (5) planning for the future or next step, which I maintain can extend present notions of 
reflective enquiry in education. 
 
This heritage of reflective practice is well-placed to reframe teaching and learning as a way of 
life (Hogan, 2004) and provides helpful ideas for practice and evaluation within the framework 
of the Capabilities Approach which promotes essential ethical questioning and enquiry. Crucial 
for human development or growth, is education as a way of life which engages in this kind of 
reflective learning. It  strives to spark curiosity in children; to help them think passionately and 
critically about difficult issues with no obvious answer; to help them manage risk, be resilient, 
value interdependence and never give up; to appreciate the wonder of nature and pay 
attention to the past, present, and future through careful listening; to engage in planning, 
monitoring and reviewing their lives; and, to participate in positive caring action developing 
moral seriousness based on a shared humanity. 
 
The growth metaphor in education is contentious, and in Part Two of this Chapter I sought to 
salvage something of the concept of growth in relation to education. I argued that the 
difficulties faced by the growth metaphor and its child-centred tendency to subjectivism, 
which does not consider others, can be overcome when reframed within the Capabilities 
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Approach. The heritage of reflective practice within the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities 
Approach, I believe, salvages an understanding of growth in education which avoids the 
tendency towards subjectivism or individualism, and which considers growth from the 
perspective of a lifetime, assessed in the context of an ethical framework based on shared 
human characteristics and capabilities. For this reason the metaphor of growth when linked to 
educating the whole person must not include a notion of completeness within it (Standish, 
1995), but rather must be viewed as ongoing throughout life. Therefore, I defend the growth 
metaphor in education when focused on nurturing practical reason and affiliation, where 
growth is realised through the process of making mistakes and ongoing reflective practice 
tested with others, within the Capabilities Approach.  
 
 
                                            
1
 Hellenistic and Roman: Hadot describes this further: ‘these words themselves open an 
immense period before us.’ (1995:53) - ‘with the emergence of the new form of Greek 
civilization beginning from the moment when Alexander’s conquests and, in their wake, the 
rise of kingdoms extended this civilization into the barbarian world from Egypt to the borders 
of India, and then brought it into contact with the most diverse nations and civilizations. The 
result is a kind of distance, a historical distance, between Hellenistic thought and the Greek 
tradition preceding it.’ (ibid.: 53). This period leads onto the Roman, which ‘covers the rise of 
Rome, which will lead to the destruction of the Hellenistic kingdoms, brought to completion 
in 30 BC with Cleopatra’s death. After that will come the expansion of the Roman empire, the 
rise and triumph of Christianity, the barbarian invasions, and the end of the Western empire. 
We have just traversed a millennium. But from the standpoint of the history of thought, this 
long period must be treated as a whole (1995: 53). 
 
2
 Here, Tetlow (2008) describes the Examen for contemporary audiences, though he does so 
within the Christian context in the main. http://ignatianspirituality.com/making-good-
decisions/discernment-of-spirits/discernment-in-a-nutshell/  (Last accessed 25/04/11). 
 
3
 For a thorough overview of the history of progressive education see Darling and Nordembo’s 
account of important arguments in this area (2003).  
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Evaluating quality and success in education within the Capabilities Approach 
  
There is a natural continuum between wonder and story-telling, between story-telling 
and theorizing: continually we seek to expand the comprehensiveness of our grasp. But 
if it is a universal human desire to grasp the world and make it comprehensible to 
reason, then it seems clear that oversimplification and reduction will be deep and ever-
present dangers. (Nussbaum, 1986: 260). 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter I argue in favour of the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach as an 
alternative to the utilitarian framework, for evaluations in education. The ethical framework in 
Capabilities Approach is significant for judgements in education, as it supports a sensitive, 
interpretative understanding in respect of evaluation, in contrast to the prevalent linear 
explanations sought by the performative culture in education.  
 
The Aristotle-inspired ethical framework which I suggest, embraces the concept of human 
flourishing or fulfilment as defined in Chapter 2, with its notion of non-commensurability at 
the heart of any discourse about what is valuable in education. In matters of evaluation, what 
evidence is justified for inclusion, what cannot be excluded, and what counts as quality, good, 
or success, cannot be reduced to a single standard. At present, the non-utilitarian ethical 
dimension which I propose is often neglected in education owing predominantly to the 
misguided quest for objectivity which seeks scientific-style proof and conclusive knowledge in 
areas where it is not appropriate to ascertain such precision (Midgley, 2004). The Aristotelian 
perspective is important in education, since as already discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the 
ethical framework offered by the Capabilities Approach enables the appropriate degree of 
objectivity for judgements to be made in this area(Aristotle, NE 1098a25-30; Nussbaum, 1986, 
1993, 2001). In particular, when judging quality and success in various areas of education, this 
approach overcomes the ‘false dualism of the quantitative/qualitative distinction’ identified by 
Pring (2000:247-60; 2004: 240-3). 
 
207 
 
In education the yearning for objectivity and proof, misconstrued as only satisfied by a (quasi) 
scientific approach (Bridges, 2009: 497), has been fuelled in recent decades by the culture of 
‘performativity’, described as ‘efficiency measured according to an input/output ratio’ 
(Lyotard, 1984: 88). This (quasi) scientific tendency in evaluation in education has been 
critiqued by educationists across the field (Dunne and Hogan, 2004; Law, 2004; Bridges and 
Smith, 2006; Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Bridges, Smeyers and Smith, 2008; Bridges, 2009; 
Pring et al., 2009, 2010; Alexander, 2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011).  
 
In contrast to this paradigm, the Capabilities Approach proposed in this chapter, with its 
ethical framework, offers an opportunity for re-balancing the scales. It seeks more sensitive 
evidence which enables a broader understanding of evaluation in respect of quality and 
success in education, with reference to what persons can be in order to flourish. The 
framework proposed here does not presume to yield the degree of objectivity claimed by the 
(quasi) scientific paradigm critiqued by Bridges (2009), and consequently rightly falls short of 
offering conclusive proof or knowledge in this area. Nevertheless, such a framework with its a 
flexible method of reflective practice, requires an interpretative view and allows for an 
appropriate degree of objectivity to be ascertained.  
 
This chapter is composed of two parts. In Part One, I concentrate on exploring the present 
situation with regards to evaluation in education today, and its difficulties. In Part Two, I 
propose the Capabilities Approach as one that provides the much needed ethical dimension 
for education and evaluations therein, which the present performative discourse in education 
does not include. 
 
Therefore in Part One, I focus first on the philosophical critique of the popular claim that we 
live in a scientific age which provides all the information we require to make sense of life, 
make judgements, and guide actions. As Mary Midgley suggests, this view is misguided as it 
reduces the complexity and plurality of the human condition to a ‘metaphysical simplicity’ 
(2004: 49). Instead, what is required is a more sensitive form of reasoning which allows for 
deep understanding in our judgements in this area, understood within the ethical dimension 
proposed in this chapter.  
 
Second, I examine the present context of evaluation in education and expose the rhetoric of 
the scientific age as wanting when applied to the field of education. Such an approach in 
education often diminishes and constrains our value judgements to a utilitarian framework.  
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When defending the importance of an ethical dimension in education, Pring, correctly reminds 
us that the focus of any educational debate ‘must be, but frequently isn’t, an understanding 
(controversial though it is) of what it means to be and to grow as a person’ (2004: 5), which 
cannot be reduced to a single objective standard or explained in simplistic ways.  
 
Third, I seek support from educationists, who like Pring, propose a more sensitive approach to 
establishing trustworthy evidence and who are in favour of a greater balance in evaluation 
than that afforded by the (quasi) scientific approach in both educational research, and 
teaching and learning in schools. What is sought here is a place for evaluation which is more 
akin to an art than a science (Bridges, 2009), while resisting being overly-subjective and non-
comparable .  
 
In Part Two of this chapter, I focus on the importance of the ethical dimension within the 
Capabilities Approach for evaluation processes in education, and what this might entail. 
Although Part One finds growing support for a broader perspective in education which breaks 
free from the confines of measurement, there remains a lack of conviction to postulate an 
ethical dimension which education can embrace with confidence and trust as an alternative to 
the utilitarian perspective. I propose therefore, the Capabilities Approach as one which allows 
a much needed sensitive evidence-source for evaluation, free from the framework of utility.  
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Part One 
 
 
Evaluation in education today: The need for greater balance 
 
 
 8.1 A plural discourse to calm the imperialism of the scientific paradigm 
 
The desperate search for certainty breeds an obsessive tendency which continues to be 
evident in society today. There is a perceived need to take refuge in the isolated discourse of 
science or logic, and to identify with this rational sphere to the exclusion of all other forms of 
discourse available. This perennial danger illustrated by the quotation at the beginning of this 
chapter, which troubled Aristotle thousands of years ago, is one that Nussbaum (1986: 260) 
warns against. The tendency to accept the supremacy of single explanations continues to 
affect the social sciences, including the field of education. Obvious examples of this approach 
are Statutory Assessment Tests (SATs) in the primary stage and the General Certificate of 
Secondary Education (GCSEs). This narrow outlook which seeks certainty by measuring with 
one standard, or by confining evaluation to the metric view is critiqued by educationists who 
argue in favour of a broader understanding of evidence for judgements about educational 
research and practice (Bridges, Smeyers and Smith, 2008). 
 
The philosopher Mary Midgley, in her book The Myths We Life By, suggests that the attempt to 
understand human nature gives rise to the desire for humans to distinguish themselves from 
animals, resulting in the perennial human effort to distance itself from animals through appeal 
to reason. This tendency was further heightened during the Enlightenment, although as she 
argues, in spite of many ‘minor gains’ the Enlightenment ‘could not produce that total 
revolution’ which dismissed so many important aspects of the human condition (2004: 137). 
But there remain vestiges of the age old tendency to create a strict division between human 
beings and other animals which continue to give rise to conflicting ideas about the meaning of 
the human/animal frontier. This false dualism affects human identity and nurtures its tendency 
to define itself with reference to science alone, promoting this as the only authentic voice of 
explanation and understanding. This has given rise to the notion that humans identify 
themselves as ‘thoroughly scientific beings, individuals too clear-headed and well-organised to 
use blurred or ambivalent concepts’ (Midgley, 2004: 137). This view, prominent in many areas 
of private and public life has permeated education resulting in a sometimes narrowed vision. 
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This is paradoxical, as the appeal to science was envisioned to yield greater precision and to 
overcome opacity, rather than to constrain discourse and horizons of understanding to a 
narrow view. 
 
Midgley identifies in her writing (1978, 1994, 2004), as the Aristotelian perspective underlines, 
that simple descriptions arrived at using a narrow vision of reality lead to deficient 
representations of the human condition, resulting in blinkered and inadequate definitions 
about terms, and judgements about situations. In reality, the concepts that we actually use in 
everyday life are blurred or ambivalent. ‘Notions such as love, care, trust and consent are 
incredibly complicated’ and Midgley draws evidence for this view with regards to friendship, 
where she identifies that what we mean by a friend is not a simple concept (2004: 137). For 
example, in order to be a good friend or decide who are good friends and how to nurture 
them, we require a deep understanding of what a friend is. This process of understanding 
involves a serious attempt at gathering evidence about the various elements of this instance of 
friendship which together constitute a thorough definition of the term. In this attempt for 
knowledge which is not of a logical kind, it would be ill-conceived to seek certainty. Hence, 
some argue that this kind of ‘practical judgement’ ‘plays a central role in science and 
mathematics, properly understood’ (Bridges, 2009: 514). This chapter maintains this is often 
even more acutely so in education. As Midgley maintains, the conviction that the scientific 
view is the only valid one which sheds light on reality, is ill conceived.  
 
The standards of clarity that we manage to impose in our well-lit scientific workplaces 
are designed to suit the preselected problems that we take in there with us, not the 
larger tangles from which those problems are abstracted. (2004: 137). 
 
Midgley’s claim to seek broader evidence for our judgements is supported by Nussbaum in her 
interpretations of the Aristotelian position of explanation, as one best informed by multi-
various evidence beyond the confines of the metric or the commensurable (1990: 56-66). 
Nussbaum maintains that Aristotle ‘stresses complexity and context’ (ibid.: 72) rather than a 
scientific model to ascertain what is involved in practical judgements. Good deliberation in this 
sense requires, ‘flexibility, responsiveness and openness to the external’. As Nussbaum 
concludes: ‘to rely on an algorithm here is not only insufficient, it is a sign of immaturity and 
weakness’ (ibid.: 74). 
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With regards to evaluations in education what is often needed is not a scientific model 
promising precision in terms of certainty, but rather interpretative understanding. Here the 
distinction between the philosophical concepts of erklären and verstehen
1
 can help. The 
former concept depicts clarity in terms of a single explanation of the type promoted in the 
Enlightenment, whereas verstehen, depicts a different and broader kind of understanding 
which requires sensitive interpretation and allows for multiple perspectives as valid references 
of the same reality. This latter kind of understanding is described by the philosopher O’Hear, as 
the ‘sort of understanding that recognises that a particular gesture in a classical sculpture is 
full of grace’ (1987: 105). Erklären and verstehen are two different forms of reason 
(Montefiore, 1998: 314). Verstehen, while ‘not conforming to the patterns of the natural 
sciences, can nevertheless be thought of as expressing and adumbrating canons of rationality’ 
(O’Hear, 1996: vii). Verstehen, as interpretative understanding, is essential for evaluation in 
education research and practice and should not be overshadowed by erklären. 
 
 Aristotle in his writings warns against seeking scientific-style precision where it is not 
appropriate (NE 1098a25-30), especially in deliberations about evaluative matters in a persons’ 
life and progress. For example, in respect of a person learning to read, they cannot be said to 
succeed simply because they have achieved a standardised literacy test. In reality, learning to 
read is more complex and involves learning to make sense of life through subtle and complex 
pictures or narratives. This is evident in an individual or a group seeking a sensitive 
interpretation of a poem or a character in a novel. It is not precision of the metric or factual 
kind which will yield the understanding which does justice to the description of the character 
or situation in the narrative being evaluated.  
 
This is something that Jane Austen demands of her readers and her characters where in 
‘Northhanger Abbey, for example, Catherine Morland must learn that the real world is not a 
gothic tale’, or in ‘Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth Bennet must learn to make more measured 
judgments about situations and people (instead of yielding to the prejudice of the title)’ (Smith 
2003: 386-387). As Austen’s readers tend to the texts with sensitivity, they learn to read the 
human situations within the novels with care and to connect this understanding to the context 
of their own lives, thereby enabling the individual to read other texts and human situations 
with greater sophistication and to make sound judgements accordingly. These kinds of 
judgements require an interpretative evaluation which is rigorous, which yields sensitive 
understanding, and where the use of metric measures and facts would often be inappropriate. 
In evaluations about education progress and quality, or for example success in educational 
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literacy, what is required is sometimes an interpretation which is more diffuse and sensitive 
than precise, yet nevertheless yields understanding which is communicable to others as a true 
evaluation. 
 
In an effort to combat the over-reliance on measurable precision, Midgley proposes a non-
linear approach instead of the popular reductive linear pattern provided by algorithms in 
mathematics. Others, such as philosopher John Haldane (1990) with support from G. K. 
Chesterton also challenge this linear approach exemplified by the ‘scientific rationalist’, who 
claims universality only ‘in the sense that they take on a thin explanation and carry it very far’ 
(1990: 71). As he points out, ‘a pattern can stretch for ever and still be a small pattern’ (ibid.: 
71). Like Midgley, Haldane also argues against what he describes as the ‘scientific rationalist’ 
and compares him to ‘the consistent maniac in combining an expansive reason with a 
contracted common sense’ (ibid.: 71). Instead, Haldane proposes a different kind of reason, 
one which is informed and shaped by common sense. The different kind of reason described 
here which is similar to the non-linear approach proposed by Midgley, ‘is exercised in 
association with experience and insight and no presumption operates requiring simple unity 
either in the phenomena or in their explanation’ (Haldane, 1990: 71).  
 
While Midgely (2004) recognises that the linear approach is important for testing particular 
pieces of reasoning, she argues that this kind of Cartesian thinking which developed as a 
defence against scepticism is not reflective of our reality. Rather, we exist ‘as interdependent 
parts of a complex network, not as isolated items that must be supported in a void’ (ibid.: 25). 
Our experience is not sharply divided into subjective and objective points of view but rather 
‘spreads across a continuous plane’, and ‘virtually all our thought integrates material taken 
from both the objective and the subjective angles’ (ibid.: 24). The linear approach is not always 
appropriate especially in matters of morality (that is, questions about how we should live, or 
what enables humans to thrive). Such questions must take account of a wide discourse and 
allow a place for sensitive interpretation which does justice to the particular being assessed. 
Montefiore, also argues against the strong divide or false dualism exemplified in the 
‘apparently distinct divide’ between causal discourse and normative discourse, or between 
scientific and literary forms of discourse and understanding. He maintains that these forms 
‘may be more closely and intricately bound up with each other than may have appeared at first 
sight’ (1998: 321). 
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Consequently, Midgley argues in favour of the benefit of representing ‘the development of our 
knowledge’ as an ‘interaction with the world around us, leading to growth’ (2004: 26), and 
proposed the language of exploration rather of the linear. Exploration includes multiple 
discourses available for human deliberations, since ‘often it is our powers of perception that 
are central to the work, rather than the consecutive reasoning that can easily be tested’ (ibid.: 
26). The language of exploration enables pluralism and stands against the ‘conviction that one 
fundamental form underlies them all and settles everything’ (2004: 27). Hence, Midgley 
suggests using images such as that of many-maps, or of viewing the world as a huge aquarium 
which though ‘we cannot see it as a whole from above, so we peer in at it through a number of 
small windows’ (ibid.: 27). As she describes, ‘we can make quite a lot of sense of this habitat if 
we patiently put together the data from different angles’ (ibid.: 27). Significantly, when 
engaging in discourse to evaluate aspects of the world, and when making judgements about 
education in particular, Midgley’s quotation is important: 
 
All perception takes in only a fraction of what is given to it, and all thought narrows that 
fraction still further in trying to make sense of it. This means that what we see is real 
enough, but it is always partial. And a good deal of the narrowing is within our own 
control. (Midgley, 2004: 28). 
 
This view is also found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which begins with the claim that ‘all human 
beings by nature reach out for understanding’ as distinct from knowledge as certainty. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle points out that 
our first encounter with the world is through the phainomena (NE 1145b3), which Nussbaum 
translates as the ‘appearances’ (1986: 240-263), that is, the way things first appear to us 
through our powers of perception. These appearances act as a window into understanding the 
world which enables human beings to make sense of life, and hence any method which is 
trustworthy is ‘committed to and limited by these’ (ibid.: 240).  
 
Nussbaum argues that Aristotle defends the position that all human beings are inclined to sort 
and interpret the world for themselves, ‘making distinctions, clarifying, finding explanations for 
that which seems strange or wonderful’ and human beings ‘seek to comprehend and grasp the 
world under some general principles that will reveal an order in its multiplicity’ (1986: 259). 
Language is a public endeavour, as discussed in Chapter 1, developed within a shared sphere 
of understanding based on common ground between each individual’s perception. Thus, what 
makes utterances and judgements intelligible between individuals and groups ‘is a background 
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range of values and ideals, furnished partly by our culture, but also, more deeply, by our 
common species-repertoire’ (Midgley, 2004: 96).  
 
However, ‘in our anxiety to control and grasp the uncontrolled by technē’ (technical expertise 
/knowledge), ‘we may all too easily become distant from the lives that we originally wished to 
control’ (Nussbaum, 1986: 260). Consequently, Nussbaum suggests that Aristotle believes that 
most of us have become strangers to some aspect of the life we live and the language we use, 
‘through the grip of hedonism, materialism, mechanism, or some other simple picture’ (ibid.: 
260). Instead, Nussbaum invites us to view education, not as a technical matter, but rather as a 
matter which requires practical reasoning and affiliation, which is deeply ethical.  
 
For example, a group of teachers evaluating 13 year old Kevin’s achievement and progress in 
class, cannot simply rely on data from tests measured against targets to make their evaluation. 
Instead they would seek to understand what might be expected from children at different 
stages in life, and look at Kevin’s particular situation, wider history, friendships, learning in 
other areas, at different times of the day, etc. In short they would gather all the possible 
information as perceived from their particular perspective. They would then test their 
understanding with other teachers, with Kevin himself where appropriate, including listening 
carefully to evidence from Kevin where he has received peer feedback, etc. The teachers 
would in this way endeavour to work out and understand Kevin’s position within the wider 
picture of Kevin’s life. They would find ways in which they and their colleagues can nurture him 
and help him plan, monitor, and evaluate situations and material effectively to succeed and 
flourish. To judge his progress as good, simply within the context of his target set against the 
single standard, or his test scores marked against this single standard, is not to seek 
appropriate understanding or to do justice to the person being evaluated. Moreover, in this 
sensitive approach towards Kevin, teachers develop their capacity for affiliation towards him, 
as they grasp the wider context in which he is living and working and thus ‘warm to him’ as 
they empathise with his situation and inspire him towards further development according to 
his need. And this capacity for affiliation to Kevin in the action and attitude of his teachers 
enables him in turn to develop affiliation towards others.  
 
With regards to evaluation in education and the search to establish evidence which we can 
trust and which most comprehensively interprets the reality we perceive with its complexities, 
it is wise to recognise the following: 
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Our human nature, exists in a continual oscillation between too much order and 
disorder, ambition and abandonment, excess and deficiency, the super-human and the 
merely animal. The good philosopher [or evaluator] would be the one who manages 
humanly, guarding against these dangers, to improvise the mean. (Nussbaum,1986:262). 
 
The extent to which evaluation in education seeks or achieves the balance recommended here 
by the Aristotelian position which Nussbaum elucidates, requires further exploration in the 
form of the following question: What evidence, which methods, and which conceptual 
framework enables a balanced judgement and understanding about education research or 
practice?  
 
 
8.2 Balanced evaluation in education: Acceptable evidence, methods and concepts 
 
Working towards the balance recommended by the Aristotelian position, and in order to 
understand what this might entail for evaluation in education, this part of the chapter focuses 
on four areas: (1) the kind of evidence and the methods which evaluation in education 
sometimes promotes, and the difficulties these present; (2) critiques by educationists seeking 
a more balanced approach; (3) distinct approaches which draw on Aristotle’s views proposed 
by educationists in respect of research; and (4) difficulties arising from the business language 
prominent in education resulting from the conceptual framework of utility, which highlights 
the need to articulate an ethical dimension such as the Capabilities Approach affords. 
 
 
8.2.1 Evidence and methods: The discourse of ‘what works’ and of the (quasi) scientific  
 
This part of the chapter explores discourse in education which has been reduced to a 
‘metaphysical simplicity’ (Midgley, 2004: 49), such as the fundamentalist paradigm of scientism 
which demands certainty and single explanations. There are inherent difficulties in this 
position, where deliberations are only considered trustworthy using a numerical single 
standard and the only acceptable evidence is that of ‘(quasi) science’ (Bridges, 2009: 497). 
 
Various examples of the ‘what works’ culture are identified by Oancea and Pring (2008), such 
as the National Centre for Educational Research (NCER), whose preferred model and hence 
sources of evidence are ‘experimental design interventions’, in particular ‘Randomised 
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Controlled Trials’; ‘systematic syntheses of research, and in particular experimental research 
and quantitative findings’ (ibid.: 18-19). Oancea and Pring argue that the key issues of 
contention about the ‘what works’ culture of research lie in ‘the policy-driven filtering of 
evidence on technical grounds, the hierarchies of knowledge on which this filtering draws, and 
the standard-setting exercises that narrow the contribution of research to policy and practice 
to a purely instrumental role’(2008: 19). At one extreme, these research initiatives described 
by Oancea and Pring, advocate the following: (1) a view of knowledge that favours 
‘commensurable standards of scientificity across the natural and social sciences’ which also 
apply to education; (2) a hierarchy of knowledge which most values experimental design to the 
exclusion of other qualitative methods; (3) instrumentalism in the sense of ‘pre-defined 
practical ends and deliberation about the means of attaining them’; (4) a view of the ‘dynamics 
of knowledge as controllable’; and (5) a ‘technical view of quality assessment’ (ibid.: 20).  
 
Oancea and Pring (2008) argue that the model of ‘what works’ is often a restrictive model. 
They draw support from others such as Sanderson (2003) to critique this approach as an 
‘instrumentalist-rationalist conceptualisation of the role of research’, with an ‘aspiration for 
certainty that often obliterates the complexities of particular situations’. This approach, they 
argue, does not always sufficiently ‘account for knowledge of the world as ‘taken’ by the 
person’. It therefore ‘fails to recognise the ethical and social nature of education practice, and 
the encounters of practical wisdom and technical rationality within it’ (Oancea and Pring, 
2008: 22), which this chapter proposes is endorsed by the Aristotle-inspired contemporary 
Capabilities Approach.  
 
These educationists have challenged the narrowing of research by the ‘what works’ culture at 
its extreme (Oancea and Pring, 2008), whose focus is to ‘improve’ learning, ‘raise standards’, 
and make schools ‘more effective’ (Pring, 2004: 204,) by using exclusively scientific tools. 
These critics suggest that this culture reduces what is meant by evidence to the 
commensurable and the metric which negates the validity of different kinds and strengths of 
evidence which should be considered acceptable. They therefore argue in favour of widening 
the discourse about what counts as evidence. Oancea and Pring (2008) accept that validated 
evidence about ‘what works’ could be viewed as ‘an effective response to recent criticisms of 
education research’, and an ‘effective way of discarding certain instances of poor research 
practice’ (ibid.: 23). However, at its extreme, they acknowledge that this culture fuels the 
discourse based on ‘narrow assumptions about knowledge, which run against some core 
217 
 
principles of education research’ (ibid.: 23), such as those promoted by the need for conclusive 
proof or causality in epistemology.  
 
A more balanced approach to evaluation which focuses on critical understanding, will be 
discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter. Suffice to identify at this stage that critical 
understanding in the form described by Bridges (2009) or Eisner (1985, 2002), is crucial for 
sensitive evaluation in education.  
 
An example below exemplifies the concept of effectiveness and efficiency when considered 
only within the framework of science, that measures success against a single numerical 
standard which must be reached, is inappropriate for the task of evaluating fully whether a 
child is developing their literacy capabilities. Evaluating improvement in the literacy standards 
of primary school children is measured by counting the number of children who at KS1 and KS2 
standardised tests attain the required level, as compared to previous years’ results. This 
measure does not take account of ‘whether they read books’ (Oancea and Pring, 2008: 25), 
and if they do when they do so and how it helps them and what they learn from them at 
various times. For example, children may take books to read in bed and share the reading 
experience with a parent, or when older may read them to analyse style of writing, or to 
understand a human situation or dilemma which sheds light on an element of their lives, etc. 
An overly narrow measure, such as the standardised tests in the Primary stage, fails to 
recognise the importance of many other aspects which should be considered as part of a 
balanced and richer evaluation of literacy. This would depend on a wider definition of literacy, 
which is not measurable by a single standard, which would include elements such as, 
deepening curiosity, empathy, and enjoyment, as well as the technique of deciphering words.  
 
The difficulties of a single standard measurement for literacy are exemplified in the results of a 
research study (also discussed in Chapter 5) which found that enjoyment in reading reduced as 
literacy standards increased. This study indicates that it is enjoyment in reading which 
promotes literacy beyond childhood, rather than mere technical ability to read words 
(Clarkson and Sainsbury, 2007). And worth noting is also the finding that reading for pleasure 
outweighs other social advantages in the future success of the child (PIRLS, 2006)
2
. 
 
Smeyers (2008) also identifies aspects of the scientific approach of social science style 
evaluations in education as problematic. He reminds us that causality seems to pervade our 
thinking in this approach, as was exemplified by Oancea and Pring’s description of the culture 
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of ‘what works’ at its extreme. Smeyers identifies that contrary to the rhetoric of social science 
discourse, evaluations and conclusions derived from quantitative approaches such as 
randomised controlled trials assumed to be relatively unproblematic as evidence, in reality 
often yield over-simplistic and questionable conclusions. The reasons are multiple and include 
for example: rapid changing contexts, atypical samples, disparity between sample population 
and target population, difficulty with generalisations across contexts, etc (2008: 72-80).  
Smeyers argues that: 
 
... even if one accepts that one can measure an event according to the degree of 
probability, most scholars will accept that contextualisation of theoretical insights is 
necessary, which comes down to a much more moderate version of what science is 
capable of, compared to a stance where causality exclusively rules. (2008: 64-5).  
 
Smeyers does not discount the potential benefit of large scale studies altogether, ‘even if they 
flirt with the paradigm of causality’ (ibid.: 80), given that ‘correlations seem to invite the 
reader to see a mechanism that can in some way be used for particular purposes’ (ibid.: 80). 
Nevertheless, expectations of the kind of knowledge these studies can yield should often be 
reduced, while resisting the tendency of concluding that ‘not understanding everything is 
equated with not understanding anything’ (ibid.: 80). 
 
Before exploring a balance in evaluation which is more suitable to education than that of the 
paradigm of scientism, it is worth noting Davies’ conclusions that ‘all attempts to measure 
learning are imperfect’ (2003: 83). He argues that ‘the gravity of these imperfections depends 
on the purposes of the assessment’, and in his view ‘the current approaches to assessment in 
the UK and USA are counterproductive even if education is seen as the servant of a 
competitive economy’ (ibid.: 283). Furthermore, in other articles Davies suggests that ‘enough 
has been said to cast doubt on an unreflective adherence to procedural objectivity and high 
standards of consistency’ (Davies, 2006: 499). 
 
 
8.2.2 Seeking a balance in evaluation which takes account of various kinds of evidence  
 
When defining research, Oancea and Pring (2008) defend the importance of two aspects in 
particular: (1) ‘the systematic gathering of evidence’, and ‘the systematic analysis of the 
conceptual framework within which that evidence is gathered’ (2008: 23). They argue that 
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what may be considered as ‘systematic’ enquiry is best not confined to one particular model 
(ibid.: 24). Instead they maintain that ‘systematic’ should include multi-various approaches 
rather than the linear ones sometimes promoted by the culture of ‘what works’ described in 
the previous section. 
 
When thinking about a systematic approach which is sensitive to the subject matter of 
evaluation in education, it is also important to maintain the notion of rigour or quality. But 
rigour in the sense sought here is not understood as a ‘rigid format’ but rather as a flexible 
approach which includes systematic seriousness. As Pring (2004: 212) points out, it is 
necessary to explore what ‘systematic’ means within different kinds of appeal to evidence 
which include rigour, but which are not susceptible to the extreme of the (quasi) scientific 
paradigm. The notion of systematic includes ‘rigour’ which requires ‘traditional qualities such 
as reliability and validity’, ‘integrity’, and ‘consistency of argument’ (Bridges, 2009: 500). 
However, the meaning of these terms requires deliberation beyond that afforded by the 
narrow confines of the (quasi) scientific definition. As Bridges suggests with regards to 
research, establishing the claim to ‘rigour’ must include not just ‘seeing what is in a research 
text’, but also the ability to see this in ‘relation to a much wider understanding of what is in 
other texts’ together with ‘seeing what is going on in the wider world of education and politics’ 
(ibid.: 509).  
 
Consequently, Bridges (2009) concludes that ‘perhaps we are looking entirely in the wrong 
direction in expecting even a (quasi) scientific answer to a question about ‘quality assessment’ 
(ibid.: 511). Rather than employing a scientific language to describe such a process, Bridges 
suggests talking about ‘‘appreciating’ the quality of something’ (ibid.: 511). This approach is 
not dependent on the metric but rather on ‘discernment’, which suggests an ‘intelligent and 
informed appreciation’, ‘one capable of observing relatively nuanced differences between one 
object of appreciation and another’ (2009: 511). Hence, drawing from Eliot Eisner, Bridges 
proposes that ‘assessment owes more to aesthetics than to science – that is perhaps more 
akin to connoisseurship
3
 than to measurement’ (ibid.: 511). 
 
Such an approach defined by attentive deliberation requires an acceptance of the 
interpretative qualitative view ascertained by the particular in context, which the (quasi) 
scientific approach to evaluation would not accept as valid. There exists a divide between the 
scientific and other claims to knowledge which is problematic, as identified by Montefiore and 
other philosophers earlier in this chapter, in the false ‘distinct divide’ between the ‘scientific 
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and the literary’, or the ‘causal and the normative’ (1998: 321). Pring critiques the divide 
between these two claims to understanding which restrict evaluation to either quantitative or 
qualitative data respectively. As he argues, this divide has ‘created the false dualism between 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches to research (2004: 212). In order to close the 
existing divide, Pring suggests the need to examine more carefully various kinds of evidence 
which ‘legitimately enter into educational deliberations’ (ibid.: 212). Hence as he maintains, 
problems arise not over the need for evidence but over opposing positions of what is to count 
as evidence. And the ‘danger lies in the imperialism of any one form of discourse together with 
its distinctive notion of evidence’ (ibid.: 211) tipping the balance one way or the other. 
Examples of this are found in the ‘what works’ culture, which often only accepts evidence 
which presumes proof and can be proved through scientific explanation.  
 
Pring warns in other works that ‘the first thing to say about evidence is that it must not be 
confused with proof’ (Oancea and Pring, 2008: 25). In order to avoid the extreme position of 
seeking proof in respect of evidence Pring suggests that ‘what counts as evidence will depend 
upon the kind of discourse one is engaged in’ (2004: 203), which should include the 
deliberations of practical reason and be inclusive of the objective and interpretative 
perspectives. He identifies the trap of dualism when it comes to evidence, which arises as a 
result of different groups claiming positions at each extreme of the (quasi) scientific 
/interpretative spectrum. Pring recognises that ‘to contrast so starkly the large-scale 
explanations of human behaviour ... with the uniqueness of the individual human condition, 
which escapes any such pigeon-holing, is a false dualism’ (2004: 208).  
 
Instead, Pring suggests that educational practice requires ‘judgements about ‘achievement’ as 
well as about the ‘ability to achieve’ and about the ‘capacity to have the ability to achieve’ 
(2004: 204). And given that these require various types of evidence appropriate for each 
evaluative discourse, they depend on a balance between different kinds of explanations 
arrived at using a variety of appropriate data. Rather than applying the restrictive label of 
either quantitative or qualitative, as these overlap to greater or lesser degrees in the 
evaluation process, it is less distracting and more fruitful to consider data free from the 
divisive categories encouraged by often false differentiation.  
 
In the quest to broaden what counts as evidence to include practical judgement, Oancea and 
Pring (2008) draw on Aristotle’s thinking for support , as they seek to establish greater balance 
in evaluation than sometimes found in the ‘what works’ culture described above which can 
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restrict evidence to one extreme. In particular they identify practical reasoning as essential to 
broaden discourse in evaluation, and argue in favour of its critical importance for value 
judgements in education. They claim that such a shift in perspective, would resist confining 
evidence to only one extreme, and would accentuate important features for evaluation in 
education. These include ‘communicative processes’ ‘based on dialogue and argumentation’ 
about what is appropriate in particular circumstances, ‘the uncertainty and pluralism of praxis’, 
and ‘the need for free, open normative debate to replace the mechanistic appeal to pre-
determined standards likely to privilege the more powerful’ (2008: 22-23). Quoting Sanderson, 
they argue that as all these aspects are included and nurtured, ‘the question for teachers is not 
simply ‘what is effective’, but rather, more broadly, ‘what is appropriate for these children in 
these circumstances’ (Sanderson, 2003: 341, in Oancea and Pring, 2008: 23). Rightly, Oancea, 
Pring, and others, contest the culture of evaluation which overemphasises metricity and a 
single standard, and the tendency it has to exclude or marginalise the concern for what may be 
educationally worthwhile.  
 
This crucial point will be discussed at greater length below within the context of the 
Capabilities Approach as one which provides the ethical dimension required to make 
judgements about what is worthwhile, and which shapes our discourse about what counts as 
evidence in education which seeks the balance outlined above. Here, the rhetoric of efficiency 
and effectiveness must be balanced by discourse about what is worthwhile.  
 
Before attending to this however, Oancea and Furlong (2007) develop thinking about 
knowledge and evaluation focused on the debate about quality in educational research which 
merits discussion. They draw on Aristotle’s views which are pertinent to the quest for greater 
balance in the discourse of evaluation in education. 
 
 
8.2.3 Aristotle-inspired evaluation: Oancea and Furlong on three domains of knowing  
 
Bridges (2008), suggests that ‘notions of quality are often confused with (narrow) expectations 
of what will count as research at all’ (2008: 42). Oancea and Furlong (2007), agree with this 
position and challenge the sometimes extremist position of the ‘what works’ model. Instead, 
they search for a systematic approach which includes trustworthy evidence and which 
considers quality as excellence from a wider perspective than that afforded by the scientific 
model. Drawing from the Aristotelian perspective, they seek to widen the discourse about 
222 
 
evaluation in education research beyond the constraints of the extreme which demands 
certainty. As Oancea reminds us, with regards to judgements about research ‘the grounds for 
certainty are always problematic’ (2005: 178). 
 
Oancea and Furlong (2007) search for greater balance in this area of evaluation, and in their 
article propose three different conceptions of reasoning as valid, which embrace varying 
evidence in respect of evaluation in educational research. Their argument is developed using 
concepts drawn from Aristotelian philosophy which consider three domains for knowledge: 
‘theoria (contemplation); poiesis (production); and praxis (social action)’ (2007: 124). Within 
each domain there is space for excellence, ‘epitomized by three further concepts’: ‘epistēmē 
theoretike (knowledge that is demonstrable through valid reasoning)’; ‘technē (technical skill, 
or a trained ability for rational production)’; and ‘phronēsis (practical wisdom, or the capacity 
or predisposition to act truthfully and with reason in matters of deliberation, thus with a 
strong ethical component)’ (ibid.: 124). 
 
With regards to judgements about quality in education research, Oancea and Furlong (2007) 
advocate three domains of knowledge as valid forms of evidence, and suggest it is possible to 
identify different forms of excellence in these different domains. Here, judging quality in 
‘applied and practice-based research’ cannot be achieved by ‘fine-tuning a single set of criteria 
to cut across its possible embodiments’, but rather by ‘capturing the deep distinctiveness of 
the three domains and of their expressions of excellence, while at the same time allowing for 
compatibility’ (2007: 124-5).  
 
In providing an explanation of these domains in practice, Oancea and Furlong explain critical 
features of each domain and how they work. First, with respect to epistēmē, or demonstrable 
knowledge they suggests that ‘application’, from this perspective, ‘normally translates as a 
gradual gliding from the general to the particular, and from the abstract to the concrete’ (ibid.: 
125). Excellence in this mode of knowledge involves developing ‘scientific’ knowledge ‘about 
things that are universal and necessary’ (ibid.: 125).  
 
However, although Oancea and Furlong (2007) quote Aristotle for support, in his writings 
when he considers epistēmē it is expressed as being knowledge of why observations are the 
way they are of necessity, that is, owing to universal laws. Here the appropriate explanation, 
after research, would be a set of universal laws from which the observed phenomenon follows 
logically. This expresses the results of the research, and does not inform about valid reasoning 
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with regards to the methods of research. Moreover, evaluative questions about education 
cannot be explained using theoretical knowledge of the kind offered by epistēmē and instead 
require a different kind of explanation such as that informed by phronēsis. It is difficult to see 
how epistēmē might be applicable to judgements about excellence in evaluations about 
education, as Oancea and Furlong seem to suggest. As Nussbaum argues, Aristotle would 
consider ethical reasoning to yield inexact results, which requires practical reasoning rather 
than scientific reasoning of a logical necessary kind expressed as epistēmē. As this thesis 
argues (and compare Oancea and Pring, 2008; Bridges, 2009; Pring and Pollard, 2011), 
education discourse whether about research or practice is an ethical concern which requires 
the ethical dimension, and which must resist being confined to the scientific. 
  
Second, with respect to technē, Oancea and Furlong (2007) describe it as a technical skill 
connected with the area of ‘production’, which ‘concerns the activity of installing order’ or 
identifying the best structure or method, where ‘practice is seen as the pursuit of predefined 
ends through the careful selection of suitable means’ (ibid.: 125). This process involves ‘design 
and planning’ and concern for ‘efficient use of the resources available’ (ibid.: 125-6). As 
Oancea and Furlong suggest, ‘research and its findings may assist this process and provide the 
rationale for (some of) the choices being made’ (ibid.: 125-6). However, although excellence in 
poiesis may be technē as Oancea and Furlong suggest, it is not clear what the framework 
against which technē is ascertained consists in, if it is not that of utility. Since the framework of 
epistemic knowledge is the universal which defines the instance by necessity, technē requires 
a framework which by definition cannot be of the kind which results in epistēmē. From the 
tone of their argument it would seem that Oancea and Furlong would not wish to adopt the 
framework of utility for their understanding of technē. However, this question of an 
appropriate framework for this domain of knowledge and excellence is left unanswered by 
them.  
 
Nussbaum is helpful here in her understanding of technē as ‘a deliberative application of 
human intelligence to some part of the world, yielding some control’. As she maintains, ‘the 
person who lives by technē does not come to each new experience without foresight or 
resource’ and ‘possesses some sort of systematic grasp, some way of ordering the subject 
matter, that will take him to the new situation well prepared’ (1986: 95). Nussbaum explains 
that for Aristotle, a technē ‘comes into being when from many notions gained by experience a 
universal judgement about a group of similar things arises’ (ibid.: 95). In this way a general 
theory is arrived at, not in the sense of epistēmē. Hence, though ‘technē can rightly be a 
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precise understanding’, as Oancea and Furlong (2007) suggest, it only yields the kind of 
precision appropriate to the subject matter. In the case of human beings, Aristotle reminds us 
that precision in respect of ethics, which includes questions about what is worthwhile in 
education, is only possible according to the nature of the subject matter, which in this case is 
not compatible with scientific precision, or technical utility. Instead the precision required 
must arise from practical judgement. At best what we can hope for is the technical excellence 
or precision of the builders of Lesbos who ‘measure with a flexible strip of metal that bends 
round to fit the shape of the stone and is not fixed’ (NE 1137b30-2) (Nussbaum, 1986: 301). 
However it seems to me that this is not what Oancea and Furlong (2007) have in mind when 
they suggest technē as a domain of excellence for evaluation in education. 
 
Third, Oancea and Furlong (2007) propose practical wisdom, or phronēsis, as the third domain 
of knowledge important for research as it takes account of the ‘messy’ (Law, 2004) character 
of the relationship between research and practice. They note that excellence in this sense is 
not understood in any scientific or technical sense and is not defined by ‘external ends’. In 
addition the excellence of practical wisdom (which I refer to interchangeably as practical 
reason) ‘involves deliberation about ends and reflective choice, and so is ultimately both 
educational and social’ (Oancea and Furlong, 2007: 126). It also requires ‘an act which is more 
akin to perception ... than to the application of general rules’ (ibid.: 126).  
 
However, there are difficulties here too, although they claim accurately with support from 
Nussbaum, that ‘perception can respond to nuance and fine shading, adapting its judgement 
to the matter at hand in a way that principles set up in advance have a hard time doing’(1986: 
300-301). The difficulties lie in that Oancea and Furlong (2007) do not explain the framework 
within which experience perceived is further defined and understood with a ‘thick’ rather than 
‘thin’ definition. I shall be arguing in the next part of this chapter that the Capabilities 
Approach provides the framework needed to arrive at the ‘thick’ definition sought.  
 
Nussbaum supports the view that Aristotle has such a framework in mind, which he describes 
as our shared humanity, and from which the capabilities list which Nussbaum postulates arises 
(2001: 416-418). Importantly, it is this framework, or general conceptual understanding of 
humanity, which enables the particular experience to be tested within the context of the 
perceived general framework (1993: 242-270). This makes possible the ‘thick’ definition sought 
of quality or excellence in the particular instance. However, although Oancea and Furlong 
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mention that there is an ethical dimension (2007: 131), they do not suggest the nature of this 
dimension or advocate an ethical framework such as this.  
 
Furthermore, although there is no excellence in the sense of a technique for practical 
reasoning, Oancea and Furlong (2007) do not articulate that within the concept of phronēsis 
there is a flexible method which facilitates the individual experience to inform the resulting 
judgement, and which is communicable between persons with reference to some common 
framework. I suggest something like this flexibility in an extract from Henry James later in this 
chapter. Oancea and Furlong explain that:  
 
practical judgement is ethical, and professional, and ultimately human, which is why 
practical excellence is so difficult to achieve, to describe, and to assess. It is the 
practically wise person who chooses the salient issues and sets the implicit standards 
through the very act of her judgement and in the concreteness of her situation. (2007: 
126).  
 
This begins to sound very subjective in its rightly interpretative approach. They do not make 
explicit in this claim, as they need to do, that in order to ascertain some degree of objectivity in 
any interpretation, there must be a common framework which enables the assessment or 
evaluation to be made.  
 
By contrast, Nussbaum suggests the capabilities which we share as the conceptual framework 
we require for judgements to be made about what is good and what is just. It is such a 
framework which shapes the standards we choose by which judgements can be made about 
what is worthwhile in education, and what excellence entails therein. In other words, 
Aristotle’s ethical framework recognises which lives are fulfilled within the context of a shared 
humanity which respects the dignity of every person and enables their capabilities to be 
realised. Therefore, interpretative judgements about the particular are made within this 
general framework. Evaluations or judgements are developed with reference to and within the 
context of the extent to which shared capabilities are nurtured or not.  
 
Oancea and Furlong (2007) rightly move the discourse of evaluation in education away from 
the scientific paradigm, and make a case for discourse to include the three Aristotelian 
domains of knowledge and excellence. In particular, they suggest epistēmē, technē and 
phronēsis as domains which the discourse should embrace for a fuller understanding or 
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explanation of excellence in our judgements in this area. However, in education at present, 
excellence within the epistemic domain is defined by a single metric standard. Within the 
technical domain it is understood as means-end within the frame of utility. And, within the 
domain of phronēsis, judgement has the tendency to be overly subjective without a common 
framework of reference for evaluation. The degree of compatibility between these domains 
remains uncertain owing to the distinctly different conceptual frameworks which shape these 
domains in education.  
 
What Oancea and Furlong (2007) endeavour to do in their argument is commendable in its 
attempt to expand the boundaries of evidence towards an interpretative explanation. In the 
form of phronēsis, this includes domains of knowledge beyond the fundamentalist scientific 
approach, or the technical approach. And their efforts have already engaged many 
educationists in the discussion (2007:134). However, if education is acknowledged as an 
ethical matter, it is difficult to understand what the ethical dimension would be which enable 
these domains to be compatible, as Oancea and Furlong suggest they may be (2007), unless it 
is something like the Capabilities Approach with its understanding of human potential.  
 
The language they promote does suggest an ethical approach which includes ‘deliberation, 
reflexivity, and criticism’ and ‘receptiveness and dialogue’ (2007: 132), and demands listening 
carefully, together with being thorough. But unfortunately, Oancea and Furlong do not commit 
themselves to an ethical framework. In fact they do not enter this discourse at all. In not 
offering an explanation of what the ethical dimension entails, as they promote the significance 
of the domain of phronēsis for making good judgements about excellence in education, their 
contribution to the debate about evaluation falls short of the impact it could have. Instead, the 
ethical framework offered by the Capabilities Approach emphasises elements of phronēsis. 
These include taking time, listening carefully, and doing justice to the situation being evaluated 
as essential for judgements about education, which would also inform any technical 
explanation in the field. 
 
What should be noted as significant about the contribution which Oancea and Furlong (2007) 
make to the debate about evaluating excellence in education, is the language which they argue 
education evaluations must embrace, which is nurtured by the concept of phronēsis. Phronēsis 
and the language it promotes for evaluation will be discussed below in greater detail in the 
context of the Capabilities Approach. Suffice at this point to highlight some of the language 
proposed such as, ‘deliberation, reflexivity, and criticism’, ‘engagement’, ‘plausibility’, 
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‘salience/timeliness’, ‘receptiveness and dialogue’ (2007: 132). I suggest that such language is 
essential to the sensitive approach to evaluation sought in education. First, however, a critique 
of the predominant language in education of managerialism and performativity will be the 
focus of discussion. 
 
 
8.2.4 Language matters: performativity and managerialism in the culture of utility 
  
The language of ‘engagement’ with a text, of ‘transaction between teacher and learner’, 
of ‘intrinsic value’ of an activity, of ‘struggle to understand’, of ‘personal enrichment’ 
seems inimical to the language of targets and of standardized performance indicators. 
(Pring, 2004: 205). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, concerns fuelled by the factory metaphor of education stemming 
from the industrial revolution continue to be prevalent in the language of education today, in 
the shape of business language, and the focus on managerialism and intrumentalism which it 
encourages. An example of this is evident in Elliott’s (2004) critique of Hargreaves position on 
evidence-based practice. Elliott argues against the view ‘that the major task of educational 
research is to improve the performativity of teachers with respect to the outcomes of their 
teaching’ (ibid.: 166). The language which describes teaching as instrumental by being directed 
towards bringing about a specific and prescribed set of learning outcomes for all pupils, judged 
against one standard of performance, is misguided in its means-end approach. Of concern is 
that this approach is further supported by the language of outcome-based education. As Elliott 
argues, this language and the culture it promotes mistakenly specifies that learning outcomes 
should be the same for all pupils, ‘operationally defined as exit behaviours, and progress 
towards them measured against benchmarks’ (ibid.: 167).  
 
This language framework, or engineering model as Elliott describes it, treats practices as 
‘manipulative devices (technologies) for engineering desired levels of output’. Instead of this 
instrumental model of utility nurtured by the language which supports it, Elliott argues in 
favour of placing ‘the judgement of teachers at the centre of the research process’(2004: 170). 
This approach would then stand against the instrumental framework of utility and the 
language it promotes, which ‘prioritizes target-setting and forms of evaluation and quality 
assurance which measure the perfomativity (efficiency) of practices against indicators of 
success in achieving targets’ (ibid.: 170). Instead, he suggests a different conceptual framework 
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than that of instrumentalism, such as that provided by Aristotle which supports the idea of 
education as an intrinsic rather than extrinsic good. Elliott maintains that it is not extrinsic 
goods such as those of utility, but intrinsic goods which should define the norms and values 
and thus the language we use in education. These include amongst others: being able to make 
connections between specific human activities, developing a wider pattern of meaning in life, 
and having one’s perspective transformed by what is being learnt, which defy being 
understood with reference to one standard or metricity. It is commendable that Elliott defends 
the need for an ethical perspective from which ‘goods internal to a practice are distinguished 
from external goods because one cannot specify them independently of the activities and 
processes the practice itself consists of’ (2004: 171). However, although Elliott alludes to the 
benefits of an Aristotelian perspective, he does not articulate the nature of the ethical 
perspective needed, or how it might shape practice and evaluation which stands against 
instrumentalism. 
 
Smith (2010) when writing about university education also cautions against education of the 
instrumental kind:  
 
It is not easy to articulate the vision of university education as something which 
broadens your mind, expands your horizons and generally turns you into a more civilised 
person, without prompting people to ask ‘yes, but what’s the point of it, though?’ It is 
distinctly difficult to explain that part of why we have higher education is to preserve, 
explore and develop forms of rationality different from the prevailing instrumental kind. 
(Smith, 2010: 41). 
 
If we are to succeed in articulating and promoting a view such as that espoused by Smith, an 
ethical dimension that is appropriate for education must be provided for understanding what 
we do, why we do it, to evaluate how we are doing, and to promote language sympathetic to 
this approach. 
 
Elliott and Lukes (2008) argue in favour of a different language and a different approach in 
education which takes evaluation beyond the instrumental framework. They draw on 
Nussbaum’s claim that ‘almost every area of social life’ is mistakenly dominated by the ‘science 
of measurement’ in favour of consequentialism, rather than supportive of the Aristotelian 
conception of practical rationality or phronēsis (Nussbaum, 1990: 55). Elliott and Lukes oppose 
the language of ‘driving up standards’ fuelled by the maximisation principle ‘which presumes 
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that the practices of schools and teachers only have value if they produce good consequences 
that can be quantified in terms of a single metric that applies generally across the system’ 
(2008: 100). Given their views that instrumentalism in education is not appropriate, we must 
begin to articulate the ethical dimension and guiding framework for evaluation which is 
required, such as the Capabilities Approach provides.  
 
 
8.2.5 In Summary 
 
Consistent with Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views described in the first section of 
this chapter, it is fair to surmise that the dominant culture of ‘what works’ critiqued by 
educationists does not always seek the balance sought for sound judgements in education. 
This is the case when it over-emphasises metricity
4
, commensurability, and utility. 
Furthermore, this extreme is fuelled by the language of managerialism and performativity 
which is critiqued widely by educationists. In contrast, Oancea and Furlong (2007) urge the 
conversation to move beyond the extremes sometimes evident in scientific paradigm, and to 
embrace domains of excellence for evaluation to be accepted such as that offered by the 
Aristotelian concept of phronēsis. The domain of practical reasoning, or phronēsis, can be 
developed within the context of the  Capabilities Approach, together with affiliation, as critical 
for a sensitive yet thorough approach to evaluation within an ethical framework beyond utility.  
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Part Two 
 
 
Evaluation within the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach 
 
The Capabilities Approach is ‘defined as an approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment 
and to theorizing about basic social justice’ (Nussbaum, 2011: 18), and any assessment within 
this approach takes each person as an end and a bearer of dignity. In this chapter, I propose an 
ethical dimension more appropriate to education than the existing dimension of utility 
prevalent today. In this part of the chapter I argue in favour of the Capabilities Approach in 
education and focus on the following areas: (1) education as value-laden, where the ethical 
dimension provided by the utilitarian framework is unsuitable to nurture fulfilled human 
beings; (2) the Capabilities Approach and in particular practical reason and affiliation as 
essential for critical understanding in education; and (3) evaluation as a way of life understood 
within the capabilities framework. 
 
The popular (quasi) scientific approach used for evaluation in education which demands 
certainty has been critiqued widely by educationists and social science researchers, including 
Eisner, 2002; Dunne and Hogan, 2004; Law, 2004; Pring, 2004; Bridges and Smith, 2006; 
Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Smeyers and Smith 2008; Bridges, 2009. In particular, as discussed 
in Chapter 5 and 6, educationists argue that the Standards Agenda in the UK shaped by this 
approach requires revision. Some claim that benchmarks such as the single standard and 
quantifiable measures used in tests such as SATs, GCSEs, GCEs, and others in the UK, constrain 
judgements about the success and progress of school age children and young people to a 
narrow view of what being an educated person entails. On its own this approach is insufficient 
if not misguided (Pring et al., 2009; Alexander, 2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011). In respect of 
education research as discussed in this chapter, the sometimes overzealous quest for certainty 
has also been critiqued by educationists (Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Elliott and Lukes, 2008; 
Smeyers, 2008; Bridges, 2009) and proposals made for broader domains of knowledge and 
excellence to be accepted in the field (Oancea and Furlong, 2007). There is a recognition that 
with regards to evaluations about learning ‘no one size fits all’ (Pring et al, 2009: 66). 
 
Significantly, for many years educationists such as Pring (1989) have advocated that the ethical 
dimension in education be recognised. As discussed in Chapter 6, more recently this 
recommendation continues to be exhorted as illustrated by education reviews such as the 
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Nuffield Review (Pring et al., 2009), the Cambridge Primary Review (Alexander et al., 2010), 
and most recently a review of reviews, Education for All (Pring and Pollard, 2011). This view is 
also evident in the field of research, where many educationists highlight the importance of an 
ethical dimension in evaluations in this area, even if they do not articulate what such an ethical 
dimension entails (Eisner 1985, 2002; Pring, 2004; Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Elliott and Lukes, 
2008; Oancea and Pring, 2008; Smith, 2008; Bridges, 2009). 
 
 
8.3 The ethical dimension in education 
 
Educationists such as Winch and Gingell remind us that education is deeply ethical: 
 
Education ... is at least partly about the overall aims that society has for itself and how 
these aims are realised in practice. It cannot, therefore, be a neutral technical exercise, 
but is invariably deeply ethical ... bound up with ideas about the good society and how 
life can be worthwhile. (Winch and Gingell, 2004, Preface). 
 
Articulating an ethical dimension which shapes what is educationally worthwhile beyond utility 
is essential for all aspects of education including evaluations in respect of research and 
practice. As many educationists advise, the utilitarian paradigm which influences educational 
discourse and narrows evaluation to commensurable measures requires revision (Pring, 1989, 
2004; Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Alexander, 2010; Pring and Pollard, 2011). Moreover, they 
appeal for a reviewed understanding of the ethical dimension in education. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 and 4, evaluations about human development, including education, do not lend 
themselves to being defined or measured using narrow economic or even happiness measures. 
However, despite the appeal by educationists for a different approach than that afforded by 
the culture of performativity, their arguments fall short of articulating what such an ethical 
dimension entails.  
 
This thesis engages with the ethical dimension in education and attempts to provide some 
answers regarding the nature of this dimension. Within the ethical dimension proposed, what 
is ‘educationally worthwhile’ is understood within the wider context of what is ‘worthwhile’ 
for human development and fulfilment in the Aristotelian sense, with particular reference to 
the Capabilities Approach (described in detail in Chapter 3 and 5). For that reason, the position 
developed in this chapter maintains that evaluation is best undertaken and understood within 
232 
 
this Aristotle-inspired ethical framework, rather than within a utilitarian context, or even as 
some would argue in a context that is value-free. 
 
 It would not be contested by many that ‘to educate someone is to enable them to learn those 
things that are regarded as valuable in some way’ and that the person is to some degree 
‘transformed for the better’ (Oancea and Pring, 2008: 28). In this sense education is an 
evaluative term, where quality, or excellence, or success, can only be judged with reference to 
the value system which is applied. As Pring et al.(2009) suggest: ‘Education is not ethically 
neutral. Values matter. We cannot avoid the tricky question as to what values and whose aims 
should prevail’ (2009: 201-202). 
 
A brief journey through history and the changing prevailing values is worth noting here. Hogan 
(1992), provides a helpful account of the historical transition of prevailing values. The Greco-
Roman era, shaped by writers such as Plato, Aristotle, and later by Cicero and Quintillian, 
understood the ethical dimension of education as an endeavour towards personal fulfilment 
and the good of the community (polis). This ethical dimension in education, values what is 
good for the person and the community which includes ‘a shared understanding of being 
governed by some publicly recognised virtues (e.g. courage, truthfulness)’, and ‘a shared sense 
of disdain for some publicly recognised vices (e.g. cowardice, underhandedness)’ (Hogan, 
1992: 138). However, the authority of the polis with its prevailing values about human 
flourishing were later superseded. From 800 AD, the authority of Christendom ‘marked the 
institutional beginnings of a new cultural pattern which, despite recurring setbacks and even 
decisive rifts, was to remain the prevailing one in Western history for a thousand years’ (ibid.: 
138). As a result, the pursuit of learning ‘came to be publicly viewed within boundaries fixed by 
the Church’s interests and doctrines’. This prevailing authority was finally contested by the 
Enlightenment which challenged the ‘rule of established authority and tradition’ (Hogan, 
1992:139). 
 
The Enlightenment adopted technical expertise as the prevailing value in education, resulting 
in education being relegated to a means towards technical success in an ever growing 
industrialised culture. This resulted in the dominance of schooling as an instrument for the 
production of 'human capital' (1992: 143). In other words, it valued the cultivation of learning 
for harnessing wealth and prepared the learner with appropriate instrumental skills. As Hogan 
points out, this ‘recasting of education into a sub-species of political economy’ marks the 
rejection of ‘the more noteworthy traditions of learning which distinguished the classical and 
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Christian periods of Western civilization’. It also marks ‘a decisive stage in the march of 
utilitarian ideas’ (1992: 144), which this thesis contests. Instead the prevailing value or ethical 
dimension which this thesis promotes, is one where teaching, learning and evaluation ‘engage 
both intellect and sensibility’, and which supports ‘efforts to unearth and to bring to fluency 
such abilities as are native to each pupil and are worthy of disciplined nurturing’ (ibid.: 145). In 
particular the abilities of practical reason and affiliation, being intertwined since practical 
reason is essentially dialogical, are valued in the Capabilities Approach and its ethical 
dimension. 
 
Oancea and Pring (2008) suggest that the utility based approach, which is easily quantified and 
presumed to produce the necessary ‘skills’ required for employment, remains the framework 
of choice for learning and evaluation today, because ‘people have different ideas of what 
constitutes an educated person’ and there is no ‘universal agreement’ on what the prevailing 
values should be (2008: 29). Furthermore, there is a tendency within the performative culture 
of education to view education as value-free , outside the rubric of the ethical and within the 
paradigm of science. 
 
The culture of ‘what works’ with its (quasi) scientific approach to evaluation is often a prime 
example, where evaluation is presented as purely pragmatic or a matter of common sense and 
even free of any pre-determined position. Even if this approach yielded objective 
understanding in any meaningful way, which is a notion contested earlier in this chapter, it 
cannot be supported as value-free, since at the very least it must be accepted as utilitarian in 
its instrumentalist approach. Bridges and Watts argue that it is misconceived to maintain that 
an advantage of evidence-based education is that it is ‘free of ideology, of pre-determined 
positions’ (2008: 55). As has been discussed in the earlier parts of this chapter, the culture of 
‘what works’ in education fuelled by the language of performativity and managerialism, in 
reality mostly values utility to the exclusion of other aspects of education.  
 
At present, a goal of education is to prepare students for the world of work and as a result, 
teaching, learning, and evaluation is heavily influenced by the discourse of business and wealth 
production in its outcome-based utilitarian approach. However, there is evidence that the 
performative culture in education which values technique above other qualities is being 
contested by employers and academics in the world of business. In particular, ‘employers 
complain that [employees] lack the skills, knowledge and attitudes which serve business and 
the economy (Leitch Report, 2006)’ (quoted in Pring et al, 2009: 66). Such knowledge and 
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attitudes include the ability to work collaboratively in a filial manner and the ability to make 
judgements which are wise. Furthermore, support for the importance of these abilities is 
found in articles by business academics such as Porter and Kramer (2010), who maintain that 
solutions towards sustainable business growth lie ‘in the principle of shared value’ (ibid.: 64), 
where such capabilities are essential. In addition, academics and writers in the field of business 
value practical wisdom as critical for leadership (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 2011), and uphold the 
value of ‘collaborating for the common good’ (Tierney, 2011: 38). Even in the area of business 
which is the preserve of economics, employers value the capabilities of practical wisdom and 
affiliation in their employees as important for the fulfilment of individuals and the success of 
their business. This is a message that educators and politicians should heed as they review 
their understanding of evaluation in education in accordance with what is valued as 
worthwhile in the Aristotelian sense, rather than that confined to utility alone.  
 
There is support from employers, business academics, and educationists for valuing 
capabilities to be developed in education beyond basic skills for output maximisation in 
utilitarian terms. This requires a sensitive approach to evaluation which incorporates the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation in particular. However, what educationists do not 
provide, is the nature of the ethical dimension which enables these value judgements to be 
made across individuals and cultures, while being sensitive to the context and the individual. 
What is clear is that some common framework is required to agree prevailing values which 
enable evaluations about what is worthwhile to be ascertained.  
 
Oancea and Pring suggest that ‘there is by no means universal agreement on what those 
values are’ and ‘people have different ideas of what constitutes an educated person’ (2008: 
29). Although this may be true, there does seem to be agreement, at least as claimed by 
psychological studies, about what people value and consider to be worthwhile, which as the 
studies indicate goes beyond utility. For example participants in a study conducted in 40 
countries across the world articulated wisdom and knowledge, courage, justice, humanity, 
temperance, etc. as intrinsically valuable. (Peterson and Seligman, 2004)
5
. There may well be 
dispute about the interpretation of these values and whether one particular instance is 
commensurable with another of the same general value across cultures. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that at the general level there are features about human beings which are shared, 
and which in the very general sense transcend cultures (Nussbaum, 1986; 1993; 2000; 2011). 
This supports the Capabilities Approach in education which provides a general framework for a 
common understanding about what constitutes fulfilment, based on values shared across 
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humanity, and which calls for every person to be educated such that they are able to be 
fulfilled by doing well according to values such as these. 
 
Furthermore, education, which educationists support is an evaluative concept, requires the 
ability to evaluate as precisely and sensitively as the subject allows. When evaluation is 
undertaken within the Capabilities Approach, this means making sound judgements which are 
sensitive to the dignity of every person rather than based on their degree of economic 
usefulness. These judgements are arrived at as a result of critical interpretation of the 
particular instance which involves practical reason, and where possible tested dialogically with 
others, which is where practical reason and affiliation interrelate. This immediately moves the 
debate away from the value framework of utility and the metric measure. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Nussbaum (2000) and Sen (2009) advocate the Capabilities Approach which stands 
in contrast to the utilitarian approach with its demand on commensurability which does not do 
justice to the dignity of every person and does not include a suitable framework which enables 
sound judgements about what is worthwhile to be made. The ethical framework included in 
the Capabilities Approach which enables persons to make sound judgements through the 
development of practical reason and affiliation tested against a notion of a shared humanity, is 
suitable in education where the utilitarian frame is not.  
 
The capabilities of practical reason and affiliation are distinct from the skills promoted by the 
‘what works’ culture which often aims to prepare students to maximise function in economic 
terms. Yet, as the studies mentioned in Chapter 4 illustrate and the Easterlin paradox 
exemplifies, fulfilment does not consist in economic output or income enhancement. It would 
be ill-conceived to evaluate what is worthwhile about education and to identify excellent 
examples using the framework of utility which may serve economics to the exclusion of other 
important areas of development. Instead, we turn to the Capabilities Approach for the ethical 
dimension which enables sensitive and critical evaluations in education to be made. 
 
 
8.4 The Capabilities Approach with its emphasis on practical reason and affiliation 
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the Capabilities Approach shapes our understanding of an 
educated person based on the concept of a fulfilled human being, rather than understood in 
terms of their level of production in the economic sense, or their level of positive feeling in the 
hedonic sense. This approach provides a common language for understanding progress and 
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success in education informed by what we share as human beings and a conception of what 
constitutes fulfilment. Within this approach evaluation is understood as a ‘discursive form of 
analysis’ (Nussbaum 2011: 62), where judgements in education include more diverse evidence 
than that allowed by the narrow approach of the scientific paradigm. 
 
The criteria which define the standard by which quality is established and evaluations made in 
a particular field should be the summary of wise decisions, rather than reductionist 
summations resulting from the fundamentalist quest for certainty. These should include and 
take account of new wise decisions, and be open to ongoing revision as new evidence from 
good judgement arises. Nussbaum explains this point below, which is pertinent for education 
and its evaluation:  
 
Good judgement, once again, supplies both a superior concreteness and a superior 
responsiveness or flexibility. This requirement of flexibility, so important to our 
understanding of Aristotle’s non-scientific conception of choice, is then described in a 
vivid metaphor. Aristotle tells us that a person who attempts to make every decision by 
appeal to some antecedent general principle held firm and inflexible for the occasion is 
like an architect who tries to use a straight ruler on the intricate curves of a fluted 
column. Instead, the good architect will, like the builders of Lesbos, measure with a 
flexible strip of metal that ‘bends round to fit the shape of the stone and is not fixed’ 
(1137b30-2). Good deliberation, like this ruler, accommodates itself to what it finds, 
responsively and with respect for complexity. It does not assume that the form of the 
rule governs the appearances; it allows the appearances to govern themselves and to be 
normative for correctness of rule. (Nussbaum, 1986: 301). 
 
This process therefore begins from the individual’s perception, which Nussbaum refers to as 
‘appearances’ (1986: 301). These perceptions are then interpreted critically with reference to 
the objective general understanding of a shared humanity and what fulfilment entails. 
Understood in this way, evaluations are neither value-free nor confined to relativity where 
there is no ethical point of comparison between judgements. As Nussbaum suggests: Value is 
anthropocentric, not fixed altogether independently of the desires and needs of human 
beings; but to say this is very far from saying that every preference of every human being 
counts for evaluative purposes. (1990: 62).  
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What is sought here in respect of evaluation, which is made possible through the ethical 
dimension provided in the Capabilities Approach is what Nussbaum describes as ‘discernment’ 
and ‘perceptive equilibrium’ (1990: 165), made possible through the capabilities of phronēsis 
(practical wisdom or reason), and affiliation described in detail in previous chapters. In good 
deliberation and judgement, ‘the particular is in some sense prior to general rules and 
principles’, and ‘an approach to ethical judgement that omits awareness of and response to 
these particular contextual features is deficient’ (ibid.: 165). However this does not mean 
‘discarding the guidance of general principles’ such as those provided by the capabilities list 
outlined in Chapters 3 and 5. It is such general rules which ‘provide an invaluable sort of 
steering, without which perception would be dangerously free-floating’ (1990: 165). 
 
Although judgement within the Capabilities Approach begins with each human perception, the 
process of practical judgment or phronēsis includes deliberation of the situation perceived 
which is critically interpreted and where possible tested through discourse with others. And it 
is the shared conceptual framework articulated through the capabilities list described in 
Chapters 3 and 5 which allows preferences to be tested and reinterpreted within the 
framework of our shared humanity, which transcends cultures. In other words, evaluation 
within the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach involves the rankings of the person of 
practical wisdom, and are arrived at individually and as a result of collegial discourse. This 
sensitive, yet critical interpretative process, is what is required for evaluation in education. 
This process is shaped by evidence we can trust and engages in discursive analysis of cultural 
norms, both personal and social within a framework of care, friendship, and respect (affiliation 
incorporates these three concepts).  
 
The Capabilities Approach as defined in Chapters 3 and 5 in particular, recognises essential 
elements for educational success which must be included in educational discourse and inform 
the judgments we make in this area. Such elements include the development of the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, which Nussbaum argues are ‘architectonic’ 
(2000: 131). Practical reason and affiliation are capabilities which have been discussed in detail 
in previous chapters. For ease in this chapter, a quotation from Nussbaum’s description of 
each capability is outlined below: 
 
Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life. (2001: 417). 
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Affiliation. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for 
others human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction to be able to 
imagine the situation of another... being able to be treated as a dignified being whose 
worth is equal to that of others. (2001: 417). 
 
It is these capabilities in particular which enable balanced judgements to be made, as we learn 
to read a situation or text, to listen and be attentive. Judgements made through practical 
reason (phronēsis) and affiliation, take account of the historical heritage, the here and now, as 
well as the possible dreams fostered by the imagination. Nevertheless what is sought in such 
judgments are truth claims in respect of what is being evaluated, but not as manipulated or 
reduced by the reductionist scientific paradigm critiqued earlier. Nussbaum makes this clear: 
 
... the discovery that truth is to some extent or in some manner human and historical 
certainly does not warrant the conclusion that every human truth is as good as every 
other and that such time-honoured institutions as the search for truth and the rational 
criticism of arguments have no further role to play. (1990: 222). 
 
The Capabilities Approach and the critical interpretation made possible through practical 
reason and affiliation yields the truths we can trust in respect of evaluation in education. As 
Nussbaum reminds us, in ‘the world as perceived and interpreted by human beings, we can 
find all the truth we need’ (1990: 223). Significantly, this ‘Aristotelian tradition of practical 
philosophy, with the notion of phronēsis or practical judgement and affiliation at its heart, 
gives us crucial insight into the kind of business that education uniquely is’ (Bridges and Smith, 
2006: 417) which enable good judgments to be made about quality and progress in this field.  
 
Bridges (2009) defends Nussbaum’s work as important and applicable to quality assessment 
‘because it is to do with a sense of life, of what constitutes human beings and human 
experience and the values that lie at the heart of it and how, as a consequence, things are to 
be understood and evaluated’ (ibid.: 513). In agreement with Bridges (ibid.: 513), two 
particular features of Nussbaum’s argument stand out as critical for the kind of evaluation 
which this thesis supports: ‘the noncommensurability of valuable things’ and the demand for 
‘the priority of perceptions’ which allow ‘a much finer responsiveness to the concrete – 
including features that have not been seen before and could not therefore have been housed 
in any antecedently built system of rules’ (Nussbaum, 1990: 36-37). 
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8.5 Evaluation within the Capabilities Approach: Flexible critical interpretation 
 
Oancea and Furlong (2007) emphasise that ‘research in education ought to be assessed in the 
light of what it wants and claims to be, and not through a rigid set of universal ‘standards’ 
(ibid.: 112). This is also true of assessment in learning. The flexible general framework and 
interpretative method sought instead of the ‘rigid’ one critiqued by educationists is 
exemplified in the Capabilities Approach with its ethical dimension which shapes what is 
valuable and worthwhile in the context of our shared humanity.  
 
For this reason, assessment about progress and success in education is not appropriate using a 
single standard of evaluation, such as SATs, GCSEs, or GCE. The reason for this with regards to 
for example, learning to read, to dialogue, and to live well through reflective practice as 
described in Chapter 7, is that universal standards only yield information about the numbers 
who can pass the test and give little as to the person’s development in the areas here 
mentioned. Pring et al. point out that ‘simply counting the number of GCSEs passed at 
different grades fails to capture what was deemed important in terms of the pursuit of 
excellence’ (2009: 63). Moreover, ‘good performance is not necessarily educational; and an 
‘output’ of high achievers does not equal an ‘output’ of educated people’ (ibid.: 63). This is 
why the Nuffield Review (2009) stresses that ‘using GCSE or GCE A-level attainment as a proxy 
measure requires faith in an assessment process that is not necessarily designed to capture 
holistically the wide range of understandings, intellectual virtues or practical capabilities’ (ibid.: 
63).  
 
Further evidence that this approach to evaluation is misconceived is provided by higher 
education admissions staff who agree that ‘ the ability to read critically, write fluently, and 
discuss and apply ideas - are consistently under-developed in their new entrants’ (2009: 63), 
even though they succeed in accordance with the universal standard measure of GCEs. 
Instead, as admissions staff highlight, evaluation about quality and progress must take account 
of students ability to read critically and discuss and apply ideas.  
 
Instead of this rigid rule which Nussbaum challenges and which the scientific paradigm for 
evaluation exemplifies, the flexible rule which Aristotle describes being applied by the 
carpenters of Lesbos (Nussbaum, 1986:301), and which the Capabilities Approach promotes, 
yields the kind of understanding sought for evaluation about teaching, learning, and research. 
This is a sensitive interpretative yet critical understanding akin to that described earlier in the 
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chapter as verstehen. Support for a more flexible approach to critical interpretative 
understanding is given by educationists including Eisner (2002), who describes it in terms of 
connoisseurship and criticism, and Hogan (2004), who advocates teaching as a way of life.  
 
 
8.5.1 Critical appreciation and connoisseurship 
 
Eisner suggests we consider learning and evaluation, as an art instead of a science (2002). He 
argues against the tacit undertaking in much evaluation and learning which only accepts a 
(quasi) scientific system of efficiency to achieve the aims. Instead, he suggests that there are 
times when efficiency is not appropriate and what should be sought in its place is 
connoisseurship and critical appreciation. For example efficiency is out of place when making 
judgements about various meaningful activities in life. As Eisner puts it: ‘few of us like to eat a 
great meal efficiently or participate in a wonderful conversation efficiently, or indeed to make 
love efficiently. What we enjoy the most we linger over’ (ibid.: xiii). Efficiency in these 
examples is not the approach required to yield understanding in these cases. And Eisner 
believes this extends to education, especially with regards to important learning in the arts. He 
maintains that assessing student performance, for example, ‘almost always must take into 
account that which cannot be measured’ (ibid.: 169). The reason for this is that ‘measurement 
is one way to describe the world’, yet ‘measurement is a description of quantity’ and ‘some 
descriptions require prose – even poetry!’ (2002: 169). Hence Eisner appeals not to efficiency 
from standards, but to critical understanding, since standards are only considered helpful to 
this process when they are ‘viewed as aids, as heuristics for debate and for planning’ (ibid.: 
173).  
 
In respect of teachers, for example, Eisner promotes a ‘practical hub around which 
conversations can take place among teachers and others working in a school’ (2002: 173). This 
practical conversation between teachers is also promoted by educationists such as Black and 
Wiliam (1998) in their research on assessment for learning which now emphasises the benefit 
of teacher learning communities. However, in practice, such teacher communities and the 
conversations they contain can sometimes confuse various kinds of assessments which 
reduces the conversations from assessment for learning (AfL), to assessment for accountability 
(AfA) or assessment for selection (AfS). This is identified as a difficulty by the Nuffield review 
which points out that although, AfL ‘seeks to record what has been learnt’ and AfS ‘seeks to 
discriminate between the learners’, these are sometimes ‘confused’ and conflated in the 
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language of targets and mechanistic conversations of how to achieve them (Pring et al.,2009: 
81).  
 
This tendency is also present in the classroom where students are encouraged to either self-
assess their own learning, or peer-assess one another’s learning, as part of the Assessment for 
Learning initiative, which the Nuffield review commends when undertaken ‘accurately’ and not 
‘confused’ with other kinds of assessment (Pring et al.,2009: 81). In reality, student 
assessments ‘for learning’ are too often made within the context of whether they are on 
target, or have achieved the appropriate level, and thereby miss the opportunity to critically 
understand essential aspects about their learning activity and process which are beyond the 
confines of the outcome-based paradigm in respect of evaluating and thus learning. 
 
Eisner recommends evaluation in education as ‘educational criticism’, which is ‘descriptive’, 
‘interpretative’, ‘evaluative’, and ‘thematic’ (2002: 187). Such educational criticism is attentive 
to what ‘has been perceived’, interprets the perception with reference to ‘theory, experience 
and context’, makes judgements about ‘educational value’, and provides ‘general observations 
and conclusions derived from what is being described, interpreted, and evaluated’ (ibid.: 187). 
For Eisner, ‘educational criticism is intended to avoid the radical reductionism that 
characterises much quantitative description’ (ibid.: 189). Instead he defends evaluation 
‘designed to provide a fine-grained picture of what has occurred or has been accomplished so 
that practice or policy can be improved and high quality achievement acknowledged’ (ibid.: 
189).  
 
Eisner advocates two processes important for evaluation: ‘connoisseurship’ as ‘the art of 
appreciation’ and ‘criticism’ as ‘the art of disclosure’ (1985: 92). ‘Connoisseurship is private, 
but criticism is public’ and ‘effective criticism requires the use of connoisseurship’ (ibid.: 93). 
However, in confining ‘connoisseurship’ to the private sphere, Eisner does not acknowledge 
the importance for the connoisseur of testing and refining her thinking and findings dialogically 
by testing her ongoing thinking with others. This element seems an integral part of what being 
a connoisseur entails. In this sense the concept of ‘connoisseurship’ would best include the 
concept of affiliation in order to recognise the dialogical aspect which supports practical 
reason. 
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Nevertheless, it is significant to note Eisner’s conclusion: 
 
Since educational evaluation has, as its ultimate objective improving the quality of the 
educational life students lead, I see no reason why we should not exploit the various 
forms of understanding that different knowledge structures can provide. Educational 
connoisseurship and educational criticism represent two modes through which we come 
to understand and express what we come to know. ... What we need today is a 
breakthrough in conception, a wedge in the door of possibility. Educational 
connoisseurship and educational criticism, it seems to me, offer some promising 
possibilities, not only for broadening the base of educational evaluation but for helping 
those of us in the arts committed to the improvement of the process of education. 
(Eisner, 1985: 101-102). 
 
For individuals or groups to arrive at a critical understanding in education the capabilities of 
practical reason and affiliation are particularly significant. They are important for evaluating an 
educational situation, activity, written text or debate; for making judgements about it in the 
context of what is valuable and worthwhile with reference to a shared humanity; and in order 
to empathise appropriately and respond accurately to the context under evaluation. These 
capabilities enable the evaluator not to over or under react, but to arrive at a balanced 
judgment of the particular instance. The student will develop this ability and the teacher and 
researcher will assess progress and quality by applying these capabilities herself. 
 
This kind of reflective practice required for evaluation is akin to that described in Chapter 7 in 
respect of learning, and I would argue is equally applicable to evaluation. Both require a similar 
kind of critical interpretative understanding. The flexible method for evaluation described 
here, understood as a way of life, requires learning to live, to read, and to dialogue, as part of 
the development of the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation. In addition, the 
evaluator must have a conception of the common good provided by the capabilities list in 
order to make evaluations which reach beyond the subjective individual interpretation and 
which respect the dignity of every person. An evaluator who has a heightened awareness and 
ability for reading the situation correctly and discussing this with others with sensitivity and 
critically will understand the subtleties of a text or an event, will understand its meaning 
without seeking certainty, and arrive at their evaluation through careful reflection and with 
reference to a shared humanity.  
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Here the interplay between evaluation and learning is evident, as is the notion that one is not 
possible without the other, as every instance of evaluation is to some extent a learning 
process, and each learning process requires evaluation as a critical part. In this sense, the 
concept of learning as a way of life, described in Chapter 7, can be extended to understand 
evaluation as a way of life, rather than a rigid process. 
 
 
8.5.2 Evaluation within teaching and learning as a way of life 
 
Hogan (2004) proposes the concept of teaching and learning ‘as a way of life’ (2004: 18). He 
suggests that this way of life requires making ‘an occupational commitment to a form of action 
that has an authority of its own and responsibilities of its own, and to understand that these 
two features constitute the integrity of that way of life’ (ibid.: 19). Teaching and thus 
evaluation as a way of life, receives ‘its distinctive character from its inherent relationship to 
learning as a human undertaking, and from the significance of this more inclusive undertaking 
for how life is to be lived’ (ibid.: 27). For Hogan, this requires an active relationship between 
teaching and learning, and evaluating which attends with an ‘incisiveness of mind and an 
openness of heart to inheritances of learning’ and which tries to ‘discern in these inheritances 
what is most deserving of one’s convictions and sustained practical efforts’ (ibid.: 30-31).  
 
Noddings (2004) also argues in favour of the central importance of the teacher and the need 
for sensitive yet critical assessment of her teaching and her students learning, as ‘she sets an 
example with her whole self – her intellect, her responsiveness, her humour, her curiosity ... 
her care’ (ibid.: 162). Noddings considers this necessary if ‘teachers are to meet responsibility 
for the development of their students as whole persons’. Moreover, ‘relations of care and trust 
also form a foundation for the effective transmission of both general and specialised 
knowledge’ (ibid.: 162). This position adds support to the importance of affiliation as a 
necessary capability for teaching and learning and assessments therein, and brings to the fore 
the ethical dimension essential for education which this thesis advocates. 
 
The process of affiliation as well as practical reason described in the Capabilities Approach, 
requires a flexible rule such as that proposed by Aristotle in the builders of Lesbos. The flexible 
process proposed is exemplified for Hogan in the approach of ‘historical Socrates of Athens’ 
(2004: 21), who he describes as the best exemplar of teaching as a way of life. He suggests that 
Socrates discovered the real significance of learning, ‘as it became his distinctive way of life’ 
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(ibid.: 22). The most important lesson for Socrates, which applies as much to learning as to 
evaluation, was that ‘limitation, partiality, lack of finality and not least fallibility are probably 
inescapable features of all human efforts to understand and know’ (2004: 22). As Hogan 
explains, a Socratic understanding of teaching and learning, which includes evaluation, involves 
a critical understanding of the ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ (ibid.: 30). A ‘what’, Hogan identifies as 
‘a specific body of aims and contents’, that is, educational substance which includes the voices 
of tradition; a ‘why’ involves a ‘sense of purpose and rightness in the sense of ‘educational 
purpose’; and a ‘how’ involves a ‘range of attitudes by which the aims are pursued’ and by 
which there is an ‘active, searching engagement with these voices’ (ibid.: 30). 
 
Like the kind of reflective practice advocated in Chapter 7, evaluation by teachers and learners 
which engages with questions regarding the what, why and how, require certain processes 
made possible through the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation. As Hogan suggests, 
these include ‘daily practices’ such as ‘giving an attentive ear to the many and different voices 
of tradition in order to elicit most promisingly what is addressed to human imagination and 
sensibility by these voices’ (2004: 30). And on the part of the teacher it requires an ongoing 
ability to dialogue and refine their ‘range of communicative capacities in order to elicit these 
responses from students and to nurture them to a self-critical and an increasingly fluent 
engagement with these voices’ (ibid.: 30). In this way teaching as a way of life, which involves 
ongoing evaluation and nurturing students to evaluate wisely themselves, ‘is constituted by 
the complex practice of bringing about and sustaining relationships of learning in which the 
voices of history, of poetry, of science, etc. are enabled to speak, and to get a critical yet a 
generous response from learners’ (ibid.: 30-31). Importantly, for Hogan, this approach to 
teaching, learning, and thus evaluation, requires the following: 
 
... consciousness of the inherent limitations of even the best of human enquiries; an 
acknowledgement of both the modesty and the ever-emergent prospects that befit 
learning [and evaluation] as an unfinished and unfinishable undertaking; the self-critical 
insight that teaching is itself a form of learning-anew with others, where the teacher 
acts as listener, questioner, instructor, guide and as a responsible and caring leader. ... 
Teaching as a way of life then is ... a singularly conversational way of being human. 
(Hogan, 2004: 32). 
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8.5.3 Examples of evaluation: Interpretative understanding versus a narrow approach 
 
In this section I will discuss some examples in respect of reading a text and evaluating it within 
the Capabilities Approach, which illustrate what the flexible process of evaluation entails. This 
differentiates what constitutes a sensitive critical interpretation of a text or a situation with 
examples which illustrate a more narrow approach. The Aristotle-inspired approach, as 
Nussbaum suggests, ‘remains close to the world of particulars, directing the reader’s attention 
to these and to experience – including the emotions of experience – as the sources of ethical 
insight’ (1990: 238-239). In addition the interpretative approach proposed here has ‘the 
dialectical power to compare alternative conceptions perspicuously, contrasting their salient 
features’ (ibid.: 238-239).  
 
The importance of the ethical dimension of this approach is that it enables the evaluator to be 
‘affectionate yet critical, attentive and responsive to particularity while committed to 
explanation’ (1990: 239). Importantly, it refrains from the temptations of the seductive power 
of a rigid abstract rule with the power to lure the reader, or evaluator ‘away from the richly 
textured world of particulars to the lofty heights of abstraction’ and from ‘the messy and 
difficult world we live in to a world made more simple and schematic’ (ibid.: 238). 
 
The first example, is taken from the work of Charles Dickens and illustrates a rigid approach to 
evaluation based on utility, which this chapter challenges. Below is a quotation from Hard 
Times by Dickens which describes accurate yet narrow evaluation using the paradigm of utility. 
This vignette depicts a teacher seeking a very specific and precise kind of evaluation and 
learning from their student, to the exclusion of all other forms of sensitive evaluation and 
learning. Here, Thomas Gadrind assigns his student Sissy Jupe with the task of describing a 
horse, and illustrates how his rigid frame for evaluation, where only facts count for success, 
leaves Sissy quite lost for words in her apparent ‘failure’. In this approach there is only room 
for one kind of evaluation, understanding and thus learning about a horse which is meaningful:  
 
Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, 
and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. 
Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth. (Dickens, 
1854 [1969]: 50). 
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For the teacher, Thomas Gadrind, the aim and process of evaluation is clear, yet as this chapter 
has argued it is misconceived: 
 
You are to be in all things regulated and governed, ... by fact. We hope to have, before 
long, a board of fact, composed of commissioners of fact, who will force the people to 
be a people of fact, and of nothing but fact. ... you must use, for all these purposes, 
combinations and modifications of mathematical figures which are susceptible of proof 
and demonstration. This is fact. This is taste. (ibid.: 52). 
 
Dickens critiques the way in which teachers of the time where learning to teach and evaluate 
with scientific precision and where the value of education is extrinsic and subsumed within the 
value of utility. He writes of teachers that they ‘have been lately turned at the same time, in 
the same factory, on the same principles, like so many pianoforte legs’ (ibid.: 52-53).  
In addition, English specialist Craig in his commentary of Hard Times in the Penguin edition of 
1969, maintains that Dickens’ criticism ‘of the over-factual, over-trained M’Choakumchild’ still 
holds true and is evident today in ‘contemporary HMI’s, headmasters, and even some college 
principals to the effect that the colleges force their students to ‘cram’ an ‘immense 
preponderance of names, dates, and facts, which have to be remembered but not digested’ 
(1969: 319). Craig, suggests that Dickens challenges the dragooning of children in schools and 
of workers in factories, where what is evident is ‘the human cost of industrialization in its early 
stages, when minds and bodies have to be forced into exactitudes and regularities which are 
unnatural and at the same time indispensable to the large-scale, technically precise production 
on which our way of life depends’ (1969: 320). 
 
By contrast, a second example elucidates a kind of evaluation which is sensitive and 
demonstrates a subtle and rich understanding of what is being observed and described. This 
example of sensitive evaluation and appreciation of quality is taken from Henry James’ novel, 
Wings of the Dove, and exemplifies a method of assessing and understanding which is not 
reduced to the factual as measurable, but which resembles the delicate methods proposed by 
Eisner above. In the extract below, a character in the story named Kate Croy, assesses herself 
from her reflection in the mirror:  
 
She was handsome, but the degree of it was not sustained by items and aids: a 
circumstance moreover playing its part at almost any time in the impression she 
produced. The impression was one that remained, but as regards the source of it, no 
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sum in addition would have made up the total. She had stature without height, grace 
without motion, presence without mass. Slender and simple, frequently soundless, she 
was somehow always in the line of the eye – she counted singularly for its pleasure. 
(1909: 9). 
 
Bridges (2009) notes of this extract from James’ novel that it represents the kind of evaluation 
we seek, that is, a kind of assessment which ‘owes more to aesthetics than to science – that is 
perhaps more akin to connoisseurship than to measurement’ (2009: 511). He identifies several 
significant points from this extract which exemplify the kind of evaluation which this chapter 
favours. Firstly, Bridges notes that quality is ‘not sustained by items and aids’ and in that sense 
‘we are looking at pure quality unadorned’. Secondly, he identifies that the ‘qualities the writer 
attributes to the woman (stature, grace and presence) are discerned in spite of the absence of 
their quantitative measures (height, motion and mass)’ (ibid.: 512). Hence he points out that 
‘the total impression is explicitly something quite different than could be achieved by adding 
up the sum of its parts’ and that ‘the observation of these qualities elicits a response of 
pleasure in the beholder’ (ibid.: 512). However, I would disagree with Bridges’ conclusion that 
in this example ‘James has quality assessment in a nutshell’ (ibid.: 512). The reason being that 
although James’ sensitive kind of assessment is commendable, it demonstrates where Eisner’s 
idea of connoisseurship can go wrong by being defined by and confined to the ‘private’ sphere. 
Instead, this thesis supports through the Capabilities Approach, that evaluation undertaken 
with practical reason and affiliation involves a dialogical dimension which refines and guides 
the private or first ‘appearance’.  
 
The kind of sensitive evaluation sought here becomes more significant in respect of 
evaluations about education where the ethical dimension surfaces to the fore. As Smith and 
Standish (2007) maintain, this requires that we ‘dwell thoughtfully upon what is implied in a 
particular ethical situation or predicament’ (2007: 200). They suggest that in order ‘to decide 
what to do from the right kind of receptivity and trust, to do justice to the persons involved, 
one can use poems, art of calculative reasoning’ but that these all require the concept of 
‘enquiry-as-interpretation’, and an effort to ‘make sense for oneself’ (ibid.: 200). In this sense 
they support the Aristotelian picture of phronēsis suggested in this thesis as significant for 
evaluation which embodies the ethical dimension beyond utility. Moreover, affiliation is also 
recognised as important as they identify that ‘a secure group where mutual trust is fostered is 
one capable of contemplating and joining in the play of meaning’ which is key for the 
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interpretative understanding required (ibid.: 4). This approach embodies the notion of 
evaluation as a way of life which Hogan (2004) supports. 
 
This chapter argues that an ethical dimension shaped by a shared humanity which the 
Capabilities Approach promotes is necessary for evaluations in education, as it enables 
individuals to be attuned to the situation being evaluated, and hence to perceive the particular 
with care, dignity, and with an understanding of the wider picture of which it is a part. Jane 
Austen in her novels provides examples of the need for sensitivity when making judgements. 
She also illustrates the importance of doing justice to the situation by understanding the 
complexities involved, which all require the ethical dimension to be recognised as shaping the 
process of evaluation. Thus her characters face the demand, ‘that they respond to each other 
honestly and accurately’ (Smith, 2003: 386).  
 
In respect of Pride and Prejudice, Smith (2003) suggests what Austen requires of her characters 
in order that they make good judgements. ‘Elizabeth Bennet must learn to make more 
measured judgements about situations and people (instead of yielding to the prejudice of the 
title), while Darcy must learn that accurate judgements are not enough; they must be made in 
a spirit of humility’ (2003: 387). In this sense, good evaluation, like the good novel, is marked 
by ‘a vital capacity for experience, a kind of reverent openness before life, and a marked moral 
intensity’, since the judgements the characters face, and the literary critic is concerned with 
‘are judgements about life’ (ibid.: 387).  
 
It is only when the ethical dimension becomes integral to the process of evaluation and thus of 
making good judgements, whether in a novel, about a novel, or about education, that the 
appropriate degree of precision is achieved through sensitive interpretation of the particular 
reality, within the context of the general framework of a shared humanity. This is similarly 
important, whether it concerns the author’s depiction of characters in a novel, or the readers’ 
evaluation of the novel and its character. In the case of education, this is important where the 
teacher assesses students in her class, where students assess themselves and one another, or 
where the researcher assesses quality in respect of teacher and learner assessment or assesses 
other research. 
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Summary 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, there are widely accepted concerns with a narrow approach to 
evaluation generally in society, and in particular in the areas of economics, health, and 
environmental or educational development. It was argued there and later in Chapter 4 that 
understanding quality or success in human development using an economic metric is very 
restrictive and that attempts at commensurability in respect of development are 
inappropriate. In the field of education, the over reliance on the scientific paradigm for making 
judgements about quality and success continue to be questioned by many (Oancea and 
Furlong, 2007; Bridges, 2009; Pring 2004). Some of these issues were discussed in detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6, in particular in relation to the factory metaphor for education and the 
language of performativity which was found wanting as an adequate model for understanding, 
discussing and assessing educational quality, progress and success. In addition, in respect of 
human flourishing, the hedonic approach popular in utilitarianism was challenged in Chapter 4, 
where the narrow understanding of happiness based only on reports of people’s ‘feelings of 
well-being’ was argued to be unhelpful to our understanding of flourishing. Furthermore, the 
attempt at commensurability of value judgements about well-being was considered 
misconceived.  
 
Limiting our judgements about value to data which is oversimplified to a single standard, 
numerically measured in formulaic style, and confined to the quantitative sphere to be 
considered trustworthy and to yield knowledge, does not yield the understanding of human 
flourishing we require. Instead what has been proposed is the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities 
Approach which allows us to approach data with greater sensitivity and to consider a wider 
breadth of data in our considerations. This approach takes account of the particular recorded 
and the varied interpretations these yield, and is inclusive of contextualised voices (whether 
adult or child) as essential to the heuristic process. In particular, the data sought and 
interpreted must be sensitive to the concept of human perception as the starting point or the 
window into understanding. Paradoxically this very window that is human perception or 
‘appearances’, as Aristotle described them, is itself restricted and cannot yield conclusive 
knowledge of the kind sought by technical rationality. Nevertheless the normative framework 
of our shared capabilities which Aristotle proposes as the common and flexible guide for our 
value judgements, ensure the degree of objectivity we require.  
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The perspective proposed in this chapter enables a way of seeing and recognising what counts 
as quality, progress and success in education, which is sensitive to the particular context, and 
which is mindful of the complexity of assessing human development in the educational sphere. 
This approach admits that any view or evaluation must rely on the historical accumulation of 
evidence dependent on human judgement in order to be trustworthy. And it is this forming 
and reforming of the general view or generic criteria, or the universal, by the particular voices 
through time, that provides the rich standard we must seek, not a quasi ‘scientific’ approach.  
 
Most importantly the Capabilities Approach includes the ethical dimension necessary for 
judgments to be made about what is better or worse in respect of evaluations about 
education. It is not appropriate in this area to seek proof, or to demand complete knowledge 
of the kind sought in the sciences. As Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the German philosopher and 
dramatist of the 18
th
 century suggests, ‘accidental truths of history can never become the 
proof of necessary truths of reason’ (1956: 53).  
 
Nevertheless this should not imply that we fall into complete subjectivity and any evidence is 
as valid as any other. We do require criteria for the trustworthiness of evidence, but such 
criteria instead of being criteria defined by certainty, should best be considered as criteria 
defined by plausibility. It is the benchmark provided by the Capabilities Approach and the 
flexible and collegial methods employed by the person of practical reason and affiliation which 
yield the degree of objectivity appropriate to the subject of human development, of which 
education is an essential part. It is through this process of reflective practice that evaluation 
becomes a way of life, within and beyond education. As Aristotle’s counsel suggests: 
 
One must ... not look for precision in the same way in everything, but in accordance with 
the underlying material in each sphere, and to the extent that is appropriate to the 
inquiry. (NE 1098a25-30). 
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1
 Erklären and verstehen : For a fuller debate of these concepts refer to a series of 
philosophical essays, which editor O’Hear (1996) describes in the preface of the book, as an 
attempt to explore the questions as to whether reason might take different forms depending 
on subject matter. These essays formed the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s annual lecture 
series for 1995-96 , where the contributors examine whether in the human world, forms of 
thought and knowledge exist which, while not conforming to the patterns of the natural 
sciences, can nevertheless be thought of as rational . 
 
2
 http://timss.bc.edu/pirls2006/index.html (Last accessed 23/02/11). 
 
3
 For further explanation of the notion of Connoseurship refer to Elliot Eisner (1985), Chapter 
11.  
 
4
 Metricity is a term coined by Nussbaum in describing the science of measurement as 
composed of four constituent claims: metricity, singleness, consequentialism, and 
maximisation. Here, Nussbaum defines metricity as ’the claim that in each situation of choice 
there is one value, varying only in quantity, that is common to all the alternatives, and that 
the rational chooser weighs the alternatives using this single standard’ (1990: 56-66). 
 
5
  Peterson and Seligman found evidence for values shared by many, expressed as a set of six 
human virtues ubiquitous to human flourishing.  
252 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Education: The broader perspective offered in this thesis 
 
In this thesis, I have put forward an alternative philosophy to that of performativity, offering a 
broader understanding of what we mean by an educated person than the performative culture 
in education allows. The Aristotle-inspired contemporary Capabilities Approach proposed, as 
developed by Martha Nussbaum in particular, allows for different descriptions of the good life 
referenced against essential shared human capabilities which enable human flourishing. 
Importantly, the Capabilities Approach focuses on a person’s opportunity and ability to realise 
their capabilities with reference to what is intrinsically valuable and an understanding of 
human beings as more than economic units. It is an approach which relies on human 
judgements resulting from sensitive interpretations of specific situations which are complex 
and varied. It is therefore not reducible to a single scale of measurement. This approach 
constitutes an ethical dimension which is inclusive of and attends to vulnerable groups and 
individuals. It demands that opportunities are made available in societal structures, especially 
education, for persons to develop capabilities integral to realising potential such as practical 
reason and affiliation. 
 
I have proposed the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach in an effort to redress the 
theoretical bias that exists in education towards two unhelpful utilitarian foci: First, the focus 
on defining educational success in terms of employment outcomes, and second, the focus on 
individuals passing prescribed exams measured on a single scale which in turn values only 
educational activities which fit on this scale. This utilitarian tendency towards instrumentalism 
and technical reason in education today, with its narrow definition of what is valuable, has 
rightly been critiqued by educationists. For example, some have challenged the tendency to 
reduce activity in education to a mechanistic approach judged in the main against criteria of 
productivity using impersonal processes that greatly diminish the relevance of judgements 
made by individual practitioners (Dunne and Hogan, 2004). Of particular concern, the 
performative culture in education with its misplaced value on productivity often measures 
success against a single standard which overshadows important complex values. These include, 
the value of listening attentively, of being open to ourselves, of attending to others and the 
world, and of developing a vision of the good in the context of others (Smith, 2011). The result 
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of this narrow view prevalent in education is a loss of a much-needed ethical dimension which 
goes beyond utility.  
 
Education reviews such as the Nuffield Review in 2009 recognised that endeavours in 
education have been made following the 2006 Education Act in England to break free from the 
performative culture. These efforts have focused on developing a more holistic approach in 
education attentive to the well-being of young people, the need for greater inclusion, and to 
promoting more radical ways of learning. Examples of these include the official emphasis of 
Every Child Matters on personalised learning and assessment for learning. Other initiatives 
include: The RSA: Open Minds Project, or Futurelab: Enquiring Minds programme (Pring et al., 
2009: 77, 79, 201). Notwithstanding these endeavours, the Nuffield Review and more recently 
Education for All (2011) are right to continue to call for a broader definition of what counts as 
an educated person. As these reviews indicate, education is not ethically neutral and 
acknowledging the ethical dimension in education and developing moral seriousness in the 
field is necessary.  
 
As I have argued in this thesis, questions should prevail in education about which are the 
appropriate values and aims, and these can only be justified through dialogue and argument 
based on what human beings share, and need to be understood through practical rather than 
technical reason. However, these questions cannot begin to be answered without some 
theoretical groundwork. Although the aforementioned education reviews stress the need for 
the ethical dimension they do not go far enough in articulating the conception of its nature 
and the kind of theory needed to support it. In order to address this issue, I have attempted to 
articulate the nature of this ethical dimension with reference to the Capabilities Approach and 
its underlying principles. I have therefore argued in favour of the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities 
Approach espoused by Nussbaum, whose contribution strengthens education in its attempt to 
answer these questions and to move education beyond the limits of the technical perspective.  
 
Arguably, Aristotle’s philosophy, and particularly the Nicomachean Ethics, provide the much-
needed theoretical groundwork for the ethical dimension sought in education which 
challenges the present performative culture. In particular, Aristotle’s understanding of human 
flourishing (eudaimonia) respects human complexity and offers an important general outline 
of human nature. He suggests that specific human capabilities are developed in order to 
realise potential with reference to a good life. What each good life looks like in practice is 
diverse, yet certain characteristics can be universally recognised as present in each instance. At 
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the heart of Aristotle’s view of ethics is the need for insight (nous) and practical reason 
(phronēsis) in our search for understanding. The evaluative process requires a shared language 
about humanity and the need for relationships to test our developing understanding. This view 
does not allow for a reductive single measure of the good which yields an incomplete 
explanation. Instead, it relies on the cumulative complex human process of sensitive 
evaluations which yield wise judgements, drawing from every available source whether 
scientific or not. Aristotle’s philosophy stands in contrast to the standardised approach to 
measuring success and realising potential prevalent in education today and provides us with a 
far-reaching ethical dimension which contrasts with the narrow position of performativity.  
 
Aristotle’s complex view of human flourishing within which realising potential is understood, 
challenges contemporary ideas of happiness or well-being as measurable on a single scale. 
Instead, Aristotle contributes an understanding of happiness in the context of flourishing as a 
life well lived, through practical reason, deliberated trust, and bonds of care promoting 
positive social action. This practical philosophy requires individuals and groups to participate in 
the public arena and to reflect carefully about issues using this shared understanding of human 
flourishing.  
 
Nussbaum (1993) draws and builds on aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy as she develops the 
contemporary Capabilities Approach. In particular, she draws on his understanding of human 
flourishing (eudaimonia), including the ethical claim that certain human abilities ought to be 
developed and that society ought to offer opportunities for these. I have argued that with its 
capabilities list (which is open to continual refinement), this contemporary approach is well-
placed to challenge the performative culture in education. Significantly, the Capabilities 
Approach enables us to redefine our understanding of an educated person as someone who is 
not just technically competent in an area of productivity, but as one who is more crucially a 
sensitive, empathetic interpreter in every situation. 
 
I suggested that the Capabilities Approach strengthens education in its quest to nurture well-
being and realise potential because it requires that key capabilities such as practical reason 
and affiliation are developed as an integral part of the process of education. Practical reason 
and affiliation are considered essential in enabling persons to realise their potential as happy, 
trustworthy, thoughtful, and engaged social beings. At present however, these capabilities are 
often sidelined by the Standards Agenda in education. 
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Given the evidence of mental health issues (WHO, 2010) also affecting children and young 
people (UNICEF, 2007), there is considerable urgency to review our understanding of 
happiness and well-being and its relation to education and realising potential. Many children in 
England today still fail to thrive in school and some drop out altogether. Added to this, rises in 
mental health issues connected with stress and anxiety are linked with statutory forms of 
standardised assessment. Although present forms of standardised assessment promise 
precision of evaluation they often lead to evaluations insensitive to diversity and potential 
beyond the narrow measure. They do not consider context sufficiently, or specific obstacles, or 
needs faced by individuals which may limit their ability to flourish within the standard or in 
respect of other measures. This reality gives energy to the argument of this thesis against a 
performative emphasis in education and in favour of the Capabilities Approach with its 
emphasis on well-being. This approach provides practical guidance for education which 
includes a strong theoretical basis and does not make the mistake of reducing everything of 
value to one measure.  
 
The flexible method of reflective practice in the Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach is 
well-placed to re-focus teaching and learning with its emphasis on the ethical dimension in life. 
This particular kind of reflection draws on the Greco-Roman heritage of philosophy as a 
practical tool which I discuss in Chapter 7. In addition and building from this early tradition, the 
16
th
 century Ignatian practice of the Examen as a daily cycle of reflection is one which 
continues to thrive today used by individual and groups. I suggest in Chapter 7 that this regular 
cycle of reflection when adapted for education further enriches the flexible method of 
reflection promoted within the Capabilities Approach. I have argued that this kind of reflection 
is relevant and significant in contemporary education, particularly in its support of ethical 
questioning which refines the ability to ‘read’ situations accurately and react in a balanced 
manner. Thus, reflection grounded on this tradition strengthens already established enquiry 
methods in teaching and learning. With regards to evaluation in education, the Capabilities 
Approach and its particular kind of reflection helps evaluators make sensitive judgements 
based on a variety of evidence. In this sense, the Capabilities Approach is important in that it 
enables educationists to resist oversimplification and reductionism in evaluations about 
progress and success, and instead to be satisfied with only as much precision as is appropriate 
from sensitive interpretative understanding which includes the ethical perspective. 
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Perceived limitations of the Capabilities Approach: Implications for education 
 
Within the Capabilities Approach literature there is an acknowledged possible tension 
between the goal of basic capability equality on the one hand and the objective of capability 
expansion on the other (Alkire, 2002; Clark, 2005). In addition, the informational requirements 
of this approach can be very high and some researchers in health have struggled to make it 
operational as there are difficulties in measuring capabilities and their development, even if 
they can be identified. For example, Anand developed 60 indicators of capability aligned to 
Nussbaum’s capabilities list which limits its usability in its complexity, and Coast has developed 
an index of capability for use with the elderly which limits its capacity for generalisation 
beyond the elderly (Lorgelly et al., 2005). Notwithstanding these difficulties, many credible 
attempts have been made to investigate and evaluate social issues using the Capabilities 
Approach, including: inequality, well-being, social justice, gender, social exclusion, health, 
disability, child poverty, and identity. A particular example of this is the Human Development 
Index which specifically includes education (Clark, 2005). Importantly, when applied in 
education the Capabilities Approach broadens the informational base of evaluation, refocusing 
on persons as ends in themselves. 
 
As I have argued in this thesis, Nussbaum’s contribution with its definite list of capabilities has 
developed beyond Sen’s framework to include a theory of what is valuable to guide moral 
judgements. Though some consider this list to be confused, others defend it as a systematic 
process which uses criteria for well-being and humanity as a starting point for constitutional 
discussions. Grounded on Aristotle’s philosophy, this list should not be understood as a top-
down and prescriptive view of western opinion, but rather ‘as a hypothesis about what would 
over time become acceptable starting points for discussions in each society, as a rational 
interpretation, implication and evolution of their values’ (Gasper, 2004: 187). Nussbaum’s list 
should therefore be critiqued primarily for its potential for abuse rather than its method 
(Clark, 2005), a point which Nussbaum herself accepts.  
 
The difficulties in applying the Capabilities Approach in a particular area of social action 
(including education) require ongoing consideration and awareness of its limitations in 
particular contexts. Nevertheless these difficulties have not been found to invalidate its 
soundness and strength as a theory, and the ethical dimension it supports I have argued in this 
thesis to be crucial in education. What is most significant here when adopting the Capabilities 
Approach in education, despite its difficulties and imperfections, is that Nussbaum’s list of 
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capabilities, in particular practical reason and affiliation, represents a way of looking and 
understanding any particular situation which goes beyond utility and which includes within it 
the ethical dimension required. For these reasons, the Capabilities Approach requires 
education practice and evaluation to be mindful of and include in its reflections the following 
concerns: 
 
… content and potentials in diverse important areas of people’s lives, with attention to 
holistic cases and to a broad range of evidence, including from fiction, poetry and 
biography, as well as from conventional social science sources; and using rich pictures of 
mind, personhood, emotions and language to explore the human content of evidence, 
including its emotional content. These features form an interconnected package and are 
important for building both relevant ethical theory and concern and compassion for 
other persons, and for motivating and sustaining action. (Gasper, 2004: 188). 
 
 
The Capabilities Approach in practice: Distinctive views of reflection and understanding 
 
There are various ways in which this approach is applicable in education and I have mentioned 
examples in this thesis including the flexible method of reflection integral in this approach 
which contains ethical questioning and views education as a way of life.  
 
Although there has not been room in this thesis to focus in depth on practice in line with the 
Capabilities Approach it is worth mentioning a few instances here. Exemplars are being 
developed through programmes in primary schools in the North East of England which focus 
on students looking deeper at their social world, reflecting on and discussing social situations 
which enable them to thrive and those which diminish them, and practising being agents of 
change in their communities. Practitioners developing this programme indicate that the 
students are developing in positive ways, and their ability to write, communicate, and engage 
sensitively and positively has been heightened when immersed in this programme.  
 
In the secondary stage, schools in this area of the country have created programmes of daily 
reflection on an ethical theme where there is time for personal thought, group dialogue, and 
engagement with issues which they would not normally encounter in their daily curriculum. As 
the programme has developed students have become involved in designing the topics for 
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reflective practice themselves which require the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation 
to be further refined.  
 
Learners as enquirers and researchers have also developed in the secondary and primary 
stages in schools in North East England. They have engaged in methods of reflective enquiry 
based on the principles of the Capabilities Approach. Their flexible structure requires them to 
undertake a process of enquiry: (1) agree on a set of qualities which they consider essential for 
flourishing learners and outstanding teachers, (2) in groups, embark on observing a variety of 
learning situations in school focusing on the teacher and the student perspective, (3) make 
sense of their observations, test them against their theory, and provide exemplars of good 
practice which they share with others in the school, to be further refined as the next step in 
their cycle of reflection.  
 
These three examples have been significant for practice as they enable learners to plan, 
monitor, and evaluate their learning and decisions within a broad narrative, and to engage in a 
structured process of reflection applicable to any situation. Also important has been the 
opportunity for practitioners to reflect individually and with others about their practice and 
the children in their care. Within this context, they are better able to view and review their 
aspirations and expectations of the children they teach, in order to nurture their learning and 
progress within the ethical dimension of realising potential.  
 
With regards to applying the Capabilities Approach to research and evaluation, there is an 
opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of children and young people living in social 
disadvantage and failing to realise their potential in school and beyond. The emphasis on 
reflection in the Capabilities Approach and the ethical dimension which it includes could help 
guide sensitive exploratory research to understand the wider narrative of these children’s lives 
and to ensure they receive the support required. In particular, further connections could be 
made between children in receipt of Free School Meals (FSM) and other areas of social 
difficulty, including Troubled Families. Understanding the intersections between different 
needs in society and their contexts more fully could contribute to ameliorating some of the 
difficulties faced by individuals and groups. Here, focusing on human capability could help 
disadvantaged individuals and their families be better supported to thrive in society today.   
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Limitations of this thesis: Opportunities for the future 
 
When considering the practical implications of this thesis, two aspects stand out. Firstly, it 
provides an alternative philosophy to the performative culture in education, and secondly, it 
offers a set of ideas about how education can help young people to flourish. Developing this 
position embodied the ongoing challenges present in bringing abstract philosophical concepts 
to the practical area of education, and required delving well beyond the education literature 
within a limited time frame. Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to search in various 
disciplines beyond education, including philosophy, psychology, social sciences, theology, 
history, and literature in order to seek understanding and evidence in support of my argument, 
and to relate the abstract to the practical. The constraints of time and length, together with 
the attempt to interweave understanding from various disciplines and to synthesise concepts 
with practice, has resulted in various limitations in this thesis. In particular I wish to note three 
of these below. 
 
1. I am aware that writing a thesis in education and not primarily in philosophy, the 
philosophical position for which I have argued has not received the nuance of argument or 
detail that it deserves. For example, this has been the case in respect of Aristotle’s 
philosophy, and more generally with regards to questions about ethics which include 
concepts from epistemology and metaphysics. More specifically, there has not been 
adequate space for a thorough discussion of the ongoing debate about interpretation of 
various aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics, resulting in a rather course-grained exposition 
of the idea of human flourishing and its associated philosophical concepts. In addition, 
making connections between the language of varying disciplines as diverse as psychology 
and poetry in an attempt to support the argument in this thesis has required being satisfied 
with a lack of refinement in the translation and understanding which each discipline 
deserves. 
 
2. Educational practice focused on developing the ability to think and act well continues both 
in west and eastern cultures, and I acknowledge that an in-depth exploration of this 
practice has been limited in this thesis. There is a need to examine some of these 
programmes further, including their philosophical underpinnings and how they may 
connect with the Capabilities Approach, and the development of practical reason and 
affiliation. For example, I would like to consider further programmes such as those in India 
inspired by Tagore which draw on art and the humanities to develop a public culture of 
260 
 
sympathy and imagination (Nussbaum, 2010); enquiry-based learning approaches including 
those developed by Forest schools in Northern Europe which focus on learning in the 
outdoors; approaches which promote self-organised learning using digital media 
(Mitra,2012); and other practice around the world which focuses more generally on 
students ‘Learning to learn’ (Higgins, 2009). 
 
3. Developing practical programmes arising from the flexible methods of reflection for which I 
have argued in this thesis, have not been part of the scope of this work. For example, 
reflective practice traditions of earlier centuries could be embraced in education today to 
develop the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation specifically, such as the Greco-
Roman philosophical tradition of learning as a way of life, and the 16
th
 century daily cycle of 
reflection of the Examen. In particular, there may be opportunities for applying these 
concepts to practice with children and practitioners more fully as part of an approach to 
enquiry learning, peer learning, coaching, and mentoring. Similarly, with regards to 
evaluation there has been little space to attempt to assess learning through reflective 
practice in the spirit of phronēsis. The importance of the Capabilities Approach needs 
further testing in education and this thesis has been limited in its scope to develop this 
area, and I would seek to undertake further research using these principles and the flexible 
methods of reflection I have argued for here.  
 
In conclusion, there is further research needed to explore more fully the significance of the 
Aristotle-inspired Capabilities Approach in education. Nevertheless, I have strived to show in 
this thesis that this approach and its philosophical principles offer a broader understanding of 
what we mean by an educated person than the performative culture in education allows, 
which strengthens education theory and practice. Crucially, this approach is inclusive of and 
sensitive to the needs of vulnerable groups and individuals in society, it redefines our 
understanding of realising potential which includes an ethical dimension, and it offers practical 
ideas about how education can help all young people live a fulfilled life. 
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